Denver Law Review
Volume 47
Issue 2 Symposium - Colorado Water Law

Article 8

January 1970

Vol. 47, no. 2: Full Issue
Denver Law Journal

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
47 Denv. L.J. (1970).

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOLUME 47
1970

DENVER LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 47

1970

NUMBER 2

ARTICLES

A

REVIEW OF RECENT

AcTivITY IN COLORADO WATER LAW

Gary L. Greet

FEDERAL-STATE WATER PROBLEMS

Raphael 1. Moses

A GUIDE TO THE EXAMINATION
OF WATER TABULATIONS

Michael D. White

NOTE

A

SURVEY OF COLORADO WATER LAW

COPYRIGHTO 1970, Denver Law Journal, University of
Denver (Colorado Seminary), College of Law

The leading tax minds
provide these 3 unique
services

E

Expertise built the landmark service, Tax Management,
covering federal taxation of the domestic income of
U. S. corporations. And now it has produced two companion services, Tax Management

and Tax Management

-

-

Foreign Income

Estates, Gifts, and Trusts.

All three draw upon the knowledge, experience, and
judgment of more than 100 special consultants

-lead-

ing tax attorneys, tax accountants, active tax practitioners.

All

three

are professionally

oriented

and

functionally organized. All three use the unique TM
concept of a topic-by-topic approach to tax problems
in separate, self-contained Portfolios.
The three

Tax Management

services are available

separately or in combination. For descriptive literature
and particulars of subscription rates, write:

Dept. 5789
THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC.
1231 25th STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20037

UNIVERSITY OF DENVER COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS
MAURICE B. MITCHELL, LL.D., Chancellor
JOHN L. BLACKBURN, B.S., M.S., PhD., Vice Chancellor for Student Affairs

CLYDE E. KELSEY, JR., B.A., M.A., Ph.D., Vice Chancellor for Development and
Public A/fairs
WILBUR C. MILLER, Ph.D., Vice Chancellorfor Academic Affairs
HARVEY D. WILLSON, M.S., C.P.A., Vice Chancellorfor Business Affairs, Treasurer
ROBERT B. YEGGE, A.B., M.A., LL.B., Dean of the College of Law
CHRISTOPHER H. MUNCH, B.S., J.D., Associate Dean of the College of Law
ARTHUR R. BARRY, B.S., J.D., Director of Continuing Legal Education
JOHN C. HANLEY, B.S., Assistant Dean

RICHARD D. TORPY, B.S., Assistant to the Dean
R. TIMOTHY McKENNA, B.S., J.D., Assistant to the Dean
FACULTY
WILLIAM A. ALTONIN, A.B., LL.B., LL.M., J.S.D. CANDIDATE, Associate Professor
of Law
WILLIAM M. BEANEY, A.B., LL.B., Ph.D., Professor of Law
MURRAY BLUMENTHAL, B.M.E., M.A., Ph.D., Visiting Professor of Law
THOMAS P. BRIGHTWELL, B.S., J.D., C.P.A., Associate Professor of Law and
Director of Natural Resources Program
GLENN W. CLARK, A.B., LL.B., Assistant Professor of Law
VANCE R. DITTMAN, JR., A.B., LL.B., Professor Emeritus
WILLIAM S. HUFF, B.S.L., LL.B., Diploma in Law, LL.M., Associate Professor of Law
HAROLD E. HURST, A.B., LL.B., M.S., Professor of Law
JEROME L. KESSELMAN, B.A., M.B.A., LL.B., C.P.A., Professor of Accounting
and Law
RICHARD D. LAMM, B.B.A., LL.B., C.P.A., Associate Professor of Law and Director
of Student PracticeProgram
JOHN PHILLIP LINN, A.B., M.A., LL.B., Professor of Law
ANTHONY X. McDERMOTT, B.A., LL.B., Associate Professor of Law
THOMPSON G. MARSH, A.B., LL.B., M.A., LL.M., J.S.D., Professor of Law
ALAN MEaSON, A.B., LL.B., Associate Professor of Law
VED P. NANDA, B.A., M.A., LL.B., LL.M., J.S.D. CANDIDATE, Associate Professor
of Law
JOHN H. REESE, B.B.A., LL.B., LL.M., S.J.D., Professor of Law
H. LAURENCE Ross, A.B., M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Law and Sociology
JOHN J. SCHANZ, JR., B.S., M.S., Ph.D., Professor of Natural Resources
ROBERT H. SULNICK, A.B., J.D., LL.M., Assistant Professor of Law
RICHARD H. SURLES, JR., B.A., J.D., M.L.L., Assistant Professor of Law and Law
Librarian
GRESHAM M. SYKES, A.B., Ph.D., Professor of Law and Sociology and Director of
Administration of Justice Program
LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY, A.B., LL.B., S.J.D., Professor of Law
JAMES E. WALLACE, A.B., LL.B., B.D., Th.D., Associate Professor of Law ana
Director of Professional Responsibility Program
CHARLES E. WORKS, A.B., LL.B., Professor Emeritus
ADJUNCT PROFESSORS OF LAW
KENNETH E. BARNHILL, JR., B.A., LL.B., Adjunct Professor of Law

WILLIAM E. DOYLE, A.B., LL.B., judge, United States District Court, Adjunct
Professor of Law
HARRY 0. LAWSON, B.A., M.S., Adjunct Professor of Law
CLYDE 0. MARTz, A.B., LL.B., Adjunct Professor of Law
HOWARD I. ROSENBERG, B.A., LL.B., Adjunct Professor of Law
HENRY E. SANTO, B.S.B.A., LL.B., judge, Denver District Court, Adjunct Professor
of Law
DON H. SHERWOOD, B.S., LL.B., Adjunct Professor of Law

HONORABLE MORTIMER STONE

DENVER LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME

47

1970

MORTIMER STONE

-MR.

NUMBER 2

COLORADO

WATER LAW
By

ROBERT

B. YEGGE*

There is a Colorado jurist who never ceases to perform legal
miracles: Mortimer Stone. It is to him and his distinguished career that
this special issue of the Denver Law journal is dedicated.
"Mort," as his long-time friend, colleague, and associate in practice (and my father) called him, was born in 1882. The son of parents
of modest means, he was required to strive diligently to gain his
worldly goals. Yet for Mortimer Stone, the goals weren't hard; it was
the means that posed the problems. It comes as no surprise that Mort
wanted a fine, classical liberal arts education followed by a legal education which would allow him to, with experience and reflection, become
a student of the law in the finest tradition. And with perseverance
and many long, arduous hours, Mort did it. He graduated from Colgate
University, being named to Phi Beta Kappa. After further work for
means, he entered into law study at New York Law School, where he
earned the LL.B. degree (honors).
The admonition of Horace Greeley called Mort to the west, and
he moved to Fort Collins: Mortimer Stone, Attorney and Counsellor
at Law, member of the Colorado Bar from and after 1910.
He tells the story about his early career: "I walked briskly because
when I first started to practice in Fort Collins, I wanted people to think
I was busy, thus a successful lawyer." For 35 years he practiced law in
Fort Collins, where he shall never be forgotten as "Resident Wiseman."
Then, in 1944, he was nominated and subsequently elected to a tenyear term on the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado.
In those ten years, Colorado became known for its jurisprudence.
Mr. Justice Stone wrote opinions incisive in their legal and social
thought, often witty, and always sound and just. During his last two
years on the court, he rendered service long and nationally remembered
as its Chief Justice. Indeed, he was named President of the Conference
of Chief Justices of the United States: Res Ipsa Loquitor.
-,Dean,University of Denver College of Law.
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In his years on the court, he became well known and respected
for his thoughtful and meaningful opinions on litigation over the
allocation of water resources; and in his final year of service, then
Chief Justice Stone wrote one of the more significant opinions on
these scarce and precious rights.
In 1955, Mr. Chief Justice Stone left the Colorado Court and
returned to private practice in Denver. Although constantly called
upon to help solve water problems, he found time to develop another
expertise: labor arbitration. Indeed, he is still called upon to perform
this service as one of the few recognized arbitrators in major railroad
labor disputes.
When the editors of the Denver Law Journal decided to produce
this Symposium on Colorado water law, they thought only once about
a Special Editor: Mr. Colorado Water Law; and without hesitation,
the distinguished scholar accepted the position. Justice Stone spent
numerous hours consulting with the editors, editing manuscripts, and
giving helpful and witty advice. His thorough knowledge of the subject, his precise style of exposition, his tireless energy, and his informal
manner won for him the respect and admiration of the entire Journal
Association. Hence, once this issue was ready, the editors - our finest
students at the College of Law -were
of one mind: the issue must
be dedicated to the mentor of Colorado water law.
Thus, Mr. Chief Justice Stone, we proudly dedicate this issue of
the Denver Law Journal to you, your distinguished (and we know
satisfying) career, and its continuation. You are our colleague, mentor,
and friend.

SYMPOSIUM ON COLORADO WATER LAW
INTRODUCTION
"Every lawyer engaged in general practice in Colorado should have
a working knowledge of the elementary principles of water law."
The Honorable Jean S. Breitenstein
Some Elements of Colorado Water Law
22 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 343 (1950)
Water is of primary importance to the economic and social growth
of Colorado. Recognizing this fact, Colorado- from its earliest days
as a territory -undertook to regulate the use of water. Yet many of
the early principles proved inadequate as the population of Colorado
increased and as new industries located in the state. Greater needs for
water were generated which taxed an already burdened supply. Consequently, laws were changed and new laws were created in an effort to
maximize water use and, at the same time, conserve water resources.
The principles governing the acquisition, disposition, and administration of water rights which emerged from all of these various legislative
enactments and judicial pronouncements form the current body of Colorado water law.
Realizing the importance of water law in Colorado and mindful
of its obligation to the practicing bar, in the fall of 1969 the Denver
Law Journal undertook the task of preparing a concise, documented
survey of the law in this area. It was the opinion of the Journal Association that there was no general collection of the principles of Colorado
water law and of the cases supporting them. Hence, in preparing this
Symposium, it was the policy of the Journalto try to develop a general
reference book which would set forth the elementary principles of the
law, describe the interrelationship of the principles, and point the practicing attorney to as many relevant supporting cases as possible. To aid
in this task, the Journal asked three members of the Colorado bar who
have demonstrated considerable water law expertise to write articles
which discuss some of the current problems with respect to the existing
!a, in this area.
The article by Mr. Gary Greer, which begins the Symposium,
focuses on the recent changes in Colorado water law which have been
made by the three branches of state government: the legislature, the
executive, and the judiciary. He also notes some of the problems which
have yet to be resolved, such as the conflict between federal and state
governments with respect to the ownership of water within the state.
Examining this federal-state problem in greater depth, the article
by Mr. Raphael J. Moses suggests that the continued development of
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water resources in all of the Western States is seriously threatened by
the federal claims, because they affect the security afforded by state
granted water rights. He indicates the need for a rapid resolution of
the matter and states that the recommendations of the Public Land
Law Review Commission may provide the necessary solution.
Taking another approach to problems with the current law, the
article by Mr. Michael White discusses one of the difficulties which has,
arisen from the recent Water Right Determination and Administration
Act of 1969. Specifically, he notes the complexity of the published
tabulation lists authorized by the Act and explains the problem in determining whether a priority listed in the tabulation is accurate. Further,
in a very practical manner, he outlines an approach which can be used
to reduce the amount of effort necessary to examine the tabulation lists,
providing detailed instructions and sample worksheets.
The survey of Colorado water law prepared by the Journal Association concludes the Symposium. Divided into three major parts, this
study sets forth the basic legal principles which govern the acquisition
and use of water in Colorado. By utilizing the cross references within
each major division, the practicing lawyer can find rules and cases
which might be applicable in solving various aspects of a particular
water law problem.
While this Symposium is designed to be a reference source which
can be used as an aid in solving particular problems, the journal does
not pretend that the issue is complete in every respect; it does not list
every Colorado case nor does it reveal all of the legally relevant issues
that can arise when dealing with such a complex body of law. The
journal Association wanted to present a Symposium which would give
lawyers "a working knowledge of the elementary principles of water
law"; we hope that this issue fulfills that purpose.
Michael G. Massey
Editor-in-Chief

A REVIEW OF RECENT ACTIVITY IN
COLORADO WATER LAWBY

GARY

L.

GREER*

Recent legislative, administrative, and judicial developments have
significantly modified the procedures for adjudicating and administrating water rights in Colorado. In this article, Mr. Greer focuses
on the procedures outlined in S. 81, noting in particular the shortcomings of S. 81 with respect to the problem of integrating the
priorities of surface and ground water users. He also points out the
major administrative developments which stem from the conflict
between the use of ground and surface water and discusses the requirements of Fellhauer as well as subsequent decisions which deal with the
promulgation of rules and regulations for the administration of waters
of the state. He concludes by considering the case of United States v.
District Court, wherein the Colorado Supreme Court found that the
water rights of the United States were subject to the jurisdictionof the
Colorado district courts under their plenary powers, and the case of
Pikes Peak Golf Club, Inc. v. Kuiper, wherein the court held that nontributary water was not subject to administration by the state engineer.
INTRODUCTION

S the demand for water in Colorado has grown, all three branches
of government have become increasingly concerned with the use
and administration of this valuable resource and have added significant substance to the body of Colorado water law. Recently, for
example, the legislature has amended procedures of long standing for
adjudicating, using, and modifying water rights; the executive, acting
through an administrative body, has probed more deeply into the old
underground-surface water conflict; and the judiciary has marked off
new boundaries between state and federal rights in and powers over
Colorado waters. This review will discuss these and other significant
developments in all three areas of governmental activity.
I.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

The year 1969 witnessed the enactment of the most extensive and
comprehensive water legislation in Colorado in recent years. Pursuant
to the 1967 Water Study Act,' seven major water bills, prepared under
the direction of the Natural Resources Coordinator, were introduced
IThis article was prepared in March, 1970, for the Young Lawyers Section of the Coorado
Bar Association as an annual survey of water law developments in Colorado covering the
year 1969. These materials will appear together with a review of 1970 developments in
the Young Lawyers Section publication early in 1971.
*Legal staff, National Water Commission; A.B., Columbia College, 1957; L.L.B., University of Colorado, 1964.
1 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-2-9 (Supp. 1967).
181
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in the General Assembly. Of this package of seven bills, two were
enacted into law after extensive revision:2 S. 81, the Water Right
Determination and Administration Act of 1969,1 and S. 105, dealing
with the office and duties of the state engineer.4 Of these two, S. 81
made the most significant changes in the law.
The most important water legislation enacted since the Adjudication Act of 1943' and the core of the 1967 Water Study Act package,
S. 81 provides entirely new procedures for adjudication and administration of water rights: 6 It abolishes existing water districts and irrigation
divisions and substitutes for them seven new water divisions which have
roughly the same boundaries and limits as the former seven irrigation
divisions; 7 it provides that each division shall have a specific water
2

Among the Water Study Act bills introduced which were not enacted were S. 75, 47th
Assembly, 1st Sess. (1969), a volumetric limitation bill; S. 86, 47th Assembly, 1st Sess.
(1969), which would have authorized the development of water projects with state funds;
S. 87, 47th Assembly, 1st Sess. (1969), a bill which would have created water advisory
committees, S. 88, 47th Assembly, 1st Sess. (1969), dealing with storage, reservoir refill,
seepage recapture, and temporary conversion of direct flow water rights to storage water
rights; and S. 104, 47th Assembly, 1st Sess. (1969), providing for exchanges and authorizing the division engineer to make certain requirements therein with respect to wells.
In addition, there were other water bills which were presented and enacted that were
not a part of the Water Study Act. For example, S. 258 (CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
148-22-1 to -8 (Supp. 1969)) authorized the creation of river basin authorities with all
the powers generally held by quasi-municipal corporations, including powers to raise
revenue by taxing property and water rights and by issuing bonds. While it is envisioned
that such authorities may eventually make use of such powers to construct and operate
various water projects and to appropriate water and establish standards for its use within
their territorial limits, no such authority has yet been created. Further, the County Commissioners of the counties making up the "Upper South Platte" river basin authority,
as authorized by this enacted legislation, have considered and rejected such action. Other
enactments amended the Ground Water Management Act. Id. §§ 148-18-3, -15 (Supp.
1969).
3 The major portion of the 1969 Act deals with administering and adjudicating water
rights and is designated COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-1 to -45 (Supp. 1969). The
remaining sections of the Act deal with a variety of matters and are scattered throughout
Chapter 148 of the statutes. (This Act is hereinafter cited as S. 81).
4 Id. §§ 148-11-23 to -25 (Supp. 1969).
5

Ch. 190, §§ 1-25, (1943) Colo. Sess. Laws 613-31 (repealed 1969); ch. 254, § 1, (1945]
Colo. Sess. Laws 724 (repealed 1969); ch. 287, § 1, [19571 Colo. Sess. Laws 860 (repealed 1969).
6
See, e.g., COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-18 (Supp. 1969). The word "determination"
is used to redefine actions analogous to, but broader in scope than, adjudications under
the 1943 Act. For example, judicial approval of "Plans for Augumentation," defined as
"detailed programs to increase the supply of water" by a variety of techniques limited
in number and scope only by a water user's resourcefulness and imagination (id. §
148-21-3(12)), is provided by the Act. Id. § 148-21-18(1). Similarly, a "change of
water right" covers not only the familiar changes in point of diversion but also includes
virtually every conceivable kind of change in type, place and time of diversion and of
use of water, thus providing procedural devices whereby the owner of a water right may
obtain prior court approval of various kinds of changes and modifications of his right
in addition to changes in point of diversion. Id. § 148-21-3(11). For further discussion
of these provisions of S. 81, see Note, A Survey of Colorado Water Law, 47 DENVER
L.J. 226, 296 (1970).
7Id. § 148-21-8. The appointment of a division engineer for each division is authorized.
Id. § 148-21-9. Each division engineer may establish one or more field offices with a
water commissioner for each such office. Hence, though the official boundaries between
the old water districts are obliterated, the water user is likely to find familiar faces at
the new field offices.
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judge who is to be a district judge and who alone is authorized to act
with respect to "water matters"' for all of the district courts situated
within the water division; and it makes provision for each division to
have a water clerk who is to be an associate clerk of the district court
and who is to maintain records of all proceedings of the water judge.'
In addition, the water judge of each division, unless he elects to perform
such functions himself,"0 shall appoint such referees as may be necessary" for the purpose of making investigations" and rulings'8 on
applications for water determinations or changes of water rights which
4
are regularly referred to the referees by the water judge.1
The general procedural plan of S. 81 requires a water user who
desires a determination or a change of water rights to file an application 1 5 with the water clerk of the appropriate division. This application is then referred by the water judge to a referee who makes an
initial determination' 6 after due notice of the application has been
given to other users' 7 and after the referee has made such investigations as he may find necessary to determine the truth of the representations made in the application (or in the statement of opposition filed
by an opponent)."' Since this ruling by the referee is subject to judicial
review by the water judge in a formal hearing,' 9 it may be confirmed,
modified, reversed, or reversed and remanded.20 Yet in any event, the
8Id.

§

148-21-10.

Id. § 148-21-11. It should be noted that it is incorrect to refer to a Colorado "water
court." The new legislation does not create a water court, as such, but merely authorizes
one of the several district judges sitting in the several district courts within a water
division to be designated Water Judge to hear all water matters arising within the
geographic boundaries of that division. S. 81.

30 CoLO.

REV. STAT. ANN.

§

148-21-10(5)

(Supp. 1969).

S Id. § 148-21-10(4).
12
1d. § 148-21-18(4).

131d. §

148-21-19.
14d. § 148-21-10(7). For further discussion of water judges, water clerks, and referees,
see Note, A Survey of Colorado Water Law, 47 DENVER L.J. 226, 296 (1970).
1s A water user may apply for a
determination of a water right or a conditional water right and the amount and
priority thereof including a determination that a conditional water right has
become a water right by reason of the completion of the appropriation, determination with respect to a change of a water right, approval of a plan for
augmentation or biennial finding of reasonable diligence.
Id.§ 148-21-18(1).
16 Id. § 148-21-17(2).
171d. § 148-21-18(3).
IsId. § 148-21-18(4).
19 Id. § 148-21-20(3). A careful reading of the statute is required for a full appreciation of
the somewhat intricate procedural timetables for processing an application. Such timetables and a useful "flow chart" showing the process in a diagram form have been
published. See Colorado Water Congress Newsletter No. 7, July 2, 1969 (Supp.).
RId. § 148-21-20(5).
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final ruling is embodied in a judgment and a decree subject to appellate
21
review.
In addition to providing procedures for adjudicating determinations
of water rights, S. 81 provides for division-wide inventories or "tabulations" of decreed rights to be completed by the offices of the several
division engineers.2 2 When the tabulation is accomplished, the various
lists of rights and priorities in the 70 former districts will have been
integrated and consolidated into priority lists of all appropriators who
take water from the same source without regard to the former district
boundaries. The division engineers are currently authorized to omit
from the tabulated lists of water rights those rights which they determine to be abandoned,2 3 but at the time this article was written
substantial amendments to the tabulation and abandonment sections
had been proposed and appeared likely to be enacted.2 4
S. 81 also provides a response to the need for integrated administration of the diversion of surface and underground water supplies,
one of the major objectives of the Water Study Act. It approaches the
problem by permitting the owner of a surface water right to secure
authorization to have a well used as an alternate point of diversion
for the surface right, provided that the well is situated so as to draw
water from the same stream system as the surface right.25 Wells which
are not so situated are to be integrated into the lists of priorities for
their respective water divisions, and the priority is determined by the
date of the actual appropriation, if the well owner files an application
for such determination before the cut-off date of July 1, 1971. "6 How211d. § 148-21-20(9). For additional discussion of the procedure provisions of S. 81, see
Note, A Survey of Colorado Water Law, 47 DENVER L.J. 226, 298 (1970).
22
d. §§ 148-21-27 to -28 (Supp. 1969).
23
Md. § 148-21-28.
24 Pursuant to recent legislation, the Legislative Council Committee on Water was appointed
and held public meetings during the latter months of 1969 throughout the state at which
the impact of the 1969 legislation was reviewed and users' suggestions received. H. J.
Res. No. 1034, [1969) Colo. Sess. Laws 1286-88. The Committee reported that water
users were apprehensive that the tabulation and abandonment sections might unfairly and
adversely affect existing rights. Specifically, they felt that abandonment proceedings
should be separated from the tabulation process and should include provisions for notice
and court hearings with a burden of showing abandonment to be placed on the state
water officials. Additional concern was expressed that the initial tabulation proceedings
scheduled for completion by July 1, 1970, could not be completed by that time. [Ed.
note: the tabulations were not completed by that time], Amendments designed to separate
abandonment proceedings from the division engineer's tabulation process, to postpone
the first tabulation, and to reschedule subsequent periodic tabulations have been suggested. See COLORADO LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 1969 WATER
LEGISLATION 3 (Research Pub. No. 147, 1969). These amendments were not, hovever,
enacted by the General Assembly in the 1970 session. For additional disc;,ssion of the
tabulation procedures see Note, A Survey of Colorado lVater Law, 47 Der4vrit L.J. 226,
305 (1970).
2COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-17(a)-(d) (Supp. 1969).
26Id § 148-21-22. The date is July 1, 1972, for wells in water division No. 3 (San Luis
Valley). Id.
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ever, this approach has not resolved all of the problems with respect to
the integration of ground and surface water. The following report of
the Legislative Council on Water in December, 1969, describes some of
the difficulties which remain:
Water users stated that they were having difficulty deciding whether
to use their wells as alternate points of diversion under Senate Bill 81.
The state engineer was asked for assistance in the form of suggested
guidelines and methods to integrate ground and surface water use.
The law was interpreted by some water users as permitting old surface
rights from which water had never been obtained with any regularity,
to be used to give the owners of such rights an unfair advantage in the
priority system, especially over persons having only wells. In other
words, wells with relatively junior priorities or dates of application,
but attached to an unusable surface decree, might be given a relatively
senior priority to wells which had been drilled much earlier, but which
have no surface priority.
One interpretation given to Senate Bill 81, which some senior water
appropriators thought unfair, concerned charging the use of a well
against a surface right. It was stated that the division engineer would
require a senior appropriator who had a well to use the well at his own
expense before he could put a call on the river. The objection was that
a senior should be allowed to leave his well idle and call the river, or
if juniors upstream wish to divert water when the senior is short, the
juniors should pay for the operation of the well. The well was drilled
for the purpose of adding to the water supply in some areas, but it
could become merely a more expensive point of diversion for the same
27
amount of water as used in the past.

The general nature of the difficulties illustrated by these expressions
of dissatisfaction with the provisions of S. 81 has been recognized for
a number of years. 2" Yet a satisfactory and comprehensive solution
continues to be elusive. Therefore, what appeared to be the last in
a continuing series of legislative attempts to resolve the conflict between
the use of ground and surface water may only be a temporary response.
II.

ADMINISTRATIVE

ACTIVITY

The major administrative developments in Colorado water law
also stem from this conflict between the use of ground and surface
water. In 1965, the General Assembly enacted legislation which
authorized the state engineer to administer surface waters and "underground waters tributary thereto in accordance with the right of priority
27 COLoRAio LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 1969 WATER LEGISLATION

28

3 (Research Pub. No. 147, 1969).
See, e.g., Kelly, Colorado Ground Water Act of 1957, 31 ROCKY MT. L.
McHendrie, Underground Water Legislation, 23 ROCKY MT. L. REv.
Hendrie, The Law of Underground Water, 13 ROCKY MT. L. REVr. 1
Vranesh, Colorado's New Ground Water Laws, 38 U. COLO. L. REV.

REV. 165 (1959);
439 (1950); Mc-

(1940); Moses &
295 (1966).
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of appropriation .. .. "'9 While the Colorado Supreme Court sustained
this grant of authority to the state engineer in Fellhauer v. People,"0
it went on to state that for such regulation to be constitutional under
the "equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution and the due process clause in article II, section 25,
of the Colorado constitution," it must be accomplished under and
"in compliance with reasonable rules, regulations, standards and a plan
established by the state engineer prior to the issuance of the regulative
orders." 3 '
After the decision in Fellhauer, the state engineer began almost
immediately to promulgate rules and regulations for the administration
of diversions of tributary ground waters8 2 and by the date of enactment
of S. 813' had completed the task subject to approval of the Attorney
General.3 4 These rules and regulations were to have become effective
on August 8, 1969, and to have remained in effect until October 15,
1969." 5 However, before the state engineer had an opportunity to apply
the new rules, the case of Well Owners Conservation Association v.
Kuiper3 6 was filed, seeking an injunction against the exercise of the
regulations. The Well Owners case was set for trial on plaintiff's
application for preliminary injunction on August 5, 1969. After the
lapse of several days (during which time the rules were suspended and
an application by the state engineer for a Writ of Prohibition failed
0 Ch. 318, § 1, [1965] Colo. Sess. Laws 1244, as amended COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14821-34 to -36 (Supp. 1969). The general statute charging the state engineer with the
responsibility for the administration and distribution of water of the State is COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 148-21-17 (Supp. 1969). Both the state engineer and his predecessor
have actively administered those wells which, in their determination, have used water
which is tributary to a natural stream. The case of Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986
(Colo. 1968) was one of several lawsuits which arose from such legislation. For an
extensive discussion of the attempts to integrate ground and surface water, see Note, A
Survey of Colorado Water Law, 47 DENVER L.J. 226, 331 (1970).
30 Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 991 (Colo. 1968).
31 Id.
32

at 993.

Drafts of proposed rules were available for discussion at informal and formal hearings
held in Denver on March 24, 1969, and April 2, 1969, respectively.

33 June 7, 1969. Early drafts of the rules and regulations recited that they were adopted
pursuant to COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-11-22 (Supp. 1965) and Fellhauer.Enactment

of S. 81, with its repeal of § 148-11-22 created certain doubts about statutory authority
for the regulations. Later drafts recited authority for the regulations in those sections of
S. 81 which amended or replaced § 148-11-22, i.e., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-34
to -36 (Supp. 1969), but the rules and regulations were required in any event by the
constitutional standards stated in Fellhauer.
34
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-2(8)(b) (Supp. 1967).
35 Rules and Regulations, Office of the State Engineer, para. 1 (July 14, 1969)

after cited as Rules and Regulations).
36 No. W-2 (Dist. Ct., Weld Co., November 20, 1969).
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in the Colorado Supreme Court), an injunction was issued based upon
numerous grounds among which were the following:
(a) There was no evidence on the part of the state engineer that
shutting down of wells as proposed would produce water at
the time when, and, at the point which, calls on the stream
may be anticipated. 87
(b) The regulations promote and encourage futile calls and permit
senior appropriators to command the whole flow of the
stream, merely to facilitate the taking of a fraction of the
3
whole flow.

8

(c) The regulations do not take into consideration relative priori39
ties of wells.
(d) The regulations fail to require a surface decree holder to
satisfy his needs by first pumping from wells located on the
37 The

Rules and Regulations provide:
5. In administering waters of the state, the state engineer, division engineers and authorized representatives shall consider the weather conditions,
present and prospective water supply conditions, records of the state engineer's
office, past experience gained in administering water, and any other pertinent
conditions, in implementing the rules and regulations set forth herein. Pursuant
to these rules and regulations there shall be no curtailment of any diversion,
whether it be by surface diversion, wells, or any other means, unless such
curtailment together with other curtailments shall result in a reasonable lessening
of material injury to a senior appropriator requiring water in time of shortage
or projected shortage.
Good intentions do not appear to be enough. While the courts may now generally accept
the principle that surface and underground waters are hydrologically interconnected in
such a way that well pumping affects surface flows at some time and place, they may
require, as between well user and surface owner, some evidence that diversions by one
affect the supply of the other at a time when the other is in need and, by virtue of his
priority, eligible to curtail the use of the first. Rules and Regulations, supra note 35,
para. 5.
8 It has been suggested that the "futile call" problem is more or less inherent in the
priority system because appropriation rules look exclusively to seniority, disregarding
other equally important factors such as proximity of junior right to senior right and
actual effect of junior pumping on senior rights. See Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986,
996-97 (Colo. 1968), quoting from Morgan, Appropriation and Colorado's Ground
Water: A Continuing Dilemma? 40 U. COLo. L. REV. 133 (1967).
39
6. All rights to divert ground water that have not been adjudicated according to Colorado law, shall be administered as if they all had the same date of
priority and the same right to divert until such time as these rights have been
adjudicated. The priority dates of those ground water rights which have heretofore been adjudicated shall be fully recognized; provided, however, that such
adjudicated rights shall not be regulated to a greater extent than unadjudicated
rights.
Rules and Regulations, supra note 35, at 997. The Court in Fellhauer invited presentation
of this issue in clearest terms:
These wells must be administered in accordance with priority, along with
other factors. Offhand, we know of no reason why the state engineer cannot
take into account the relative priorities of wells, subject to appropriate judicial
review. However, the issues involved have not been presented too thoroughly in
the briefs and, therefore, it will be the better part of wisdom for us not to speak
determinatively. Also, these questions can better be presented after the state
engineer acts according to plan, rules and regulations.
Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 997 (Colo. 1968).
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lands supplied by the surface decree, and charging water
pumped against his surface decree.40
(e) The regulations provide for the zoning of wells on a geographic basis contrary to law. 4
(f) The regulations were prematurely promulgated, were discriminatory, arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, unreasonable, vague and unenforceable, unconstitutional and void
under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, and article II, section 25, of the constitution of the
State of Colorado.
Since S.81 charges the state engineer with the responsibility of administrating and distributing waters of the state4" and provides for the
integration of ground and surface water,4 3 the decree in the Well
Owners case as framed appears to present a sufficient number of issues
to provide not only amplification of the rule-making requirements of
the Fellhauercase but also a thorough test of the groundwater sections
of S.81.
III.

JUDICIAL AcTIvITY

The judiciary, like the other governmental branches, has also been
adding to the body of Colorado water law. Two recent cases have
provided the most significant developments in this area.
A.

4

4
United States v. District Court

In 1967 the Colorado Water Conservation District (petitioner)
initiated proceedings in the District Court for Eagle County, Colorado4 5
40The proposed rules provided that an appropriator may elect to treat any well or wells

as alternate points of diversion for part or all of any decreed surface right upon submission and approval of a written plan to the division engineer. The district court found
unfairness in the elective approach in that it may permit a "double use" of wells and
surface decrees. On the basis of policy declarations in S. 81 calling for integration of
use of underground and surface uses, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-2(2) (Supp.
1969), the court found that the state engineer is obliged to charge pumped underground
water against surface decrees when the water is used on the same lands by the same
owners as is supplied by the surface decree before recognizing a surface "call" by the
decree owner. Contrast the concern expressed by surface owners before the Legislative
Council Committee, supra note 24.
41The proposed rules and regulations involved a plan of dividing river basins into strip
zones paralleling the surface stream. Different regimens were to be applicable to wells
in different zones to account for the time lag between diversion by pumping and its
impact on the surface flow of the stream.
42
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-17 (Supp. 1969).
43Id. § 148-21-2. See also Note, A Survey of Colorado Water Law, 47 DENVER L.J. 226,
331 (1970).
44458 P.2d 760 (Colo. 1969), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 1005 (1970). For another discussion
of this case, see Moses, Federal-State Water Problems, 47 DENVER L.J. 194 (1970).
45The Colorado River water conservation district is authorized by law "to make filings
upon . . . water and initiate appropriations for the use and benefit of the ultimate
appropriators, and to do and perform all acts and things necessary or advisable to secure
and insure an adequate supply of water, present and future, for irrigation, mining,
manufacturing and domestic purposes." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 150-7-5(3) (1963).
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for supplemental adjudication 6 of priorities to the use of water in
water district No. 37, irrigation division No. 5.47 Several claimants
appeared and entered the proceedings to have their claims adjudicated.
The petitioner sought to make the United States a party under the
consent-to-suit provisions of the McCarran Amendment. 48 The United
States moved to have itself dismissed, but the motion was denied. The
United States then sought a writ from the Colorado Supreme Court to
prohibit the trial court from asserting jurisdiction over the federal
government.
In support of its request for a Writ of Prohibition, the United
States urged three arguments upon the court. First, the federal government contended that the McCarran Amendment covers only general
adjudications of an entire river system in which all rights of all water
users are before the court.4" In support of this contention, the United
States asserted that water district No. 37 was not an entire river system
but only one of the tributaries of the Colorado River. It was further
alleged that in supplemental adjudication proceedings in Colorado no
priority earlier than the last preceding adjudication can be awarded; °
that, therefore, not all the rights of all the users of the river system are
affected or are before the court for determination at once; and that,
4 Pursuant to COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-9-7 (1963), there have been a number of
previous adjudications in the district, the last of which was decreed in February, 1966.
The United States has not been a party to these proceedings.
47 "District No. 37 shall consist of all lands lying in the state of Colorado irrigated by
waters taken from the Eagle River and its tributaries." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14813-38 (1963). The Eagle River has its headwaters near the continental divide in southeastern Eagle County. It flows northerly and westerly, joined by Homestake, Cross, Gore,
Brush, Gypsum and other small creeks, to its confluence with the Colorado River near
Dotsero at the west boundary of Eagle County. It drains portions of the White River
National Forest and the Camp Hale Military Reservation.
48 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1964), which provides in part:
(a) Consent is given to join the United States as defendant in any suit
(1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other
source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the
United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by
appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the
United States is a necessary party to such suit. The United States, when a party
to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right to plead that
the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not amenable thereto
by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the judgments, orders,
and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for costs shall be entered against
the United States in any such suit.
(b) Summons or other process in any such suit shall be served upon the
Attorney General or his designated representative.
Id.
49
United States v. District Court, 458 P.2d 760, 762 (Colo. 1969), cert. granted, 397 U.S.
1005 (1970).

5OHardesty Res., Canal & Land Co. v. Arkansas Valley Sugar Beet & Irr. Land Co., 85
Colo. 555, 559, 277 P. 763, 765 (1929).
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consequently, the provisions of the McCarran Amendment are not
applicable.
The second major argument of the United States also stemmed
from the supplemental adjudication proceedings.51 Specifically, the
federal government argued that it has rights with dates of initiation
earlier than the latest priority dates awarded in district No. 37, but
that because of the rule that no priority earlier than the last decreed
priority can be awarded in a supplemental adjudication, the Eagle
County District Court is powerless to award the United States its actual
priority dates. The effect is to bind the United States to decrees in past
adjudications to which it was not a party.
The third contention involved the federal government's claim to
reserved water rights52 based on federal law which assertedly entitles
the United States to use as much water from sources on lands withdrawn
from the public domain as is necessary to fulfill the purposes for which
the lands were withdrawn, subject to water rights vested as of the date
of any particular withdrawal.5 3 With respect to these reserved rights,
51United States v. District Court, 458 P.2d 760, 762 (Colo. 1969), cert. granted, 397 U.S.

1005 (1970).
52 Id.
53 The exact nature of the United States' types of claims only recently became known. Mr.

Justice Groves noted in his opinion:
In its application here, the United States makes the statement, "The court had
no jurisdiction to adjudicate rights other than those arising under Colorado law,
but the United States claims rights otherwise arising." We are not sure whether
by this statement the United States asserts that none of its rights have arisen
under Colorado law. For the purpose of our discussion we will assume that it
claims both (a) water rights reserved in connection with the withdrawal of
public lands and which it asserts have not arisen under Colorado law and (b)
appropriations arising under Colorado law ....
The Government insists that our district courts have jurisdiction only to
adjudicate rights under the doctrine of appropriation and, therefore, they do not
have jurisdiction over the so-called reserved water of the United States. It
advises us that such reserved rights are valid with priorities substantially antedating several of the supplementary decrees in Water District 37 under the
authority of Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 83 S.Ct. 1468, 10 L.Ed.2d 542;
Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 75 S.Ct. 832, 99 L.Ed.
1215; Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 28 S.Ct. 207, 52 L.Ed. 340;

United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 19 S.Ct. 770,
43 L. Ed. 1136.
Id. at 768. The United States affirmed the dual nature of its claim in its application
for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at
3, United States v. District Court, 458 P.2d 760, cert. granted, 397 U.S. 1005 (1970).
Actually, the United States has not formally claimed water rights in Water District
No. 37 by filing in court but has merely informally advised the various courts before
which it has appeared at stages of this proceeding of its assertions of water rights. The
Colorado Supreme Court was particularly troubled by this fact, saying:
Our situation with respect to water rights has been that priorities are
decreed under state laws, but any water rights of the United States in Colorado
remain mysterious, largely unknown, uncatalogued and unrelated to decreed
water rights. This created an undesirable, impractical and chaotic situation.
Id. at 765.
See generally 2 E. MORREALE, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 1-109 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
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the United States asserted that district courts in Colorado have no
jurisdiction since such rights are nonappropriative and do not arise
under state law. 4
The Colorado Supreme Court rejected these arguments and discharged a rule to show cause why the writ should not be granted. The
court found from legislative history5" that Congress intended to authorize state jurisdiction over federal water rights and that the Colorado
court adjudication procedure was fully comprehended within the consent
given in the McCarran Amendment. No distinction between original
and supplemental proceedings was intended but rather, Congress meant
only to exclude private disputes from its waiver of immunity. 6 Differences between Colorado's procedures for adjudication of rights in
segmentary districts and those of other states for statewide or drainage
basin-wide adjudications are differences only in degree and do not
support any attempt to exclude Colorado on the ground that it does not
57
adjudicate rights of an entire river system at once.
With respect to the United States' claims to appropriative priorities antedating those already awarded in prior decrees, the court
suggested that the United States may collaterally attack decrees to
which it was not a party. The court stated:
However, the decree can speak only as to matters within the
jurisdiction of the court, and where the court in such a statutory
proceeding attempts to determine matters beyond its competence, its
decree, as to such matters, is not conclusive; "If the court lacks jurisdiction to render, or exceeds its jurisdiction in rendering, the particular
judgment in the particular case, such judgment is subject to collateral
attack, even though the court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the
subject-matter." [citations omitted] 5 8
The court thus indicates that courts in earlier adjudication proceedings
5 This argument is apparently double-barreled. It says (1) that the adjudicative jurisdiction
of district courts in Colorado does not provide for and encompass water rights which
are outside the appropriation system and (2) Congress did not intend to consent to
suits for the adjudication of its reserved rights when it enacted the McCarran Amendment.
55

The Court quoted and relied on the Desert Land Act, ch. 107, § 1, 19 Stat. 377 (1877),
as amended 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1964); Reclamation Act, ch. 1093, § 8, 32 Stat. 39, as
amended 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1964), and legislative history of the 1952 McCarran
Amendment.

56 The United States has argued that the McCarran Amendment relates only to general
adjudications, not supplemental ones, since it is objectionable to the government to be
subjected to the burden of piecemeal litigation. The Court noted that Colorado's supplemental proceedings are general in the sense of being quasi-public in nature as opposed
to being private suits.
67 The court observed that COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-9-17 (1963) effected a correlation
between water districts and that S. 81 creates a water division for each river system after
1969 so that the same practical result obtains in Colorado as in other states not having
water districts. United States v. District Court, 458 P.2d 760, 767 (Colo. 1969).
58Id.
at 771 (citations omitted).
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lacked jurisdiction to "fix and settle" rights of users in such a way as to
exclude the United States from priority.59
As to the argument of the United States that its reserved rights
were beyond the reach of state courts, the court found jurisdiction
under the plenary powers of Colorado district courts60 sufficient to
make the relative rights of the United States the subject of their decrees
and to bring all necessary parties before them. The court held that the
McCarran Amendment was intended to give consent to suit with respect
to the reserved rights although the court declined to decide whether or
not the United States actually has any such reserved rights,6 noting that
the federal government has yet to present such rights to a trial court
so that issues of law and fact may be clearly drawn.
62
Since this case touches upon both present and future uses of
water by the United States on public land and upon the rights of
appropriators of waters of the state, its importance is apparent. The
ultimate resolution of the issues which the case raises should affect
virtually every water user within Colorado and should command continuing attention.
B. Pikes Peak Golf Club, Inc. v. Kuiper.6"
Defendants (State Engineer Kuiper, the division engineer and
water commissioners), acting for the purpose of protecting the supply
of Fountain Creek and certain appropriators therefrom, ordered the
plaintiff golf club to release certain water for the benefit of said
appropriators. The golf club asserted that the water involved was
salvaged water and that since it was not and never had been tributary
to any natural water course, it was not subject to administration by
state water officials. The District Court for El Paso County sustained
the state engineer's order, and the plaintiff golf club appealed. The
evidence showed that annually some 240 acre-feet of water, which the
state engineer was requiring the plaintiff to release to Fountain Creek,
had subirrigated natural hay and wild plants and had been lost to
S9The court here likens the position of the United States to that of out-of-state users of
Colorado water. For example, in West End Irrigation Co. v. Garvey, 117 Colo. 109, 184
P.2d 476 (1947), it was held that Utah users of water appropriated in Utah from Rock
Creek which arises in Utah, flows into Colorado, and returns to Utah - might collaterally
attack a Colorado decree affecting their rights even after the expiration of the four-year
period prescribed by COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-9-17 (1963) for attacks on decrees
by persons whose rights are outside the water district for which the decree was rendered.
60
COLO. CONST. art. VI.
61 The court outlined the arguments made to it on the reserved right question, noting
Stockman v. Leddy, 55 Colo. 24, 129 P. 220 (1912) and observing that no authorities
cited to it by the United States (see note 47 supra) are directly in point as far as its rights
in Colorado are concerned.
62 In disclosing the rights it considers it has by reservation, the United States designates
various classes of uses some of which are called "current" and others, "foreseeable".
Memorandum of United States in support of Motion to Dismiss at 13, In re Adjudication, Water District No. 37, No. 1529 (Dist. Ct. Eagle County, Oct. 1967).
6455 P.2d 882 (Colo. 1969).
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transpiration. The plaintiff golf club constructed an extensive drain
system under the land thus irrigated and collected this water in a
system of small ponds and reservoirs, having the effect of drying out
a substantial portion of the lands previously subirrigated and making
water available for irrigation of 95 acres of irrigated golf course.
Improved drainage resulted in a net accretion to a Fountain Creek
tributary below plaintiff's lands.
In reversing the judgment of the trial court, the Colorado Supreme
Court noted that the thrust of the state engineer's order and the demand
of the Fountain Creek appropriators was that the full 240 acre-feet
per year collected and salvaged by the plaintiff should be released to
the stream. Noting further that this 240 acre-feet of water was not
historically tributary water, the court held that it was not subject to
administration by the state engineer. In making this finding, the court
relied upon two separate theories: 4 (1) the principle of salvaged
water, as illustrated by the cited case of Leadville Mining Development
Co. v. Anderson,"5 in which it was held that "[w]here a person by
his own efforts has increased the flow of water in a natural stream,
he is entitled to the use of the water to the extent of the increase"; "
and (2) the Colorado statutory doctrine of limited riparian rights in
nontributary spring water,67 exemplified by Cline v. Whittenj8 in
which it was held that a person owning land on which nontributary
spring water arises is entitled to use such water on his lands.69
CONCLUSION

Although all three branches of government have recently been
attempting to provide more efficient use and administration of water
in Colorado, none of the solutions have been complete. In particular,
significant problems with respect to the integration of ground and
surface water and the relationship between the water rights of the state
and federal governments need a more definitive response. Hence it can
be anticipated that these difficulties will continue to cause uncertainty
for water users and lawyers and that additional attempts to find sohtions will be made by the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary.

"Id. at 884.
6591 Colo. 536, 17 P.2d 303 (1932).
66
d. at 537, 17 P.2d at 303.
67

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-2-2 (1953),

2-2 (1963).
68 144 Colo. 126, 355 P.2d 306 (1960).
6
19d. at 128, 355 P.2d at 884.

as amended COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-

FEDERAL-STATE WATER PROBLEMS
By RAPHAEL J. MOSES*

Continued orderly development of western water resources under
state law is seriously threatened by the federal government's claims to
water rights and jurisdiction over water use. Mr. Moses considers the
power bases which enable the federal government to make such claims,
examining in particular those claims based on the Commerce and
Property Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. Under the Commerce Clause
he traces the development of the navigationpower and the concomitant
use of the navigation servitude to take property without compensation.
With respect to claims under the Property Clause, he discusses the
federal government's right to waters arising on reserved lands, including an analysis of the relevant cases and statutes. He concludes by
commenting on the attempts by state courts to delineate the extent of
federal power and by pointing out the numerous bills which have been
introduced in Congress to resolve the federal-state conflict.
INTRODUCTION

I

RIMARILY from the security afforded by state-granted water
ky rights, much of the West has been transformed from the "Great
American Desert" into an economically productive and socially inhabitable region. As the Public Land Law Review Commission' stated in
its report to the President:'
In nearly 100 years of development, state water law has achieved
a reasonable certainty of results which has permitted substantial public
and private development in the West. While sometimes necessarily
provided a
complex, state administrative and judicial procedures have
3
means to determine security of rights to the use of water.
However, the continued orderly development of the water resources
in the 17 reclamation states 4 of the West is seriously threatened by
claims of the United States which cloud the titles of countless numbers
of citizens who have made valid appropriations under state law. As
Floyd Bishop, the State Engineer of Wyoming, stated recently before
the National Water Commission:
One of the most important problems facing the Western States
today relates to the so-called "Reservation Doctrine," and the related
question of jurisdiction over water use and water rights. We feel that
federal claims of reservation of unlimited quantities of water for use
on federal reservations, with a priority as of the date of the reserva*A.B. University of Colorado, 1935; L.L.B. University of Colorado, 1937; Chairman,
Western States Water Council, 1966-69.
143 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1400 (1964), as amended (Supp. IV, 1969).
2 PUBLIC LAN

LAW REVIEW COMMISSION,

ONE THIRD

OF THE NATION'S RESOURCES

(1970).
3Id.at 142.

4The 17 states usually considered the "West" are: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho,
Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
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tion, create a cloud over state-granted water rights which is intolerable.
Such unquantified reservations would limit future development and
discourage investment in water projects. National Forest Reserves in
Wyoming cover most of the high water producing areas, and these
forests were reserved prior to many of our state-granted water rights.
The potential impact of the Reservation Doctrine on our State is significant. At its extreme it could seriously damage existing water users, and
as a minimum it creates a cloud over future water development which
needs to be removed.
Jurisdiction over water resources and the authority to issue rights
for the use of water must be clearly established if we hope to maintain
an orderly system of water administration. Dual jurisdiction simply
cannot work. The states have traditionally accepted and fulfilled this
responsibility and there 5does not appear to be sufficient reason to
modify this arrangement.
The federal claims make it apparent, however, that the United
States does feel a need to modify the traditional arrangement. Therefore, it will be the purpose of this article to consider the nature of the
claims and discuss the ways in which the federal-state conflict might be
resolved.
I.

THE NATURE OF THE FEDERAL CLAIMS

The power bases which enable the federal government to claim
a right to regulate water usage within the Western States are derived
from five Constitutional grants of authority: the Welfare,' War,'
and Treaty' Powers; and the Commerce 9 and Property"0 Clauses. While
all are conceivably valid as power bases, the last two are those generally
relied upon in asserting the federal claims and are, therefore, the most
significant.

A.

The Commerce Clause"

While the United States was still a young nation, conducting most
of its commerce along its coast and on its navigable rivers, the Supreme
Court held in Gibbons v. Ogden' that control of navigable rivers was
vested in the Congress under the Commerce Clause.' 8 Further, in The
Daniel Ball1 4 the Court more specifically defined the extent of Congres5

Hearings Before the National Water Commission, sitting in Denver (1969).
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8(1).
7 Id. While it might be thought to be strange to relate the use of water to the War Power,
it may be recalled that the Tennessee Valley Authority was originally begun as a project
to provide munitions. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288
(1936).
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
9

Id. art. I, § 8(3).
'Old. art. IV, § 3(2).
11id. art. I, § 8(3).
1222 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
13Id.

at 84. Gibbons declared the proposition that: "All America understands, and has uni-

formly understood, the word 'commerce' to comprehend navigation." Id.
1477 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
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sional control and stated what has since been the prevailing rule: All
streams, tidal or fresh water, which are in fact navigable are subject
to the navigation power of Congress under the Commerce Clause.' 5
In discussing the effect of this rule, one commentator has stated that
-[i]f a stream is navigable under this definition, federal power extends
over its entire course, including its non-navigable stretches, and this
power survives commercial disuse, whether for changed economic or
16
geographical reasons.11
Yet the scope of the navigation power has not remained constant,
but rather has been expanded. For example, on the strength of Arizona
v. California,17 it has been stated that "navigable" refers to any stream
which has once been navigable, is navigable, or would be navigable
after reasonable improvements.' 8 Indeed, it has been suggested that
"non-navigable streams which affect the navigable capacity of navigable
streams are subject to the express exercise of the regulatory power."19
Further, it has been held that it is not essential that navigation be the
primary object of any federal program to improve a stream.20 It is
sufficient if navigation is one of the purposes for which the project is
designed.
Hence, the federal regulatory power under the Commerce Clause
is extremely broad. As one commentator has accurately summarized:
Navigation has thus ceased to be the measure and limit of federal
power. But, for reasons of history only, navigation remains the basis

and the constitutional touchstone. Once navigation purposes are pres-

ent, Congress may in effect use the waters of both navigable and nonnavigable streams for whatever purposes and in whatever manner it
wishes. In so doing, it can completely override any state water plan.
It can prevent, in toto, state law from being applied to "federal"

waters; or, on a lesser scale, it can prevent state law from being applied
to federal waters in a particular situation where its application conflicts
with the federal interest.
Finally, as a matter of comity, it may submit
21
to state regulation.
While it is obvious from the foregoing that the federal claim to
regulate water based on the navigation power can cause serious problems for the states, an equally egregious aspect of federal power which
has developed from the Commerce Clause is the navigation servitude.
15 Id. at 563.
101.1(A) (R. Clark ed. 1967) (footnotes omitted) (hereinafter cited as 2 E. MORREALE].
, 283 U.S. 423 (1931). The Court said: "And the federal government has the power to
create this obstruction in the river for the purpose of improving navigation .
Id. at
452.
*82 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 101.1(C).
19 Id.
20 Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 454-56 (1931). The Court stated: "And the fact that
purposes other than navigation will also be served could not invalidate the exercise of the
authority conferred, even if those other purposes would not alone have justified an exercise of Congressional Power." Id. at 456.
?t 2 E. MORREA.E, supra note 16, § 101.2(A) (footnote omitted).
162 E. MORREALE, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §
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The navigation servitude is a dominant servitude which allows the
federal government to take, without compensation, private property
rights.2 2 As stated in United States v. 412.715 Acres of Land:2
In controlling, improving and regulating the navigability of waters the
Government . . . may deepen channels, widen streams, erect lighthouses, build bridges, construct dams, and make similar improvements,
the owners of land subject to the navigation
without compensating
24
servitude.
Thus, even though the federal government may be spending vast sums
of money on projects involving navigable waters, it may also be discouraging more significant investment by private developers who are wary
of the right of the United States to change conditions on a navigable
stream without compensating those damaged thereby. Even more
serious, however, is the problem which arises when the federal government invokes the navigation servitude against an appropriator who
has established a valid appropriation under the state law; for in such
a situation, a valuable property right sanctioned by state law has been
destroyed by a federal law without compensation. And given the wide
scope of the navigation power, the threat of such a situation arising
at any time and on virtually any stream within a state does, indeed,
affect the security of a state-granted water right.
B. The Property Clause
The second major grant of authority under which the federal
government claims a right to regulate the use of water within the states
is the Property Clause which provides that "[tjhe Congress shall have
power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and
nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any
claims of the United States, or of any particular state."'25 Based upon
this clause, the argument is made that since all of the land now in the
Western United States at one time belonged to the federal government
(with the exception of Texas), the Western States did not acquire
title to the public lands when they were admitted to the Union; therefore, unless the United States has disposed of such lands (and the
water thereon), the federal government is still the owner.2 6 The
is an expression used to describe "[the rule that in the
exercise of the navigation power certain private property rights may be taken without
compensation .... " Id. § 101.3(A). Morreale is careful to point out that the scope of
the navigation servitude is not commensurate with the navigation power as derived from
the commerce power. Id.
2353 F. Supp. 143 (N.D. Cal. 1943).
at 148.
2Id.
22 The "navigation servitude"

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3(2). For a discussion of the relationship of the Property Clause
to federal-state water relations, see 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 102.
2 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 102.1.
25
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effect of this argument is to subject nonnavigable waters 7 on public
lands to the far-reaching powers of the Property Clause when those
waters are not validly appropriated under state law.
While a discussion of the effect of certain federal acts on the
question of the disposition of federally-owned waters"s is not within
the scope of this article, the prevalent view2 9 is that the federal government did not dispose of its rights to such waters by the Act of 1866,"
the Act of 1870,"1 or the Desert Land Act of 1877.8
Nevertheless, when the United States Supreme Court decided the
case of California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co. 8
in 1935, it seemed clear that the states had the right to determine the
terms and conditions upon which individual appropriators would take
title to the waters within the respective state boundaries. The Court
stated:
Second. Nothing we have said is meant to suggest that the act
[the Desert Land Act], as we construe it, has the effect of curtailing
the power of the states affected to legislate in respect of waters and
water rights as they deem wise in the public interest. What we hold is
that following the act of 1877, if not before, all non-navigable waters
then a part of the public domain became publici juris, subject to the
plenary control of the designated states . . .with the right in each to
determine for itself to what extent the rule of appropriation or the
common-law rule in respect of riparian rights should obtain.8 4

Many western lawyers, following the Beaver Portland decision,

assumed that the states had complete control over the appropriation
and use of the waters within their boundaries, subject only to the
equitable apportionment of those waters with the other states through
which such waters might flow. However, the inaccuracy of such an
assumption was manifested by the decision in Federal Power Commission v. Oregon.85 This case, known as the Pelton case, was the beginning
27 Navigable waters can be subjected to federal appropriation and regulation under the Com-

merce Clause as construed in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597 (1963).
See generally 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 102.1. Morreale's argument on this question may be summarized thusly:
(a) The Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377, permitted states to establish
water rights for severed waters actually put to beneficial use from public lands;
(b) The United States continued to share control of nonnavigable waters;
(c) In appropriation states, the United States remains owner of nonnavigable waters on
public lands subject to displacement by downstream users through valid appropriations under state law;
(d) The United States as landowner may prevent further divestment of its water rights
by withdrawing unappropriated waters from the state appropriation system (under
the Property Clause). Id.
29 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 102.1.

2

3
0Act
3t

of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 253.

Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 218.
32 Ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377. The decision in Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 349 U.S.
435, 448 (1955), held that the Desert Land Act did not apply to reserved lands.
33295 U.S. 142 (1935).
34Id. at 163-64.
35349 U.S.435 (1955).
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of a series of cases which clearly declared that the United States had
not, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, divested itself of title to all
of the waters of the West. 6
In Pelton the Federal Power Commission had authorized the
construction of a dam, one abutment of which was located on an Indian
reservation, the other of which was located on a power site withdrawal. 3 7 Oregon objected to the construction, claiming that no compliance with Oregon law had been effected. The Court rejected this
argument using the same rationale as was used in First Iowa HydroElectric Co-op. v. Federal Power Commission 8 which held that it
would be impractical to permit the state to hold veto power over a
federal project. 39 The Court said: -[T]o allow Oregon to veto such
use, by requiring the State's additional permission, would result in the
very duplication of regulatory control precluded by the First Iowa
' 40
decision.
Perhaps the real difference between the Beaver Portland and
Pelton cases is that Beaver Portland upheld the right of the states to
regulate the manner in which appropriations could be made from public
lands, whereas Pelton involved reserved lands. In Pelton the Court said:
The purpose of the acts of 1866 and 1870 was governmental recognition and sanction of possessory rights on public lands asserted under
local laws and customs. [citation omitted] The Desert Land Act
severed, for purposes of private acquisition, soil and water rights on
public lands, and provided that such water rights were to be acquired
41
in the manner provided by the law of the State of location.
The Court went on to say that "these Acts are not applicable to the
reserved lands and waters here involved. The Desert Land Act covers
.sources of water supply on the public lands . . . .' The lands before
us in this case are not 'public lands' but 'reservations.'"42
For those who felt, after Pelton, that there was some hope that
the United States did not claim or have authority to claim water for
its reserved lands, the decision in Arizona v. California43 convinced
them that such was not the case. The contentions were raised in Arizona
that the United States did not have power to reserve water on its
36 The Court rejected Oregon's argument that certain federal acts were delegations of power

to the states to regulate the use of federal waters, stating that such acts applied only to
public lands and the lands in question in Pelton were reserved lands. Id. at 443-44.
37 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 102.4(E) n.44.
38 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
Id. at 164. The First Iowa decision involved a navigable stream, while Pelton involved a
nonnavigable stream on reserved lands.
40 Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 445 (1955).
41 Id. at 447 (emphasis by the Court).
421d. at 448.
3

-373

U.S. 546 (1963).
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reserved lands after Arizona had been admitted to statehood and that
the United States had never intended to reserve water for Indian
reservations. 4 4 Both contentions were rejected, the Court stating: "We
have no doubt about the power of the United States under these clauses
[the Commerce Clause and art. IV, § 3 of the Constitution]
to reserve
' 45
water rights for its reservations and its property.
The decisions of Pelton and Arizona offered little comfort to most
of the West since vast quantities of land within the region are covered
by federal reservations, e.g., the national forest reserves. Consequently,
to combat the effect of the decisions, the Western States have raised
the ingenious "equal footing" argument which is based on the proposition that any new state is entitled to be admitted on an equal footing
with the original 13 states.46 Ergo, since the United States did not
claim waters of the 13 original states as the sovereign, the Western
States should likewise be free of such claims. 47 However, as one
commentator has noted:
Two things are clear. Claims of the United States to unappropriated nonnavigable western waters based on original ownership of the
public domain in no way conflict with the equal-footing clause. While
the court has never expressly said so, the Winters and Pelton Dam

cases clearly imply that claims to such waters are based
on proprietary
rather than on sovereign rights of the United States.48
The effect of the early federal legislation, therefore, is apparent.
Beaver Portlandwas concerned with private rights of private claimants
and did not concern federal ownership or sovereignty; and further,
the case is not authority for the proposition that the Desert Land Act
or earlier legislation effected the wholesale transfer of water or ceded
any property to the Desert Land Act states. 49 Perhaps the most that
can be said for Beaver Portland is that it reaffirmed the right of the
states to determine the manner in which private individuals could
obtain property rights in waters on public lands.5" However, there has
been less certainty about the language in Pelton and Arizona. Indeed,
the confusion sparked by those two cases with respect to both the
federal claims and the extent of such claims has resulted in continuing
controversy between the state and federal governments.
E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 102.4(F).
45Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963).
46 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, §§ 102.5-.6.
47The argument was raised but not decided in Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 611
(1945).
48 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 102.6 (footnote omitted).
42

49 Id. § 102.7.
50 What Beaver Portland did say was that land taken under a government patent is severed

from the water rights thereon. Hence forward, all nonnavigable waters on patented lands
would "be reserved for the use of the public under the laws of the states and territories
named." California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 162
(1935).
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II.

RESOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL-STATE

CONFLICT

There have been several attempts to resolve or at least clarify the
federal-state conflict which arose from Pelton and Arizona. In general,
the attempted resolutions have been proposed by state court adjudications or by bills introduced in Congress.
A. State Court Adjudication of Federal Water Rights
It can be suggested that the proper place to settle a dispute
concerned with federal and state claims to waters is in court. Efforts at
such adjudication have been attempted numerous times, but have been
generally unsuccessful. 51 A major reason for this lack of success is
that the United States is immune from suit in the absence of its consent.
However, this difficulty was at least partially alleviated in 1952
when Congress waived the sovereign immunity of the United States by
enacting the so-called McCarran Amendment. 52 The amendment provided in part:
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any
suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river
system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights,
where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the
process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law,
by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a

necessary party to such suit. 53
The amendment, by its terms, is limited to a water adjudication where
parties seek to settle their water rights as against all other users asserting
a right in a common source. By judicial decision the amendment has
been further limited to deny individual suits against the United States.5 4
One significant case "5 has been brought in Colorado under the
McCarran Amendment. It involved a recent water adjudication proceeding in Colorado water district No. 37 (the Colorado River District)
in which the petitioner in a supplemental adjudication proceeding
served the United States with process. The United States appeared and
moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, claiming that under the
Colorado law only segments of the stream were adjudicated and that
this type of proceeding did not conform to the requirements of the
McCarran Amendment.5 6 The trial judge overruled the motion to dismiss, causing the United States to obtain a temporary writ of prohibition
from the Colorado Supreme Court.
51 For a general discussion of suits against government officers as a means for adjudicating
the federal government's water rights, see 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 106.1.
52
Suits for Adjudication of Water Rights, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1964).
53 Id.
54

Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618 (1963).

55 See United States v. District Court, 458 P.2d 760, 762 (Colo. 1969) for a statement of
the lower court proceedings.
56 Id. at 762.
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In an opinion delivered by the Colorado Supreme Court, the writ
was quashed. Mr. Justice Groves, in deciding the case, cited Beaver
Portland5 7 and section 8 of the Reclamation Act5 8 to support the
court's finding that water rights should be acquired under the provisions
of state law. The court quoted from a report of the Senate Judiciary
Committee which had been written after consideration of a bill containing provisions similar to those included in the McCarran Amendment.
The report, as adopted by the court, stated:
In the administration of and the adjudication of water rights under
State laws the State courts are vested with the jurisdiction necessary
for the proper and efficient disposition thereof, and by reason of the
interlocking of adjudicated rights on any stream system, any order or
action affecting one right affects all such rights. Accordingly all water
users on a stream, in practically every case, are interested and necessary
parties to any court proceedings. It is apparent that if any water user
claiming to hold such right by reason of the ownership thereof by the
United States or any of its departments is permitted to claim immunity
from suit in, or orders of, a State court, such claims could materially
interfere with the lawful and equitable use of water for beneficial use
by the other water users who are amenable to and bound by the decrees
and orders of the State courts. Unless Congress has removed such
immunity by statutory enactment, the bar of immunity from suit still
remains and any judgment or decree of the State court is ineffective
as to the water right held by the United States. Congress has not
removed the bar of immunity even in its own courts in suits wherein
water rights acquired under State law are drawn in question. The Bill
(S.18) was introduced for the very purpose of correcting this situation
and the evils growing out of such immunity.5 9

Mr. Justice Groves continued by holding: "Therefore, we conclude
that a proceeding under C.R.S. 1963, 148-9-7 in Water District 37 or any other water district - constitutes an adjudication of rights to
the use of water of a river system contemplated by the McCarran

Amendment."6

0

571d. at 764.

Mid.
59 Senate Calendar No. 711, Report No. 755, Sept. 17, 1951.
60United States v. District Court, 458 P.2d 760, 766 (Colo. 1969), cert. granted, 397 U.S.

1005 (1970). It should be noted that while the court's decision was based upon COLO.
ANN. § 148-9-7 (1963), which was repealed by Act of June 7, 1969, ch. 373,
§ 20, (1969] Colo. Sess. Laws 1223, the court was cognizant of new legislation (COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-1 et req. (Supp. 1969)). As was stated in the case:
REV. STAT.

Senate Bill 81 adopted in 1969 [citation omitted] was approved after the briefs
were filed in this proceeding and prior to oral argument. Following oral argument
the United States and the City and County of Denver filed supplemental briefs on
the subject of the effect of this Act upon the questions involved, if any. Since the
district court did not have this matter before it, we deem it the better part of wisdom
to await its determination with respect to this matter. We do make the observation
that some or all of the parties in Water District 37, as well as in similar proceedings
in other parts of the state which have been held in abeyance awaiting this opinion,

may conclude that the provisions of the 1969 Act are more suitable than the preexisting statutes for adjudications involving the United States.
United States v. District Court, 458 P.2d 760, 774 (Colo. 1969), cert. granted, 397 U.S.
1005 (1970).
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There still remains the troublesome problem concerning joining,
in a supplemental adjudication proceeding, all persons whose rights
might be affected by the claims of the United States. Although the
Colorado Supreme Court expressed confidence in the ability of the district court to resolve this matter, it provided no opinion of its own.6 1
B. Bills Introduced in Congress
There have been a number of bills introduced into the Congress
which have attempted to deal with water rights claimed by the United
States vis-a-vis state rights. The first of these was the so-called "Barrett
Bill," 6 2 introduced in 1956. This bill failed to pass. Similarly, there
was introduced in 1959 the so-called "Agency Bill, ' " 3 a compromise
proposal which attempted to meet the fears aroused by the Pelton
decision by providing that "rtfhe withdrawal or reservation of surveyed
or unsurveyed public lands, heretofore or hereafter established, shall
not affect any right to the use of water acquired pursuant to state law
either before or after the establishment of such withdrawal or reservation. '"4 Incorporated in the Agency Bill was an amendment which
would have supported the equal footing argument.6 5 It has been speculated that the bill failed to pass because of executive opposition to this
amendment.6 6
In 1965 Senator Kuchel of California sponsored a bill 7 which
would have had the effect of preventing any reservation from impairing
any right to the use of navigable or nonnavigable water acquired
pursuant to state law either
(1) before the establishment of such withdrawal or reservation, or
(2) after the establishment of such withdrawal or reservation unless,

in the latter event, a Federal statute, or an officer of the United States
authorized to make such a withdrawal or reservation, shall have pro-

mulgated the purpose, quantity, and priority date of the water right
reserved to the United States or otherwise established under its own
laws, and such promulgation shall have antedated the initiation of the
68
conflicting right under state law.

This provision, although far from perfect, would have alleviated some
of the uncertainties clouding present property rights to the use of water
in the Western States, because it would have required the Federal
61

ld. at 767.

62S. REP. No. 863, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
63 See 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16,
107.1 n.

§
96.
64Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation and Reclamation of the House Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 9, at 13 (1959).
65 See text accompanying notes 45 & 46, supra.
6 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 107.1.
67 S.REp. No. 1636, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
68 Id. For a comprehensive discussion of S. 1636, see 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 107.2.
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agencies to quantify their needs in connection with reservations. With
the defeat of Senator Kuchel, however, Congress took no action on the
bill. "9
In 1967, a bill substantially similar to the Senator Kuchel proposal
was introduced into the Senate70 and was followed by a similar bill
introduced in the House in 1969.71 Affirmative action was not taken
on either of these bills, and none appears planned for the immediate
future.
Congressman Aspinall of Colorado had indicated that the House
Interior and Insular Affairs Committee would not hold hearings on
such bills until the Public Land Law Review Commission makes its
report. Now that the report has been issued,72 it remains to be seen
whether the recommendations contained therein will be adopted or
whether water appropriators in the Western States will be forced to
continue to wait for a resolution of the federal-state conflict.
CONCLUSION

The federal government's control of navigable waters under
the Commerce Clause and its claims to water rights under the Property
Clause have created an atmosphere of uncertainty which threatens to
impede the further orderly development of the water resources of the
Western States. While state courts have attempted to delineate the extent
of federal power and numerous bills have been introduced in Congress
which seek to resolve the federal-state conflict and remove the cloud
which hangs over the rights of those who own state granted water
rights, none of these measures have been successful. Perhaps the report
of the Public Land Law Review Commission and the recommendations
contained therein will provide the compromise measure which will
not only allow a modicum of dual sovereignty but will also define the
respective power limitations.
APPENDIX*
THE IMPLIED RESERVATION DOCTRINE OF FEDERAL WATER RIGHTS

As successor to the sovereigns from which the United States
obtained the vast areas of the western public domain, the Federal Government by the mid-19th century possessed complete power over the
land and water of that region. Because the courts have settled the issue,
69 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 107.2.

7o S. REP. No. 2530, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
71 H.R. REP. No. 476, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
72The section of the report of the Public Land Law Review Commission dealing with the
federal-state conflict is set out in toto in the APPENDIX, at 204 infra.
*This APPENDiX is a portion of the chapter on Water Resources reprinted from the recent
report of the Public Land Review Commission. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THUD OF THE NATION'S RESOURCES 141-49 (1970).
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there is little to be gained in academic arguments as to whether that
power derives from concepts of "ownership" as distinguished from
"sovereignty": the power is plenary, whatever its conceptual basis.
By a series of acts in 1866, 1870, and 1877,1 when Federal policy
stressed the disposition of the public domain under the homestead,
public sale, and other settlement and disposal laws, Congress provided
that such Federal land disposals would not carry with them an accompanying water right. Rather, the water on the public lands was declared
open to use, and property rights to its use were to be obtained under
the laws and customs of the states and territories. As to lands retained
in Federal ownership, there were none of the public land manasem.ent
programs we know today requiring water use on Federal lands by t'-e
Federal Government or its agents, e.g., mineral leasing operations,
recreation facility management, fish and wildlife protection and habitat
enhancement, and so forth. Accordingly, the Federal Government did
not then have to face up to whether it would comply with state water
laws.
By the turn of the century, the Federal Government had started
reserving public lands from disposition by setting aside national forests
and parks, creating wildlife refuges, and making large-scale withdrawals
for other purposes. With respect to the water needs associated with
programs on these lands, the usual practice during the first half of this
century was for permittees, licensees, etc., to acquire necessary water
rights under state law in accordance with the policy stated in the 1866,
1870, and 1877 acts. The Federal agencies generally followed that
same practice for their program needs.
In the 11 western states the predominant water right system is
the law of prior appropriation, which was adopted as being most suitable to a water-short region. Under this system prior use establishes
priority of right, and nonuse for prescribed periods will cause a forfeiture. In times of shortage, uses are curtailed in inverse order of their
priorities. The riparian law of water rights2 which prevailed in the
more humid eastern states was rejected as unsuitable. Its principal vice
was that an upstream riparian owner could do nothing indefinitely
while his neighbor downstream put water to use and became dependent
thereon, yet at any time the upper riparian could assert his equal right
and destroy or impair the effort and investment of his neighbor.
An appropriative water right may be acquired only for a beneficial
purpose, and even if the proposed type of use is beneficial under state
' The relevant portions of the acts are codified as 43 U.S.C. §§ 321, 661 (1964).
2 The riparian system has three major features, all of which are the antithesis of the appropriation doctrine. First, water may be used only by a riparian landowner, on riparian land,
and within the natural drainage basin of the stream from which it is taken. Second, it is
neither acquired by use nor lost by nonuse. Third, it is correlative, in that all users share
shortages ratably.
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law, it must usually also be a reasonable use in the light of other
demands for water. While there are diversities among the water laws
of these states, they are generally consistent in recognizing, by statute
or decision, domestic and municipal purposes, irrigation, mining, power,
and manufacturing, as well as other similar uses, as beneficial.
Although the decided court cases indicate that there is no serious
problem in obtaining rights for recreation and fish and wildlife conservation, several of these states do not expressly specify such uses as
beneficial in their water statutes.
Nearly all state appropriative water laws also establish a system
of preferences under which certain beneficial uses are preferred over
others. In most of these 11 states, domestic, stock-watering, and municipal uses appear to have preferred status over irrigation, and irrigation
is preferred over all the remaining uses. Recreation and fish and
wildlife uses are not preferred uses in these states. This has caused
concern that Federal program needs, particularly for fish and wildlife,
may not be fully served if the Federal Government must rely on these
state laws. However, while problems for Federal agencies may yet
develop because of state laws relating to beneficial use or preferences,
none has been brought to our attention.
In nearly 100 years of development, state water law has achieved
a reasonable certainty of results which has permitted substantial public
and private development in the West. While sometimes necessarily
complex, state administrative and judicial procedures have provided
a means to determine security of rights to the use of water.
However, in 1955, the Supreme Court in the Pelton Dam decision'
indicated that the withdrawal or reservation of Federal lands for
specified purposes also reserved rights to use water on such lands, even
though the legislative or executive action made no mention of water
or its use. Under this doctrine such reserved water rights would carry
a priority as of the date of the reservation or withdrawal of the lands.
Although the possible consequences of the decision that state law
need not control the acquisition of water rights for such "reserved"
lands were disturbing to many in the western public lands states, under
the facts of the case the Pelton Dam decision itself did not require
infringement of water rights previously vested under state law. The
limits and impact of the newly enunciated application of the reservation doctrine were left uncertain. However, some of the Federal
agencies began to rely on this doctrine for water rights in addition to
their customary compliance with state law.
In 1963, any lingering doubts about most of the implications of
the reservation doctrine as a source of water rights were removed in
3

Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
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the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. California.4 By analogy to
earlier Indian cases, and in partial reliance on the Pelton Dam decision,
the Court sustained the conclusions of its Special Master in that case
that certain reservations of public domain land for particular purposes,
i.e., wildlife refuges, a national forest, and a national recreation area,
carried with them an "implied" reservation of sufficient unappropriated water to satisfy the reasonable requirements of those reservations
without regard to the provisions of state law.
Since then, the Forest Service and the military departments have
indicated that they will no longer comply with state law in acquiring
rights for the use of water on reserved lands, and will rely on Federal
claims arising out of the reservation or withdrawal of the public lands
they administer. Other Federal agencies, such as the National Park
Service, still have a policy of compliance with state appropriation
procedures, but whether this will continue is uncertain.
The result has been apprehension in the western public land states
that the doctrine will have the effect of disrupting established water
right priority systems and destroying, without compensation, water
rights considered to have vested under state law. Moreover, the uncertainty generated by the doctrine is an impediment to sound coordinated
planning for future water resources development.
Legislative proposals that Congress either affirm, abolish, or
clarify the reservation doctrine have been the subject of numerous
hearings and discussions during the last decade, but Congress has
taken no action on the matter. The issue has been one of the most
controversial before the Commission.
The Commission gave much attention to the question of whether
this controversy might be only a doctrinal legal argument with little
substantive impact. We conclude it has substance.
Although most of the current concern relates to the doctrine's
potential future impact, such potential impacts could be major.5 This
would be particularly likely on specific streams or systems where water
is now virtually completely appropriated under state law.
We recommend legislative action to dispel the uncertainty which
the implied reservation doctrine has produced and to provide the basis
for cooperative water resources development planning between the
Federal Government and the public land states.
The reservation doctrine has several advantages for the Federal
Government. (1) As reservation needs develop, uses under it can
expand indefinitely without regard to state water law requirements
4 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
5

Even though Federal departments and agencies were requested to estimate future water
needs for the use in our contract water study, the estimates provided were obviously
rough, not all-encompassing, and, therefore, unconvincing. We also note that the needs
expressed could not be considered as maximums.
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that water be put to beneficial use within a reasonable time. (2) Vast
reserves created around the turn of the century carry advantageous
early priority dates vis-a-vis state-determined priorities. (3) The Federal
Government need not pay any compensation for divested non-Federal
rights initiated after the date of the withdrawal or reservation, however
long the water may have been beneficially used. (4) The Federal use
need not be "beneficial" under state law if it is within the scope of
the purposes for which the reservation or withdrawal was created.
While the advantages of the reservation concept to Federal
agencies are apparent, there are problems which must also be considered
from the Federal standpoint. (1) In Arizona v. California6 the Master
required some evidence of intent for each land reservation before he
would sustain an implied reservation of water. It is not clear whether
such an intent would be implied for all reservations and withdrawals,
although to date it appears this should ordinarily be no problem if
water is essential to the express purposes of the reservation. (2) There
is some doubt whether any use will be implied other than those
expressly stated at the time of withdrawal. (3) It appears that where
the purpose of a withdrawal or reservation is changed, the priority
date of the new use will be the date of the use change and not that
of the earlier use. (4) Without litigation or agreement it is not possible
to determine what the maximum permissible amount of water would
be for any given use. In Arizona v. California, for example, the amount
allowed for irrigation uses was based on irrigable acreage and then
current Bureau of the Budget standards of economic feasibility. The
effect of future changes in feasibility standards is uncertain. (5) It is
not clear what the physical relationship of the reserved land must be
to the source of the water supply, i.e., whether a reservation right is
available for land outside the natural watershed of the river system
from which the water would be drawn. (6) It is not clear whether
acquisition of a state appropriative right by the Federal Government
or its lessees, licensees, and permittees has the effect of waiving any
reservation right to additional water for that particular use. (7) It has
not been determined whether termination of a land withdrawal or
reservation also terminates the reserved water right, even when the
particular use continues thereafter.
Limitation of Reservation Doctrine
Recommendation 56: The implied reservation doctrine of water rights
for federally reserved lands should be clarified and limited by Congress
in at least four ways: (a) amounts of water claimed, both surface and
underground, should be formally established; (b) procedures for con-

testing each claim should be provided; (c) water requirements for
future reservations should be expressly reserved; and (d) compensation
6 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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should be awarded where interference results with daims valid under
state law before the decision in Arizona v. California.
Although state law appears to be generally adequate as a basis
for water rights for uses on reserved public lands, the reservation
doctrine should not be abrogated. To do so and to require the public
land agencies to rely solely on state law for the acquisition of water
rights for reserved land uses presents several problems:
(1) In some states important Federal uses, such as for recreation
or fish and wildlife purposes, are either not recognized as beneficial
uses or have low preferences vis-a-vis other competing uses.
(2) The implied reservation doctrine provides the necessary water
rights for certain Federal uses and future needs for which state law
has not been complied with for one reason or another. To discard the
reservation doctrine might well place the validity of those rights in
question and inject further uncertainty into this area.
Nevertheless, the implied reservation doctrine as announced and
applied in Arizona v. California7 has created many problems. Numerous
unanswered questions about its scope and impact remain. The two
most important questions which Congress should resolve, however,
center on (1) the uncertainty which the doctrine has engendered, and
(2) the equity of holders of water rights vested under state law, whose
rights may be curtailed without compensation through its strict application. Solutions of these two critical problems will permit reliance
on the reservation doctrine where necessary to assure adequate Federal
water rights for the reserved public lands, and at the same time minimize
disruption to existing state administrative machinery, promote more
effective water resources planning, and provide equitable treatment
to holders of water rights vested under state laws. Consequently, we
recommend that Congress take the following legislative actions:
(1) Provide a reasonable period of time within which Federal
land agencies must ascertain and give public notice of their projected
water requirements for the next 40 years for reserved areas, and forbid
the assertion of a reservation claim for any quantity or use not included
within such public notice.
Some Federal agencies, in particular the Forest Service, are
endeavoring to refine their data on present uses and future requirements and to provide such information to state water authorities.
However, there is nothing in the present legal system which requires
this or makes such quantification binding on the agencies, and they
would be free to enlarge these projections in the future as they deem fit.
Most of the present uncertainties should be removed by requiring
a binding quantification and delineation of Federal claims, particularly
such questions as quantities of water reserved, priority of right, per7

Id.
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missible purposes and places of use, etc. These determinations might
be made as part of the review of existing land withdrawals which we
recommend elsewhere in this report, although a shorter time period
for this effort seems desirable. In those cases where it seems likely
that existing uses on reserved lands will increase to significantly larger
estimated future requirements at a relatively modest rate over the
40-year period, Congress may wish to provide a means for the agencies
to permit interim use of reserved water until it is needed for Federal
purposes. This would promote maximum beneficial use of water and
could be done through formal arrangements with the states.
(2) Establish a procedure for administrative or judicial determination of the reasonableness of the quantity claimed, or the validity
of the proposed use under present law.
This would give an opportunity for timely contest by present
users or appropriate state agencies of the quantity or legality of the
use, such as whether the use is properly implied from the creation of
the withdrawal or reservation. At the present time there is no procedure
for doing this.
There is no effective judicial machinery to permit the resolution
of the many issues raised by the reservation doctrine, even if a case-bycase approach to its clarification and refinement were desirable, and
we do not believe that it is. Although the United States is free to
initiate such a suit, the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars such
actions by non-Federal water users or state administrative agencies
unless Congress has consented to such a suit. The McCarran Act,8
which on its face consents to certain kinds of water adjudications, is
an unsatisfactory vehicle for obtaining definition of Federal reservation claims. The courts have held that all water users on a river system
must be joined under that Act,' and this is not always possible or
feasible. Moreover, the issue of whether the McCarran Act permits
adjudication only of rights held under state law and not of Federal
reserved rights, as the Department of Justice contends, is now before
the United States Supreme Court.1 °
Although we elsewhere recommend that Congress provide for
judicial review of public land decisions by aggrieved parties, we are
not prepared to go that far with respect to all Federal water right
questions. Not only are the questions more complex, but they go far
beyond this Commission's jurisdiction, since they usually affect multiplepurpose project developments having little or no public land connection
and are best dealt with by the National Water Commission. However,
8 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1964).
9 Miller v. Jennings, 243 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 827 (1957).
10 United States v. District Court, 458 P.2d 760 (Colo. 1969), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 1005
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we do recommend provision for judicial review of at least the limited
questions of the reasonableness of the quantity claimed under the
reservation doctrine, its priority date, and the purposes for which the
reserved water may be used.
(3) Provide that procedures for creation of future withdrawals
and reservations require, as a condition to claims of reserved water
rights, a statement of prospective water requirements and an express
reservation of such quantity of unappropriatedwater.
This would have the effect of requiring an administrative or
legislative review of these claims and substitution of express water
rights reservations for potential implied claims. Coupled with the
previous recommendation concerning existing reserved rights, most of
the uncertainty generated by the reservation concept should be eliminated.
(4) Require compensation to be paid where the utilization of the
implied reservation doctrine interferes with uses under water rights
vested under state law prior to the 1963 decision in Arizona v.
California.
When reliance is placed on Federal water rights impliedly reserved
along with the reservation or withdrawal of public lands, the effect
may be to displace, without compensation, other non-Federal public
and private uses under water rights acquired under state law subsequent
to the date when the water was impliedly reserved for the Federal
lands, but prior to the date the water was actually put to use by the
Federal agencies. This is the principal vice of the doctrine from the
viewpoint of individual water users. Prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Arizona v. California in 1963, no water user could
have been on actual or constructive notice of the existence of such
an "implied" Federal water right. The same is true of the state
administrative agencies, since as a matter of formal policy and actual
practice, the public land agencies generally adhered to state law in
acquiring water rights for reserved lands prior to 1963.
As a practical matter, use of the doctrine to cause actual injury
to water rights vested under state law without compensation has been
rare to date, and the likely future impact is uncertain. However, as a
matter of policy Congress has generally provided in the Reclamation
Act of 1902" and the Federal Power Act of 192012 that compensation
be provided to holders of water rights vested under state law when
they are interfered with by projects authorized or licensed under those
two acts. We find no reason for a different policy where public land
programs are involved. As a matter of fairness and equity, it is appro1143 U.S.C. §§ 371 et seq. (1964).
12

16 U.S.C. §§ 791-825 (1964).
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priate to compensate holders of vested state water rights whose uses
are curtailed through Federal reliance on the implied reservation
doctrine. We believe that the potential costs to the Federal Government
would be relatively low. In any event, the social costs of displacing
existing uses for the benefit of national programs should be borne by
the Federal taxpayers, and not by the affected individual users.

A GUIDE TO THE EXAMINATION OF
WATER TABULATIONS
BY MICHAEL D. WHITE*
Attorneys, by the nature of their profession, are continually
being called upon to familiarize themselves with current legislative
enactments and the practical procedures that usually accompany their
implementation. The recent change in Colorado water law with respect to the tabulation of water rights presents such a situation. Mr.
White, in this timely and informative article, discusses this complex
area and presents a guide to examining the recently published tabulation lists. In a very practical manner, the author attempts to help
many attorneys understand and utilize these tabulations so that the
water rights of their clients may be adequately safeguarded.
INTRODUCTION

N accordance with the "Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969,"'1 division engineers throughout the state have
prepared tabulations of all decreed water rights and conditional water
rights in their respective divisions in order of seniority. 2 All owners
of water rights are thus faced with the problem of determining
whether their water rights are correctly listed in the various tabulations
prepared by the division engineers. Although many owners may attempt
this process on their own, its complexity usually requires the attention
of a lawyer who is familiar with water law as well as the records
3
maintained by the state engineer.
Under the 1969 Act, two initial tabulations in 1970 and regular
bi-annual tabulations after 1974 are required.4 The state and division
engineers are to prepare the tabulations, describing
[ejach water right and conditional water right by some appropriate
means [setting] forth the priority and amount thereof as established by

court decrees.... so that only those water rights and conditional water
rights which take or will take water from the same source and are
in a position to affect one another will be on the same priority list.6

Each tabulation will be subject to protest or objection based on the
6
incorrect entry or omission of a water right or conditional water right.
*B.S. United States Military Academy, 1963; M.A.O.M. University of Southern California,
1967; J. D. Cornell University, 1970; Associate, Holland & Hart, Denver, Colorado. The
author is indebted to James E. Hegarty and Robert L. VerSchure of Holland & Hart for
their assistance in the preparation of this article.
1 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-1 el seq. (Supp. 1969).
2 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-27(1) (a) (Supp. 1969).
3 If you are located near one of the division engineers, it would be worthwhile to call his
office to find out what records are kept there.
4 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-27(1)(a),-28(1) (Supp. 1969).
5Id. § 148-21-27(1) (a).
eid. §§ 148-21-27(3), (5); id.§§ 148-21-28(2)(c), (e).
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Consequently, a lawyer representing the owner of any water right
or conditional water right must determine two things: first, that the
contents of the decree, resulting from the adjudication of his right, are
correctly entered in the tabulation; second, that his right is given its
correct priority vis-a-vis all the other rights listed in the same tabulation. This article suggests one approach lawyers might use to determine
whether rights have been correctly listed in the tabulations.
I. DETERMINING THE STRUCTURE NAME

Since many owners do not know either the extent or identity of
their water rights, an attorney must first obtain this information before
he can determine if the tabulation accurately reflects his client's rights.
Since the tabulation entries are listed by structure name7 rather than
by the name of the owner, the first problem is to ascertain those
structures in which the owner may have an interest. If the structure
name is unknown to the owner, it can be found in a variety of ways.
Perhaps the simplest method is to examine the documents, or the
abstracts thereof, in the owner's chain of title. Unfortunately, however,
even if these documents can be found, they may not specify the water
rights conveyed.' Consequently, an examination of certain records in
the office of the state engineer may be in order.
If the owner was himself the claimant of an adjudicated water
right or if he knows the name of the claimant, the structure name
can be found by examining the file index in the state engineer's office
labeled "Filings by Claimant."9 The index cards in the claimant's file
are arranged alphabetically by claimants' names, and a structure name
will appear on the card for the appropriate claimant. Once a structure
name has been found, it should be verified as the correct structure
by reference to other documents in the state engineer's office.' 0
If the name of the original claimant is not known or if the name
of an appropriate structure cannot be found on a claimant's card, the
structure name may be found if the legal description of the point of
diversion is known." By examining the map obtainable at the state
engineer's office which points out the boundaries of the former water
7

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-27(1) (a)

(Supp. 1969) provides that: "Such tabula-

tion shall describe each water right and conditional water right by some appropriate means
.
Id. ...
The "appropriate means" has taken the form of structure names to describe
each water right.
8 Comment, Water Title Examinations, 34 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 509, 510-14 (1962).
9 See Worksheet #1 in APPENDIX infra.

10 To make sure that the structure name which is found on the claimant's card is the correct
structure, verify that the structure's location is where the client diverts his water. Instructions for making this determination are given elsewhere (see text at 215 infra).
IU See Worksheet #2 in APPENDIX infra.
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districts, 1 2 the particular water district in which the legal description
falls can be determined. After the district has been determined, then
the decree ledger books (which are also obtainable at the state engineer's office) should be consulted; they contain a listing of all
adjudicated structures in each of the old districts and a description of
the location of each structure. To utilize the books, run down the
listing for the appropriate district to determine if there is a location
description that matches the legal description of a client's structure. If
the structure at the described location does not appear to be the correct
one or if no location description can be found that corresponds to the
legal description of the client's structure, then note the name and date
of the adjudication of the last structure listed in the decree ledger
book. It is possible that relatively recent decrees have been issued which
are not listed in the appropriate decree ledger book but which are
listed in the appropriate decree page book (located in the state engineer's office) which appears in several volumes for each district and
which contains copies of all the decrees issued in that district. By
using the date of adjudication of the last structure listed in the decree
ledger book, it can be determined if there are any decrees in the district
page book which have not yet been entered in the ledger book. If so,
run through the legal descriptions of any structures which have been
subsequently adjudicated.
II.

IDENTIFYING THE APPROPRIATE TABULATION LIST

Once the structure name is known, the next step is to determine
the tabulation list upon which it appears. Each division engineer prepares one tabulation list for each separate source within his division1"
so that on!y those water rights and conditional water rights which
take or will take water from the same source and are in a position to
affect one another will be on the same priority list.'"14 Sources are
comprised of entire drainage basins of the major rivers and streams
of the state. For example, Division No. 2 contains two sources: the
drainage basin of the Arkansas River and the drainage basin of the Dry
Cimarron River.'" With certain exceptions, each drainage basin is
located, in its entirety, within a single water division.' 6 For a fee,"' the
12COLO.REV. STAT. ANN.§ 148-21-27(1) (b) (iv)
1Id.§ 148-21-27(1) (a).

(Supp. 1969).

14Id.
5

2 Id. § 148-21-8(3).

16 The water division within which a particular drainage area is located may be determined
by examining the map published by the state engineer showing the boundaries of the new
water division or by referring to COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-8 (Supp. 1969).
17 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-18(1)

(Supp. 1969).
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tabulation for any particular drainage area may be obtained from the
appropriate division engineer.1 8
III.

EXAMINING THE TABULATION

Each tabulation contains information with respect to (1) the
findings and decrees in original or supplemental adjudication proceedings 9 and (2) the priority of a particular structure as against all
other structures listed in the tabulation.2 ° The task of the lawyer is to
determine the accuracy of this information.
A. Comparing the Decree Information with Tabulation Entries
It is relatively easy to ascertain that the decree information has
been transferred correctly to the tabulation. First, the structure name
should be found by examining the left-hand column of the tabulation.
If, after a careful examination, the structure name cannot be found,2
then an objection is in order,22 if the structure was the subject of a
decreed priority.2 3
Provided that the structure name is listed on the tabulation, the
next step is the examination of the decree itself; copies of all
decrees can be found in the decree page book.2 4 To use this book,
first consult the card index labeled "Filing by Title" and find the
card which contains the name of the structure, noting the district
number; move to the card file index labeled "Decrees", look in
the drawer labeled with the appropriate district number, and check
the card containing the name of the structure, noting the page of the
18 As of October 6, 1970, the names and addresses of the division engineers were:
#1

W. G. Wilkinson

#5

Donald L. Smith

Room 208
P.O. Box 926
8th and 8th Office Bldg.
Glenwood Springs, Colorado 81601
Greeley, Colorado 80631
#6 Wesley E. Signs
#2 Rudolph Styduhar
P.O. Box 95
1906 West Northern Avenue
Steamboat Springs, Colorado 80477
Pueblo, Colorado 81004
#7 George E. Barklay
#3 Wayne M. Crosby
P.O. Box 551
P.O. Box 269
Durango, Colorado 81302
Alamosa, Colorado 81101
#4 Ralph V. Kelling, Jr.
P.O. Box 456
Montrose, Colorado 81401
19Name of structure, type of structure, name of source, number of the original water district, the use, the amount, the type of adjudications, the location of the point of diversion,
the date of the adjudication, the date of the previous adjudication (if any), and the
appropriate date for the structure. For certain entries, numerical or letter codes (explained
on the tabulation's cover sheet) are used.
2D With the exception of structures receiving their priorities in an original adjudication, this
priority cannot be determined by reference to the underlying decree alone.
21 It is possible that a structure is included in the "District List," described at 218 infra, but
not carried over into the tabulation for the entire source. Consequently, check the "District
List"; if the structure appears there, mention that fact in the protest.
22 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-27(3)

(Supp. 1969).

2 To be certain that the structure did receive a decreed priority, see text at 217 infra.
24 See text at 215 supra.
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decree page book on which a copy of the decree can be found. By
comparing the information contained in the decree with the entries
can be ascertained; discrepancies
in the tabulation,25 any discrepancy
26
constitute grounds for objection.
B. Verifying the Tabulation Priority Number
The number in the far right-hand column of the tabulation is
the structure's priority vis-a-vis all other structures in that tabulation.
Whether or not the listed priority is correct is the most difficult issue
facing a lawyer making a tabulation examination.
Generally, it is completely impractical to be absolutely certain that
the priority numbers given to structures senior to a client's structure
are correct. Such a task would entail checking the tabulation entries
for each senior structure against the information contained in each
supporting decree.
However, if a client's structure has a relatively low priority number or was given its priority in an original adjudication, a thorough
examination is possible. To make the examination, obtain the appropriate decrees for each senior structure 27 and compare them with
the entries in the tabulation.2 8
On the other hand, this procedure will usually be impractical if a
client's structure has a relatively high priority number. Consequently,
anyone making an examination will be forced to accept as correct all
tabulation entries for senior structures.
After the correctness of all tabulation entries for senior structures
has been checked or it has been decided to accept the correctness of
those entries, the next step is to determine if a client's structure has
been given the proper priority number.
The following statutory provisions are the ground rules for establishing priority numbers:
As among water rights decreed in the same water district in the

same adjudication suit, the historic date of initiation of appropriation
shall determine the relative priorities, beginning with the earliest right.
As among water rights decreed in the same water district in
different adjudication suits, all water rights decreed in an adjudication

suit shall be senior to all water rights decreed in any subsequent

adjudication suit.
As among water rights decreed in the various original adjudication suits in the various water districts of the same water division, the
decreed date of initiation of appropriation shall determine the relative

priorities in numbered sequence, beginning with the earliest right.
As among water rights decreed in the various supplemental
adjudication suits in the various water districts of the same water
division, the actual priority date of any decree in any district shall not
25 See Worksheet #3 in APPENDIX infra.

§ 148-21-28(c) (Supp. 1969).
27For instructions on how to conduct this examination, see text § III (A) supra.
2 See Worksheet #3 in APPENDIX infra.
20 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
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extend back further than the day following the entry of the final

decree in the preceding adjudication suit in such district.

If the preceding principles would cause in any particular case a

substantial change in the priority of a particular water right to the
extent theretofore lawfully enjoyed for a period of not less than
eighteen years, then the division engineer shall designate the priority
for that water right in accordance with historic practice.29

There are two major exceptions to these rules. First, if the client's
structure is a well (designated by a "2" on the tabulation), if his
priority has been awarded in a decree after June 7, 1969, and if he has
filed an application under the 1969 Act before July 1, 1971,30 then
the priority number is not limited by the date of the previous adjudication but should align the well with other structures of like date of
appropriation. 31 Second, if the priority was awarded for nonirrigating
uses, then the priority number should likewise align the client's structure
with other structures of like appropriation date, unless the prior
adjudication date is July 11, 1903, or later and unless the prior adjudication was open to nonirrigating uses., It should be noted, however, that these exceptions are subject to being supplanted by an
historic practice of 18 years duration;33 but the statutory term "historic practice" is so ambiguous that an objection should be filed in
order to protect a client's interest in spite of the passage of 18 years.
Given the basic rules and exceptions, the first place to begin the
examination of the accuracy of the tabulation is with the appropriate "District List," a computer printout found in the state engineer's
office.3 4 By using the structure's priority number on the tabulation,
locate the structure and note its working date. Based on this date,
it can be determined if the structure was given its proper priority
within its original district of adjudication. Disregarding the exceptions
noted above for wells and for nonirrigating uses, the working date
for each structure should be either the appropriation date or the previous adjudication date, whichever is later. Unless the working date
29

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-27(1)(b)(iii-vii) (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
30 In Water Division 3, an application need not be filed until July 1, 1972. Id. § 148-21-22.
31 The

statute states that:
[W]ith respect to water rights which are diverted by means of wells, the priorities for which have not been established or sought in any such decree or proceeding, if the person claiming such a water right files an application for determination of water right and priority not later than July 1, 1971, except in Water
Division 3, where such application must be filed not later than July 1, 1972.
and such application is approved and confirmed, such water right, subject to the
provisions of section 148-21-21 (1), shall be given a priority date as of the date
of actual appropriation and shall not be junior to other priorities by reason of
the foregoing provision. Id. § 148-21-22.
32 Ch. 130, § 1, [19031 Colo. Sess. Laws 297 brought nonirrigating uses into the adjudication systems. Before the effective date of that act, decrees could not award priorities
for purposes other than irrigation. Doll v. McEllen, 21 Colo. App. 7, 12-13, 121 P. 149,
151 (1912). Consequently, the first subsequent supplemental adjudication for nonirrigating uses must be considered as an original adjudication.
33 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-27(1) (b) (vii) (Supp. 1969).
34 See Worksheet #4 in APPENDIX infra.
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is correct, there is little or no chance that the tabulation priority is
correct. Consequently, an incorrect working date constitutes grounds
for objection.
The last step in the investigation is the examination of the tabulation itself. Again with the exception of wells and nonirrigating
uses, a client's structure should be listed senior to any structure which
has an appropriation date later than the appropriation date of the
client's structure. However, if a structure has an adjudication date
earlier than a client's structure, then it should be senior to the client's
structure. 5 Determining such a fact involves a careful examination of
the appropriate entries for each senior structure. 36
CONCLUSION

The procedure outlined above represents a proven technique for
examining water tabulations. Although it is not necessarily the only
acceptable or best technique, it has been used successfully to examine
a large number of structures in the initial tabulations published pursuant
to the 1969 Act. For lawyers beginning their first tabulation examination, it will provide a starting point for that exercise and a vehicle
through which they can develop an approach to the tabulation better
fitted to their own predilictions and the needs of their clients.
APPENDIX
WORKSHEET #1
DETERMINATION

OF STRUCTURE

NAME
BASED ON CLAIMANT'S NAME

1. Claimant's Possible Name:
2. Name of Structure from Claimant's Card:
3. Complete and attach hereto Worksheet #3.
WORKSHEET

#2

DETERMINATION OF STRUCTURE

NAME
BASED ON LEGAL DESCRIPTION
OF POINT OF DIVERSION

1. Suspected Legal Description:

3 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-27(1) (b) (iv)
36 See Worksheet #5 in APPENDIX infra.

(Supp. 1969).
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2. Original Water District within which legal description falls based
on examination of map showing boundaries of former Water
Districts:
3. The structure in the appropriate decree ledger book, which (based
on its location) appears to be the client's:
4. Name and date of adjudication of the last structure listed in the
decree ledger book:
5. If no appropriate structure appears in the decree ledger book, note
the name of the structure in the decree page book for the Water
District in "2" above, which:
a. Received priorities in adjudications subsequent to the date entered
in "4" above, and
b. Has a legal description which indicates that it is the client's
structure:
6. Complete and attach hereto worksheet #3.
WORKSHEET

#3

MATCHING DECREE INFORMATION
AND
TABULATION

ENTRIES

1. From the card bearing the structure's name in the file labeled

"Filing by Title", note the district number:
2.

In the file labeled "Decrees", look in the drawer labeled with the
district number in "1" above, and, from the card bearing the
structure's name, note the page number at which the decree appears
in the decree page book:
TABULATION

3.

Name of structure:

4. Type of structure:

(circle one)
(1) ditch

(2) well
(3)

reservoir

(4) springs
(5) seeps
(6) mine

DECREE
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(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

pipeline
surface pumps
power plant
other

5. Name of source:
6. W"D (Water District)

(tab. 71 = dist. 34;
tab. 74 = dist. 42)
7. Type of use(s):

(circle one)
(1) irrigation
(2)

municipal

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

commercial
industrial
recreation
fishery
fire
domestic
stock
others

8. Amount:
9. Type of adjudication:

(circle one)
(1) original
(2) supplemental
(3) original
conditional
(4) original
transfer to
(5) original
transfer from
(6) original
abandoned
(7) original alternate
(8) original conditional transfer to
(9) original conditional transfer
from
(10) original conditional abandonment

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)

(18)

(19)

(20)

10. Location:
(1) Meridian

original conditional alternate
supplemental
conditional
supplemental
transfer to
supplemental
transfer from
supplemental
abandonment
supplemental
alternate
supplemental
conditional
transfer to
supplemental
conditional
transfer from
supplemental
conditional
abandonment
supplemental
conditional
alternate

(circle one)
S - Sixth
N - New Mexico
U - Ute
C - Costilla

(2) Township

(3) Range
(4) Section number
(5) Portion of
Section
11. Adjudication date:
12. Previous adjudication
date:
13. Appropriation date:
14. Complete and attach hereto Worksheet #4.
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WORKSHEET

#4

VERIFICATION OF WORKING DATE
ON DISTRICT LIST

Working Date:
1. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-27(1)(b) (Supp. 1969):

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

(ii) As among water rights decreed in the same water district in
the same adjudication suit, the historic date of initiation of appropriation shall determine the relative priorities, beginning with the
earliest right.
(iii) As among water rights decreed in the same water district in
different adjudication suits, all water rights decreed in any adjudication suit shall be senior to all water rights decreed in any subsequent adjudication suit.
Is the working date the latest of the following? yes/no
(1) appropriation date:
(2) prior adjudication date:
Exception for nonirrigating use: For any nonirrigating use (all
but "1") the working date should not be the prior adjudication
date unless the prior adjudication date is July 11, 1903, or later,
and the prior adjudication was open to non-irrigating uses. Does
the client's structure fall within this exception?
yes/no (circle one)
Exception for wells. When the client's structure is a well ("2")
and his priority has been awarded in a decree after 6/7/69, and
he has submitted an application under the 1969 Act on or before
7/1/71 (7/1/72 for division 3), the working date should align
the well with other structures of like date of appropriation. CoLo.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-22 (Supp. 1969). Does the client's
structure fall within this exception?
yes/no (circle one)
Is the working date correct?
yes/no (circle one)
(1) If so, are the working dates of all senior structures earlier than
the client's?
yes/no (circle one)
(2) If not, which ones are later?
Structure name
Prioritynumber
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Complete and attach hereto Worksheet #5.
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WORKSHEET #5
VERIFICATION OF PRIORITY
NUMBER ON TABULATION

1. Client's structure
a. Name:
b. Date of appropriation:
/
/
c. Previous date of adjudication:
2. Since this verification involved only structures in other districts,
bear in mind the following provisions of COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 148-21-27(1) (b) (Supp. 1969):
(iv) As among water rights decreed in the various original
adjudication suits in the various water districts of the same water
division, the decreed date of initiation of appropriation shall determine the relative priorities in numbered sequence, beginning with
the earliest right.
(v) As among water rights decreed in the various supplemental
adjudication suits in the various water districts of the same water
division, the actual priority date of any decree in any district shall
not extend back further than the day following the entry of the
final decree in the preceding adjudication suit in such district.
3. Do all structures with a lower priority number have an earlier
appropriation date?
yes/no (circle one)
4. If not, what are their priority numbers?

5. Do any of the structures with the priority numbers listed above
have a previous adjudication date which is later than the previous
adjudication date of your client's structure?
yes/no (circle one)
6. If so, what are their priority numbers?

1970
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7. If your client's structure is a well and its priority was awarded
in a decree after June 7, 1969, and he has submitted an application under the 1969 Act on or before 7/1/71 (7/1/72 for

division 3), its priority number is not limited by the previous
adjudication date of other structures. Consequently, has your
client's structure been given a priority number commensurate solely
with its date of appropriation?
yes/no (circle one)
If not, what should its adjudicated priority number be?
_A.
8. If your client's water right or conditional water right is for nonirrigation uses, do any senior structures have both:
a. an appropriation date later than the appropriation date of the
client's structure, and
b. an adjudication date earlier than July 11, 1903?
yes/no (circle one)
9. If so, what are their priority numbers?

10. If so, what priority number should be assigned to the client's
structure to align it with other structures with the same date of
appropriation?
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INTRODUCTION

OLORADO has attempted to encourage the utilization of its water
resources in a manner which is consistent with the climate and
geography of the state and in a way which contributes to social and
economic growth. To affect this policy, there have been numerous
legislative enactments, judicial opinions, and administrative procedures
-all
of which comprise the total body of Colorado water law. It is
the purpose of this study, divided into three major parts, to set forth
this law as clearly and concisely as possible.
PART ONE: WATER WHICH IS TRIBUTARY

In Colorado, all water which flows into natural streams is governed
by the system of prior appropriation, a system which comprises a
number of elements and which constitutes a significant portion of the
total body of Colorado water law. PART ONE discusses the component
parts of the prior appropriation doctrine against the historical background of the system.
To provide this background, PART ONE begins with a brief sketch
of the early developments of prior appropriation in Colorado. Within
this context, those elements of water law which have become known
as the "Colorado Doctrine" and the "Colorado System" are described.
Following this discussion, the first major element of the appropriation
doctrine is treated: the requirements which must be satisfied before a
right is acquired. The principles of diversion, beneficial use, conditional
rights, and rights-of-way are considered within this area.
Once the appropriative right is acquired, the important issues then
become the legal extent of the right and how it may be exercised.
The legal principles involved in these parts of the appropriation system
delineate the rights of junior and senior appropriators as well as the
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requirements necessary for changing the point of diversion and place
of use of a water right.
Yet legal controls have been placed upon the exercise of a water
right which restrict it and which can cause it to be lost. Further, extensive adjudication and administrative procedures have been adopted
which can significantly affect the manner in which a water right may
be secured and maintained. A discussion of these aspects of the prior
appropriation doctrine concludes PART ONE.
I.

HISTORICAL

BACKGROUND

Although perhaps of little practical value, the history of the development of the prior appropriation doctrine and, more specifically, of
the Colorado Doctrine and the Colorado System provides significant
insight into the water problems which were confronted by the Western
States and the various methods and approaches used to solve those
problems. In addition, the statutes and the judicial principles formulated
during this early period form the general bases for the appropriation
doctrine as it exists today.
A. The Development of the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation
Before the development and settlement of the West, the right to
use the waters of natural streams was tied inextricably to the incidence
of land ownership. Utilized primarily in the eastern half of the United
States where water was abundant,' this common law riparian doctrine
was founded on real property rights.2 Thereunder, "rights in water
arise from, and only from, ownership of land which adjoins or underlies a stream .... ."' Further, riparian rights cannot be lost by mere
disuse; the water can be used only on the riparian tract; and, at common
law, there were no specific requirements as to beneficial use. 4
Such rules were not suitable in the Western States. The arid
climate, the geographical features, and an economy primarily based
on mining and agriculture required more flexibility in water usage.
For example, in the mining industry
water was absolutely indispensable, but as such use often necessarily
involved the diversion of the water to points at a distance from the
stream, from which it could not well be restored to its natural channel,
as well as its substantial diminution in quantity and deterioration in
quality, it was found that the common-law doctrine governing the right
to the use of natural streams was inapplicable.5

Therefore, to restrict the use of water only to land which touched

12 J. SAX,

WATER LAW 8 (1965) [hereinafter cited
J. LONG, IRRIGATION 126-27 (1916).
3 J. SAx, supra note 1, at 8.
4
5

as J. SAx].

Id. at 9.
See Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 63 Am.Dec. 113 (1855).
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natural streams was both impractical and inefficient. Indeed, "to limit
the use of water to those tracts of land which bordered the streams
in the West have made the vast bulk of non-riparian lands simply
unusable."
To alleviate the difficulties in applying the riparian doctrine, a
new theory of obtaining water rights had to be developed. As more
people moved to the West and used the water, a method had to be
devised which would protect those who had already used water, allow
maximum use of water resources, and, at the same time, conserve as
much water as possble. By analogizing to mining law, the law of water
rights became one of prior appropriation, i.e., the first user of the
water was protected against later takers, just as the first to claim a mine
was protected from later "claim jumpers."' Although first developed
as a custom, this appropriation doctrine gradually became the subject
of constitutional and statutory enactments, making it a part of the law
of the several Western States, albeit in varying forms: Some states
attempted to commingle the doctrines of prior appropriation and
riparian rights; 7 others adopted a general appropriation statute which
made some provision for certain riparian rights;8 and still others repudiated the riparian doctrine entirely.9 Further, in the Mining Act of
1866,10 the Desert Land Act of 1877," and the Reclamation Act
of 1902,12 there appeared to be tacit approval by the federal government that the appropriation doctrine as adopted by the several states
would be applicable to public lands which were located in such states,
although presently that issue is the subject of heated debate between
the state and federal governments. 3
B. The Development of the Prior Appropriation Doctrine in
Colorado and the Colorado System
Unlike some western states,' 4 Colorado repudiated riparian rights
in toto1' and adopted the doctrine of prior appropriation. Because
6 Trelease, Law, Water and People: The Role of Water Law in Conserving and Developing Natural Resources in the West, 18 WYO. L.J. 3, 6 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Trelease].
7 For a good discussion of the results of such attempts, see California Oregon Power Co.,
v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
8 See J. SAx, supra note 1, at 1.
9Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
10 14 Stat. 262, 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1964).
11 19 Stat. 377, 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1964).
12 32 Stat. 388, 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1964).
13 See generally Moses, Federal-State Water Problems. 47 DENVER L.J. 194 (1970).

14 See text accompanying notes 8 and 9 infra.
15CoLo. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 6; CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148.2-2 (1963); see Coffin v.
Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882).
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Colorado was the first state to adopt this system, the prior appropriation doctrine also became known as the "Colorado Doctrine" and is
often contrasted with the earlier "California Doctrine" which attempted
to commingle both riparianism and appropriation.16 The factors which
necessitated the adoption of the Colorado Doctrine were succinctly
stated by Justice Helm in the well-known case of Coffin v. Left Hand
Ditch Co.: 17
The climate is dry, and the soil, when moistened only by the usual
rainfall, is arid and unproductive; except in a few favored sections,
artificial irrigation for agriculture is an absolute necessity. Water in
the various streams thus acquires a value unknown in moister climates.
Instead of being a mere incident to the soil, it rises, when appropriated, to the dignity of a distinct usufructuary estate, or right of
property.,
It should also be noted that the Colorado Doctrine was the rule
in Colorado even before the adoption of the state constitution, 19 a fact
of significant importance since many water rights had been established
before the state was admitted to the Union. Notwithstanding the
Session Laws of 1861, which seemed to infer that there may be riparian
rights if the user applied his water to agricultural purposes,2 ° the
Colorado Supreme Court in the Left Hand Ditch case21 construed the
intent of the legislature in enacting such laws to be in accord with the
doctrine of prior appropriation so that there was no conflict.2 2 By so
holding, the Court established the underpinnings of the Colorado
Doctrine.
In addition to adopting the appropriation doctrine, Colorado has
developed liberal procedures to be followed in establishing a water
right, procedures which constitute what is frequently known as the
"Colorado System." Historically this system has generally been described
as permitting "water to be appropriated without any governmental
intervention"; 2" and it is often contrasted with permit systems which
16

See California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
See also W.

17
18

HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE

WEST 21-22 (1942) [hereinafter cited as W. HUTCHINS).
6 Colo.

443 (1882).

Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882).

19 Id.

[A]ll persons who claim, own or hold a possessory right or title to any land
or parcel of land within the boundary of Colorado Territory, . . . when those
claims are on the bank, margin or neighborhood of any stream of water, creek
or river, shall be entitled to the use of the water of said stream, creek or river,
for the purposes of irrigation, and making said claims available, to the full
extent of the soil, for agricultural purposes.
Act of November 5, 1861, § 1, [1861) Colo. Laws 67 (amended 1866).
21
Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
2
Id. at 451-52.
20

23

J. SAX, supra note 1, at 38.
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have been adopted in other western states 24 (as welt as a few eastern
states) 2 5 and which
require as a prerequisite to taking and using water that an application
for a permit to proceed be made with some administrative agency
.

. .

. Such applications frequently require a detailed information

filing, publication and notice, hearing and provision for judicial review.
• . . The grant or denial of the permit depends on whether the agency

believes it would be "detrimental to the public interest." '26
While the constitutional provision that the right to divert and
beneficially use unappropriated water "shall never be denied ' 2 7 would
ostensibly seem to preclude Colorado from adopting a permit system,
there are significant indications to the contrary. For example in Fundingsland v. Colorado Ground Water Commission,28 plaintiff applied
to the Colorado Ground Water Commission 9 for a permit to dril a
well. Even though there were no objections to the application filed,
the Commission denied the application "on the basis that there was over
appropriation in the area where the well was to be drilled.'' s° In appealing the decision of the trial court which upheld the Commission, the
plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the ruling denied him of his constitutional right to appropriate. In rejecting this contention, the Colorado
Supreme Court reasoned that even though unappropriated water might
exist, it might not be available for appropriation. Indeed, the fact that
it would deplete the source of supply and, concomitantly, be detrimental to senior appropriators using the same source of supply would
support a finding that there was no available water for appropriation.
Specifically, the court held that
[w]hen, as in this case, water is being mined from the ground
water basin [made subject to prior appropriation by COLO. REV. STAT.
24ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.

§

45-142 (1956), as amended ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.

§

45-142

(Supp. 1970); CAL. WATER CODE § 1225 (1956), as amended CAL. WATER CODE
§ 1225 (Supp.1970); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-202 (1948), as amended IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 42-202 (Supp. 1969); KANSAS STAT. ANN. § 82a-709 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 46-233 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.325 (1963), as amended NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 533.325 (Supp. 1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-5-1 (1968); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 61-04-02 (1960), as amended N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-02 (Supp. 1969); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 82 § 21 (1970); S.D. COMPILED LAWS § 46-5-11 (1969); TEx. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7492 (1954), as amended TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 7492

(Supp. 1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-1 (1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.250
(1962),

as amended WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.250 (Supp. 1969); WYO. STAT.

ANN. § 41-201 (1959), as amended Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-201 (Supp. 1969).
2FLA. STAT. ANN. 8 373.141 (1960), as amended FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.141 (Supp.
1969); IOWA CODE ANN. § 455A.26 (1949), as amended IOWA CODE ANN. § 455A.26
(Supp. 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66c, § 720 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.41
(1964), as amended MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.41 (Supp. 1970); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 5956-04 (1943), as amended MISS. CODE ANN. § 5956-04 (Supp. 1968).

2

rJ. SAX, supra note 1, at 37 (citations omitted).
7
§ 6.
28468 P.2d 835 (Colo. 1970).
29 COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-3 (Supp. 1965).
30 Fundingsland v. Colorado Ground Water Comm'n, 468 P.2d 835, 839 (Colo. 1970),
2" COLO. CONST. art. XVI,
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§ 148-18-1 (Supp. 1965)], and a proposed appropriation would

result in unreasonable harm to senior appropriators, then a determina81
tion that there is no water available for appropriation is justified.
Hence, the court upheld the permit procedures and dispensed with the
constitutional question by deciding that there was no water available
for appropriation.
Recent legislation also seems to indicate a trend to the permit
system. In addition to the permit required by the Ground Water Management Act 2 discussed in Fundingsland,the "Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969" 33 provides for extensive
application procedures8 4 and administrative machinery 5 which is somewhat similar to procedures found in permit states and which indicates
that at least a modified permit structure is being established in
Colorado.

II.

ACQUISITION OF A WATER RIGHT

Since Colorado has adopted the prior appropriation system, it is
important to determine what acts are necessary to establish a valid
appropriation. The material which follows focuses on the requireinents which must be satisfied and also discusses the subjects of
conditional rights and right-of-way which are often interrelated with
the acquisition of a water right.
A. Requirements
Subject to several limitations and modifications which will be
discussed in some detail at a later point, the doctrine of prior appropriation imposes two requirements in acquiring a water right: there
must be a taking of the water and an application to beneficial use.86
1. The Taking
While the taking of water has generally been held to refer to an
actual, physical diversion of water from a stream, 7 the courts have
31 Id. at 839-40.
32

COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-6 (Supp. 1965).
3
3 Id. §§ 148-21-1 et seq. (Supp. 1969).
34Id. § 148-21-18.
35
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-19 to -21 (Supp. 1969).
36
Board of County Comm'rs v. Rocky Mtn. Water Co., 102 Colo. 351, 361, 79 P.2d 373,

378 (1938). It should be noted that at one time there might have been three requirements, the third being the filing of maps and plats. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1484-1 (1963). While it was not essential that such maps and plats be filed to make a valid
appropriation, the entire section was nevertheless repealed by the legislature in 1969.
Id. § 148-4-1 (Supp. 1969).

37Denver v. Northern Colo. Water Conserv. Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 386, 276 P.2d 992,
998 (1954).
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stated that -[t]he word 'divert' must be interpreted in connection with
the word 'appropriation' "38 and that "the true test of appropriation
of water is the successful application thereof to the beneficial use
designed, and the method of distributing or carrying the same or making
such application, is immaterial." 3' 9 Thus, in Thomas v. Guiraud, °
wherein it was alleged that a valid appropriation had not been made
because ditches had not been constructed, the court stated:
If a dam or contrivance of any kind will suffice to turn water from
the stream and moisten the lands sought to be cultivated, it is sufficient,
though no ditch is needed or constructed. Or if land be rendered
productive by the natural overflow of the water thereon, without the
aid of any appliances whatever, the cultivation of such land by means
of the water so naturally moistening the same is a sufficient appropriation of such water, or so much thereof as is reasonably necessary for
such use. 41
The need for extensive, mechanical devices to accomplish a diversion of water was similarly disposed of in Genoa v. Westfall.42 In that
case, the plaintiff claimed water which had been used for domestic
purposes, including water consumed by his livestock at natural watering
places. The court held:
It is not necessary in every case for an appropriator of water to
construct ditches or artificial ways through which the water might be
taken from the stream in order that a valid appropriation be made.
The only indispensable requirements are that the appropriator intends
to use the waters for a beneficial purpose and actually applies them
43
to that use.

Likewise, where a party utilized a natural reservoir in the bed of
a stream to store water for future irrigation needs, the court held that
a valid appropriation had been made even though an actual diversion
from the bed of the stream did not take place till a subsequent date.44
It should be noted, however, that the court's decision was conditioned
upon the appropriator's beneficial purpose being consummated without
4
unnecessary delay. "
Hence, whether or not an actual, physical diversion of water is
necessary is dependent upon the needs of the appropriator and the
location of the water supply. Yet in any event, any taking of water
Larimer County Res. Co. v. People ex tel Luthe, 8 Colo. 614, 616, 9 P. 794, 795 (1885).
Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530, 533 (1883). But see Colorado River Water Conserv.
Dist. v. Rocky Mtn. Power Co., 158 Colo. 331, 406 P.2d 798 (1965).
406 Colo. 530 (1883).
41
Id. at 533.
4141 Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370 (1960).
3 Id. at 547, 349 P.2d at 378.
38
39

" Latimer County Res. Co. v. People ex rel Luthe, 8 Colo. 614, 617, 9 P. 794, 796 (1885).
45 Id. at 617, 9 P. at 796.
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must be accompanied by the second requirement for establishing a valid
46
appropriation: beneficial use.
2.

Beneficial Use

While the state constitution requires that all waters be appropriated for a beneficial use, 47 it contains no definition of that term.4 8

Lacking a constitutional standard, the courts have held that the determi49
nation of beneficial use depends upon the circumstances of each case.
Notwithstanding this ad hoc approach, the courts have created general
categories of beneficial use which not only include, by implication,

the constitutional list of preferences5 - i.e., domestic, agricultural, or
4Knapp v. Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist., 131 Colo. 42, 279 P.2d 420 (1955).
"[Bleneficial use is the ultimate essential in the establishment of a water right .... "
Id. at 52, 279 P.2d at 425. Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 96 P.2d 836 (1939).
"(T)he application of water to a beneficial use is essential to a completed appropriation." Id. at 199, 96 P.2d at 839. Board of County Comm'rs v. Rocky Mtn. Water Co.,
102 Colo. 351, 79 P.2d 373 (1938). "[T)he act of diversion and the act of applying
the water diverted to a beneficial use, whether performed by the same or different
persons, are both necessary to constitute an appropriation, so the continued existence
of the appropriation depends on the continuance of both, diversion and beneficial
application." Id. at 361, 79 P.2d at 378. United States v. Palisade Irr. Dist., 60 Colo.
214, 152 P. 145 (1915). Much of the proceeding for the adjudication of water rights as
related to a future appropriation of water depends on whether there will be an application to a beneficial use. Id. at 215, 152 P. at 145. Highland Ditch Co. v. Union Res.
Co., 53 Colo. 483, 127 P. 1025 (1912). Water diverted and stored must be beneficially
applied to constitute a valid appropriation. Id. at 485, 127 P. at 1025. Crawford Clipper
Ditch Co. v. Needle Rock Ditch Co., 50 Colo. 176, 114 P. 655 (1911). A decree of an
amount of water that flowed through a ditch was limited to the amount of water per
second of time that had been applied to a beneficial use. Id. at 181, 114 P. at 657. Drach
v. Isola, 48 Colo. 134, 109 P. 748 (1910). A decree for water for a future use could
only become absolute if the water "was applied to a beneficial use within a reasonable time." Id. at 144, 109 P. at 751. Fort Morgan Land & Canal Co. v. South Platte
Ditch Co., 18 Colo. 1, 30 P. 1032 (1892). The diversion of water into ditches "at
times when the same is not needed for a beneficial purpose, to the detriment of other
later appropriators" cannot be allowed. Id. at 3-4, 30 P. at 1033. Farmers' High Line
Canal & Res. Co. v. Southworth, 13 Colo. 111, 21 P. 1928 (1889). A diversion of
water "must be applied to some beneficial use, and in the case of irrigation it must
be actually applied to the land before the appropriation is complete." Id. at 114-15, 21
P. at 1029. Platte Water Co. v. Northern Colo. Irr. Co., 12 Colo. 525, 21 P. 711 (1889).
"It has been the settled doctrine of our courts that . . . appropriation, to be valid, must
be manifested by the successsful application of the water to the beneficial use designed,
or accompanied by some open, physical demonstration of intent to take the same for
such use." Id. at 531, 21 P. at 713. Wheeler v. Northern Colo. Irr. Co., 10 Colo. 582,
17 P. 487 (1888). "[T]o constitute a legal appropriation, the water diverted must be
applied within a reasonable time to some beneficial use." Id. at 588, 17 P. at 489. Sieber
v. Frink, 7 Colo. 148, 2 P. 901 (1884). "One of the essential elements of a valid appropriation of water is the application thereof to some useful industry." Id. at 154, 2 P. at
904.

47 COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6. "The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any
natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied." Id. Denver v. Sheriff, 105
Colo. 193, 96 P.2d 836 (1939). "The term 'beneficial use' is not defined in the
constitution. What is beneficial use, after all, is a question of fact and depends upon
the circumstances in each case." Id. at 204, 96 P.2d at 842.
48

Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 96 P.2d 836 (1939). "The term 'beneficial use' is not
defined in the Constitution." Id. at 204, 96 P.2d at 842.
49 Id. at 204, 96 P.2d at 842. See also Bell, Beneficial Use of Water, 3 WILLAMETrE L.J.
382, 384 (1965).
50 COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
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industrial purposes - but also other general purposes for which water
is used.
a. Domestic Use
In 1888, a district court gave the term "domestic use" a definite
description, stating that the term was to include
housing purposes, including water for drinking, washing, bathing,
culinary purposes, and the like; water for such domestic animals as are
used and kept about the house, such as work animals and cows kept
to supply their owners and their families with dairy products; and such
other uses, not being either agricultural or mechanical, as directly tend
to secure and promote the healthfulness and comfort of the home. 5 1

b. Agricultural Use
Like domestic use, the term "agricultural use" has been broadly
defined. It has been held to include "[a]ny activity incident to the
cultivation of land for the growing of crops, the harvesting thereof,
and the care and feeding of livestock. .

.

.It includes tillage, seeding,

husbandry, and all things incident to farming in the widest sense of that
term.' '52
c. Industrial Use
There is very little case law defining what constitutes industrial
use for purposes of meeting the beneficial use requirement although
it has been held that water is being put to a beneficial use if used for
mining,5 3 milling, 54 or the production of hydroelectric power.5" Arguing by analogy from the rather broad definitions of domestic and
agricultural use, it would appear that any use of water which involves
an industry or which is related to an industry would be classed as a
beneficial use.
d. Municipal Use
In addition to those beneficial uses which are based upon the list
of preferences in the constitution, an additional category has been
created which involves municipal uses. Indeed, "[tlhe municipality
. . . has the legal right to devote its acquired rights to municipal
5

lArmstrong v. Larimer County Ditch Co., 1 Colo. App. 49, 53, 27 P. 235, 236 (1891).
The definitive description was set forth in the final decree entered on November 5, 1888,
by the District Court of Larimer County and repeated by the Court of Appeals who reversed the district court on other grounds.
5
2Billings Ditch Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 127 Colo. 69, 72, 253 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1953);
accord, Smith v. Industrial Comm'n, 134 Colo. 454, 457, 306 P.2d 254, 255 (1957);
Great Western Mushroom Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 103 Colo. 39, 41, 82 P.2d 751,
752 (1938). See also McComb v. Farmers Res. & Irr. Co., 167 F.2d 911 (10th Cir.
1948); Zeigler v. People, 109 Colo. 252, 124 P.2d 593 (1942).
53See generally North Am. Explor. Co. v. Adams, 104 F. 404 (8th Cir. 1900); Sternberger v. Continental Mines, Power & Red. Co., 259 F. 293 (D. Colo. 1919).
54See generally North Am. Explor. Co. v. Adams, 104 F. 404 (8th Cir. 1900); San Luis
Roller Mills, Inc. v. San Luis Power & Water Co., 102 Colo. 119, 77 P.2d 128 (1938);
Windsor Res. & Canal Co. v. Hoffman Milling Co., 48 Colo. 82, 109 P. 422 (1910);
Colorado Milling & Elev. Co. v. Larimer & Weld Irr. Co., 26 Colo. 47, 56 P. 185 (1899).
55 See generally Sternberger v. Continental Mines, Power & Red. Co., 259 F. 293 (D. Colo.
1919).
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uses ....
,n This particular category appears to be a hybrid of other
57
uses since it includes water used for fire fighting and street sprinkling,
for flushing sewers,"' for irrigation of lawns and gardens, 5 9 for irrigation of trees, shrubs, grasses and other plant life usually grown in
city parks, 60 for private and public bathing establishments, 6 and for
recreational purposes."
In many cases, the appropriation of water for municipal use is an
appropriation of water for the purpose of sale to the ultimate consumer, 63 i.e., to the inhabitants of the community and to industries
located within the municipality. The city may also supply water to
persons outside its boundaries although it has no duty to do so.64
e. Aesthetic Use
Beneficial use has also been held to include aesthetic uses such as
watering "trees and grass, flowers and shrubs."6' 5 While the wasteful
use of water for purely aesthetic purposes was denied in Empire Water
& Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co.,6" there was dictum to suggest
that aesthetic uses "designed to promote health by affording rest and
relaxation are assuredly beneficial." 6 7
B. Conditional Rights
Once the requirements of taking the water and applying it to a
beneficial use have been satisfied, an appropriator has the right to
the use of water so acquired as against all other users who thereafter
establish rights, provided that the appropriator continues to put the
water to a beneficial use and that he does not infringe upon the rights
of others. 8 Yet with the development of large scale water projects
which often take years to complete, it became obvious that valuable
Westminster v. Church, 445 P.2d 52, 58 (Colo. 1968).
57 CoL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-2-6 (1963), as amended COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
148-2-6 (Supp. 1969).
58Id.; Pulaski Irr. Ditch Co. v. Trinidad, 70 Colo. 565, 568, 203 P. 681, 682 (1922);
Winchester v. Winchester Water Works Co., 149 Ky. 177, 184, 148 S.W. 1, 4 (1912).
59
Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 209, 96 P.2d 836, 844 (1939).
6
0 Denver v. Brown, 56 Colo. 216, 231, 138 P. 44, 50 (1913).
61 COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-2-3 (1963), as amended COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §
148-2-3 (Supp. 1969). The amending statute has, among other changes, deleted the
specific wording declaiming private and public bathing establishments as a beneficial
use of water.
5

Olid. § 148-21-3(7)

(Supp. 1969).

3 See Pulaski Irr. Ditch Co. v. Trinidad, 70 Colo. 565, 203 P. 681 (1922), where the city
was denied the right to sell the water which it recovered and purified after being used
in the sewers.
64 Colorado Springs v. Kitty Hawk Dev. Co., 154 Colo. 535, 543, 392 P.2d 467, 471
(1964), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 647 (1965).
65
Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 209, 96 P.2d 836, 844 (1939).
66205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).

67Id. at 128.
6 For a discussion of the rights of junior and senior appropriators, see PART ONE, § III
(A) infra.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 47

water rights could be lost due to the necessary delay in applying the
water to a beneficial use. In response to this problem, the Colorado
courts, by legal fiction, have recognized a conditional right of appropriation, which protects the appropriator's interest by establishing his
priority at an earlier date than when beneficial use was first made,
provided that the water project is pursued with due diligence. "9
1. Due Diligence
A conditional right is predicated on the requirement that an appropriator maintains due diligence in completing his right. In making such
a determination, the courts have decided the cases on an ad hoc basis,
considering such factors as the complexity and size of the project, the
extent of the construction season, the availability of materials, labor
and equipment, the claimant's economic capabilities, and intervening
external factors such as strikes, wars, and litigation.7" While one need
not display "unusual efforts or expenditures" in pursuing due diligence,7 1 it has been held that reasonable progress must be shown in
the financing, construction, and completion in whole or in part of each
water project to prevent cancellation of a conditional decree for lack
of due diligence.7 2
It should be noted, however, that in certain instances "reasonable
progress" may be construed more liberally than in other situations.
For example, in Metropolitan Suburban Water Users Association v.
Colorado River Water Conservation District73 the court stated:
We hold that the statutory requisite of due diligence is met, during
the period of the pendency of adjudication proceedings and until a
conditional decree is awarded, by diligent action of the claimant in
seeking to have his claim allowed and opposing in good faith the
of other claims which would, if allowed, be senior in point
allowance
74
of time.

Yet an appropriator cannot merely show due diligence in a single
instance and thereby totally fulfill the requirement. Indeed, recent
69 See, e.g., Four Counties Water Users Ass'n v. Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist.,
159 Colo. 499, 509, 414 P.2d 469, 475 (1966). See also CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §

148-21-3(9) (Supp. 1969).
70Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. Twin Lakes Res. & Canal Co., 468 P.2d 853,
856 (Colo. 1970); Denver v. Northern Colo. Water Conserv. Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 398,
276 P.2d 992, 1004 (1954); Taussig v. Moffat Tunnel Water & Dev. Co., 106 Colo.
384, 389-90, 106 P.2d 363, 366 (1940).
71 Riverside Res. & Land Co. v. Bijou Irr. Dist., 65 Colo. 184, 201, 176 P. 117, 122 (1918)
(dissenting opinion); Highland Ditch Co. v. Mumford, 5 Colo. 325, 336 (1880);
2 C. KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS, § 734 (2d ed. 1912) [hereinafter cited
as 2 C. KINNEY]; 93 C.J.S. Wa'ers § 179 (1956).
72 Four Counties Water Users Ass'n v. Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist., 159 Colo.
499, 509, 414 P.2d 469, 475 (1966). While a great deal of the discussion in Four
Counties with respect to conditional decrees and due diligence centered around a statute
which has since been repealed (Law of April 9, 1919, ch. 147, § 7, (1919] Colo. Sess.
Laws 493 (repealed 1969) ), it is arguable that those administering the procedures of the
"Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969" will consider similar
factors in determining whether or not due diligence has been performed.
73 148 Colo. 173, 365 P.2d 273 (1961).
74 Id. at 199-200, 365 P.2d at 287.
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legislation obligates the holder of a conditional decree to make court
appearances in every second calendar year after his application for a
conditional decree has been approved in order to present proof of
75
diligence in support of his conditional decree.
Further, filings for an application for a showing of due diligence
concerning a conditional water right must be made before June 1,
1970.76 As the result of 1970 legislative efforts, 77 however, some confusion ensued as to possible exceptions to this suspense date, but the
Executive Committee of the Legislative Council Committee on Water
has attempted to remove that doubt.
At an executive committee meeting after the public meeting the
committee discussed a point of confussion [sic] about the meaning of
a change made to Section 148-21-44 by House Bill 1028 [1970 Colo.
Session Laws 433] in the 1970 Session. Some water attorneys were of
the opinion that since the change in Section 44 was to the effect that
water cases being heard in court before Senate Bill 81 (CoLo. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 148-21-1 et seq. (Supp. 1969)) was passed in 1969,
[sic] are to be heard under the law under which they were initiated,
that this provision negates the provision of Section 148-21-18(1) [and
Section 148-21-44] which [when read together state] that filings for
an application for a showing of due diligence concerning a conditional
water right must be made before June 1 of 1970. The consensus of the
committee was that this is not the case; the change in Section 44 did not
alter Section 18.78
(Supp. 1969); see Colorado River Water
Conserv. Dist. v. Twin Lakes Res. & Canal Co., 468 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1970). In addition,
the Attorney General of Colorado has observed:
that in all cases where the conditional water right is determined under the new
Act [CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-1 et seq. (Supp. 1969)) the application for a biennial finding of reasonable diligence does not have to be filed by
any particular date of the year; however, the owner must obtain a finding by
the referee sometime during the second year of each successive two-year period.
It is also observed there is no requirement that the application be filed in even
numbered years.
Letter from Duke W. Dunbar to A. Wayne Denny, May 5, 1970.
76 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-18(1), -44 (Supp. 1969).
77 Law of Feb. 3, 1970, ch. 103, § 5, [1970] Colo. Sess. Laws 433.

75COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-17(4)
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9 (July 6, 1970). The Attorney General of Colorado also seems
to lend support to the Council's interpretation. He has stated:
The ... section [CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-44 (Supp. 1969)]
in so far as it relates to biennial findings of reasonable diligence is only applicable to existing conditional decrees on the effective date of the Act, to wit:
June 7, 1969, and to conditional decrees subsequently entered in proceedings
pending on the effective date of the Act. As to existing conditional decrees on
the effective date of the Act, an application for a biennial finding of reasonable diligence must be filed with the Water Clerk of the Division by June 1,
1970. As to conditional decrees entered subsequently to June 1, 1970 in proceedings pending on the effective date of the Act, an application would be due
June 1, 1972.
Showings of reasonable diligence under existing conditional decrees or
conditional decrees entered in proceedings pending on the effective date of the
Act are to be made in the year 1970 and even numbered years thereafter pursuant to the new Act. Thus, the Act, in effect, transfers all matters in regard
to findings of reasonable diligence, with respect to conditional water rights,
to the Water Courts effective June 1, 1970.
Letter from Duke W. Dunbar to A. Wayne Denny, May 5, 1970.
COMMITTEE MEETING
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2. Relation Back

When a conditional water right has been pursued with due diligence and there has ultimately been an application of the water to a
beneficial use, the courts have created the legal fiction of relation back
which controls the priority date given to the appropriation." More
specifically, relation back has been defined as that operation by which
the appropriation of water relates back to the time when the first step
to secure that appropriation was taken, if the work from that step on
was prosecuted with reasonable diligence."0
The purpose of the first step requirement of the relation back
principle is to give notice to others, 8 placing them "on inquiry as to
the proposed use, the volume to be appropriated, and the consequent
demand upon the source of supply.'"' Since this notice should be
reasonably likely to "bring knowledge to everyone within the sphere
of possible adverse interest,"8 8 it has been held that the first step must
be "an open and notorious physical demonstration, conclusively indicating a fixed purpose to diligently pursue and, within a reasonable
time, ultimately acquire a right to the use of water. ' 84 While a bare
intention to divert water is not sufficient to satisfy the first step
requirement,8 5 it has been held that relation back will apply to the
time when actual construction on a water project was begun 86 or when
a survey was commenced.8
While historically the principle of relation back has been strictly
construed, 8 there appears to be a trend to interpret the doctrine more
liberally. Indeed, in Metropolitan Suburban Water Users Association
v. Colorado River Water Conservation District 9 it was stated that the
79 Rocky Mtn. Power Co. v. White River Elec. Ass'n, 151 Colo. 45, 50, 376 P.2d 158, 161

(1962); Denver v. Northern Colo. Water Conserv. Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 388, 393, 276
P.2d 992, 999, 1001 (1954).
80 Taussig v. Moffat Tunnel Water & Dev. Co., 106 Colo. 384, 392, 106 P.2d 363, 367
(1940); Sieber v. Frink, 7 Colo. 148, 153, 2 P. 901, 903 (1884).

For a decision in-

volving the awarding of a conditional decree, see Four Counties Waters Users Association v. Colorado River Water Conservation District, 159 Colo. 499, 414 P.2d 469 (1966).
81 Rocky Mtn. Power Co. v. White River Elec. Ass'n, 151 Colo. 45, 50, 376 P.2d 158, 161
(1962), cited with approval in Four Counties Water Users Ass'n v. Colorado River
Water Conserv. Dist., 161 Colo. 416, 421, 425 P.2d 259, 261 (1967).

8 Holbrook Irr. Dist. v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 84 Colo. 174, 190, 269 P. 574, 581 (1928).
8 San Luis Roller Mills, Inc. v. San Luis Power & Water Co., 102 Colo. 119, 123, 77 P.2d
128, 129 (1938).
84Fruitland Irr. Co. v. Kruemling, 62 Colo. 160, 165, 162 P. 161, 163 (1916); accord,

Holbrook Irr. Dist. v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 84 Colo. 174, 190, 269 P. 574, 581 (1928).
85 Holbrook Irr. Dist. v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 84 Colo. 174, 187-88, 269 P. 574, 580
(1928); New Loveland & Greeley Irr. & Land Co. v. Consolidated Home Supply Ditch
& Res. Co., 27 Colo. 525, 529, 62 P. 366, 367 (1900).
86 Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 495 (1922).
8

Metropolitan Suburb. Water Users Ass'n v. Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist., 148

Colo. 173, 196, 365 P.2d 273, 285 (1961).
88 Denver v. Northern Colo. Water Conserv. Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 393, 276 P.2d 992,
1001 (1954).
8 148 Colo. 173, 365 P.2d 273 (1961).
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relation back principle should be construed and applied in a manner
which would "aid and encourage, rather than to block development
....
of the state's water resources. 0
C. Rights-of-Way
The acquisition of an appropriative water right in tributary waters
may also involve taking whatever legal steps are necessary to gain
access to the water source. Under a riparian system of water rights,
the persons with rights to the water would, by definition, have access
to the water source by virtue of their ownership of land adjacent to
the stream; but under the appropriation system, an appropriator may
or may not own the land necessary for access to a source of supply.
If he does not, he must acquire a right-of-way to gain such access.
In Colorado, the acquisition of a right-of-way across the land of
another by an individual who owns a water right is provided for both
in the state constitution"' and in the statutes;9 2 case law also supports
the proposition.9" Further, a right-of-way may be acquired in various
ways, is subject to certain limitations, and may run over the public
domain.
1. Modes of Acquisition
A right-of-way may be obtained in many ways. It can be acquired
by contract or grant,9 4 parole license, 5 prescription,9 6 or eminent
97
domain.
a. Contract or Grant
A right-of-way over private lands may, of course, be acquired by
grant, although whether an easement or fee simple is conveyed depends
upon the intention of the parties. 8 If the grant is not exclusive, the
90 Id. at 194, 365 P.2d at 285; Four Counties Water Users Ass'n v. Colorado River Water
Conserv. Dist., 159 Colo. 499, 513, 414 P.2d 469, 477 (1966).
See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 14; id. art. XVI, § 7.
92
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-3-1 (Supp. 1969).
91

See Larimer & Weld Irr. Co. v. Landers, 23 Colo. App. 84, 141 P. 517 (1914).
94DeGraffenried v. Savage, 9 Colo. App. 131, 47 P. 902 (1897): "The right [right-ofway] might be granted by contract between the parties .... " Id. at 136, 47 P. at 903-04.
See North Sterling v. Knifton, 137 Colo. 40, 320 P.2d 968 (1958); Farmers' High Line
Canal & Res. Co. v. New Hampshire Real Estate Co., 40 Colo. 467, 92 P. 290 (1907).
95
Webb v. Wild Cat Lateral Ditch Co., 67 Colo. 495, 497, 186 P. 287, 288 (1920);
Graybill v. Corlett, 60 Colo. 551, 553, 154 P. 730, 731 (1916); DeGraffenried v. Savage,
9 Colo. App. 131, 133, 47 P. 902, 902-03 (1897).
9 Pleasant Valley & Lake Canal Co. v. Maxwell, 93 Colo. 73, 78, 23 P.2d 948, 950
(1933); Abrams v. Colwell, 79 Colo. 46, 47, 243 P. 615, 617 (1926); Neville v. Louden
Irr. Canal & Res. Co., 78 Colo. 548, 549, 242 P. 1002 (1926).
Lamborn v. Bell, 18 Colo. 346, 349, 32 P. 989, 990 (1893); Tripp v. Overacker, 7 Colo.
72, 73-74, 1 P. 695, 696-97 (1883); Boglino v. Giorgetta, 20 Colo. App. 338, 344,
78 P. 612, 614 (1904); see COLO. CONST. art. II, § 14; id. art. XVI, § 7; CoLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 148-3-1, -3(Supp. 1969).
9 North Sterling Irr. Dist. v. Knifton, 137 Colo. 40, 44, 320 P.2d 968, 970 (1958); cf.
Logan v. Morris, 147 Colo. 1, 362 P.2d 202 (1961); Percifield v. Rosa, 122 Colo. 167,
220 P.2d 546 (1950).
93

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 47

owner of the servient estate may use the ditch but not to an extent
that would be inconsistent with or injurious to the dominant use
thereof.9 9
A right-of-way may also be acquired by implied grant, such rightof-way receiving the same treatment as an easement passed by deed.' 0
Thus, it has been held that when one sells part of his land and that
portion of the water right used on such land, a right-of-way for a ditch
across the unsold land passes by implication. 1' 1 Similarly, when ditches
have been constructed, maintained, and used with the knowledge of
the landowner and with his consent or without his interference, the
courts have found a right-of-way to have been acquired by implied
grant.

10 2

b. Parol License
One might also obtain a right-of-way if a parol license is granted
permitting the appropriator to construct or maintain a ditch across the
land of the licensor. However, if the licensee makes no expenditures
for substantial improvements, then the license is apparently revocable
at the will of the licensor. On the other hand, if based upon the faith
of the license the licensee has entered upon the land and expended
money for improvements, then the license becomes irrevocable and
03
operates like a grant.

c. Prescription
A right-of-way acquired by prescription gives an appropriator access
to water by means of an existing ditch. 1 4 Along with the prescriptive
right-of-way, the appropriator also obtains all the rights necessary for
the use and proper maintenance of the ditch, including the rights of
ingress and egress."0 5 Yet if the land is registered under the Torrens
99

See Sebold v. Rieger, 26 Colo. App. 209, 142 P. 201 (1914).

10

oSee Kane v. Porter, 77 Colo. 257, 235 P. 561 (1925); Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551
(1872).

101 Cleary v. Skiffitch, 28 Coo. 362, 373-74, 65 P. 59, 62-63 (1901 ); American Nat'l Bank
v. Hoeffer, 18 Colo. App. 53, 55, 70 P. 156, 157 (1902). Contra, Child v. Whitman,
7 Colo. App. 117, 42 P. 601 (1895).
12Leonard v. Buerger, 130 Colo. 497, 502-03, 276 P.2d 986, 988-89 (1954); Kane v.
Porter, 77 Colo. 257, 259, 235 P. 561, 562 (1925); Rogers v. Lower Clear Creek Ditch
Co., 63 Colo. 216, 218. 165 P. 248, 249 (1917); cf. Graybill v. Corlett, 60 Colo. 551,
154 P. 730 (1916).
103Tynon v. Despain, 22 Colo. 240, 2.47, 43 P. 1039, 1041 (1896); Jones v. Bondurant,
21 Colo. App. 24, 26, 120 P. 1047, 1048 (1912); DeGraffenried v. Savage, 9 Colo.
App. 131, 133, 47 P. 902, 903 (1897).
104Pleasant Valley & Lake Canal Co. v. Maxwell, 93 Colo. 73, 78, 23 P.2d 948, 950
(1933); Abrams v. Colwell, 79 Colo. 46, 47, 243 P. 615, 617 (1926).
05
1 Neville v. Louden Irr. Canal & Res. Co., 78 Colo. 548, 549, 242 P. 1002 (1926). See
a'so Pleasant Valley & Lake Canal Co. v. Maxwell, 93 Colo. 73, 23 P.2d 948 (1933);
Abrams v. Colwell, 79 Colo. 46, 243 P. 615 (1926).

1970

COLORADO WATER LAW

Title Registration Act '06 prior to the running of the prescriptive period,
no right in an existing ditch may be acquired. 0 7
d. Eminent Domain
Under the power of eminent domain, rights-of-way may be acquired
by federal and state governments as well as by private parties. For
example, federal acquisition of a right-of-way is possible under the
Reclamation Act 0 8 which empowers the Secretary of the Interior to
decide whether a taking is necessary and which prohibits state imposed
limits or controls on the Secretary's authority.' 09 In addition, the power
of the federal government to take private property for public purposes,
which is implicit in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution,"10 has been affirmed in numerous judicial decisions."'
The State of Colorado has also been granted the power of eminent
domain under its constitution;" 2 and when this power is exercised, the
constitution further provides that the compensation to be paid must be
determined by either a board of commissioners or by a jury when
requested. 1 3 If neither a board nor a jury is present and if the defendant
objects, then any determination of damages is considered reversible
error." 4 Yet as long as one of the two groups is present, a determination can be made; and the only matters to be decided are the necessity
of the taking and the amount of the damages. Other issues, such as
the feasibility of the project, may not be considered."'
In addition to the State's power of eminent domain, Colorado's
constitution also permits the taking of land for a private right-of-way." 6
106COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118-10-37 (1963).

1'7See Dillenger v. North Sterling Irr. Dist.. 129 Colo. 17, 266 P.2d 776 (1954) (holding
that registration subject to any subsisting incumbrances on the property involved was
sufficient to defeat title by prescription where registration was accomplished before expiration of eighteen years of adverse use by the claimant).
1
08See Henkel v. United States, 196 F. 345 (9th Cir. 1912), aff'd, 237 U.S. 43 (1915).
10 United States v. O'Neill, 198 F. 677, 682-83 (D. Colo. 1912).
110
U.S. CONST. amend. V: .
nor shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation." Id.
I"United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 237 (1946); Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S.
367, 371 (1875); United States v. Tiffin, 190 F. 279, 280 (N.D. Ohio 1911); United
States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 209 F. Supp. 483, 486-87 (S.D. Il. 1962), affd, 314
F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963); 43 U.S.C. § 421 (1964).
113 COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15.

11Id.
114 Tripp v. Overocker, 7 Colo. 72, 76, 1 P. 695, 698 (1883); see Phipps v. Denver, 57
Colo. 205, 140 P. 797 (1914). See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-1 (1963).
"15 Rothwell v. Coffin, 122 Colo. 140, 145, 220 P.2d 1063, 1065 (1950); Pine Martin
Mining Co. v. Empire Zinc Co., 90 Colo. 529, 534, 11 P.2d 221, 223-24 (1932). The
issues regarding persons entitled to condemn, the class of property subject to condemnation, the purpose for which property is to be used, and the constitutionality of the law
authorizing condemnation were not to be considered. Id. at 538, 11 P.2d at 225. Kaschke
v. Camfield, 46 Colo. 60. 64, 102 P. 1061, 1062-63 (1909) (while there was no timely
showing of an attempt to agree on compensation, this issue was a matter to be determined solely by the court); cf. Mortensen v. Mortensen, 135 Colo. 167, 309 P.2d 197
(1957).
116CoLo. CONST. art. II, § 14; id. art. XVI, § 7. For a case holding that such private takings
are not in conflict with the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution, see Pine
Martin Mining Co. v. Empire Zinc Co., 90 Colo. 529, 537, 11 P.2d 221, 224-25 (1932).
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This private right of condemnation upon payment of just compensation
has been justified on the basis of necessity.'" 7 As stated by the Colorado
Supreme Court: "[A]ll lands are held in subordination to the dominant
right of others, who must necessarily pass over them to obtain a supply
of water to irrigate their own lands, and this servitude arises, not by
grant, but by operation of law."" '
While the acquisition of a private right-of-way for conveying
water is limited to reservoirs, drains, flumes or ditches under the Colorado constitution," 9 the legislature in 1969 insured a liberal interpretation of this provision by providing that a right-of-way may be
acquired for a ditch, canal, conduit, well, pump, by-pass, reservoir,
flume or other structure or device.12 0 Thus, it would now appear that
a right-of-way may be acquired for any type of diversion work, the
only limitations being those common to rights-of-way in general.
2. Limitations on Rights-of-Way
In Colorado, the acquisition of a right-of-way is limited by statute.
For example, one statute provides that
[n]o tract or parcel of improved or occupied land, without the written
consent of the owner thereof, shall be subjected to the burden of two
or more ditches or other structures constructed for the purpose of
conveying water through said land when the same object can feasibly
and practicably be attained by uniting and conveying all the water
necessary to be conveyed through such property through one ditch or
2
other structure.' '

Similar state statutes govern the location, 2
117 CoLo.

extent,2

and control

CONST. art. II, § 14. Private ways of necessity as construed in this section are not

limited to or derived from common law easements so designated (Wagner v. Fairlamb,
151 Colo. 481, 487, 379 P.2d 165, 169 (1963)) but rather refer to ways indispensable
to enjoyment of the land considering the purpose for which the ways are claimed. Moreover, the specific exceptions enumerated in this section are not so limited with respect
to ways of necessity. Crystal Park Co. v. Morton, 27 Colo. App. 74, 85, 146 P. 566, 571
(1915). However, this section does not apply to private persons taking part of the public
domain in possession of a private individual but over which he holds no title. See Knoth
v. Barclay, 8 Col. 300, 6 P. 924 (1885).
118 Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 555 (1872). See also the concurring opinion of Chief
Justice Thatcher in Schilling v. Rominger, 4 Colo. 100, 109 (1878).
19

1 COLO.CoNsT.

art. II, § 14.

CoLo. REV.STAT. ANN. § 148-21-3(5) (Supp. 1969).
1 1d. § 148-3-4. See Sand Creek Lateral Irr. Co. v. Davis, 17 Coo. 326, 29 P. 742 (1892).
120
21
12

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-3-5 (Supp. 1969). "Whenever any persons find it necessary to convey water through the lands of others they shall select for the line of such
conveyance the shortest and most direct route practicable, upon which said ditch can be
constructed with uniform or nearly uniform grade." Id. See Mulford v. Farmers Res. &
Irr. Co., 62 Colo. 167, 161 P. 301 (1916); Downing v. More, 12 Colo. 316, 20 P. 766

(1889).

§ 148-3-2 (Supp. 1969). "Extent of right-of-way. Such right-ofway shall extend only to a ditch, dike, cutting, pipeline or other structure sufficient for
the purpose required." Id.

12 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
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over the use of rights-of-way, 4 and federal statutes limit the acquisition of a right-of-way over the public domain.
3. Across the Public Domain
There are several federal statutes governing the laws of rights-ofway over the public domain. One of the statutes provides in part as
follows:
Whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water
for mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested
and accrued, and the same are recognized and acknowledged by the
local customs, laws, and the decisions of courts, the possessors and
owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and protected in the
same; and the right of way for the construction of ditches and canals
for the purposes herein specified is acknowledged and con-

firmed

125

....

This language has been subject to judicial interpretation in two respects.
First, the requirement of a vested and accrued water right recognized
under local law has prompted the question of whether a conditional
water right is sufficient to acquire a right-of-way; and the case of
Jarvis v. State Bank,' 2 6 though not expressly answering the question,
at least implies that a conditional water right is sufficient to satisfy
the statute.'2

7

Second, the language providing for rights-of-way for

canals and ditches, while seemingly narrow in scope, has been broadly
1
construed to include rights-of-way for reservoirs.

28

The statute set forth above was modified by a later enactment
which involved irrigation rights over the public domain and which
delineated a procedure to be followed by canal ditch companies and
irrigation or drainage districts in obtaining rights-of-way.' 29 A similar
law made this procedure applicable to corporations, individuals, or
124CoLo.

REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 148-3-6 (1963). "No persons having constructed a private

ditch for the purposes and in the manner provided in section 148-3-5, shall prohibit or
prevent any other person from enlarging or using any ditch by them constructed in common with them, upon payment to them of a reasonable proportion of the cost of construction of said ditch." Id. See Junction Creek & N. Durango Dom. & Irr. Ditch Co. v.
Durango, 21 Colo. 194, 40 P. 356 (1895) (holding that ditches subject to enlargement
pursuant to this section are strictly private ditches).
12543 U.S.C. § 661 (1964).
22 Colo. 309, 45 P. 505 (1896). The court in Jarvis stated that the ditch company involved would have required their right of way before completion if they had obtained
a conditional water right by complying with the procedures required by Colorado law
to obtain such a right. Id. at 314-15, 45 P. at 507. For a complete discussion of the
current procedures which must be followed under COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-17
(Supp. 1969), see PART ONE, § VI (B) (2) (b) infra.
127 Id. at 314-15, 45 P. at 507.
128 See United States v. Big Horn Land & Cattle Co., 17 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1927) wherein
the court held the words "canal or ditch" to include the acquisition of reservoir land.
The words used by the court imply an even broader interpretation: "We think the clear
spirit and intent of the act applies to a failure to complete the reservoir as well as the
canal or ditch proper; that in the particular clauses mentioned the words canal or ditch
were used in an inclusive sense, embracing the whole project." Id. at 365.
12943 U.S.C. § 946 (1964).
12
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associations of individuals.' 30 Although these statutes provide for
rights-of-way solely for irrigation and drainage, Congress has allowed
rights-of-way for the additional purposes of water transportation,
domestic use, and the development of power when the same are
31
subsidiary to a primary purpose of irrigation or drainage.'
All of these irrigation statutes have been held to apply only to
public lands which were vacant or unoccupied at the time of their
enactment and in no way affect rights which had attached previous to
their passage."' Nor do they give a mere user of public lands, however
long, any rights as against a patentee who has come into possession
of the land.133 Once a right of way is established, however, a subsequent
34
patentee takes subject to the existing easement.'
III.

LEGAL EXTENT OF THE ACQUIRED RIGHT

Once a valid appropriation has been acquired, there are certain
limitations and obligations placed upon the appropriator by the laws
of Colorado. Since the use of water is so critically important, the rights
and duties so incurred are jealously guarded and strictly enforced by
both statutes and case law in an attempt to maintain a balance between
the rights of users and to allow for maximum beneficial use of Colorado's water.
A. Relative Rights of Junior and Senior Appropriators
Due in part to the peculiar nature of water rights, it is difficult,
if not impossible, to view the rights of "senior" or "junior" appropriators in a vacuum. On most streams in Colorado there are a number
of users with different priorities that, in effect, "compete" with one
another for a limited quantity of water, and any change, either natural
or man-made, in the quantity, quality, or condition of the stream may
affect other appropriators. For example, if a senior appropriator diverts
more water than that allocated by his appropriation, junior appropriators' rights are going to be infringed. Thus, any examination of water
rights must be viewed with the knowledge of this interconnecting
relationship between senior and junior appropriators, ' ' and courts
uniformly try to maintain and afford the maximum use of the water
supply consistent with vested rights of appropriators.
Id. § 948.
Id. § 951.
32
1 See Nippel v. Forker, 26 Colo. 74, 56 P. 577 (1899).
133Boglino v. Giorgetta, 20 Colo. App. 338, 343, 78 P. 612, 614 (1904); cf. Knoth v.
Barclay, 8 Colo. 300, 6 P. 924 (1885).
134 Farmers' High Line Canal & Res. Co. v. Moon. 22 Colo. 560, 564, 45 P. 437, 438
(1896); Tynon v. Despain, 22 Colo. 240, 248. 43 P. 1039, 1041 (1896); Edwards v.
Roberts, 26 Colo. App. 538, 544, 144 P. 856, 859 (1914).
135 It is well to keep in mind that "rights" of senior appropriators are limitations on junior
appropriators and vice-versa.
130

131
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1. Rights of Senior Appropriators
It is a well recognized principle in Colorado that in cases concerning the diversion of water for the same purpose, 3" the first appropriator of the water of a natural stream has a prior right to such water
to the extent of his appropriation.' 3 7 A senior appropriator can insist
that no junior divert to the senior's detriment water which is tributary
to the senior's supply.' 8 For example, an upstream junior appropriator
diverting water from a tributary of the main stream cannot so reduce
the quantity of water reaching the main stream that the downstream
senior appropriator is deprived of his full appropriation. The extent
of impairment of the senior appropriator's right is the factor to be
considered and not the particular location of the junior appropriator's
diversion.
There also exists the principle that a senior appropriator is entitled
to have the conditions which existed on the stream at the time when
he made his appropriation substantially continued and maintained.' 3 9
In general, this principle grew out of the practice of mining companies
which deposited large quantities of tailings and slime into their local
water supply, making the appropriation of a downstream senior practically useless if it were for domestic or agricultural purposes. With
this principle in effect, a senior appropriator, under a claim of right,
13 The phrase "for the same purpose" might raise an inference that the rule "first in time
first in right" does not apply in times of shortage when a conflict exists between users of
dissimilar uses, e.g., domestic use as opposed to industrial use. This is perhaps an overstatement of current Colorado law. While there does exist some authority (Sterling v.
Pawnee Ditch Ext. Co., 42 Colo. 421, 426, 94 P. 339, 340 (1908)) for the proposition
that when a conflict exists between dissimilar users a more preferred junior user may be
allowed to supercede a less preferred senior user, this rule is generally subject to eminent
domain proceedings and thus requires payment of just compensation to the senior user.
For a more complete discussion of preferences, see PART ONE, § V(B) infra.
13 Schilling v. Rominger, 4 Colo. 100, 103 (1878). The extent of a senior's appropriation
is not limited to that quantity of water which would be immediately used. For example,
in People ex rel. Park Reservoir Co. v. Hinderlider, 98 Colo. 505, 57 P.2d 894 (1936),
a senior user was allowed to fill his reservoir to the full extent of his appropriation,
even though a junior appropriator needed a part of that water for direct irrigation. Id.
at 510. 57 P.2d at 896. For a more complete discussion of storage rights, see PART ONE,
§ IV (B) infra.
13 Strickler v. Colorado Springs, 16 Colo. 61, 26 P. 313 (1891). Here. the court stated:
"The fundamental principle of this system is that priority in point of time gives superiority of right among appropriators for like beneficial purposes. To now say that an
appropriator from the main stream is subject to subsequent appropriation from its tributaries would be the overthrow of the entire doctrine." Id. at 67-68, 26 P. at 315. See also
Peterson v. Reed, 149 Colo. 573, 369 P.2d 981 (1962); Rio Grande Res. & Ditch Co.
v. Wagon Wheel Gap Imp. Co., 68 Colo. 437, 191 P. 129 (1920); Trowell Land and
lrr. Co. v. Bijou Irr. Dist., 65 Colo. 202, 176 P. 292 (1918); Comstock v. Ramsay, 55
Colo. 244, 133 P. 1107 (1913).
39
i Cushmon v. Highland Ditch Co., 3 Colo. App. 437, 439, 33 P. 344, 345 (1883). Note,
however, the qualification stated in Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366
P.2d 552 (1961):
Furthermore, under our law there can be no apportionment of available supplies
of water in times of short supply, instead, junior appropriators may be shut
off if necessary to supply the priorities of senior appropriators, except where
juniors who are so situated that shutting them down would not result in improving the water supply of senior appropriators.
Id. at 463, 366 P.2d at 555-56.
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may insist that the quality of water that reaches his headgate not be
permanently or unreasonably impaired by any action of an upstream
40
junior.1
The main thrust of the rights of senior appropriators occurs in
time of water scarcity when the senior has the right to his full appropriation, if there is water available, before the junior is allowed to exercise
his right. 14 1 Further, even though it might be possible to supply several
users by prorating the existing water, a senior appropriator is under
no legal duty to give up any part of his appropriation, and any attempt
to make the senior user rotate the use of available water or prorate it
with junior users is legally unenforceable.142 However, it should be
noted that recent trends toward making more maximum utilization of
the water have resulted in two statutory limitations upon this general
rule: first, an appropriator is "not entitled to command the whole
flow of the stream merely to facilitate his taking the fraction of the
whole flow to which he is entitled" ;14 3 and second, -[n]o reduction
of any lawful diversion because of the operation of the priority system
shall be permitted unless such reduction would increase the amount of
water available to and required by water rights having senior priorities.' ' 4 4 While the latter of these two statutory limitations raises
questions, e.g., to what extent must the senior priority be increased
before the reduction of a junior appropriation is allowed, there clearly
is an indication by the legislature that even senior rights are subject
to the trend toward maximum beneficial use.
2. Rights of Junior Appropriators

While the right of a senior appropriator is superior to that of
one who acquired his appropriation at a later date, the senior right
is not absolute, and junior appropriators are entitled to exercise certain
limited rights. For example, an upstream junior need not close his
headgate to supply a downstream senior if this action will not benefit
the senior.'" That is, when stream conditions are such that there
140 Comstock v. Ramsay, 55 Colo. 244, 257, 133 P. 1107, 1111 (1913). See also Rio Grande

Reservoir & Ditch Co. v. Wagon Wheel Gap Improvement Co., 68 Colo. 437, 191 P.
129 (1920) for a classical statement of the argument and Peterson v. Reed, 149 Colo.
573, 369 P.2d 981 (1962) for current interpretation.
141Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 463, 366 P.2d 552, 555-56 (1961). See also
People ex rel. Park Res. Co. v. Hinderlider, 98 Colo. 505, 57 P.2d 894 (1936); Windsor
Res. & Canal Co. v. Hoffman Milling Co., 48 Colo. 89, 109 P. 425 (1910); Coffin v.
Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1883).
142 See Platt Valley Irrigation Co. v. Buckers Irrigation, Milling & Improvement Co., 25
Colo. 77, 53 P. 334 (1898) for a detailed explanation of this point. See a!so Water
Supply & Stor. Co. v. Larimer & Weld Res. Co., 25 Colo. 87, 53 P. 386 (1898); Farmers
Ind. Ditch Co. v. Agricultural Ditch Co., 22 Colo. 513, 45 P. 444 (1896). But cf.
discussion in PART ONE, § IV(C) (2) infra.
143 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-2(2) (c)

(Supp. 1969).

1- Id. § 148-21-2(2) (e).
145 Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Ext. Co., 42 Colo. 421, 428, 94 P. 339, 341 (1908).
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is no reasonable likelihood that useable quantities of water will be
received by the senior appropriator as a result of the junior appropriator's shutdown, the junior appropriator cannot be compelled to cease
16
his diversion.
In addition, since no appropriator is entitled to have priority to
more water than he has actually appropriated or for more water than
he actually needs, 47 junior appropriators may divert any water beyond
the needs of the senior and apply it to their own use. If a dispute then
arises concerning the priority of the claims to the water, the court will
determine whether the junior appropriator took a senior appropriator's
surplus or whether the junior took under claim to the senior appropriator's priority. If the court finds that the junior user merely diverted
surplus water, the senior user has no standing to complain. If the court
finds that the junior appropriator diverted part of the senior appropriator's priority, other issues may have to be determined: The court may
find that the senior appropriator abandoned part of his priority or that
the junior appropriator's taking was under a claim of adverse possession.148
Junior appropriators are also entitled to have the conditions which
existed on the stream at the time when they made their appropriations
continued and maintained, 1 49 allowing the junior user to insist that
the original quantity and quality of the water which reaches his headgate be maintained. 50 This principle is subject to the limitation that
a junior user cannot be heard to complain if the conditions on the
stream are changed by any natural or non man-made occurrences."' 1
However, this principle might work to the detriment of a junior
appropriator. For example, if the stream carried polluted water before
the date of appropriation but the pollution was not discovered by the
junior user until after his date of appropriation, it would seem that
the junior could not be heard to complain about the quality of the water
6

14 Alamosa Creek Canal Co. v. Nelson, 42 Colo. 140, 149, 93 P. 1112. 1115 (1908).

147 Nichols v. McIntosh. 19 Colo. 22, 29, 34 P. 278, 281 (1893).

148See, e.g., DeHerrera v. Manassa Land and Irr. Co., 151 Colo. 528, 379 P.2d 405 (1963);
Farmers Highline Canal & Res. Co. v. Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d 629 (1954);
Enlarged Southside Irr. Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 120 Colo. 423, 210 P.2d
982 (1949); Faden v. Hubbell, 93 Colo. 358, 28 P.2d 247 (1933);

Baker v. Pueblo,

87 Colo. 489, 289 P. 603 (1930); Denver v. Colorado Land & Livestock Co., 86 Colo.
191, 279 P. 46 (1929); Comstock v. Ramsay, 55 Colo. 244, 133 P. 1107 (1913); Baer

Bros. Land & Cattle Co. v. Wilson, 38 Colo. 101, 88 P. 265 (1906); Handy Ditch Co.
v. Louden Irr. Canal Co., 27 Colo. 515, 62 P. 847 (1900).

For a discussion of adverse

possession and abandonment, see PART ONE, § V(E) infra.
14Vogel v. Minnesota Canal & Res. Co., 47 Colo. 534, 541, 107 P. 1108, 1111 (1910);

Monte Vista Canal Co. v. Centennial Irr. Ditch Co., 24 Colo. App. 496, 503, 135 P.
981, 984 (1913); Larimer County Canal No. 2 Irr. Co. v. Poudre Valley Res. Co., 23
Colo. App. 249, 259, 129 P. 248, 251 (1913); Farmers' High Line Res. Co. v. Wolf,
23 Colo. App. 570, 578, 131 P. 291, 294 (1913).
150Vogel v. Minnesota Canal & Res. Co., 47 Colo. 534, 541, 107 P. 1108, 1111 (1910).
151 Mendenhall v. Lake Meredith Res. Co., 127 Colo. 444, 447, 257 P. 2d 414, 415 (1953).
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which he received. The senior appropriator who was causing the pollution could argue that since the quality of the water had not changed
after the appropriation by the junior, the conditions on the stream had
not been changed but had been maintained according to the enunciated
principle. The Colorado Supreme Court confronted this problem in
Suffolk Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. San Miguel ConsolidatedMining
& Milling Co.' and held that since the rights of senior appropriators
were not absolute but conditional, they "were obligated to so use the
water that subsequent locators might . . . receive the balance of the
stream unpolluted, and fit for the uses to which they might desire to
put it";1' 3 provided that the senior use involved only part of the water
of a stream and that there was a reasonable way in which the remaining
1 54
water in the stream could be preserved in its original condition.
3. Limitations on Senior and Junior Appropriators
Appropriators of water have the right to change the point of
diversion or the place or character of use, provided that the change
will not injure vested rights of any other user.' 5 However, if an
appropriator seeks to secure water in excess of his original amount, the
appropriation for such water will be junior to rights which accrued
between the time of the original appropriation and the additional
appropriation. For example, in Church v. Stil/we/1156 the court stated:
The plaintiff might have had, as he claims, the prior right to the
amount of water appropriated to and used from the reservoir when it
was in its natural state first utilized by him, but he would not have such
priority as to any additional water attempted to be secured by an
enlargement of the reservoir made after the rights of defendants had
accrued by their appropriation through ditches or reservoirs.' 57

B. Effect of Federal-State Relationships
In addition to the legal limitations imposed on the appropriative
right by Colorado law, the rights of the federal government might
also have an effect on the extent of the legal right which is acquired
when a valid appropriation is made. However, because of the extensive
controversy between the federal government and the states as to the
rights in waters which flow through public lands and as to interstate
1529 Colo. App. 407, 48 P. 828 (1897).
153

Id. at 417, 48 P. at 832.

154 Id.

155 Denver v. Colorado Land & Livestock Co., 86 Colo. 191, 192-93, 279 P. 46, 47 (1929);
Fort Collins Milling & Elev. Co. v. Larimer & Weld Irr. Co., 61 Colo. 45, 53, 146 P.
140, 143 (1916). For the procedures involved in changing a point of diversion or place
of use, see CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-18 (Supp. 1969).

For a discussion of

changing the exercise of the water right, see PART ONE, § IV(A) infra.
15
6 Church v. Stillwell, 12 Colo. App. 43, 54 P. 395 (1898).
157 Id. at 48, 54 P. at 397.
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waters which flow through Colorado, the exact nature and limits of
the effect cannot yet be determined."' 8
IV.

EXERCISE OF A WATER RIGHT

Once the extent of the acquired right has been determined, an
appropriator may need to consider other factors in exercising his right.
More specifically, he may want to know how he may change the
character or place of use or the point of diversion; whether or not he
is allowed to store water; or how his water right may be affected by
water distribution organizations.
A. Change in Exercise
It is important for an appropriator to be able to change the exercise
of his right as circumstances and needs vary. Hence, the Colorado
courts have allowed,1 9 and the legislature has facilitated, 160 such
changes (often referred to as transfer proceedings) since the early
beginnings of the prior appropriation system. This is not to imply that
the right to change the exercise is conferred by statute; but rather, the
right is incident to the ownership of a water right."'
When an appropriator desires to change the way in which he is
exercising his right, there are several considerations with which he must
concern himself. The most important of these are the types of changes
which are permitted, the procedures which must be followed to affect
a change, and the principles which govern whether or not a change
can be made.
1. Types of Changes
Traditionally, a change in exercise has referred to a variety of
possibilities such as a change in the place of use, 62 the character of
use,' 63 and/or the point of diversion. 64 The "Water Right Determi158 For a more extensive discussion of federal-state relationships, see Moses, Federal-State
WVater Problems, 47 DENVER L.J. 194 (1970).
159 See. e.g., Knowles v. Clear Creek, Platte River Mill & Ditch Co., 18 Colo. 209, 210,
32 P. 279, 280 (1893); Strickler v. Colorado Springs, 16 Colo. 61, 68-69, 26 P. 313,
316 (1891); Fuller v. Swan River Placer Mining Co., 12 Colo. 12, 19, 19 P. 836, 839
(1888); Sieber v. Frink, 7 Colo. 148, 154, 2 P. 901, 904 (1883).
§§ 148-18-18 to -21 with Law of April 6, 1899, ch.
105, § 1, [1889] Colo. Sess. Laws (repealed 1903).

160 Compare COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

161 See Diez v. Hartbauer, 46 Colo. 599, 105 P. 868 (1909); New Cache La Paudre Irr.
Co. v. Water Supply & Stor. Co., 29 Colo. 469, 68 P. 781 (1902).
v. Englewood, 124 Colo. 366, 372, 237 P.2d 116, 120 (1951);

162 Brighton Ditch Co.

Enlarged Southside Irr. Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 116 Colo. 580, 586, 183
P.2d 552, 555 (1947); Knowles v. Clear Creek, Platte River & Mill Ditch Co., 18 Colo.
209, 210, 32 P. 279, 280 (1893); Strickler v. Colorado Springs, 16 Colo. 61, 68, 26 P.
313, 316 (1891).

163 See Brighton Ditch Co. v. Englewood. 124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116 (1951).
14 Enlarged Southside Irr. Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 116 Colo. 580, 586, 183
P.2d 552, 555 (1947);

Wadsworth Ditch Co. v. Frown, 39 Colo. 57, 62, 88 P. 1060,

1062 (1907); Knowles v. Clear Creek, Platte River & Mill Ditch Co., 18 Colo. 209,
210, 32 P. 279, 280 (1893).
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nation and Administration Act of 1969" appears to reflect the continuance of this approach in defining a "[c]hange of water right"'6 5 as
[a] change in the type, place, or time of use, a change in the point
or points of diversion, a change from a fixed point or points of diversion to alternate or supplemental points of diversion, a change from

alternate or supplemental points of diversion to a fixed point or points
of diversion, a change in the means of diversion, a change in the place
or places of storage, a change from direct application to storage and
subsequent application, a change from storage and subsequent application to direct application, a change from a fixed place or places of

storage to alternate places of storage, a change from alternate places
of storage to a fixed place or places of storage, or any combination
of such changes. The term "change of water right" includes changes

of conditional water rights as well as changes of water rights.' 6
This broad terminology coupled with the notation of the various
combinations of allowable changes seems to indicate a legislative
recognition that the most expeditious use of water might necessitate
a change in the exercise of the right. Such a supposition would certainly
correspond with the legislature's intent "[t]o maximize the beneficial
16 7
use of all of the waters of this state.' 1
2. Procedure for Instituting Changes
With respect to change in the exercise, the major affect of the
"Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969" seems
to be upon procedures for instituting such changes. Under the new
provisions a person desiring a change must initially file an application
with the water clerk of the division setting forth facts supporting the
ruling sought." 8 Anyone opposing such a change may file with the
water clerk a "statement of opposition setting forth facts as to why
the application should not be granted or why it should be granted
only in part or on certain conditions."' 6 9
3. Principles Governing Changes
Since junior and senior users have vested rights in having stream
conditions maintained substantially as they were at the time of their
respective appropriations, any proposed change in the exercise of the
right must not materially injure their vested rights.' 71 In addition,
165 COLO.
166Id.

REV.

STAT. ANN. § 148-21-3(11) (Supp. 1969).

167 d § 148-21-2(1).
168d. § 148-21-18(1).
169Id. For a more detailed explanation of this procedure see PART ONE, § VI(B) (2) (b).
170 Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 150 Colo. 91, 105-06, 371 P.2d 775, 783 (1962); Reagle
v. Square S Land & Cattle Co., 133 Colo. 392, 394, 296 P.2d 235, 236 (1956); Farmers'
Highline Canal & Res. Co. v. Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 580, 272 P.2d 629, 632 (1954);
Faden v. Hubbell, 93 Colo. 358, 369, 28 P.2d 247, 251 (1933); Denver v. Colorado
Land & Live Stock Co., 86 Colo. 191, 193, 279 P. 46, 47 (1919); Handy Ditch Co. v.
Louden Irr. Canal Co., 27 Colo. 515, 518, 62 P. 847, 848 (1900); see Baer Bros. Land
& Cattle Co. v. Wilson, 38 Colo. 101, 88 P. 265 (1906).
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"[t~he inherent right to change includes the right to change subject
171
to conditions, if injury to rights of others may thereby be avoided."'
An interesting question posed by the above principles involves
determining what constitutes "injury". Although there is no absolute
answer, case law indicates that the existence of injury depends on the
facts 1 72 of each particular case.1 73 These facts cannot include any
evidence that benefits from the proposed change exceed the burdens to
be suffered; the sole question is whether other users would be substantially injured by the change." 4 Some considerations that have been
involved in determining the substantiality of injury are the size and
capacity of the various ditches which may be affected by the proposed
change, the volume of water applied to beneficial uses, the time of its
use, the place where and the acreage upon which it was used, the periods
of non-use between successive irrigations, excessive use, and the place
and conditions of the use contemplated after the proposed change is
effectuated. 175 Once the possibility of injury is raised, the concern
shifts to the possible conditions which might be imposed upon the
exercise of the right to prevent such injury.
Under the "Water Right Determination and Administration Act
of 1969," either the party protesting or the party seeking a change in
the exercise may present terms or conditions designed to eliminate
possible injury. 17 1 Such terms or conditions may include:
(b) A limitation on the use of the water which is subject to the change,
taking into consideration the historic use and the flexibility required
by annual climatic differences.
(c) The relinquishment of part of the decree for which the change
is sought or the relinquishment of other decrees owned by the appli-

171 Colorado

Springs v. Yust, 126 Colo. 289, 294, 249 P.2d 151, 154 (1952).

572Monte Vista Canal Co. v. Centennial Irr. Ditch Co., 24 Colo. App. 496, 135 P. 981

(1913) wherein the court stated that
two witnesses gave as their opinions that the change contemplated would not
injuriously affect others; but such opinions were not based upon any facts of
conditions testified to by them, or otherwise in evidence at the time they were
given, from which such inference can by any exercise of the imagination be
drawn.
Id. at 500, 135 P. at 983.
173 Flasche v. Westcolo Co., 112 Colo. 387, 391, 149 P.2d 817, 819 (1944); In re Priority
Rights to Use of Water in Water Dist. No. 20, 92 Colo. 407, 411, 21 P.2d 177, 179
(1933).
174 Hallenbeck v. Granby Ditch & Res. Co., 160 Colo. 555, 569, 420 P.2d 419, 427 (1966);
Monte Vista Canal Co. v. Centennial Irr. Ditch Co., 24 Colo. App. 496, 502, 135 P. 981,
985 (1913); Farmers' Highline & Res. Co. v. Wolf, 23 Colo. App. 570, 579, 131 P.
291, 295 (1913).
75
1 Trinchera Ranch Co. v. Trinchera Irr. Dist., 83 Colo. 451, 460, 266 P. 204, 208 (1928);
see COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-20(6) (Supp. 1969) which provides:
Any decision of the water judge as specified in subsection (5) of this section
dealing with a change of water right . . . may include the condition that the
approval of such change .. . shall be subject to reconsideration by the water
judge on the question of injury to the vested rights of others during any hearing commencing in the two calendar years succeeding the year in which the
decision is rendered ....
Id.
7
1 6 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-21(3) (Supp. 1969).
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cant which are used by the applicant in conjunction with the decree
for which the change has been requested, if necessary to prevent an
enlargement upon the historic use or diminution of return flow to
the detriment of other appropriators.
(d) A time limitation on the diversion of water for which the change
is sought in terms of months per year.
(e) Such other conditions
as may be necessary to protect the vested
77
rights of others.'
The inclusion of (e) obviously indicates a legislative recognition that
the terms or conditions limiting a change in the exercise of water rights
must vary according to the facts of each case.
B.

Water Storage Rights

Colorado law178 recognizes two types of appropriative right: one
for direct use of water from the stream and a second for taking water
and storing it for future beneficial use. 7 9 Since appropriation for one
of these two purposes is not an appropriation for the other, 8 ° an
appropriator cannot store water for future use when he has obtained
a decree for direct use only.''
A decreed appropriation for storage is superior to a subsequent
appropriation for direct use,18 as long as the water is beneficially
applied.' 8 3 A reservoir may take its full appropriation of water according to its priority date regardless of whether or not a portion of that
water diverted is needed by junior appropriators for direct irrigation;'
85
and a junior may not enjoin this storage.

§§

148-21-21(4) (a)-(e).
Ditch Co. v. Greeley & Loveland Irr. Co., 86 Colo. 197, 199, 280 P. 481 (1929);
Holbrook Irr. Dist. v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 84 Colo. 174, 191, 269 P. 574, 581 (1928);
Greeley & Loveland Irr. Co. v. Huppe, 60 Colo. 535, 538, 155 P. 386, 388 (1916); Ne
Loveland & Greeley Irr. & Land Co. v. Consol. Home Supply Ditch & Res. Co., 27 Colo.
525, 528, 62 P. 366, 366-67 (1900); COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5, 6; COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 148-5-1 (1963); 2 C. KINNEY, supra note 71, at 1484, citing Church v. Stilwell,
12 Colo. App. 43, 54 P. 395 (1898):
As in the case with other rights acquired under the Arid Region Doctrine of
appropriation, the rule of priority governs, and it is held that the reservoir
having the prior right is entitled to fill the same first from the flow of the
stream to the full extent of the capacity of the appropriation made therefor.
Id. at 1484. See generally COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-5-let seq (1963).
17
9 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-5-1 (1963).
177Id.

178 Handy

8OHolbrook Irr. Dist. v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 84 Colo. 174, 191, 269 P. 574, 581 (1928).
181Handy Ditch Co. v. Greeley & Loveland Irr. Co., 86 Colo. 197, 200, 280 P. 481, 482
(1929). It should be noted however, that one who has acquired a priority for a certain
amount of water for direct irrigation may store the quantity to which he is entitled
during the direct irrigation season for use on crops to be irrigated later in that season.
Seven Lakes Res. Co. v. New Loveland & Greeley Irr. & Land Co., 40 Colo. 382, 385,
93 P. 485, 486 (1907).
182 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-5-1 (1963).
18 Cline v. Whitten, 150 Colo. 179, 185, 372 P.2d 145, 148 (1962); Highland Ditch Co.
v. Union Res. Co., 53 Colo. 483, 485, 127 P. 1025 (1912).
18 People v. Hinderlider, 98 Colo. 505, 510, 57 P.2d 894, 896 (1936); COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 148-5-1 (1963).
'8Larimer & Weld Res. Co. v. Cache La Poudre Irr. Co., 8 Colo. App. 237, 45 P. 525
(1896).
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Anyone desiring to build and maintain a reservoir to store water
has the right to store in such reservoir any unappropriated water of
the state.18 6 The state engineer must approve the reservoir construction,
and the facility is regarded as completed only when the engineer has
accepted and certified the work as satisfactory.' 8 7 Even though a
priority of right is only awarded for a completed storage appropriation, 88 the priority date of the right may relate back to the time when
notice of intent was first given to secure such a right and to apply the
water thereunder to a beneficial use.' 8 9
A priority for storage purposes will not be awarded for a temporary storage of water in temporary receptacles which form part of a
continuous conduit for carrying water directly from the stream to
irrigated lands.'
However, one desiring to store water may use the
bed of a nonnavigable stream as a reservoir provided that the vested
rights of prior appropriators are not thereby injured.'
The amount of water which the appropriator can store is measured
by the storage capacity of the reservoir. 19 2 "Capacity" is defined as
the amount of water that the reservoir will hold at any one time.' 93
The state engineer is charged with annually determining the amount
of water capable of being safely stored in reservoirs within the state,
94
and it is unlawful to store water in excess of that amount.1
Only one annual filling of any particular reservoir is allowed.' 95
"[E]ach reservoir shall be decreed its respective priority, and this
priority entitles the owner to fill the same once during any one year,
up to its capacity, and restricts the right, upon one appropriation, to
1

87

1

CONST. art. XVI, § 6; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-5-1 (1963). This rule
applies only to water not needed for immediate use for domestic or irrigation purposes.
Id.

6 COLO.

COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-5-5 (1963).

18 Windsor Res. & Canal Co. v. Lake Supply Ditch Co., 44 Colo. 214, 98 P. 525 (1908).
In this case, a corporation constructed the embankment of a reservoir in the bed of a
stream, but did not apply the water to beneficial use. It later conveyed the reservoir site
to another, reserving any appropriation which it had acquired by reason of the construction. The court held that since the corporation had never applied the water to beneficial
use, it had no priority to reserve. Id. at 218, 220, 98 P. at 732.
189 Rocky Mtn. Power Co. v. White River Elec. Ass'n, 151 Colo. 45, 50-51, 376 P.2d 158,
161 (1962). See PART ONE, § II(B) (2) for a more detailed discussion of conditional
rights.
190Windsor Res. & Canal Co. v. Lake Supply Ditch Co., 44 Colo. 214, 233, 98 P. 729, 736
(1908).
191COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-7-17 (1963).
1921d. § 148-5-7. "The state engineer shall annually determine the amount of water which
it is safe to impound in the several reservoirs within this state and it shall be unlawful
for the owners of any reservoir to store in said reservoir water in excess of the amount
so determined by the state engineer to be safe." Id.
19 Windsor Res. & Canal Co. v. Lake Supply Ditch Co., 44 Colo. 214, 224, 98 P. 729, 733
(1908).
'94COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-5-7 (1963).
195Orchard City Irr. Dist. v. Whitten, 146 Colo. 127, 141, 361 P.2d 130, 137 (1961);
Holbrook Irr. Dist. v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 84 Colo. 174, 192, 269 P. 574, 582 (1928);
Windsor Res. & Canal Co. v. Lake Supply Ditch Co., 44 Colo. 214, 223, 98 P. 729, 733

(1908).
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a single filling for one year."' 19 Restricting storage appropriators to
a single annual filling is based upon the fact that "[a] double filling
in effect would give two priorities of the same date and of the same
capacity to the same reservoir, on the same single appropriation .... 197
Yet it should be noted that there is no principle which restricts the
number of appropriations which can be decreed for the same reservoir.
An appropriator may use the water he has stored in several ways.
For example, he may exchange water with the owner of a direct flow
right as long as the vested rights of others are not thereby injured.
Such a system of exchanges is practiced extensively in eastern Colorado
in order to more efficiently use water in accordance with the needs of
the season of the year.' 9 ' Such a system will not be allowed, however,
when its effect would be to disturb the order of priorities and convert
a junior into a senior right.' 9 9
An appropriator of storage water may also use water appropriated
in one season even after that season has ended; he need not withdraw
all water within the season during which it was appropriated. 00 In such
a situation, the user still retains his priority as long as the water is
applied to beneficial use within a reasonable period of time after
20
storage. '
However, a reservoir owner does not have the right, under his
storage appropriation, to use seepage water from his reservoir which
would naturally return to the stream. Since such surface and/or underground seepage water is tributary to the stream, 20 2 it is not treated as
part of the original diversion and appropriation. 2 " The owner also
cannot use such water for direct irrigation, because water appropriated
for storage is not appropriated for direct irrigation.20 4
In addition, reservoir owners are "liable for all damages arising
from leakage or overflow of the waters therefrom or by floods caused
196

19

Windsor Res. & Canal Co. v. Lake Supply Ditch Co., 44 Colo. 214, 224, 98 P. 729, 733
(1908); accord, Holbrook Irr. Dist. v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 84 Colo. 174, 192, 269 P.
574, 582 (1928).
Windsor Res. & Canal Co. v. Lake Supply Ditch Co., 44 Colo. 214, 224, 98 P. 729, 733
(1908).

198 Hemphill, Irrigation in Northern Colorado, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE BULL. 1026

(1922).
§ 6; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-5-1 (1963).
200 North Sterling Irr. Dist. v. Riverside Res. & Land Co., 119 Colo. 50, 55, 200 P.2d 933,
935 (1948).
199 COLO. CONST. art. XVI,

201 Id.

v. Smith, 86 Colo. 178, 181-82, 279 P. 44, 45 (1929); Fort Morgan Res. & Irr.
Co. v. McCune, 71 Colo. 256, 258-60, 206 P. 393, 394 (1922); Trowel Land & Irr. Co.
v. Bijou Irr. Dist., 65 Colo. 202, 214, 176 P. 292, 296 (1918); Comstock v. Ramsay,
55 Colo. 244, 256, 133 P. 1107, 1111 (1913).
2 Nevius v. Smith, 86 Colo. 178, 181-82, 279 P. 44, 45 (1929); Fort Morgan Res. & Irr.
Co. v. McCune, 71 Colo. 256, 258-60, 206 P. 393, 394 (1922); Trowel Land & Irr. Co.
v. Bijou Irr. Dist., 65 Colo. 202, 214, 176 P. 292, 296 (1918); Comstock v. Ramsay,
55 Colo. 244, 256, 133 P. 1107, 1111 (1913).
20" Rio Grande Res. & Ditch Co. v. Wagon Wheel Gap Imp. Co., 68 Colo. 437, 443, 191
P. 129, 131 (1920).
202Nevius
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by breaking of the embankments of such reservoirs. ' 20
1
A lessee of a
reservoir is within the meaning of the statute, and a person may be
considered an owner even though his interest is less than an absolute
fee.2 0 6 The plaintiff in an action for damages under this statute need
not allege nor prove negligence since the liability of the owner of the
20 7
reservoir is absolute.
C. Water Distribution Organizations
To facilitate the delivery of water to users, several types of water
distribution organizations have been developed. In general, these
organizations have taken the form of mutual or carrier ditch companies,
irrigation or conservancy districts or reclamation projects involving
the federal government.
1. Mutual Ditch Companies
a. Definition and Organization
Mutual ditch companies have been described as "[p]rivate corpotions organized for the express purpose of furnishing water only to the
shareholders thereof and not for profit or hire.' '208 The basic relationship between the mutual corporation and the stockholders is that of
contract. 20 9 This contract, however, is one implied in law;21 0 -[t]he
members commit their property interests to the corporate body for
certain express purposes which are defined in the charter or certificate,
and the corporation undertakes to faithfully carry out these pur' 21
poses. '
From this contract a trust arises charging the corporation with the
duty of managing the corporation in the best interests of the stock2

05 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-5-4 (1963).

2oLarimer County Ditch Co. v. Zimmerman, 4 Colo. App. 78, 34 P. 1111 (1893).
2 07
Ireland v. Henrylyn Irr. Dist., 113 Colo. 555, 557, 160 P.2d 364, 365 (1945); Ryan
Gulch Res. Co. v. Swartz, 83 Colo. 225, 228-29, 263 P. 728, 730 (1928); Garnett Ditch
& Res. Co. v. Sampson, 48 Colo. 285, 288-89, 110 P. 79, 80 (1910).

208Farmers Water Dev. Co. v. Barrett, 151 Colo. 140, 148, 376 P.2d 693, 698 (1962);
accord, Billings Ditch Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 127 Colo. 69, 74, 253 P.2d 1058, 1060
(1953); McComb v. Farmers Res. & Irr. Co., 337 U.S. 755, 757 (1949); Beaty v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 101 Colo. 346, 352, 73 P.2d 982, 985 (1937); Comstock v. Olney

Springs Drainage Dist., 97 Colo. 416, 419, 50 P.2d 531, 532 (1935); Kendrick v. Twin
Lakes Res. Co., 58 Colo. 281, 282, 144 P. 884 (1914). See also COLO. CONST. art. X,
§ 3; J. SAx, supra note 1, at 269.
209 Supply Ditch Co. v. Elliot, 10 Colo. 327, 332, 15 P. 691, 694 (1887); Stuart v. County
Comm'rs, 25 Colo. App. 568, 576, 139 P. 577, 579 (1914); Rocky Ford Canal & Trust
Co. v. Simpson, 5 Colo. App. 30, 32, 36 P. 638, 639 (1894); J. LONG, supra note 2,
at 486.
2 0
1 Stuart v. County Comm'rs, 25 Colo. App. 568, 576, 139 P. 577, 579 (1914); Rocky
Ford Canal & Trust Co. v. Simpson, 5 Colo. App. 30, 32-33, 36 P. 638, 639 (1894);
Supply Ditch Co. v. Elliot, 10 Colo. App. 327, 332, 15 P. 691, 694 (1887).

211 Rocky Ford Canal & Trust Co. v. Simpson, 5 Colo. App. 30, 32-33, 36 P. 638, 639
(1894); see Stuart v. County Comm'rs, 25 Colo. App. 568, 139 P. 577 (1914).
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holders.2 12 More specifically, the mutual company must "exercise
reasonable care and diligence in procuring and storing

.

. .

water and

keeping its reservoirs in repair and supplied with water and in distributing [pro-rata] water to its stockholders .... .,213 The corporation's
failure to observe any of these duties may result in liability to injured
214
stockholders.
Separate and distinct from the duties created under the trust, the
corporation has the right to assess stockholders for the care and
maintenance of the ditch and/or reservoir system.21 5 Failure to pay
such an assessment permits the corporation to sell the stock of the
non-complying owner.2 "
b. Ownership of Water Rights and Change in Place of
Diversion and Use

A mutual ditch company may own the "naked legal title' '217 to the
ditches, related facilities, and water rights;21 8 however, the stockholders
are the "equitable and actual owners ' 21 9 of these property rights.22 0
212 Stuart v. County Comm'rs, 25 Colo. App. 568, 576, 139 P. 577, 579 (1914); Supply

Ditch Co. v. Elliot, 10 Colo. App. 327, 332-33, 15 P. 691, 694 (1887); Rocky Ford
Canal & Trust Co. v. Simpson, 5 Colo. App. 30, 32-33, 36 P. 638, 639 (1894); J. LONG,
supra note 2, at 486.
213 J. LONG, supra note 2, at 487; accord, Mountain Supply Ditch Co. v. Lindekugel, 24
Colo. App. 100, 102-03, 131 P. 789, 790 (1913); see Billings Ditch Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 127 Colo. 69, 253 P.2d 1058 (1953), stating that mutual ditch companies are
organized, in part, for "[tjhe distribution of the proper apportionment of water to
[their] owners . . . " Id. at 74, 253 P.2d at 1060; Comstock v. Olney Springs Drainage
Dist., 97 Colo. 416, 50 P.2d 531 (1935) (concurring opinion of Butler, C.J.), stating
that mutual ditch companies are organized, in part, for the convenience of their members
"[iln the distribution to them of water upon their lands in proportion to their respective
interests... " Id. at 419, 50 P.2d at 532.
214 Stuart v. County Comm'rs, 25 Colo. App. 568, 576, 139 P. 577, 579 (1914), stating
that -[i)t is not necessary to the enforcement of [the implied contractual] right that the
officers of the corporation intentionally commit a wrong or an actual fraud, for, if it is
shown that the officers are diverting the assets or countenancing any unauthorized surrender of the rights of the corporation, any stockholder has the right to complain and
be relieved in equity." Id. at 576, 139 P. at 579. Mountain Supply Ditch Co. v. Lindekugel, 24 Colo. App. 100, 103, 131 P. 789, 790 (1913); J. LONG, supra note 2, stating
that "for failure to perform [the corporation's duties] it is liable to a stockholder injured
thereby." Id. at 487. See Rocky Ford Canal & Trust Co. v. Simpson, 5 Colo. App. 30,
36 P. 638 (1894).
21
5J. LONG, supra note 2, at 486; see McComb v. Farmers Res. & Irr. Co., 337 U.S. 755
(1949); Wadsworth Ditch Co. v. Brown, 39 Colo. 57, 88 P. 1060 (1907); cf. Supply
Ditch Co. v. Elliot, 10 Colo. 327, 15 P. 691 (1887). See also CoLo. CONST. art. XVI,
§ 8.
216 J. LONG, supra note 2, at 486-87.
217 United States v. Akin, 248 F.2d 742, 744 (1957).
218
Id.; see Stuart v. County Comm'rs, 25 Colo. App. 568, 139 P. 577 (1914).
2 19
United States v. Akin, 248 F.2d 742, 744 (1957); see Billings Ditch Co. v. Industrial
Comn'n, 127 Colo. 69, 253 P.2d 1058 (1953); Stuart v. County Comm'rs, 25 Colo. App.
568, 139 P. 577 (1914) stating that '[tihe stockholders [of a mutual ditch company)
are the real parties in interest in the affairs and property of the corporation.
Id.
at 576, 139 P. at 579.
M'"See Brighton Ditch Co. v. Englewood, 124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116 (1951); Beaty v.
County Comm'rs, 101 Colo. 346, 73 P.2d 982 (1937), quoting Comstock v. Olney
Springs Drainage Dist., 97 Colo. 416, 419, 50 P.2d 531, 532 (1935) (concurring
opinion of Butler, C.J.); Kendrick v. Twin Lakes Res. Co., 58 Colo. 281, 282, 144 P.
884 (1914); Stuart v. County Comm'rs, 25 Colo. App. 568, 576, 139 P. 577, 579
(1914); Cache La Poudre Irr. Co. v. Larimer & Weld Res. Co., 25 Colo. 144, 53 P. 318
(1898).
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"[Tlhe stock certificates issued by the compan[y) to [its] members
are merely muniments of title to their water rights and the value of
the stock is in the water rights which it represents. ' 12 2 ' A stockholder,
consequently, may sell his water rights222 or change his place of diversion or use.2 2 8 He has the same rights as a direct appropriator2 2 4 and
may make such changes subject to the limitation that the vested rights
of others are not injuriously affected.22 5 A second limitation imposed
upon the exercise of these rights may emanate from the corporation
itself.2 26 More specifically, the by-laws may prevent a stockholder from
selling his stock [water rights] or from changing his place of diversion
22 7
or use.
c. Operation

Mutual ditch companies were originally incorporated as a means
of aggrcyating capital to build and maintain large ditch and reservoir
systems for the use and benefit of their stockholders. 228 However, the

success of these companies was limited since stock assessment proved
22 United States v. Akin, 248 F.2d 742, 744 (1957); Billings Ditch Co. v. Industrial
Comm'rs, 127 Colo. 69, 74, 253 P.2d 1058, 1060 (1953); Beaty v. County Comm'rs,
101 Colo. 346, 352, 73 P.2d 982, 985 (1937), quoting Comstock v. Olney Springs
Drainage Dist., 97 Colo. 416, 419, 50 P.2d 531, 532 (1935) (concurring opinion
of Butler, C.J.); Kendrick v. Twin Lakes Res. Co., 58 Colo. 281, 282, 144 P. 844
(1914).
MIronstone Ditch Co. v. Ashenfelter, 57 Colo. 31, 39, 140 P. 177, 181 (1914); Cache
La Poudre Irr. Co. v. Larimer & Weld Res. Co., 25 Colo. 144, 147-48, 53 P. 318, 319
(1898); J. SAx, supra note 1, at 273; see Strickler v. Colorado Springs, 16 Colo. 61,
26 P. 313 (1891). But see Billings Ditch Co. v. Industrial Comm'rs, 127 Colo. 69, 253
P.2d 1058 (1953).
223 Cline v. McDowell, 132 Colo. 37, 44, 284 P.2d 1056, 1059 (1955); Colorado Springs
v. Yust, 126 Colo. 289, 294, 249 P.2d 151, 153 (1952); Brighton Co. v. Englewood,
124 Colo. 366, 372-73, 237 P.2d 116, 120 (1951); Nielson v. Newmyer, 123 Colo. 189,
193, 228 P.2d 456, 458-59 (1951); Ironstone Ditch Co. v. Ashenfelter, 57 Colo. 31, 39,
140 P. 177, 180 (1914); Wadsworth Ditch Co. v. Brown, 39 Colo. 57, 61-62, 88 P.
1060, 1061 (1907); Cache La Poudre Irr. Co. v. Larimer & Weld Res. Co., 25 Colo.
144, 147-48, 53 P. 318, 320 (1898); Monte Vista Canal Co. v. Centennial Irr. Ditch
Co., 24 Colo. App. 496, 498, 135 P. 981, 982 (1913); J. SAX, supra note 1, at 273.
=' J. SAx, supra note 1, at 273.
=5SWadsworth Ditch Co. v. Brown, 39 Colo. 57, 61-62, 88 P. 1060, 1061 (1907); see
Hallenbeck v. Grandby Ditch & Res. Co., 160 Colo. 555, 420 P.2d 419 (1966); Cline
v. McDowell, 132 Colo. 37, 284 P.2d 1056 (1955); Brighton Ditch Co. v. Englewood,
124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116 (1951); Consolidated Home Supply Ditch & Res. Co. v.
Evans, 59 Colo. 482, 149 P. 834 (1915); Cache La Poudre Irr. Co. v. Larimer & Weld
Res. Co., 25 Colo. 144, 53 P. 318 (1898); Knowles v. Clear Creek Co., IS Colo. 209,
32 P. 279 (1893); Monte Vista Canal Co. v. Centennial Irr. Ditch Co.. 24 Colo. App.
496, 135 P. 981 (1913).
26J. SAx, supra note 1, at 273.
2 Id.; Moses, Irrigation Corporations, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 527 (1960) noting that
"[c]are should be taken to give the board of directors control over the place of use,
so that stock cannot be sold to land owners so situated as to require uneconomica! deliveries." Id. at 528. See Costilla Ditch Co. v. Excelsior Ditch Co.. 100 Colo. 433, 68
P.2d 448 (1937), noting that a by-law restricting the location of the place of use and
diversion may not be unreasonably or arbitrarily employed or enforced. Id. at 435, 68
P.2d at 449.
=8 J. SAx, supra note 1, at 269.
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to be an inadequate method of financing when very extensive water
diversion projects were involved. 9
2. Carrier Ditch Companies
Carrier ditch companies are a second type of privately owned
irrigation organization. 2 0 They differ from mutual ditch companies
in that they are for-profit enterprises, selling water to users on a
contractual basis. 28 ' As such, these companies have been regarded
as public utilities, 232 charged with a public duty or trust,2 33 and consequently subject to the rate-making powers of the county commissioners. 23 4 These factors, however, generally do not become relevant
until the organization begins to function, and at least not until an
appropriation is initiated.
A carrier ditch company receives a priority as against subsequent
users once a valid appropriation has been made. 2 5 Althoi:gh the
company is considered to be merely an agent of the user, 2 6 both
parties must perform to establish the appropriation as valid.28 7 To
illustrate, in Farmer's High Line Canal Co. v. Southworth23 8 the court
noted that
Itihe constitution recognizes priorities only among those taking water
from natural streams. Therefore, to constitute an appropriation such
as is recognized and protected by that instrument, the essential act
of diversion, with which is coupled the essential act of use, must have
reference to the natural stream. But the consumer himself makes no
diversion from the natural stream. The act of turning water from
the carrier's canal into his lateral cannot be regarded as a diversion,
within the meaning of the constitution, nor can this act, of itself,
when combined with the use, create a valid constitutional appropriation. There is therefore no escape from the conclusion, hitherto
announced by this court, that in cases like the present the carrier's
diversion from the stream must unite with the consumer's use in order
229 Moses, supra note 227, at 529.
230 See text accompanying notes 208 to 216 supra. "Carrier ditch companies" have been
erroneously confused with "public ditch companies." J. SAx, supra note 1, at 269.
231 J. SAx, supra note 1, at 269.
232 Putnam Ditch Co. v. Bijou Irr. Co., 108 Colo. 124, 131, 114 P.2d 284, 288 (1941).
233 Wanamaker Ditch Co. v. Crane, 132 Colo. 366, 369, 288 P.2d 339 (1955); Junction
Creek Ditch Co. v. Durango, 21 Colo. 194, 196, 40 P. 356, 357 (1895); Wheeler v.
Northern Colo. Irr. Co., 10 Colo. 582, 589-90, 17 P. 487, 490 (1887); see Denver v.
Brown, 56 Colo. 216, 138 P. 44 (1914).
23
4 COLO. CONST., art. XVI, § 8; cf. County Comm'rs v. Rocky Mt. Water Co., 102 Colo.
351, 79 P.2d 373 (1938) wherein the court held that neither "[the whole [n]or any
part of the value of the water rights involved shall be included in the rate base." Id. at
355, 79 P.2d at 375.
238
See Denver v. Miller, 149 Colo. 96, 368 P.2d 982 (1962); County Comm'rs v. Rocky
Mt. Water Co., 102 Colo. 351, 79 P.2d 373 (1938); Denver v. Brown, 56 Colo. 216,
138 P. 44 (1914).
236 County Comm'rs v. Rocky Mt. Water Co., 102 Colo. 351, 363, 79 P.2d 373, 378 (1938);
Denver v. Brown, 56 Colo. 216, 222-23, 138 P. 44, 46-47 (1914).
2 37
See County Comm'rs v. Rocky Mt. Water Co., 102 Colo. 351, 79 P.2d 373 (1938).
23813 Colo. 111, 21 P. 1028 (1889).

1970

COLORADO WATER LAW

that there may be a complete appropriation, within the meaning of
our fundamental law.
The carrier makes a diversion both in fact and in law. This diversion is accomplished through an agency (the carrier) recognized by the
constitution and statutes, and for purposes expressly named in both,
hence it cannot be challenged as illegal. It would undoubtedly become
unlawful were the water diverted not applied to beneficial uses within
the diversion unquestionably
a reasonable time; but when thus applied,
23 9
ripens into a perfect appropriation.
To maintain this priority, both the diversion of the ditch company
and the beneficial application by the user must continue.240 This fact
leads to a consideration of the rights and duties of each party. In
Denver v. Brown,2 41 the court noted that
[a] consumer supplied with water by contract from a ditch owned and
operated by a carrier company in a sense is an appropriator from the
stream supplying the ditch, but does not occupy the exact status of an
independent appropriator directly from the stream, as his rights are
limited by the terms of his contract, so far as valid, with the ditch
company, as well as other limitations which the law, from the nature
carrier company and a contract consumer
of the relation between 24the
2
from its ditch, imposes.
One right of the consumer is to continue to purchase the amount
of water for which he contracted the previous year, albeit at any new
rate set by the county commissioners. If no new rate has been set, then
243
This right, however, will
the user may buy at the previous year's rate.
239Id. at 120, 21 P. at 1033-34 (citations omitted); accord, County Comm'rs v. Rocky Mt.

Water Co., 102 Colo. 351, 360-61, 79 P.2d 373, 377 (1938). In times of water shortage
this doctrine produces an interesting result among carrier ditch company users. In Denver
v. Brown, 56 Colo. 216, 233-34, 138 P. 44, 50 (1914) the court notes that all carrier
ditch company consumers who take their water under a given priority are considered as
having taken such rights as of the same date. Since no user is more senior than another,
all share on a prorata basis. This seems to be a logical application of the prior appropriation system. Later in the opinion, however, the court indicates that, in times of shortage,
if more than one priority has been awarded to a ditch, and the priorities are for the same
use (e.g., all agricultural), "all consumers, generally speaking, have the right to be
supplied from all the priorities decreed the ditch through which they are supplied, whose
rights by virtue of prior use aggregate. The volume of such priorities and in such circumstances stand on an equal plane." Id. at 234, 138 P. at 50. This raises the interesting
question of whether the courts will recognize priorities within the same preference as
far as carrier ditch companies are concerned.
240 Colorado River Dist. v. Power Co., 158 Colo. 331, 335, 406 P.2d 798, 800 (1965);
County Comm'rs v. Rocky Mt. Water Co., 102 Colo. 351, 361, 79 P.2d 373, 377-78
(1938).
241 56 Colo. 216, 138 P. 44 (1914).
4
2 Id. at 222-23, 138 P. at 47; see County Comm'rs v. Rocky Mt. Water Co., 102 Colo.
351, 79 P.2d 373 (1938) wherein the court, in citing Pioneer Irr. Co. v. Board of
Comm'rs, 236 F. 790, 792 (D. Colo. 1916), notes that
(1) the owner of the carrying ditch in making the diversion from the natural
stream acts solely as the agent or trustee for him (sic] who applies the water
in a right to the use of the water and has
to a beneficial use, (2) gets no title
no property in it subject to disposal, and (3) he who applies the water thus
diverted to beneficial use acquires a property right in the use of the water thus
dispose of and convey by deed separate
applied which he, and he only, can sell,
and apart from the land to which ithas been applied or with the land to which
ithas been applied.
Id. at361, 79 P.2d at 377-78.
243COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-8-1 (1963); County Comm'rs v.Rocky Mt.Water Co.,
102 Colo. 351, 362, 79 P.2d 373, 378 (1938); Denver v. Brown, 56 Colo. 216, 223,
138 P. 44, 47 (1914).
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be lost if the consumer ceases to purchase water "for the purpose or
with the intent to procure water from some other source of supply.
-244
It also might be lost if the consumer does not comply
with reasonable regulations of the company. 245 In either event, the
ditch company may sell the forfeiting consumer's water allotment to
another customer to insure the continued validity of its appropriation. 4
Traditionally, carrier ditch companies were plagued by their inability to finance extensive diversion systems. 24 7 Revenues from consumers
and private capital simply did not come forth in sufficient amounts
to support such projects.2 4 8 Irrigation and conservancy districts were
formed primarily as a solution to these financial problems.2 "'
3. Irrigation and Conservancy Districts
a. Irrigation Districts
The need for an organization with a sounder economic foundation capable of providing larger and more complex diversion works
provoked the creation of irrigation districts.2 5 Such organizations have
the advantage of being able to rely upon a broad tax base.2" ' To illustrate: a majority of landowners in a proposed district may file a petition
with the respective county commissioners,2 5 force a vote, 5 8 and, if
the plan is approved by a majority of the landowners therein, form the
district.2 5 4 This "public corporation ' 255 then may contract with the
federal government,25 6 exercise the power of eminent domain, 257 issue
bonds,258 and tax landowners with irrigable land.259 These latter two
244 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-8-1 (1963); cf. County Comm'rs v. Rocky Mt. Water
Co., 102 Colo. 351, 79 P.2d 373 (1938); Denver v. Brown, 56 Colo. 216, 138 P. 44
(1914).
2

5

Denver v. Brown, 56 Colo. 216, 223, 138 P. 44, 47 (1914); Golden Canal Co. v. Bright,

8 Colo. 144, 149, 6 P. 142, 149 (1885).

2

4Denver v. Miller, 149 Colo. 96, 99, 368 P.2d 982, 984 (1962); County Comm'rs v.
Rocky Mt. Water Co., 102 Colo. 351, 361, 79 P.2d 373, 377-78 (1938).
247 See also text accompanying notes 228 & 229 supra.

J. SAX, supra note 1, at 269-70.

2"

249 Id. at 270.
25 0
J. SAX, supra note 1, at 270; Moses, Irrigation Corporations, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REV.

527, 529 (1960).
1

2 J. SAX, supra note 1, at 270.
22 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 150-1-2 (1963).
253d. § 150-1-3(3).
24d.
§ 150-1-5.
2
55 Logan Irr. Dist. v. Holt, 110 Colo. 253, 258-59, 133 P.2d 530, 532 (1943).
256
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 150-1-11(2) (1963).
257See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 150-1-12 (1963).

258 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 150-1-15, -16 (1963).
259 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 150-1-1 (3), -19(1) (1963). The statute states that
[iln no case shall any land be taxed . . . which . . . is unsuitable for irrigation

and cultivation...
(emphasis added).
Id. § 150-1-19(1).

nor shall tracts of land of one acre or less be taxed ....
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powers enable districts to secure financing for the construction and
maintenance of major irrigation systems.2 60
Even with this large financial base
[t]here was one great weakness in the irrigation district law ....
As the easier projects were completed .... the sources of water were
farther away and the cost of storing and delivering the water multiplied. In most instances, the largest taxpayers in the area were contributing nothing to the cost of the works .... 261

"'The districts had not provided a broad enough tax base, since the
entire burden was carried by the land irrigated, while reclamation
plainly benefitted the entire community. ' "22The out-growth of this

inequity was the Conservation District Law.26 3
b, Conservancy Districts

Water conservancy districts are organized somewhat similarly to
irrigation districts;2 4 however, the former are "quasi-municipal corpopossessing the power to make special assessments and
rations' ,
to tax all property within the district,26 6 while the latter are "public
corporations", 2 6 7 possessing the power to make only special assessments.26" This distinction is of some importance, 6 9 for conservancy
districts may charge not only those who receive special benefits, but
also those who indirectly or generally profit from the operations of the
organization. 270 Due to this extensive tax base, such districts can
26

Moses, Irrigation Corporations, 32

ROCKY MT.

L. REv. 527, 530 (1960).

21 Id. at 531.
262j. SAx, supra note 1, at 270 (emphasis added); see Logan Irr. Dist. v. Holt, 110 Colo.

253, 133 P.2d 530 (1943) wherein the court noted that "taxes levied by (irrigation
districts] are, in reality, local or special improvement taxes, and not general taxes."
Id. at 259, 133 P.2d at 532.
3
2 Moses, supra note 260, at 531; see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 150-5-1 to -50 (1963).
264Moses, supra note 260, at 532. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 150-1-1 to -60
(1963) with COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 150-5-1 to -50 (1963).
265 People v. Letford, 102 Colo. 284, 79 P.2d 274 (1938) wherein the court stated that
such corporations (water conservancy districts) are "[d]esignated for state purposes as
distinguished from private or local municipal purposes in the proprietary sense." Id. at
299, 79 P.2d at 282.
- Id. at 300-01, 79 P.2d at 283; CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 150-5-16 (1963).
267 Logan Irr. Dist. v. Holt, 110 Colo. 253, 133 P.2d 530 (1943) stating that "[wihile an
irrigation district is a public corporation, we do not think that it is in any true sense a
branch or subdivision of the sovereignty. Its purposes are chiefly private, and for the
benefit of private landowners." Id.at 259, 133 P.2d at 532. In People v. Letford, 102
Colo. 284, 79 P.2d 274 (1938), the court in distinguishing "public" and "municipal"
corporations noted that "[w]hile all municipal corporations are public corporations, all
public corporations are not municipal corporations." Id. at 297, 79 P.2d at 281. The
logic of this statement would appear to extend to the distinction between "public" and
"quasi-municipal" corporations. Id. at 298, 79 P.2d at 282.
26
SLogan Irr. Dist. v. Holt, 110 Colo. 253, 259, 133 P.2d 530, 532 (1943); COLO. Rav.
STAT. ANN. §§ 150-1-1(3) to -19(1) (1963).
269People v. Letford, 102 Colo. 284, 301, 79 P.2d 274, 283 (1938).
2701d. at 300-01, 79 P.2d at 283; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 150-5-16 (1963); Moses,
supra note 260, at 532.
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finance diversion projects even more complex than those constructed
271
by irrigation districts.
The predominant role of the conservancy district today, however,
is that of a "middleman ' 27 2 between the federal government and the
water user. 273 Even though these districts did have broad financial
backing, the tremendous expenses associated with large scale diversions,
and the inability of such organizations to attract vast amounts of private
27
investment capital required the assistance of the federal government. 1
This assistance came in the form of the Reclamation Act. 75
4. Reclamation
a. Federal Involvement
The first Reclamation Act was passed by Congress in 1902.276
At the time it was passed, the purpose of the Act was to reclaim public
domain which was ultimately to pass into the possession of individual
citizens and to provide irrigation water for privately owned lands.27 7
Initially, users contracted with the United States for the use of project
water under the terms which provided for payment of full costs of the
construction of the reclamation facilities.2 78 It soon became apparent,
however, that irrigation users would simply be unable to finance the
repayment of the construction costs. 2 79 As a result, the Reclamation
Act was amended in 1939.80
b. The 1939 Change
Basically, the 1939 amendment provided that the government
would contract with users' associations rather than with individual
271

J. SAx, supra note 1, at 270; Moses, supra note 260, at 532.

272

J. S.x, supra note 1, at 270.

73 Id.
274

Id. at 270-71.
Act of June 17, 1902, Ch. 1093, §§ 1-10, 32 Stat. 388 et seq. (1902), as amended 43
U.S.C. §§ 371 et seq. (1964).
26 Id.
27 J. SAX, supra note 1, at 283. The Act provides that f[t)he rights to the use of water
acquired under [this Act] . . . shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial
use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right." 43 U.S.C. § 372 (1964).
This provision would seemingly be a combination of riparian and appropriative water
doctrines working within one entity, i.e., the reclamation project. The Act also provides
275

that
(n]o right to the use of water for land in private ownership shall be sold
for a tract exceeding one hundred and sixty acres to any one landowner, and no
such sale shall be made to any landowner unless he be an actual bona fide
resident on such land, or occupant thereof residing in the neighborhood of said
land, and no such right shall permanently attach until all payments therefore
are made.

Id. § 431.
27843 U.S.C. § 485 (1964).
279
J. SAX, supra note 1, at 283.

80 Act of Aug. 4, 1939, Ch. 418, §§ 1-19, 53 Stat. 1187 el seq. (1939).
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users,2 81 since the organizations had a broader financial basis with
which to repay construction costs. By statute, contracts scheduled repayment for no more than forty years or at such time as the Secretary of
the Interior within his discretion should determine.2 2
Given this basic change, the relationship among the United States,
the users' association, and the user is somewhat vague. To the extent
that repayment occurs, it is made by the association contracting with
the government rather than by the individual user, and various sources
are tapped to provide funds for repayment. In addition to the individual
irrigation user, power companies that are served by the contracting
party pay much of the bill.2 8 3 Also, the cost of certain uses such as
recreation, flood control, and navigation are absorbed by the federal
government and, consequently, no repayment is required.28 4 In addition,
the Act provides that associations (contracting parties) shall apply
"profits . . . derived from the operation of project power plants, [the]
leasing of project grazing and farm lands, and the sale or use of town
285
sites [as credits] . . . to the construction charge of the project ....
Thus, the proportion of the cost that users repay is very small when
compared with the value of the use of the water to them. Indeed, the
important question of repayment in proportion to value received has
never reached the courts for determination, and no indication of its
solution is provided in the Act.
c. Ownership of Water Rights
A difficult and perplexing question that has faced the courts is
ownership of the rights to the water subject to a reclamation project.
The Act provides that users' associations are to take over the management of projects, but it is silent with respect to ownership of title to
water rights. 2u 6 The government has claimed ownership; but in two
landmark cases the Supreme Court found title to lie in the individual
user or water company contracting with the government. In one case
the Supreme Court reasoned that "[a]lthough the government diverted,
stored, and distributed the water, . . . [a]ppropriation was made not

for the use of the government, but, under the Reclamation Act, for the
use of the land owners .

. .

. [T]he water-rights became the property

of the land owners, wholly distinct from the property right of the
government in the irrigation works.' '287
2143 U.S.C. §§ 485(a)-(g) (1964).
2
8id. § 485(6)(1).
20 J. SAx, supra note 1, at 283.
2H Id.

2043 U.S.C.

§ 501 (1964).

2MId.
M

Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 94-95 (1937).
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Another case gives a similar rationale for declaring the users and
not the government the owners of the water rights. In Nebraska v.
Wyoming,28 8 the Court declared that the government's diversion, storage, and distribution of water involved in a reclamation project under
contracts with users' associations did not vest the ownership of the
water rights in the United States.28"9 Rather, the water rights remained
vested in the owners of the land appurtenant to the water involved
in the project.2 90 The government remained the carrier and distributor
of the water with the right to receive the sums previously agreed upon
for the construction of the project and the right to make annual charges
for the operation and maintenance of the project's physical facilities.2 9 '
It should also be noted that the Reclamation Act provides that
the federal government's reclamation projects must leave vested water
rights unaffected and must not alter a given state's methods of allocating water resources.2"2 Thus, to gain ownership under the Act the
United States would have to institute condemnation or eminent domain
29 8
proceedings.
V.

LEGAL CONTROLS OF A WATER RIGHT

Once an appropriation of water is made, the right thereby obtained
and the exercise of that right are not without limitations. Both statutory
enactments and judicial pronouncements have created a set of legal
controls which govern the right and its use.
A. Beneficial Use
294
The concept of beneficial use, integral to acquiring a water right,
also acts as a legal control upon that right. For example, if a valid
appropriation is made and subsequently the court decides that the water
right is not being beneficially used, either totally or partially, then the
right is either abrogated or limited to the extent that the use is beneficial.
In order to make such determinations, courts consider a number of
288325

28

U.S. 589 (1945).

Id. at 614.

290 Id.
291 Id.

U.S.C. § 383 (1964).
Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963). The Supreme Court has held that where
there are no condemnation proceedings instituted by the federal government, the acts of
impounding and diverting water under the authority of the Reclamation Act do not vest
rights to its use or rights to its ownership in the United States. Rank v. Krug, 142 F.
Supp. 1 (D. Cal. 1956), ajfd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 293 F.2d 340,
modified on other grounds, 307 F.2d 96, aff'd in part, 372 U.S. 627, aff'd in part, rev'd
in part on other grounds, 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
See PART ONE, § 11(A) (2) supra.

29243

293 See

2

"
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factors, including the nature of the use, the place of use, and the
efficiency of the use.
1. Nature of Use
As discussed elsewhere, 295 water rights for domestic, agricultural,
industrial, municipal, or aesthetic use are usually determined to be
beneficial. It is only to the extent that the use is nonbeneficial that
the nature of the use limits the appropriative right.
2. Place of Use
The doctrine of prior appropriation permits great flexibility with
regard to the place where water may be used. Indeed, -[t]he right to
appropriate water and put the same to beneficial use at any place in
the state is no longer open to question."29' 6 Further, since the right to
use water is a property right which may be sold separately from the
land, 2 97 courts have held that the place of use may be changed, i.e.,
"the right to the use of the water is not limited to the land where the
water was first applied."'2 98
However, there are legal controls which have been developed that
limit the right to change the place of use. For example, a change in
the place of use must not "interfere with the vested rights of junior
appropriators in the continuance of conditions existing at the time of
their appropriations .... .299 Further, change in the place of use is
= For a more complete discussion of the nature of beneficial uses, see PART ONE, §§ II
(A) (2) (a)-(e) supra.
296 Metropolitan Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist., 148
Colo. 173, 202, 365 P.2d 273, 289 (1961); accord, Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co.,
6 Colo. 443, 449 (1882); see Wyoming v. Colorado 259 U.S. 419 (1922); Pioneer Irr.
Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 236 F. 790 (D. Colo. 1916). See also COLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 150-5-13(2)(d) (1963) which places restrictions on appropriators diverting water
across the trans-continental divide; that is,
facilities planned and designed for the exportation .. .shall be designed, constructed and operated in such manner that the present appropriations of water,
and in addition thereto prospective uses of water for irrigation and other beneficial consumptive use purposes . . .will not be impaired nor increased in cost
at the expense of the water users within the natural basin.
id.
29 For a more complete discussion of a water right as a property right, see PART FOUR,

§ Iinfra.
2"Hassler v. Fountain Mutual Irr. Co., 93 Colo. 246, 249, 26 P.2d 102, 103 (1933);
accord, Colorado Springs v. Yust, 126 Colo. 289, 294, 249 P.2d 151, 153 (1952);
Enlarged Southside Irr. Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 120 Colo. 423, 429, 210
P.2d 982, 985 (1949); Ironstone Ditch Co. v. Ashenfelter, 57 Colo. 31, 39-40, 140 P.
177, 180 (1914); see Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 96 P.2d 836 (1939).
2"Enlarged Southside Irr. Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 120 Colo. 423, 429, 210
P.2d 982, 985 (1949); accord, Enlarged Southside Irr. Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch
Co., 116 Colo. 580, 586, 183 P.2d 552, 555 (1947); Hassler v. Fountain Mutual Irr.
Co., 93 Colo. 246, 249, 26 P.2d 102, 103 (1933); Ironstone Ditch Co. v. Ashenfelter,
57 Colo. 31, 40, 140 P. 177, 180 (1914); Colorado Springs v. Yust, 126 Colo. 289, 294,
249 P.2d 151, 153 (1952). See generally DeHerrera v. Manassa Land & Irr. Co., 151
Colo. 528, 379 P.2d 405 (1963); Shawcroft v. Terrace Irr. Co., 138 Colo. 343, 333 P.2d
1043 (1958); PART ONE, § III(A) (2)supra.
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"[1limited not only by the volume use stated in the decree but also by
the time use measured by the needs of the land ....
It should also be noted that Colorado has enacted a watershed
protection law 30 1 which requires that works and facilities constructed
for appropriations, which export water from the basin of the Colorado
River under the authority of a water conservation district,
shall be designed, constructed and operated in such a manner that the
present appropriations of water, and in addition thereto prospective
uses of water for irrigation and other beneficial consumptive use
purposes . . . within the natural basin of the Colorado river [sic] in
the state of Colorado . . . will not be impaired nor increased in cost
3 02
at the expense of the water users within the natural basin.
The practical implication of this enactment, exemplified by the Grand
Lake diversion, is to require a compensating reservoir to be built for
the benefit of western slope appropriators when water is to be transported across the Continental Divide to the Eastern Slope. 80 3
3. Efficiency of Use
Efficiency of use deals principally with waste, i.e., "practices, such
as the use of excessive amounts of water and losses in the physical
application or transportation of water, through seepage, evaporation
and the like,"3 04 which do not make reasonable utilization of appropriated water.
a. Wasteful Use
Although decreed water rights are vested rights, there are certain
limitations which attach to them, including the limitation to not waste
the appropriated water. 0 5 If an appropriator diverts more water than
he can apply to a beneficial use, he then owes a duty to return the
surplus to the stream where it becomes subject to appropriation as if
it had never been diverted.380 Similarly, if an appropriator has no
300 Enlarged Southside Irr. Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 120 Colo. 423, 429, 210
P.2d 982, 985 (1949).

See Farmers Highline Canal & Res. Co. v. Golden, 129 Colo.

575, 272 P.2d 629 (1954); Enlarged Southside Irr. Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co.,
116 Colo. 580, 183 P.2d 552 (1947); Baker v. Pueblo, 87 Colo. 489, 289 P. 603 (1930);
cf. Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Rocky Ford Canal Co., 79 Colo. 511, 246 P. 781 (1926).

See generally Hassler v. Fountain Mutual Irr. Ditch Co., 93 Colo. 246, 26 P.2d 102
(1933).
301 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 150-5-13(2) (d) (1963).
302

Id.
303 J. SAX, supra note 1, at 122.
304
Id. at 124.
305 See generally Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986 (Colo. 1968); Colorado Springs v.
Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961).
306 Pulaski Irr. Ditch Co. v. Trinidad, 70 Colo. 565, 568, 203 P. 681, 682 (1922); Durkee
Ditch Co. v. Means, 63 Colo. 6, 8-9, 164 P. 503, 504 (1917); La Jara Creamery & Live
Stock Ass'n v. Hansen, 35 Colo. 105, 109, 83 P. 644, 645 (1905); Water Supply and
Storage Co. v. Larimer & Weld Res. Co., 25 Colo. 87, 94, 53 P. 386, 388 (1898).
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present use for his full appropriation, he owes a duty to allow that
30 7
which is not needed to remain in the stream.
The problem with excessive usage of water is particularly acute
during the summer season when shortage of available water is most
likely to occur. Hence, a Colorado statute provides that "[djuring the
summer season it shall not be lawful for any person to run through
his irrigating ditch any greater quantity of water than is absolutely
necessary for irrigating his land, and for domestic and stock purposes;
it being the intent and meaning of this section to prevent the wasting
30 8
and useless discharge and running away of water.
b. Wasteful Loss from Conveyance or Diversion
An appropriator is required to "exercise a reasonable degree of
care to prevent loss in carrying [water] to the place of use." ' 9
Attempting to convey a volume of water in excess of the capacity of a
ditch3 10 or conveying water in a ditch or canal which loses an unreasonable amount of water due to seepage or evaporation constitutes waste.3 11
While the statutes do not provide a test for determining waste,
there are specifications in a recent statute for the construction of headgates and waste gates which allow the volume of water and the
possibility of waste to be more effectively measured and controlled. 312
Further, the state engineer or the division engineer is authorized by
law to enter upon private property to inspect the means or proposed
means of diversion and transportation of water;31 3 and division engineers are required to order the total or partial discontinuance of any
diversion in their division when the water is not being applied to a
beneficial use. 1 4 In addition to risking a total or partial discontinuance
by order of the state or division engineer, the appropriator who permits
an unreasonable diversion of water also subjects himself both to the
3

07Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 203, 96 P.2d 836, 841 (1939); Fort Lyon Canal Co.
v. Chew, 33 Colo. 392, 405, 81 P. 37, 41 (1905).
308 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-7-8 (1963) (emphasis added).
3
09Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Ext. Co., 42 Colo. 421, 431, 94 P. 339, 341 (1908). See generally COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-7-7, -8 (1963); Id. § 148-21-35(6) (Supp. 1969).
310 Greeley Irr. Co. v. House, 14 Colo. 549, 553, 24 P. 329, 330 (1890).
311 Comstock v. Larimer & Weld Res. Co., 58 Colo. 186, 205-06, 145 P. 700, 706 (1914);
accord Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Ext. Co., 42 Colo. 421, 430, 94 P. 339, 341 (1908);
Montrose Canal Co. v. Loutsenhizer, 23 Colo. 233, 237-38, 48 P. 532, 534 (1896).
These cases specifically emphasize that waste can be occasioned by the use of ditches
or appliances conveying water which permit a loss of a volume of water many times
greater than that actually consumed at the point of utilization. In other words, these
cases obligate appropriators to use care in the construction and maintenance of ditches
in order to prevent waste from evaporation or seepage. Finally, there is also a statutory
obligation for ditch owners to prevent waste. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-7-7, -8
(1963).
31

2 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-7-12(1) (Supp. 1969).

313

See generally COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-35(6) (Supp. 1969).
s14 Id. §§ 148-21-35(1), (2).
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possibility of a fine8 1 and to allegations by a junior appropriator that
the water is not being beneficially used and that the senior right should.
16
therefore, be cut back.'
A reasonable means of diversion is also required when tributary
ground water is appropriated. In Colorado Springs v. Bender, 1 7 which
involved the appropriation of water from an aquifer by wells, it was
stated that "the diversion by the senior appropriator must be examined
as to whether he has created a means of diversion from the aquifer
which is reasonably adequate .... .818 The court remanded the case
for further findings, providing that
[t]he court must determine what, if anything, the plaintiffs should be
required to do to make more efficient the facilities at their point of
diversion, due regard being given to the purposes for which the
appropriation had been made, and the "economic reach" of plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs cannot reasonably "command the whole" source of
supply merely to facilitate the taking by them of the fraction of the

entire flow to which their senior appropriation entitles them. On the
other hand, plaintiffs cannot be required to improve their extraction

facilities beyond their economic reach, upon a consideration of all the
factors involved.8 1 9

While there are many problems that remain to be solved, it does
appear that the trend of water law is to attempt to minimize waste
and to obtain the maximum efficiency of use. Given the language in
Fellhauer,2 0 the provisions of recent legislation,;' and the emphasis
on economic use,32 2 it is apparent that efficiency of use may provide
a viable way in which additional water may be made available to users
in Colorado.
3 15

Id. § 148-7-9 (1963).

6

31 See Albion-Idaho Land Co. v. Naf Irr. Co., 97 F.2d 439 (10th Cir. 1938).
317148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961).
318

id. at 464, 366 P.2d at 556.
Id. at 465, 366 P.2d at 556.
320 447 P.2d 986 (Colo. 1968).
It is implicit .. .that, along with vested rights, there shall be maximum utilization of the water of this state. As administration of water approaches its
second century the curtain is opening upon the new drama of maximum utilization and how constitutionally that doctrine can be integrated into the law of
vested rights. We have known for a long time that the doctrine was lurking in
the backstage shadows as a result of the accepted, though oft violated, principle
that the right to water does not give the right to waste it. (emphasis by the
court).
Id. at 994.
32 The "Water Right Determination Act of 1969" (CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-1 et
seq. (Supp. 1969)) makes several references to the policy of maximizing use. For example, the stated policy of the act is to "maximize the beneficial use of all the waters of this
state." Id. § 148-21-2(1). Further, the definition of beneficial use uses the phrase
"reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the purpose for which the
diversion is lawfully made .. " Id. § 148-21-3(7).
See, for example, the language in COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-35(4) (Supp.
1969).
3 19
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B. Preferences in Use of Appropriated Water
Although the dominant factor of the prior appropriation system
is time, 8 this factor is not determinative of all water rights under this
system. Indeed, statutory preferences can give a junior user a priority
24
over a senior user provided that certain requirements are satisfied.
The most common types of preferences are those which correspond
to the ultimate purpose for which the water was appropriated. The
Colorado constitution states:
[w]hen the waters of any natural stream are not sufficient . . .those
using the water for domestic purposes shall have the preference over

those claiming [water] for any other purpose, and those using the water

for agricultural purposes shall have preference over those using the
82
same for manufacturing purposes. 5

It would seem that the drafters of the Colorado constitution
intended to create a true preference for appropriators using water for
domestic purposes and likewise for those using water for agricultural
purposes.32 6 From the wording of art. XVI, § 6, it appears that a
person using water for a preferred purpose could divert and use the
quantity of water he has properly appropriated as against a nonpreferential senior right and that the preference provision would be
self-executing. However, Colorado courts have refused to give the
preference clause in the constitution a self-executing effect; instead they
have held that "[r]ights to the use of water" and the priority one
appropriator may have over another are property rights "in the full
sense of that term ' 327 and, as such, are subject to the condemnation
requirements of art. II, § 15 of the constitution. This provision gives
a junior preferred appropriator a right to condemn, provided he offers
just compensation to the holder of the nonpreferential senior right
828
if the latter's consent is not obtained.
One of the earliest cases to set forth this interpretation of the
preference clause was Montrose Canal Co. v. Loutsenhizer Ditch Co..
in which it was stated:
The use [domestic] protected by the constitution is such as the riparian
owner has at common law to take water for himself, his family or his

stock, and the like. And if the term "domestic use" is to be given a
different or greater meaning than this, then as between such enlarged
use and those having prior rights for agricultural and manufacturing
purposes, it is subject to that other constitutional provision requiring

just compensation to those whose rights are affected thereby.32 9

32 Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882); Schilling v. Rominger, 4 Colo.
100, 103 (1878); COLO. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 6; see Thomas, Appropriations of Water
for a PreferredPurpose, 22 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 422 (1950).
MSee Trelease, Preferences to the Use of Water, 27 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 133 (1955).
325COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
3 Trelease, supra note 324, at 134.
32 Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Ext. Co., 42 Colo. 421,426, 94 P. 339, 340 (1908).
3
Thomas, supra note 323, at 423.
32 23 Colo. 233, 237, 48 P. 532, 534 (1896).
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The court seemed to say that a true preference would only extend to
that quantity of water a riparian landowner could take under common
law, 30 and all other preferences would merely constitute rights to
condemn or to take by consent. With this interpretation the court was
able to give effect to the literal meaning of the preference clause by
creating a true preference and provide a workable, as well as reasonable,
application of the preference clause. However, it should be noted that
cases following Montrose have never referred to that portion of the
opinion which provided for a true preference since there were few
claims for a quantity of water as small as that to which a riparian
landowner was entitled under common law 3. and since the standard
of a riparian landowner's right under common law was not applicable
83 2
in Colorado.
One of the underlying considerations in the Montrose decision was
the possibility that towns might use their preferred right for domestic
purposes to claim large quantities of water without paying compensation, thereby unreasonably interfering with the efficient allocation
of water resources. 833 The courts felt that claims so large were inconsistent with sound economic policy in view of the public welfare. It was
believed that the benefit to the domestic user was far overshadowed
by the possible detriment to the farmers and manufacturers who rights
were affected 8 4 and, further, that the general public ultimately stood
to lose by allowing domestic users to freely divert large quantities of
338
water, thus reducing food production and manufacturing output.
In response to these fears, the Colorado Supreme Court made it
explicitly clear in Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co. 3" ' that
municipalities could not take water already appropriated without paying
compensation:
Section 6, art. XVI, of the constitution states that those using water
for domestic purposes shall have the preference over those claiming
for any other purpose, but this provision does not entitle one desiring
to use water for domestic purposes, as intended by the defendant town
of Sterling, to take it from another who has previously3 appropriated
7
it for some other purpose, without just compensation.
330Under the riparian system, all riparian owners on a stream had equal and correlative

rights to the use of the water in the stream. The amount of water each user could take
directly depended on the amount of water available in the stream. A "reasonable amount"
was the proper, although often times confusing, standard. When water is scarce the
riparian rights are very small. See Trelease, Coordinationof Riparian and Appropriative
Rights to the Use of Water, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 24, 26 (1954).
331 Many early decisions like Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 P.
339 (1908), involved municipalities or large ditch companies who were appropriating
large amounts of water.
332 Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882).
33 Montrose Canal Co. v. Loutsenhizer Ditch Co., 23 Colo. 233, 237, 48 P. 532, 534

(1896).

334 d.

.
3
33

7

Id.
42 Colo. 421, 94 P. 339 (1908).
1d.

at 426, 94 P. at 340.
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A later case, Black v. Taylor,888 recognized, in effect, the right of an
individual user to condemn a less preferred senior right; 8 9 yet the
court in Black, citing Sterling, stated that full compensation must be
840
paid in such cases to the holder of the displaced senior right.
Hence, the case law development from Montrose to Black leads to the
conclusion that the purpose of use preferences for domestic, agricultural,
and manufacturing uses in Colorado amount to no more than a right
to condemn inferior uses, provided that just compensation is paid.
There also exists a favored user preference which gives one appropriator of water a better right than a prior appropriator who is using
the water for the same purpose. 34' In Colorado, the authority for the
favored user preference does not come from the preference provision
of the constitution but is based primarily on the eminent domain power
of the state. The favored user preference is, therefore, no more than
a right to condemn and is similar to the purpose of use preferences in
that regard.
C. Vested Rights
A principal element of the law of prior appropriation is the fact
that a water right is, as against all claims more junior in time, a vested
property interest.8 4 As a consequence thereof, it has been held that
prorating available water in times of short supply cannot be required
and that junior appropriators may be shut off, if necessary, to supply
priorities of senior appropriators.8 4 3
Although a right to the use of water is a vested property right,
it may still be limited or lost. For example, "[s]ince the priority rule
protects only the priority of those making 'beneficial' uses of the water,
it is always open to a junior claimant to urge that a senior's use is not
345
beneficial '8 4 4 because of excessive waste in use or transportation
8
46
or because of abandonment.
Further, even though an appropriator

338 128 Colo. 449, 264 P.2d 502 (1953).
339M. See generally Thomas, supra note 323, at 427.
340
Black v. Taylor, 128 Colo. 449, 457, 264 P.2d 502, 506 (1953).
341 Trelease, supra note 324, at 133.
342 See J. SAx, supra note 1, at 136. Well rights to tributary ground waters are vested even
though they may not be adjudicated. See Black v. Taylor, 128 Colo. 449, 264 P.2d 502
(1953). See also PART FOUR, § I infra.
33 Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 463, 366 P.2d 552, 555-56 (1961).
34 J. SAx, supra note 1, at 136. See PART ONE, § V (A) (1) supra.
34 8
Albion-Idaho Land Co. v. Naf Irr. Co., 97 F.2d 439, 444-45 (10th Cir. 1938). See PART
ONE, §§ V(A) (2) (a) & (b) supra.
346 Kaess v. Wilson, 132 Clo. 443, 447-48, 289 P.2d 636, 638 (1955); Knapp v. Colorado
River Water Conserv. Dist., 131 Colo. 42, 53-54, 279 P.2d 420, 425-26 (1955); Peterson
v. Colorado River Dist., 127 Colo. 16, 23, 254 P.2d 422, 425 (1952). Although both
nonuse and intent are normally required for abandonment, the intent may under certain
circumstances be inferred. Farmers Res. & Irr. Co. v. Fulton Irr. Ditch Co., 108 Colo.
482, 487, 120 P.2d 196, 199 (1941); Commonwealth Irr. Co. v. Rio Grande Canal
Water Users Ass'n, 96 Colo. 478, 480, 45 P.2d 622, 623 (1935). See PART ONE,
§ V(E) (1) infra.
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has a vested property right, he still cannot "command the whole flow
of the stream merely to facilitate his taking the fraction of the whole
flow to which he is entitled." 4 7 Hence, these and other restrictions.. 8
limit the vested right acquired by a valid appropriation.
Vested water rights may also not be as stable as other kinds of
vested rights. Federal reclamation projects, authorizing the distribution
of project water to users in time of shortage in accordance with a
proportional reduction scheme, may make an exception to the rule of
priority since federal law will be held to apply.84 9 There is also the
whole question of federal control over and claims to water rights in
the Western States which may threaten the security afforded by a
state-granted water right. 350
The concept of vested rights with respect to nontributary ground
waters poses an especially difficult problem. A discussion of the law
in this area and the conclusion that the property owner has a vested
right to such underlying waters, subject only to the reasonable use
doctrine, is included in a later portion of this study. 85 '
D. Restrictions on the Right
A right to the use of water is limited by the volume of water that
may be diverted and the time during which the water may be used.
1. Measure of Volume
It has been held that "[tihe rate or volume which may rightfully
35
be diverted under a decreed priority is measured by the decree.11 1
In Colorado, decrees measure the right in terms of rate of flow, i.e.,
5 cubic feet per second (cfs). In determining the rate or volume which
may rightfully be diverted, the courts generally follow the "original
enterprise" concept whereby the appropriator is entitled to take all
the water that is reasonably needed to pursue the use intended at the
time of his original appropriation."'E
2. Period of Use
It is the uniformly stated principle that
a prior appropriator of water acquires an absolute right thereto only
to the extent to which such water is applied to beneficial use.... if,
347 COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-2(2) (c)

(Supp. 1969).

348 For a more complete discussion of the legal controls placed on water rights, see PART
ONE. §§ V(A), (B) supra and PART ONE, §§ V(D), (E) infra.
34
9 J. SAX, supra note 1, at 141. See Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
3
6oSee Moses, Federal-State Water Problems, 47 DENVER L.J. 194 (1970).
351 PART Two, § I (B) (2) (b) (3) infra.
35 Enlarged Southside Irr. Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 120 Colo. 423, 428, 210
P.2d 982, 984 (1949).
353 J. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING & POLIcY 263 (1968).
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therefore, the prior appropriator makes use of the water only at certain
times, as during certain seasons, or on certain days in the week, or
during a certain number of days in a month, other persons may acquire
8 54
a right to the use of the water at other times, or on other days.
E. Loss of the Right

In addition to the foregoing restrictions, there are two other ways
in which a water right may be totally or partially lost. It may be
determined that the right has been abandoned or that another user
has obtained the water right by adverse possession.
1. Abandonment
855
In Colorado, all water rights (including direct flow rights,
storage rights,85 6 adjudicated rights, 8 57 conditional rights,"' 8 and
ground water rights. 5 9 ) are subject to abandonment even though they
4

J. LONG, supra note 2, at 240. See also Cache La Poudre Res. Co. v. Water Supply &
Stor. Co., 25 Colo. 161, 53 P. 331 (1898).
35 See Mountain Meadows Ditch & Irr. Co. v. Park Ditch & Res. Co., 130 Colo. 537, 277
P.2d 527 (1954); Commonwealth Irr. Co. v. Rio Grande Canal Water Users Ass'n,
96 Colo. 478, 45 P.2d 622 (1935); Farmers Res. & Irr. Co. v. Fulton Irr. Ditch Co.,
108 Colo. 482, 120 P.2d 196 (1941); Parsons v. Fort Morgan Res. & Irr. Co., 56 Colo.
146, 136 P. 1024 (1913).
356 Hallenbeck v. Granby Ditch & Res. Co., 160 Colo. 555, 566, 420 P.2d 419, 426 (1966);
see Del Norte Irr. Dist. v. Santa Maria Res. Co., 108 Colo. 1, 113 P.2d 676 (1941).
37 Alamosa Creek Canal Co. v. Nelson, 42 Colo. 140, 93 P. 1112 (1908) is the leading
case on this area. The court said that a statutory decree confers no new rights on the
water right owner. A decree is not a guaranty to the owner of the right that the right
cannot be abandoned; it is merely evidence of a pre-existing right which may be lost
by abandonment. Id. at 147, 93 P. at 1114. Accord, San Luis Valley Land & Cattle Co.
v. Hazard, 114 Colo. 233, 236, 157 P.2d 144, 145 (1945); Bijou Irr. Dist. v. Weldon
Valley Ditch Co., 67 Colo. 336, 338, 184 P. 382, 384 (1919); Parsons v. Fort Morgan
Res. & Irr. Co., 56 Colo. 146, 151, 136 P. 1024, 1026 (1913).
8 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-3 (14)
(Supp. 1969) states: - 'Abandonment of a
conditional water right' means the termination of a conditional water right as a result
of the failure to develop with reasonable diligence the proposed appropriation upon
which such water right is to be based." Id. This is the first time that conditional water
rights have been subject to abandonment. The old rule was that abandonment applied
only to completed appropriations of water. In Conley v. Dyer, 43 Colo. 22, 95 P. 304
(1908) the court reasoned that if the appropriator did not follow the doctrine of due
diligence to perfect his right (i.e., applying the appropriated water to a beneficial use
within a reasonable time), no appropriation of water would exist. Id. at 28, 95 P. at 306.
Accord, Bieser v. Stoddard, 73 Colo. 554, 560. 216 P. 707, 709 (1923); Drach v. Isola,
48 Colo. 134, 145, 109 P. 748, 751 (1910).
3"
'Abandonment of a water right' means the termination of a water right .
(Emphasis added) COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-3(13) (Supp. 1969), provides:
- 'Water right' means a right to use in accordance with its priority a certain portion
of the waters of the state by reason of the appropriation of the same." (Emphasis added)
Id. 148-21-3(8). " 'Waters of the state' means all surface and underground water in
or tributary to all natural streams within the state of Colorado .... " (emphasis added)
Id. § 148-21-3(3). Since "water rights" includes the right to use "'water of the state"
and "waters of the state" is defined to include "underground waters," the provision of
the statute allowing abandonment of "water rights" includes the abandonment of underground water rights.
3
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are not subject to forfeiture.36 0 If the essential elements are proved,
then water rights may be lost or limited by abandonment proceedings.
In addition, the "Water Right Determination and Administration Act
of 1969" provides for administrative determination of abandonment.
a. Essential Elements
According to the case law, abandonment consists of two elements:
nonuse of appropriated water coupled with the owner's intent not to
repossess himself of such use. 6 1 In 1969, the Colorado legislature
defined abandonment as "the termination of a water right in whole
or in part as a result of the intent of the owner thereof to discontinue
permanently the use of all or part of the water available thereunder." 6 '
While on its face the statute seems to have eliminated the element of
nonuse in this definition, the provision "intent . . . to discontinue
permanently use" could be interpreted in such a manner that nonuse
depends solely upon intent; and therefore if intent is shown, nonuse can
be assumed.
The controlling element in the definition of abandonment becomes
intent which may be shown either expressly or impliedly.36 5 Without
60 According to Dr. Kinney, the distinction between abandonment and forfeiture may be
summarized as follows:
While upon the one hand abandonment is the relinquishment of the right by
the owner with the intention to forsake and desert it, forfeiture, upon the other
hand, is the involuntary or forced loss of the right, caused by the failure of the
appropriator or owner to do or perform some act required by statute ....
The
element of intent, therefore, so necessary in the case of abandonment, is not a
necessary element in the case of forfeiture. In fact a forfeiture may be worked
directly against the intent of the owner of the right to continue in the possession and the use of the right. Therefore forfeiture as applied to water rights
in this connection is the penalty fixed by statute for the failure ... to use the
same for the period specified in the statute.
2 C. KINNEY, supra note 71, at 2020. Colorado has no forfeiture statute, and therefore
no water rights in Colorado may be forfeited. The old case of Beaver Brook Res. & Canal
Co. v. Saint Vrain Res. & Fish Co., 6 Colo. App. 130, 40 P. 1066 (1895) mentions forfeiture but in the context of conditional water rights. The court said:
If, by neglect to apply the water within a proper time, the right to apply was
forfeited, the water reverted, and anyone could proceed to appropriate and
apply it; but such right could only attach while the right of the former claimant was in abeyance by reason of his negligence, and the second party must
have availed himself of the right before the re-entry and prosecution of the
enterprise by the first party.
Id. at 135, 40 P. at 1068; cf. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-3(11) (Supp. 1969).
361 Farmers Res. & Irr. Co. v. Fulton Irr. Ditch Co., 108 Colo. 482, 487, 120 P.2d 196, 199
(1941); Del Norte Irr. Dist. v. Santa Maria Res. Co., 108 Colo. 1, 6, 113 P.2d 676,
678 (1941); Commonwealth Irr. Co. v. Rio Grande Canal Water Users Ass'n, 96 Colo.
478, 480, 45 P.2d 622, 623 (1935); Arnold v. Roup, 61 Colo. 316, 324, 157 P. 206,
209 (1916).
32 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-3(13) (Supp. 1969).
33 Scott v. Temple, 108 Colo. 463, 465, 119 P.2d 607, 608, (1941); Fruit Growers Ditch
& Res. Co. v. Donald, 96 Colo. 264, 268, 41 P.2d 516, 518 (1935); South Boulder
Canon Ditch Co. v. Davidson Ditch & Res. Co., 87 Colo. 391, 392, 288 P. 177, 178
(1930).
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of
proving such intent to abandon a water right, proof of mere nonuse
64
abandonment.'
establish
to
suffice
not
will
water
appropriated
the
b. Proof of Intent to Abandon
Abandonment is a question of fact which must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence 65 of both an intent to abandon and, concomitantly, nonuse. 366 Further, when attempting to prove abandonment of
an adjudicated water right, the evidence generally must be of facts
occurring after the adjudication and awarding of priorities, 67 although
conditions prior to the adjudication may be competent to show intent
subsequent to the decree. 368 In any case, the party who asserts abandonment has the burden of proving abandonment."6 9
The evidence necessary to establish the requisite intent may vary.
Abandonment of a water right may be effected by a plain declaration
of an intention to abandon the right. 70 However, a more complicated
situation results when the intent to abandon is presumed or inferred,
3"New Mercer Ditch Co. v. Armstrong, 21 Colo. 357, 364, 40 P. 989, 991 (1895); accord,

Scott v. Temple, 108 Colo. 463, 465, 119 P.2d 607, 608 (1941); Fruit Growers Ditch
& Res. Co. v. Donald, 96 Colo. 264, 269, 41 P.2d 516, 517 (1935); White v. Nuckolls,
49 Colo. 170, 175, 112 P. 329, 332 (1910).
365 Commonwealth Irr. Co. v. Rio Grande Canal Water Users Ass'n, 96 Colo. 478, 480,
45 P.2d 622, 623 (1935); South Boulder Canon Ditch Co. v. Davidson Ditch & Res.
Co., 87 Colo. 391, 392, 288 P. 177, 178 (1930); Arnold v. Roup, 61 Colo. 316, 324,
157 P. 206, 209 (1916); Beaver Brook Res. & Canal Co. v. Saint Vrain Res. & Fish Co.,
6 Colo. App. 130, 136, 40 P. 1066, 1068 (1895).
36 Hallenbeck v. Granby Ditch & Res. Co., 160 Colo. 555, 567, 420 P.2d 419, 426 (1966);
Lengel v. Davis, 141 Colo. 94, 100, 347 P.2d 142, 146 (1959); Pouchoulou v. Heath,
137 Colo. 462, 463, 326 P.2d 656 (1958); Means v. Pratt, 138 Colo. 214, 219, 331
P.2d 805, 807 (1958); Cline v. McDowell, 132 Colo. 37, 42, 284 P.2d 1056, 1059
(1955).
37 Bieser v. Stoddard, 73 Colo. 554, 560, 216 P. 707, 709 (1923); Arnold v. Roup, 61
Colo. 316, 324, 157 P. 206, 209 (1916); O'Brien v. King, 41 Colo. 487, 491, 92 P. 945,
946 (1907); accord, Hallenbeck v. Granby Ditch & Res. Co., 160 Colo. 555, 565, 420
P.2d 419, 425 (1966) (where the court states the rule but does not apply it to the facts
of the case); Farmers Res. & Irr. Co. v. Fulton Irr. Ditch Co., 108 Colo. 482, 120 P.2d
196 (1941) (holding that the fact that decreed water had not been used was evidence
of abandonment of the decreed right) Id. at 496, 120 P.2d at 204. See Klug v. Henrylyn
Irr. Dist., 88 Colo. 8, 291 P. 820 (1930) (where the court found abandonment where
a water user constructed his reservoir in such a way that he could not use the water
decreed to him).
3 New Mercer Ditch Co. v. New Cache La Poudre Irr. Ditch Co., 70 Colo. 351, 201 P.
557 (1921). "Evidence of abandonment must, of course, be of facts which occur after
the decree which awards the priorities, but previous conditions, declarations of the
parties and the proceedings in the suit of which that decree is the result are competent
to show conditions and intent subsequent to the decree." Id. at 353-54, 201 P. at 558.
Accord, Colorado Springs v. Yust, 126 Colo. 289, 293, 249 P.2d 151, 153 (1952) (cites
this proposition but applies the principle to a case involving a petition for a change of
point of diversion rather than a petition for a decree of abandonment); see Alamosa
Creek Canal Co. v. Nelson, 42 Colo. 140, 93 P. 1112 (1908).
30Mason v. Hills Land & Cattle Co., 119 Colo. 404, 408, 204 P.2d 153, 155 (1949);
Arnold v. Roup, 61 Colo. 316, 324-25, 157 P. 206, 209 (1916); Parsons v. Fort Morgan
Res. & Irr. Co., 56 Colo. 146, 150, 136 P. 1024, 1025 (1913); White v. Nuckolls, 49
Colo. 170, 176, 112 P. 329, 332 (1910); Platte Valley Irr. Co. v. Central Trust Co.,
32 Colo. 102, 106, 75 P. 391, 393 (1904); Hall v. Lincoln, 10 Colo. App. 360, 364,
50 P. 1047, 1048 (1897); see Bieser v. Stoddard, 73 Colo. 554, 216 P. 707 (1923).
0
3
Green Valley Ditch Co. v. Frantz, 54 Colo. 226, 232, 129 P. 1006, 1008 (1913), citing
North Am. Explor. Co. v. Adams, 104 F. 404 (10th Cir. 1900).
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for it then becomes necessary to establish the connection between the
facts asserted and the inference presumed.
In order to adjudicate the issue of implied intent the Colorado
Supreme Court has formulated several general rules for determining
what constitutes a proper inference of intent to abandon. For example,
the court has stated that intent to abandon "may be inferred from acts
or failures to act so inconsistent with an intention to retain it [the water
right] that the unprejudiced mind is convinced of the renunciation." 37 '
Further, the court has held that abandonment of a water right will not
72
be inferred because the user has changed either his point of diversion 1
or his method of conveying appropriated water from the source of
supply to the point of beneficial use, without a showing of intent to
373
abandon and nonuse of the appropriated water.

A third principle adopted by the court states that when it is shown
by clear and convincing evidence that available water has been unused
for an unreasonable amount of time, an implication or presumption of an intent to abandon may arise in the absence of satisfactory
proof of some fact or condition excusing such nonuse."7 4 The Colorado
371d. at 232, 129 P. at 1008. See also Northern Colo. Irr. Co. v. Burlington Ditch, Res.

& Land Co., 74 Colo. 159, 219 P. 1071 (1923); Nichols v. Lantz, 9 Colo. App. 1,
47 P.70 (1896).
7 Corey v. Long, 111 Colo. 146, 138 P.2d 930 (1943). The court said:
Defendants have a decreed priority. . . though the water is now taken at a
different point of diversion from that described as the diversion point in the
decree. The defendants, by changing the point of diversion, or by procuring
a priority decree in which the point of diversion was erroneously described,
did not thereby lose the right to the water which they had theretofore appropriated and which they have continued to use.
Id. at 150, 138 P.2d at 932. Accord, Lengel v. Davis, 141 Colo. 94, 101, 347 P.2d 142,
146 (1959); Pouchoulou v. Heath, 137 Colo. 462, 464, 326 P.2d 656 (1958); Graeser
v. Haigler, 117 Colo. 197, 199, 185 P.2d 781, 782 (1947). The Colorado court has
applied this doctrine to storage rights as well as in the case Del Norte Irrigation District
v. Santa Maria Reservoir Co. 108 Colo. 1, 113 P.2d 676 (1941): "[slo long as an offchannel reservoir actually continues to store available water to an extent reasonably
consistent with its decrees, it abandons none of its rights, and it matters not whether
its mean of inflow diversion is by ditch or pipeline, large or small, in good condition
or bad." Id. at 6, 133 P.2d at 678.
373 Nichols v. McIntosh, 19 Colo. 22, 34 P. 278 (1893), wherein the court said:
A distinction must be observed between the abandonment of an irrigatingditch
and the abandonment of the right to the use of water for irrigation. Water
rights may be abandoned by a nonuser; but so long as the appropriator continues the use of such rights without any unreasonable voluntary cessation, an
abandonment of his water rights will not be presumed against him. (Emphasis
by the court)
Id. at 28, 34 P. at 281. See also New Mercer Ditch Co. v. Armstrong, 21 Colo. 357,
40 P. 989 (1895) wherein the court stated the rule but held it inapplicable to the facts
in the case.
37 See, e.g., Knapp v. Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist., 131 Colo. 42, 279 P.2d 420
(1955); Mountain Meadow Ditch & Irr. Co. v. Park Ditch & Res. Co., 130 Colo. 537,
277 P.2d 527 (1954); Mason v. Hills Land & Cattle Co., 119 Colo. 404, 204 P.2d 153
(1949); Commonwealth Irr. Co. v. Rio Grande Canal Water Users Ass'n, 96 Colo. 478,
45 P.2d 622 (1935); Parsons v. Fort Morgan Res. & Irr. Co., 56 Colo. 146, 136 P. 1024
(1913); Alamosa Creek Canal Co. v. Nelson, 42 Colo. 140, 93 P. 1112 (1908); Sieber
v. Frink, 7 Colo. 148, 2 P. 901 (1883). The court does not generally make the evidentiary distinction between an inference and a presumption. In cases which speak of a
presumption, reference is made to rebutting the presumption by satisfactory proof of
some fact or condition excusing nonuse.
3
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case law on this subject is quite extensive and the following illustrations show some of the conditions that will or will not excuse long
periods of nonuse.
The Colorado Supreme Court has held that conditions which
constitute excusable nonuse arise when natural calamities or economic,
financial or legal difficulties have prevented the use of water rights.
Under such circumstances, a claim of abandonment will be defeated."' 5
The court has also held that when an upstream user was cutting off the
supply of water to a downstream user, there could be no finding of
abandonment of the water right due to nonuse by the downstream
8 76

user.

On the other hand, there are several illustrations of situations in
which the court has refused to recognize conditions of excusable
nonuse. For example, an oral statement of intent not to abandon a
water right followed by nonuse for a sufficient period of time will not
rebut a presumption of abandonment. 377 Further, when acts upon which
8 78
a claim of nonabandonment is based are not performed in good faith8 79
but are mere pretenses to evince an intention to use the water right,
the court will grant a decree of abandonment.3 8 ° Likewise, mere
expressions of desire or hope to use the water right will not be sufficient
75

Hallenbeck v. Granby Ditch & Res. Co., 160 Colo. 555, 420 P.2d 419 (1966) wherein
the court applied the rule of excusable nonuse to shortage rights when the following
conditions existed: Financial difficulties during the Depression curtailed the ability of
the owner to keep the reservoirs in peak operating conditions; a shortage of materials
and engineering help during World War II years hampered operations; and repairs
after World War II proved to be too expensive due to stringent requirement placed
thereon by the United States Forestry Service officials, Id. at 568, 420 P.2d at 426;
Flasche v. Westcolo Co., 112 Colo. 387, 149 P.2d 817 (1944) where the court said:
The evidence discloses that up to 1925, with intermittant interruptions due to
physical conditions and storms and washouts beyond petitioner's control, it
[the water right] was continuously so used. It was during this period of use
that protesting juniors acquired their rights. These interruptions were misfortunes to petitioners that of course inured to the juniors' benefit. It would
be strange construction of the rule of law that gives them a vested right to a
continuance of conditions on the stream to hold that it is broad enough to vest
them with the right to a continuance of the senior petitioners' misfortunes with
their ditch. . . . To deny petitioners, in the absence of abandonment, the right
to repair and improve their old diversion system and take all the water that
has been decreed to them would be a denial of their property rights.
Id. at 393, 149 P.2d at 820.
376 See Reagle v. Square S Land & Cattle Co., 133 Colo. 392, 296 P.2d 235 (1956).
37
7See Green Valley Ditch Co. v. Frantz, 54 Colo. 226, 129 P. 1006 (1913).
378 Parsons v. Fort Morgan Res. & Irr. Co., 56 Colo. 146, 152, 136 P. 1024, 1026 (1913).
379 Id.
3

3o Id.

The defendant diverted some of his priority water through certain ditches but under
circumstances from which it was apparent that the diversions were a mere pretense to
establish a use of water which he did not need since he was taking water from another
source. A use of water must be in good faith in order to prevent an abandonment.
[B]esides from the testimony it appears that before he [the defendant] commenced this use the water had not been used for at least seven years, and possibly
not for ten. The Parson ditch had been abandoned during all this period . . ..
From these circumstances it could be inferred that an abandonment had taken
place before the attempt to use the water in 1905. If this were true then the
use in 1905 would not revive rights which had been lost by abandonment.
Id. at 152, 136 P. at 1026.
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to overcome a claim of abandonment when a long period of nonuse
is established; 88 nor will nonuse of a water right because the owner
of the water right intended to sell his right 38 2 or because the owner
was in receivership 383 constitute sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of abandonment. Finally, when a water right is held by
tenants in common and one or more of the consumers do not use the
water to which they are entitled, such individuals will not be excused
from nonuse, and an inference of abandonment will arise as to their
water rights; if the right is exercised by other tenants in common for
a beneficial and necessary purpose, there is no abandonment of the
8 84
water right as to those users.
Because the case law fails to precisely define what is meant by
"unreasonable nonuse," "nonuse for a sufficient period," "a long period
of nonuse," and similar expressions, recent legislation has attempted
to be more precise:
For the purpose of procedures under this section, [Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 148-21-28 (Supp. 1969)] failure for a period of ten years
or more to apply to a beneficial use the water available under a water
right when needed by the person entitled to use the same, shall create
a rebuttable presumption of abandonment of a water right with respect
to the amount of such available water which has not been so used.385

c. Abandoned Water
"When an abandonment occurs, the abandoned water augments
the stream from which the diversion is made and re-establishes conditions as they would have existed had the abandoned right never come
into existence and had it never been exercised.''386 Such water is to be
taken by other appropriators according to their priorities,8 87 and a
381

Mason v. Hills Land & Cattle Co., 119 Colo. 404, 408, 204 P.2d 153, 156 (1949).

382 Knapp v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 131 Colo. 42, 279 P.2d 420 (1955)

wherein the court said: "Speculation on the market, or sale expectancy, is wholly foreign
to the principle of keeping life in a proprietary right and is no excuse for failure to
perform that which the law requires." Id. at 56, 279 P.2d at 427.
383 Farmers Res. & Irr. Co. v. Fulton Irr. Ditch Co., 108 Colo. 482, 120 P.2d 196 (1941).
The court said:
It is hardly probable that a receiver finding himself in possession of the entire
stock of a water company, and thus able to control it, would not make some
inquiry concerning its assets and their value. Neither is it probable that for ten
years nothing was done by the receiver toward using a water right potentially
capable of irrigating seventeen square miles of land .... The evidence was competent as tending to show a recognition of an abandonment of the rights ....
Id. at 497, 120 P.2d at 203-04.
3 84
See Brighton Ditch Co. v. Englewood, 124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116 (1951); Cache
La Poudre Irr. Co. v. Larimer & Weld Res. Co., 25 Colo. 144, 53 P. 318 (1898).
385
CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 148-21-28(2) (k) (Supp. 1969).
386Farmers Res. & Irr. Co. v. Fulton Irr. Ditch Co., 108 Colo. 482, 486, 120 P.2d 196, 199
(1941).
3 87
Kaess v. Wilson, 132 Colo. 443, 447, 289 P.2d 636, 638 (1955); Granby Ditch & Res.
Co. v. Hallenbeck, 127 Colo. 236, 242, 255 P.2d 965, 968 (1953); North Boulder
Farmer's Ditch Co. v. Leggett Ditch & Res. Co., 63 Colo. 522, 557, 168 P. 742, 749
(1917).
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subsequent attempt to use the abandoned water by the owner of the
abandoned right will not revive the lost right.8 8
d. Recent Legislative Developments
While not precluding private actions, the Colorado legislature has
provided a means for the administrative determination of abandoned
water rights. Specifically, the "Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969''389 provides that each tabulation, beginning in
1974, "shall modify any water rights or conditional water rights
which the division engineer determines to have been abandoned in
part, and shall omit any water rights or conditional water rights which
the division engineer determines have been totally abandoned."3 90
In making such determinations, each division engineer will "investigate
the circumstances relating to each water right, the water available
under which has not been fully applied to a beneficial use." 39 ' Further,
the statute provides that an owner, last known owner, or last known
claimant of a water right be notified if his claim has been included
within the tabulation of abandoned water rights.39 Still other provisions
of the legislation set forth procedures for filing objections to tabulations made by the state engineer, 93 for revising the tabulations if
water officials deem revision necessary, 394 and for filing objections
to the revised tabulations.3 95
M

Parsons v. Fort Morgan Res. & Irr. Co., 56 Colo. 146, 152, 136 P. 1024, 1026 (1913).

389COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-1 el seq. (Supp. 1969).

-OId. §

148-21-28(1).

391 Id.

M*Ud. § 148-21-28(2):
(a) The following deadlines shall then be effective each even numbered
year beginning in 1974:
(b) No later than July 10, the division engineer shall cause such publication of the tabulation to be made as is necessary to obtain general circulation
once in each county or portion thereof in the division . . .and shall mail a
copy of such tabulation by registered mail to the owner, or last known owner
or claimant, of every water right or conditional water right which the division
engineer has found to have been abandoned in whole or in part .
Id. § 148-21-28(2) (c):
Not later than September 10, any person who wishes to object to the manner
in which a water right or conditional water right is listed in the tabulation or
to the omission of a water right or conditional right from such tabulation shall
file a statement of objection in writing with such division engineer.
394d. § 148-21-28(2) (d):
On or before October 10, the division engineer shall make such revisions, if
any, as he deems proper in the aforesaid tabulation. In considering the matter
raised by statements of objections, the division engineer may consult with
interested persons. The division engineer shall consult with the state engineer
and shall make any revisions in the tabulation determined by the state engineer
to be necessary or advisable . . . .The revised tabulation . . .shall be filed
...with the water clerk.
M9 Id. § 148-21-28(2) (e):
Any person who wishes to protest the manner in which a water right or conditional water right is listed in the tabulation, including any revisions, or the
omission of a water right or conditional water right from such tabulation shall
file a written protest with the water clerk and with the division engineer not
later than November 30. Such protest shall set forth in detail the facts and
legal basis therefor.
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If protests to the administrative determinations are filed, the entire
matter is subject to judicial review, and procedures are set forth for
hearings to be conducted according to accepted methods of trial practice
and according to accepted rules of procedure, the trial judge promptly
entering judgment upon conclusion of the hearing.39 On the other
hand, if no protests are filed, those water rights determined to be
abandoned and included in the administrative tabulation are declared
abandoned by a decree and judgment;3 97 and after the decree is
entered, the records are corrected to conform to the decree.3

98

It is

important to note that appellate review is permitted only on those
points to which a protest was filed. 99
These new procedures have resulted in some confusion. For
example, one member of the Legislative Council Water Committee
has stated: "What will be done about abandonment suits? There could
be thousands trying to make abandoned water rights good even though
these rights have never been used or are water rights for ditches that
cannot carry the amount of the decree. Perhaps one good case will set
' 400
precedent and solve the problem.
3

§ 148-21-28(2) (f):
Commencing the second week in December and continuing for as long as may
be necessary, the water judge in each division shall conduct hearings on the
tabulation filed by the division engineer and any protests that have been filed
with respect thereto. The hearings shall be conducted in accordance with trial
practice and procedure except that no pleadings other than the protest shall be
required. The protestant shall appear either in person or by counsel in support
of the protest . . . All persons interested in the portions of the tabulation
which are being protested shall be permitted to participate in the hearing . ..
if they enter their appearance in writing . . . .Such entry of appearance shall
identify the portion of the tabulation with respect to which the appearance
is being made .... Promptly after hearing all protests the water judge shall
enter a judgment and decree which shall either incorporate the tabulation of
the division engineer as filed or shall incorporate same with such modifications as the water judge may determine proper after the hearings.
3971 . § 148-21-28(2) (g):
If no protests have been filed, then promptly after November 30 the water
judge shall enter a judgment and decree incorporating and confirming the
tabulation of the division engineer without modification.
398 Id. § 148-21-28(2) (h):
A copy of such judgment and decree shall be filed with the state engineer and
the division engineer and shall be provided by the water clerk to any other
person requesting same. . . . Promptly after receiving a judgment and decree
the division engineer and the state engineer shall enter in their records the
determinations therein made as to priority, location, and use of the water rights
and conditional water rights and shall regulate the distribution of water accordingly.
399 Id. § 148-21-28(2)(i):
Appellate review shall be allowed to the judgment and decree or any part
thereof as in other civil actions, but no appellate review shall be allowed with
respect to that part of the judgment or decree which confirms a portion of the
tabulation with respect to which no protest was filed.
4 Remarks of Representative Jackson, Minutes of the Executive Committee, LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL WATER COMMITTEE, Sept. 15, 1970.
-Id.
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2. Adverse Possession and Use
Water rights are considered property rights in Colorado4"' and
are subject, like other real property rights, to adverse possession and
use.4 °2 As was stated in Lomas v. Webster, 40 3 "It is well established
that individuals in whom a prior right to the use of water is vested
may lose such right by acquiescence in an adverse use thereof by
another ...
404 Though the court in the Lomas case speaks only of
individuals losing their water rights, water rights of corporations are
likewise subject to being lost through adverse use.40 5 Yet adverse
possession as a means to acquire a water right is not without limitation.
Water rights of the United States 40 6 and the unappropriated water of
the State of Colorado 4 7 are not subject to acquisition in this manner.
a. Elements of Adverse Use
In the case of Surface Creek Ditch and Reservoir Co. v. Grand
Mesa Resort Co.,408 the requirements for proving adverse use were
concisely set forth: "In order to establish a [water] right by adverse
possession it [is] incumbent upon [claimant] to prove ... actual, open,
notorious . . . continuous, hostile and exclusive possession . . . under
claim of right for the statutory period."40 9 As will be described later,
these elements are intertwined in various ways so that proving one
element might help to prove the other. To better understand both the
Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 199, 96 P.2d 836, 840 (1939); La Plata River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co. v. Hinderlider, 93 Colo. 128, 132, 25 P.2d 187, 188 (1933);
Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Rocky Ford Canal, Res., Land, Loan & Trust Co., 79 Colo. 511,
515, 246 P. 781, 782 (1926); Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Ext. Co., 42 Colo. 421, 426,
94 P. 339, 340 (1908); Strickler v. Colorado Springs, 16 Colo. 61, 70, 26 P. 313, 316
(1891).
For a comprehensive but brief review of water rights as property rights and legal
incidents thereto, see Brighton Ditch Co. v. Englewood, 124 Colo. 366, 372-73, 237 P.2d
116, 120 (1951).
42 The rule was early established in Clark v. Ashley, 34 Colo. 285, 82 P. 588 (1905):
401

"The right to use water ...

may be acquired . . . by adverse possession and use." Id.

at 288, 82 P. at 589.
More recent cases include Surface Creek Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. Grand Mesa
Resort Co., 114 Colo. 543, 558, 168 P.2d 906, 913 (1946); Lomas v. Webster, 109
Colo. 107, 111, 122 P.2d 248, 250-51 (1942); Maes v. Willburn, 85 Colo. 70, 71,
273 P. 886 (1928). See Greeley & Loveland Irr. Co. v. McCloughan, 140 Colo. 173,
342 P.2d 1045 (1959); Pleasant Valley & Lake Canal Co. v. Maxwell, 93 Colo. 73,
23 P.2d 948 (1933); Hitchens v. Milner Land, Coal & Townsite Co., 65 Colo. 597,
178 P. 575 (1919).
4o 109 Colo. 107, 122 P.2d 248 (1942).
4Id. at 111, 122 P.2d at 250-51.
405Surface Creek Ditch & Res. Co. v. Grand Mesa Resort Co., 114 Colo. 543, 558, 168
P.2d 906, 913 (1946); Pleasant Valley & Lake Canal Co. v. Maxwell, 93 Colo. 73,
78-79, 23 P.2d 948, 950 (1933).
4w See Morris v. United States, 174 U.S. 196 (1899).
407 Mountain Meadow Ditch & Irr. Co. v. Park Ditch & Res. Co., 130 Colo. 537, 539, 277
P.2d 527, 528 (1954).
408114 Colo. 543, 168 P.2d 906 (1946).
4wld. at 558, 168 P.2d at 913. See also Loshbaugh v. Benzel, 133 Colo. 49, 291 P.2d 1064
(1956); Haymaker v. Windsor Res. & Canal Co., 81 Colo. 168, 254 P. 768 (1927);
Webber v. Wannemaker, 39 Colo. 425, 89 P. 780 (1907).
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particular elements and the ways in which they are interrelated, each
of the requirements are explained in light of judicial interpretation.
(1) Actual Use
A mere claim of right to the use of water will not be sufficient
to sustain allegations of adverse use; 4 10 the claimant must be in actual
possession, i.e., using the water himself. As was stated in Bowers v.
McFadzean:41 1 "Proof as to this cause of action [adverse use] did not
show actual possession .. .42
"..
and the court held that since there
was no actual possession and since the claimant had not presented
evidence that a third party was using the water right under claimant's
4 18
claim of title, there could be no adverse title granted.
(2) Open and Notorious Use
Open and notorious use requires that notice or a means of knowl414
edge of an adverse use be brought home to the owner of the right:
"No adverse user can be initiated until the owners of the water right
are deprived of the benefit of its use in such a substantial manner as
to notify them that their water rights are being invaded. ' 416 For
example, in Lomas v. Webster4 16 the building of a ditch on the lands
of the defendant, the diversion and beneficial use of nontributary
seepage water arising on the land, and the filing of a statement of
claim for the water were held to constitute both actual and constructive
4 17
notice to the owner that his rights were being invaded.
(3) Hostile Use
Concomitant with the notice requirement is the fact that the
adverse use must be hostile to the owner of the water right. 418 Quoting
Long on Irrigation, the Colorado Supreme Court has held that "'[t]he
acts by which it is sought to establish the prescriptive right must be
such as to operate as an invasion of the right of the person against
whom the prescriptive right is asserted, and will give a cause of action
in his favor.' "419 For such hostile use to exist, it must be shown that
the owner neither accepted nor consented to the use. Likewise, the
410 J. LONG, supra note 2, at 343.
41182 Colo. 138, 257 P. 361 (1927).
412

Id. at 144, 257 P. at 363.

413

Id.

Clark v. Ashley, 34 Colo. 285, 288, 82 P. 588, 589 (1905).
Id. For further discussion of open and notorious possession and use, see McLure v. Koen,
25 Colo.282, 288, 53 P. 1058, 1059 (1898).
416 109 Colo. 107, 122 P.2d 248 (1942).
417
Id. at 112, 122 P.2d at 251.
418 Loshbaugh v. Benzel, 133 Colo. 49, 61, 291 P.2d 1064, 1070 (1956).
41
9 Clark v. Ashley, 34 Colo. 285, 288, 82 P. 588, 589 (1905).
414
415
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use cannot be in harmony with the use of the true owner. 420 For
42 1
example, in Schluter v. Burlington Ditch, Reservoir and Land Co.
plaintiffs objected, inter alia, to the lower court's ruling that adverse
use had not been proved. In upholding the decision of the trial court
with respect to this issue, the Colorado Supreme Court stated: "Plaintiff ... testified to use of this seep water since 1919 but this use was,
until his filing in 1928, permissive and under no claim of right. He
testified that the ditch superintendent said he would give him some
'
water to irrigate his garden and he had had that water ever since. 422
In addition to denying adverse use when the element of hostility
has not been satisfied because of permissive use, the Colorado Supreme
Court has suggested that hostility may not exist when sufficient water
exists to satisfy both the rightful owner and the adverse claimant.
In Church v. Stillwel1423 the court said:
For aught we know from the complaint, there may have been sufficient
water in Coal Creek during those years to have supplied all of the
reservoirs belonging both to plaintiff and defendants. If this were the
case, neither party could have initiated or acquired a prescriptive right
by having his reservoir first filled. Such action under such circumstances would not have been the assertion of a claim of right adverse
to the others. It would not have been an invasion of the rights of the
others for which they might have maintained an action, even had their
rights been prior and superior to that of the party whose reservoir was
424
first supplied.
(4) Continuous Use
Even if the use is proved to be hostile, an adverse user must make
use of the right continuously and uninterruptedly for the statutory
period. Indeed, "[i]t is well established that individuals in whom a
prior right to the use of water is vested may lose such right by acquiescence in an adverse use thereof by another continued uninterruptedly
for the statutory period .... .425 It also follows that if the years of

adverse use are not consecutive, then a claim based thereon cannot be
granted.
(5) Exclusive Use
Still another requirement which must be satisfied before a claim
of adverse use may be sustained is that of exclusive use. Perhaps the
best definition of this element was stated in Dzuris v. Kucharik:426
[F]or adverse possession to be effective as a means of acquiring title,
the possession of the adverse claimant must be such that the true
0 Surface Creek Ditch & Res. Co. v. Grand Mesa Resort Co., 114 Colo. 543, 558-59, 168
P.2d 906, 914 (1946) (in this case the plaintiff was using a lake for recreational sports
while the defendant was using the lake for irrigation).
42 117 Colo. 284, 188 P.2d 253 (1947).
42 Id. at 290, 188 P.2d at 256 (emphasis added).
4 12 Colo. App. 43, 54 P. 395 (1898).
2
-

Id. at 50, 54 P. at 398.
Lomas v. Webster, 109 Colo. 107, 111, 122 P.2d 248, 250-51 (1942) (emphasis added).

426164 Colo. 278, 434 P.2d 414 (1967).
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owner is wholly excluded therefrom. Any sort of joint or common
possession by the adverse claimant and the record owner prevents the
possession of the one claiming adversely from the requisite quality of
exclusiveness.427
(6) Claim of Right
In addition to all of the foregoing elements, a claimant of a water
right by means of adverse use must also establish a claim of right.
As the Colorado Supreme Court said in Surface Creek Ditch and Reservoir Co. v. Grand Mesa Resort Co.:428
By the execution and delivery of the deed of July 31, 1896, defendant's
legal title to the interest conveyed thereunder passed to plaintiff's
predecessors, and thereafter defendant's possession, if such existed,
is to be regarded as subservient to the plaintiff's predecessors as its
tenant or trustee, and nothing short of an explicit disclaimer of such
relationship and a notorious assertion of right in defendant would

render its holding hostile and adverse to plaintiff or its predecessors in
interest. (emphasis added).429

As indicated in the quotation from the Surface Creek case, claim of
right may help to establish hostility of use rather than mere permissive
use.

b. Statutory Provisions
In addition to proving all of the elements described above, a
claim of adverse possession must satisfy one of two statutory provisions. 430 The provisions and the differences between them are set forth
below.
(1) Requirement of Eighteen Years
Under one of the statutory provisions, 48 1 "[elighteen years adverse
' 43 2
possession . . . shall be conclusive evidence of absolute ownership.
A problem arises under this provision, however, when a trespasser has
used another's water right for the statutory period and the owner fails
to commence or maintain an action for the recovery of possession of
his right during that time. In such a situation, the owner could not
recover possession under the statute, and the trespasser, while in
possession, could not claim title since he does not qualify as an adverse
possessor. Perhaps a solution to this problem is suggested by the
Id. at 282, 434 P.2d at 416; accord, Surface Creek Ditch & Res. Co. v. Grand Mesa
Resort Co., 114 Colo. 543, 559, 168 P.2d 906, 914 (1946); Kountz v. Olson, 94 Colo.
186, 191, 29 P.2d 627, 629 (1934) (in which tenants in common were considered
capable of exercising exclusive possession); cf. McKelvy v. Cooper, 165 Colo. 102, 437
P.2d 346 (1968) (in which the court held that a casual intrusion by a fisherman does
not deny an adverse possessor's claim to exclusive use).
428 114 Colo. 543, 168 P.2d 906 (1946).
42Id. at 559, 168 P.2d at 914.
430 While both provisions refer to land and tenements, they also apply to water rights. See
Hayden v. Morrison, 152 Colo. 435, 382 P.2d 1003 (1963); Kountz v. Olson, 94 Colo.
186, 29 P.2d 627 (1934).
43 1
CoLo.REv. STAT. ANN. § 118-7-1(1) (Supp. 1967).
42

432 Id_
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discussion of presumptions and adverse use which follows later in this
488
study.
(2) Requirement of Seven Years
The major distinction between the statute which requires 18 years
of adverse use and the statute which requires only seven48 4 is that a
claim under the latter must be based on claim and color of title, and
the claimant must have paid all the taxes legally assessed. For example,
in Kountz v. Olson48 5 it was stated that if a water right is held adversely
for seven successive years under color of title and if all legally assessed
taxes are paid by those in possession, then "the title becomes
fixed .... ,431
To fulfill the requirement of claim and color of title, one must
have a "good faith" reason for believing himself to be the owner of the
disputed property, and the claim of ownership must be based upon
' 7 With respect to the payment of taxes, the courts have
paper title.43
held that it is sufficient to have paid taxes on either the land adjacent
to the water course or on the lands irrigated thereby.4 8 In Frey v.
Paul,4 39 however, the court held that "if no taxes were assessed, no

were not
payment was required. "440 Indeed, in that case the claimants
441
even required to plead or prove non-assessment of taxes.
c. Burden of Proof

The burden of proving adverse use is always upon the claimant
and must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. 4 2 Further, one
43See PART ONE, § V(E) (2) (c) infra.
434 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118-7-8 (1963):

Every person in the actual possession of lands or tenements, under claim
and color of title, made in good faith, and who shall, for seven successive years,
continue in such possession, and shall also, during said time, pay all taxes
legally assessed on such lands or tenements, shall be held and adjudged to be
the legal owner of said lands or tenements, to the extent and according to the
pUrport of his or her paper title. All persons holding under such possession
y purchase, devise or descent, before said seven years shall have expired, and
who shall continue such possession and continue to pay the taxes as aforesaid,
so as to complete the possession and payment of taxes for the term aforesaid
shall be entitled to the benefit of this section.
435
94 Colo. 186, 29 P.2d 627 (1934).
436 Id. at 192, 29 P.2d at 629.
437
De Foresta v. Gast, 20 Colo. 307. 310-11, 38 P. 244, 246 (1894) (in which a voidable
tax deed was held sufficient to satisfy "color of title"); Knight v. Lawrence, 19 Colo.
425, 36 P. 242 (1894): "Color of title . . . is shown by any deed or instrument which
... Id. at 433, 36 P. at 245. Gibson v. Huff, 26
purports on its face to convey title.
Colo. App. 144, 146, 141 P. 510, 511 (1914). See generally Bowers v. McFadzean, 82
Colo. 138, 257 P. 361 (1927).
8
43 See Kountz v. Olson, 94 Colo. 186, 29 P.2d 627 (1934) (where taxes were assessed orn
adjacent lands irrigated thereby).
43569 Colo. 244, 193 P. 560 (1920).
401d. at 245, 193 P. at 560.
4 Id. at 246, 193 P. at 560.
" 2 Howey v. Eshe, 452 P.2d 393, 396 (Colo. 1969); Commissioners v. Masden, 153 Colo.
247, 251, 385 P.2d 601. 603 (1963).
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who relies upon a statute as a basis for a claim of adverse use must
plead and prove all of the facts with exactness. 443 Hence, the burden
444
upon the adverse claimant is significant. Indeed, in Evans v. Welch
a presumption against the adverse user was established: "[tIhe presumption of law is that possession of property is in consonance, or
harmony, with the rights of the true owner ....,445
However, Evans has been overruled by Trueblood v. Pierce, 6
and now if a claimant establishes that he has been in possession of a
property right for 18 years, a presumption arises that the holding was
adverse. As the court stated in that case:
Plaintiffs and their predecessors in title have been in possession

of the easement for more than eighteen years; there is, as a result
thereof, a presumption that their holding was adverse. [citations

omitted] [C]onsequently, it was incumbent upon defendants to overcome this presumption, and this they did not attempt to do. The

presumption being that plaintiffs' possession was adverse, the uncontradicted evidence is that plaintiffs and their predecessors in title were

in open, notorious and visible use and occupation of the easement under
a claimed right thereto for more than eighteen years, and as a result

thereof fully established their right to the easement by prescription. 447

The rule of Trueblood was quoted with approval in Lively v. Wick,448
and in reaffirming the rule, the Colorado Supreme Court in Nesbitt v.
Jones4 49 said:
In Lively v. Wick [citation omitted] it was contended that the
burden is on the person asserting the adverse claim to prove that it was
adverse. The Court speaking through Mr. Justice Jackson held, however, that the burden of proof was on the owner (where there was
more than 18 years of exclusive possession in the adverse daimant).450
d. Estoppel
In a limited number of cases, the doctrine of estoppel has been
invoked in an attempt to deny owners from asserting their rights to
water. When it has been argued that such owners should be estopped
because of their acquiescence in another's use and there has been
merely passive acquiescence45 1 or the use has not been clearly hostile,4 52
requests for estoppel have generally been disallowed.
443Gibson v. Huff, 26 Colo. App.144, 146, 141 P. 510, 511 (1914).
4429 Colo. 355, 68 P. 776 (1902).
5
4 Id. at 362, 68 P. at 778.
446 116 Colo. 221, 179 P.2d 671 (1947).
47 Id. at 233, 179 P.2d at 677.
40 122 Colo. 156, 162, 221 P.2d 374, 377 (1950).
"0 140 Colo. 412, 344 P.2d 949 (1959).
5"Id. at 425, 344 P.2d at 956.
51 Holbrook Irr. Dist. v. Arkansas Valley Sugar Beet & Irr. Land Co., 42 F.2d 541, 546
(D. Colo. 1929); see Schluter v. Burlington Ditch, Res. & Land Co., 117 Colo. 284,
188 P.2d 253 (1947).
4 2
5 See Church v.Stillwell, 12 Colo. App. 43, 54 P. 395 (1898).
4
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On the other hand, estoppel has been successfully invoked by an
owner of a water right when an alleged adverse use is determined to
be merely permissive use. For example, in Surface Creek Ditch and
Reservoir Co. v. Grand Mesa Resort Co.45 3 it was stated that
[u]nder [the circumstances of the case] it is presumed that [the
adverse claimant's] use of the impounded waters is permissive, and
under and subordinate to the title held by its grantee; defendant is
thereby estopped by its deed from claiming that its use of the water is
adverse.454
e. Applicability to the Appropriative Right
It is well established in Colorado that rights to the use of water
acquired under the appropriation system are subject to loss through
adverse use. 455 At the same time, it is also clear that successful claims
to water rights based on adverse use are significantly curtailed both by
the requirements of the prior appropriation system and by fact that
abandonment might be found in many of the cases in which adverse
use might be argued. 45 6 These facts, coupled with the additional fact
that adverse use against all the other users from a stream is not possible, 457 renders adverse use of limited value as a means of acquiring
title to water rights in Colorado.
f. Quality of Title
While adverse use is of limited value in acquiring title to water
rights, any rights so acquired are accorded the same status as water
rights based on appropriation. Further, since a right obtained by adverse
use is regarded as real property, it may thereafter be passed by deed.4 5'
VI.

PROTECTION,

ADMINISTRATION AND ADJUDICATION
OF A WATER RIGHT

As guardian of the public waters, the state is called upon to
protect and administer water and water rights in order to insure the
efficient use of water resources. In fulfilling this obligation, a number
of protective principles have been set forth. By the increasing need for
'53 114 Colo. 543, 168 P.2d 906 (1946).
4

Id. at 559, 168 P.2d at 914.

4 See, e.g., Greeley & Loveland Irr. Co. v. McCloughan, 140 Colo. 173, 342 P.2d 1045
(1959); Surface Creek Ditch & Res. Co. v. Grand Mesa Resort Co., 114 Colo. 543, 168
P.2d 906 (1946); Lomas v. Webster, 109 Colo. 107, 122 P.2d 248 (1942); Pleasant
Valley & Lake Canal Co. v. Maxwell, 93 Colo. 73, 23 P.2d 948 (1933); Maes v. Willburn, 85 Colo. 70, 273 P.2d 886 (1928); Hitchens v. Milner Land, Coal & Townsite
Co., 65 Colo. 597, 178 P. 575 (1919).
456 See PART ONE, § V (E) (1) supra.
57 Granby Ditch & Res. Co. v. Hollenbeck, 127 Colo. 236, 242, 255 P.2d 965, 968 (1953).
4m Surface Creek Ditch & Res. Co. v. Grand Mesa Resort Co., 114 Colo. 543, 555, 168
P.2d 906, 912 (1946); see Lomas v. Webster, 109 Colo. 107, 122 P.2d 248 (1942);
Kountz v. Olson, 94 Colo. 186, 29 P.2d 627 (1934); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 118-7-8:
(1963).
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more effective administrative procedures, the legislature has enacted
the extensive "Water Right Determination and Administration Act of
1969."

A. Protection of the Appropriative Right
It is well established that the State of Colorado has an obligation
to protect the rights of those who have made valid appropriations of
its waters. 459 This protection applies not only to those having vested
rights but extends to those having conditional water rights460 as well,
provided that as holders of a conditional decree, they satisfy the
requirement of due diligence.4 6 ' In addition, more specific principles
have been developed in a number of related areas.
1. On the Main Stream
An appropriator on the main stream is protected from subsequent
appropriations made on tributaries of the stream which would injure
him. 4 12 This doctrine may be applicable even when the tributary enters
the main stream below the diversion point of the prior appropriator.4 63
Further, since "tributary" is to be construed broadly to include all
sources of supply which may constitute the volume of a stream,40 4 the
water right of an appropriator on a main channel is protected from
any interference with such tributary sources as percolating waters,
4 Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882): "The right to water in this country, by priority of appropriation thereof, we think it is, and has always been, the duty
of the national and state governments to protect." Id. at 446; see Armstrong v. Larimer
County Ditch Co., 1 Colo. App. 49, 27 P. 235 (1891); Farmers' High Line Canal &
Res. Co. v. Southworth, 13 Colo. 111, 21 P. 1028 (1889); Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo.
530 (1883).
0
4 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-17(4) (Supp. 1969).
"I For a discussion of due diligence, see PART ONE, § 11(B) (1) supra.
462
Strickler v. Colorado Springs, 16 Colo. 61, 26 P. 313 (1891):
To now say than an appropriator from the main stream is subject to subsequent
appropriation from its tributaries would be the overthrow of the entire doctrine
....To cut off the water from such tributaries would be to destroy the capacity
of the stream to the injury of those below.
Id. at 67, 26 P. at 315; see Farmers Ind. Ditch Co. v. Agricultural Ditch Co., 22 Colo.
513, 45 P. 444 (1896).
463Platte Valley Irr. Co. v. Buckers Irr., Milling & Imp. Co., 25 Colo. 77, 53 P. 334 (1898):
[A]nd this doctrine is applicable to the subsequent appropriation of water from
a tributary which enters the main stream below the point where the prior
appropriator makes his diversion, when the result of such appropriation from
the tributary is to require the prior appropriator to surrender the right to
additional water for the purpose of supplying appropriations senior to his
below the point where such tributary joins the main stream ....
Id. at 83, 53 P. at 336; see Water Supply & Stor. Co. v. Larimer & Weld Res. Co., 25
Colo. 87, 53 P. 386 (1898).
4S4In re German Ditch & Res. Co., 56 Colo. 252, 139 P. 2 (1914):
IT]he legislature, in using the word "tributary to a natural stream", did not
intend their use in a restricted sense, that is, that the tributaries themselves
should be natural, continuous running streams; but as therein used it indicates
that the word "tributaries" is used to include all sources of supply which go
to make up the natural stream, and which properly belong thereto.
Id. at 270, 139 P. at 9. See also Safranek v. Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 228 P.2d 975 (1951);
Ogilvy Irr. & Land Co. v. Insinger, 19 Colo. App. 380, 75 P. 598 (1904).
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springs, subterranean channels, seepage water,4" 5 and any other source
determined to be tributary. 4 " This is true notwithstanding the fact
that it is the owner of the land on which the water arises that has
67
caused the interference.'
Similarly, it has been held not to be a valid defense to show that
the slowly flowing water would reach the senior user only after significant losses in volume.4 6 Nor may interference with a senior's right
be justified on the ground that the junior is wholly dependent on such
source of supply.46 9 However, these provisions are subject to the statutory limitation that "nbo reduction of any lawful diversion because
of the operation of the priority system shall be permitted unless such
reduction would increase the amount of water available to and required
47 0
by water rights having senior priorities.
Against Taking Without Compensation
Although the Colorado constitution provides that certain uses
shall be preferred over other uses, 47 1 this provision is not construed
2.

"5 McClellan v. Hurdle, 3 Colo. App. 430, 33 P. 280 (1893):
It is probably safe to say that it is a matter of no moment whether water
reaches a certain point [in a natural stream] by percolation through the soil,
by a subterranean channel, or by an obvious surface channel. If by any of
these natural methods it reaches the point, and is there appropriated in accordance with the law, the appropriator has a property in it which cannot be
divested by the wrongful diversion by another, nor can there be any substantial
diminuition.
Id. at 434, 33 P. at 282; see In re German Ditch & Res. Co., 56 Colo. 252, 139 P. 2
(1914); Comstock v. Ramsay, 55 Colo. 244, 133 P. 1107 (1913); Buckers Irr., Milling
& Imp. Co. v. Farmers' Indep. Ditch Co., 31 Colo. 62, 72 P. 49 (1902); Medano Ditch
Co. v. Adams, 29 Colo. 317, 68 P. 431 (1902).
6
"O
Safranek v. Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 228 P.2d 975 (1951): "Under our Colorado law,
it is the presumption that all ground water so situated finds its way to the stream in
the watershed of which it lies, is tributary thereto, and subject to appropriation as part
of the waters of the stream." Id. at 334, 228 P.2d at 977; accord, DeHaas v. Benesch,
116 Colo. 344, 350, 181 P.2d 453, 456 (1947); see Ranson v. Boulder. 161 Colo. 478,
424 P.2d 122 (1967); Cline v. Whitten, 150 Colo. 179, 372 P.2d 145 (1962); Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961); Cresson Consol. Gold
Mining & Milling Co. v. Whitten, 139 Colo. 273, 338 P.2d 278 (1959); Prinster v.
District Court, 137 Colo. 393, 325 P.2d 938 (1958).
""McClellan v. Hurdle, 3 Colo. App. 430, 434, 33 P. 280, 282 (1893); see Austin v.
Koch, 146 Colo. 503, 362 P.2d 167 (1961); Faden v. Hubbell, 93 Colo. 358, 28 P.2d
247 (1933); Nevius v. Smith, 86 Colo. 178, 279 P. 44 (1929); La Jara Creamery &
Live Stock Ass'n v. Hansen, 35 Colo. 105, 83 P. 644 (1905); Bruening v. Dorr, 23
Colo. 195, 47 P. 290 (1896).
4" Lower Latham Ditch Co. v. Louden Irr. Canal Co., 27 Colo. 267, 60 P. 629 (1900):
There is no evidence that the water would not reach the river, and although
it may flow down the . . . [river] slowly, and a considerable volume be lost,
inasmuch as it would eventually reach the river, and could there be utilized by
plaintiff, we do not think that this defense has been established.
Id. at 277, 60 P. at 632.
4" Roberts v. Arthur, 15 Colo. 456, 24 P. 922 (1890):
It is true, when one party has acquired a priority of right to the water of a
natural stream by a valid appropriation thereof to a beneficial use, another
party cannot justify an interference with such right by merely showing that he
is wholly dependent upon the same supply of water ....
Id.at 458, 24 P. at 923.
4 70
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-2(e) (Supp. 1969).
471CoLo. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
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to mean that those taking for preferred purposes - including cities or
towns 472 - may acquire the water of a prior appropriator without just
compensation. On the other hand, even though the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution denies the taking of a property right
for public use without compensation,4 78 there are ways in which the
federal government can avoid paying compensation, e.g., the navigation
servitude.4 74
3. With Respect to Quality and Quantity
It is generally held that the law protects an appropriator's right
to have water flow down its natural channels undiminished both in
quantity and quality. 475 In maintaining control over the quality of
water, courts have traditionally resorted to several devices. For example,
courts have found that an appropriator who has polluted water has
caused waste, thereby enjoining him on that basis;4 76 or courts have
determined that a polluter has damaged a water right and have granted
77
an injunction and compensation based on the constitutional provision
that "private property shall not be taken or damaged, for public or
' 7
private use, without just compensation. 1 1
With the enactment of the "Colorado Water Pollution Control
Act of 1966, '" 71 however, determinations with respect to pollution and
standards of stream quality are made by the State Water Control
Commission. 4 0 In addition, the Commission "shall have the final
authority in the administration of water pollution prevention, abatement, and control" 4 8 and, when necessary, "shall make application,
through the attorney general, to the district court for the district in
which the violation occurs or is threatened for an order enjoining such
472

Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Ext. Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 P. 339 (1908): "That a city or
town cannot take water for domestic purposes which has been previously appropriated
for some other beneficial purpose, without fully compensating the owner, is so clear
that further discussion seems almost unnecessary." Id. at 427, 94 P. at 341; accord, Genoa
v. Westfall, 141 Colo. 533, 549, 349 P.2d 370, 379 (1960); Strickler v. Colorado
Springs, 16 Colo. 61, 74, 26 P. 313. 317 (1891).
473 U.S. CONST. amend V.
474 For a more extensive discussion of the navigation servitude, see Moses, Federal-State
Water Problems, 47 DENVER L.J. 194 (1970).
475
Humphreys Tunnel & Mining Co. v. Frank, 46 Colo. 524, 105 P. 1093 (1909):
Plaintiff's rights were subject only to the rights acquired by prior appropriators
of the water for some useful purpose, and his right, as well as theirs, as against
defendant, is to have the natural waters and all accretions come down the
natural channel undiminished in quality as well as quantity.
Id. at 532, 105 P. at 1096; see People v. Hupp, 53 Colo. 80, 123 P. 651 (1912) (criminal action); Cushman v. Highland Ditch Co., 3 Colo. App. 437, 33 P. 344 (1893)
(stream should be unpolluted in any permanent way).
476Suffolk Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. San Miguel Consol. Mining & Milling Co.,
9 Colo. App. 407, 415-16, 48 P. 828, 831-32 (1897).
4
7 COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15. See also U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
478 Game & Fish Comm'n v. Farmers Irr. Co., 162 Colo. 301, 426 P.2d 562 (1967).
479
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-28-1 et seq. (Supp. 1967).
480 Id. § 66-28-8.
81
4
d. § 66-28-11.
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act or practice.''482 Hence, stream quality control is administratively
placed with the Commission whose findings are prima facie evidence
of the facts contained therein if the matter goes before the courts. 4 88
The protection of the state is extended to the quantity as well
as to the quality of water which a user has appropriated,4 8 4 provided that
the appropriator continues to use that quantity beneficially. 485 Yet the
right to a specific quantity is always dependent upon the amount of
water in the stream and the priority date of the user.48 6
4. Remedies
Injunction lies to prevent wrongful diversion of water or interference with vested water rights, 487 especially since an action at law
would often be inadequate. 48 8 This relief is available even when the
interference comes from one upon whose land the water flows 489 and
may be brought jointly against all parties junior in right when they,
by their several acts, have caused the injury. 490 However, the parties
-2Id. § 66-28-10(5).
4 1d.
4DeHerrera v. Manassa Land & Irr. Co., 151 Colo. 528, 379 P.2d 405 (1963); Enlarged
Southside Irr. Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 120 Colo. 423, 429, 210 P.2d 982,
985 (1949); Farmers' High Line and Res. Co. v. Wolf, 23 Colo. App. 570, 580, 131
P. 291,294 (1913).
05Weldon Valley Ditch Co. v. Farmers' Pawnee Canal Co., 51 Colo. 545, 119 P. 1056
(1911): "Anyone familiar with irrigation knows that 47 cubic feet of water per second
[the amount of the appropriation] is not necessary for the irrigation of 640 acres of land.
That amount, therefore, was not beneficially applied thereto." Id. at 550, 119 P. 1057.
See also Fort Collins Milling & Elev. Co. v. Larimer & Weld Irr. Co., 61 Colo. 45,
156 P. 140 (1916); Comstock v. Larimer & Weld Res. Co., 58 Colo. 186, 145 P. 700
(1914); Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 532 (1883); Church v. Stillwell, 12 Colo. App.
43, 54 P. 395 (1898); COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-3(7), -35(2) (Supp. 1969).
For detailed discussion of beneficial use, see PART ONE, §§ If(A) (2) & V(A) supra.
06 See PART ONE, § III(A) supra.
48Faden v. Hubbell, 93 Colo. 358, 28 P.2d 247 (1933): "Injunction lies to restrain the
wrongful diversion of water away from those who are lawfully entitled thereto." Id. at
369, 28 P.2d at 251; accord, Cline v. Whitten, 144 Colo. 126, 129, 355 P.2d 306, 308
(1960); Olney Springs Drainage Dist. v. Auckland, 83 Colo. 510, 516, 267 P. 605, 608
(1928); Kane v. Porter, 77 Colo. 257, 258, 235 P. 561 (1925); Rogers v. Nevada Canal
Co., 60 Colo. 59, 64, 151 P. 923, 926 (1915); Comstock v. Fort Morgan Res. & Irr. Co.,
60 Colo. 101, 109, 151 P. 929, 932 (1915).
40 Medano Ditch Co. v. Adams, 29 Colo. 317, 68 P. 431 (1902):
An action at law against them [defendants] by plaintiff would be wholly inadequate, because it would require a multiplicity of suits to recover the damages
which he [plaintiff) might sustain from year to year on account of the shortage
of waters ....
Id. at 328, 68 P. at 435. But see Comstock v. Fort Morgan Res. & Irr. Co., 60 Colo. 101,
151 P. 929 (1915).
9Austin v. Koch, 146 Colo. 503, 362 P.2d 167 (1961): "[W]e note first that any interference with the right of a prior appropriator to divert water, even though the person
interfering owns the land through which the water flows, is subject to injunctive relief."
Id. at 508, 362 P.2d at 170.
'0Saint v. Guerrerio, 17 Colo. 448, 30 P. 335 (1892):
[I]t follows that, if plaintiff had, by 'priority of appropriation,' actually acquired 'the better right' to the use of the water of the natural stream than
either or all of the several defendants, he was entitled to have such priority
protected against their acts, whether joint or several, and for that purpose was
entitled, if necessary, to join them all as defendants in one action.
Id. at 454, 30 P. at 337; see Rogers v. Nevada Canal Co., 60 Colo. 59, 151 P. 923
(1915); Lower Lathan Ditch Co. v. Louden Irr. Canal Co., 27 Colo. 267, 60 P. 629
(1900).
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bringing the action must demonstrate that the injury is material4 9 ' and
not merely a temporary interference in flow, 4 92 a determination which is
usually based upon the circumstances of the case.495 Further, injunctive
relief is available even though the injuring party has promised no future
transgressions against the quality or quantity of flow, if there is no
adequate assurance that the promise will be upheld; 494 however, the
order will not lie to restrain an offending party when the injured party
is not using the water.4 95
If injunctive relief is not an appropriate remedy, then an action
at law may be instituted in the nature of a nuisance suit.49 6 Further,
if injury should be incurred after an injunction has been awarded
pursuant to the statutes,49 7 then a suit may be instituted at law praying
for treble damages.49 8
B. Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969499
This Act, commonly referred to as S. 81, significantly changed
Colorado water law. Its provisions established a new jurisdictional
arrangement, created new procedures for the administration and distribution of the state's water, and authorized a state-wide tabulation of
water rights.
1. Jurisdictional Arrangement of the Act
The 1969 Act500 repealed a prior article50 ' which provided for
water right determination within water districts. In place thereof, it
created seven water divisions based on the territorial boundaries of the
major watersheds. The divisions are numbered one through seven
respectively, and include the following watersheds: the South Platte
River watershed,5"2 the Arkansas River,10 3 the Rio Grande River, 504
§ 148-21-35(2) (Supp. 1969). See Hutchins, Selected Problems
in the Law of Water Rights in the West 335 (U.S. Dep't of Agriculture Misc. Pub. No.
418, 1942).
Hutchins, supra note 491, at 335.

491 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

492

493 Atchison v. Peterson, 87 U.S. 507, 514-15 (1874).
49 Slide Mines Inc. v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 102 Colo. 69, 74, 77 P.2d 125, 127 (1938);

see Atchison v. Peterson, 87 U.S. 507 (1874).
495

T. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 704 (3d ed. 1911): "The modern

rule is to regard injunctions as based strictly on beneficial use and not as restraining a
Id. See also COLO.
defendant while the plaintiff is not himself using the water .
REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-35(2) (Supp. 1969).
4 T. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 325 (2d ed. 1908).
497 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-36(1) (Supp. 1969).
4"Id. § 148-21-37.
99
4 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-1 et seq. (Supp. 1969).
"- Ch. 373, § 20, [1969] Colo. Sess. Laws 1200. For recent developments under the Act
see LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL WATER COMMITTEE, Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, Sept. 15, 1970.
501 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-13-1 et seq. (1963).
2
50 1d. § 148-21-8(2) (Supp. 1969).
Id. § 148-21-8(3).
504
Id. § 148-21-8(4).
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the Gunnison River, " " the Colorado River, 08 the Yampa River, " 7
and the San Juan River.5 08 It is anticipated that the establishment of
watersheds as the basis for jurisdiction in administering and adjudicating
water rights will eliminate conflicting decisions which have resulted
with respect to such waters in the past.
2. Administration and Distribution Under the Act
As previously noted, the Act makes significant changes in the way
in which water in Colorado is administered and distributed. Excluding
tabulation procedures which will be discussed in some detail later in
the study,50 9 the general provisions of the Act deal with the administrators, the procedures of administration, and the regulation and distribution of the state's water resources.
a. The Administrators
The general administrative responsibilities are primarily handled
by state and division engineers and by water judges. The state510 and
division 5" 1' engineers are charged with the duty of administering,
distributing, and regulating
the waters of the state in accordance with the constitution of the state
...and other applicable laws and written instructions and orders of the
state engineer, and no other official, board, commission, department,
or agency, except as provided in this article and article 28 of chapter 66,
C.R.S. 1963, as amended shall have jurisdiction .... 512

Authorized to work in conjunction with the engineers, water
judges- designated district court judges whose positions were created
pursuant to the Act55 3 - hear all matters." 4 They act for the district
courts which are within their respective water division and which have
exclusive jurisdiction over water matter. To assist the water judge in
5OSld. § 148-21-8(5).
-Id. § 148-21-8(6).
oid. § 148-21-8(7).
50 8 Id. § 148-21-8(8).
509 PART ONE, § VI(B) (3) infra.
5I0 The position of state engineer is created by COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-11-1 (1963).
The statute provides that the state engineer has "general supervising control over the
public waters of the state." Id. § 148-11-3.
In fulfilling his responsibilities, the state engineer is authorized to appoint the
division engineers, to issue orders to the division engineers, to give his approval for the
division engineers to establish field offices and to appoint a staff member as water
commissioner for each field office so established. Id. § 148-21-9 (Supp. 1969).
511 In place of "division engineers" for irrigation divisions, the new act establishes the
position of division engineer as part of the Division of Water Resources of the Department of Natural Resources. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-9(1) (a) (Supp. 1969).
The division engineer is charged with performing functions specified by law and such
functions as may be specified by the state engineer. Id. § 148-21-9(2).
5 12
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-34 (Supp. 1969).
s' 3 Id. § 148-21-10(1).
5141d. § 148-21-10(2). The Supreme Court may appoint additional water judges if necessary for the proper handling of water matters. Id.
5
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their administrative and judicial functions are water clerks."' The judges
are also to appoint referees,5 1 "provided that in any water division the
water judge may elect to perform the functions which by this article
would otherwise be vested in the water referee."5 17
b. The Procedures
A water user who desires a determination of water rights must
file an application with the water clerk in the appropriate water
division. 1 8 An application for determination may be filed for any of
the following:
20
1) a water right 519 or a conditional water right
2) a conditional water right [that] has become a water right by
21
reason of completion of appropriation
3) a change in a water right
4) a plan for augmentation or a biennial finding of reasonable
52 2
diligence.
The application for a determination of a water right must include:
1) "a legal description of the diversion or proposed diversion...;"
2) "a description of the source of the water...;
3) "the date of the initiation of the appropriation or proposed
appropriation ...

;"

4) "the amount of the water claimed and..."
5 28
5) "the use or proposed use of the water.1
515Id. § 148-21-11.
51ld. § 148-21-10(4). For a discussion of the referee's function see PART ONE § VI (B)
(2) (b) infra.
517 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-10(5) (Supp. 1969). One of the functions of a
referee is to investigate (Id. § 148-21-18(4)) and rule (Id. § 148-21-19(1)) upon an
application for a water right determination. If the judge elects to function as a referee
for the investigation and ruling, there is a uestion of the value of a subsequent hearing.
Since a statement of opposition has been iled (Id. § 148-21-18(1)), the judge acting
as referee has been able to consider the merits of such objection. Suppose the judge
acting as referee granted the application. The overruled objector could then file a written
protest to the referee's ruling (Id. § 148-21-20(2)). His written protest along with the
application, statement of opposition, and the referee's ruling would form the basis of a
subsequent hearing presided over by the water judge (Id. § 148-21-20(3)), i.e., the
same person who had ruled against the objector as referee. One may doubt the ability
of a person who has investigated and ruled upon the facts to impartially hear the merits
of, and possibly overrule, his previous decision. The appeal from the referee's ruling to
the judge's hearing would seem highly illusory when the referee and the judge are the
same person.
518Id. § 148-21-18.
519 Id. § 148-21-3(8). " 'Water right' means a right to use in accordance with its priority
a certain portion of the waters of the state by reason of the appropriation of the same."
Id.
5
- Id. § 148-21-3(9). " 'Conditional water right' means a right to perfect a water right
with a certain priority upon the completion with reasonable diligence of the appropriation upon which such water right is to be based." Id.
5a21Id. § 148-21-18(1).
2

Id.
Id. § 148-21-18(2).

1970

COLORADO WATER LAW

Further, if one applies for a change in a water right, the application
must include:
1) "a description of the water right or conditional water right... ;"
2) "the amount and priority of [such a right] ... and...
3) "a description of the proposed change .. .24
And if one seeks approval of a plan for augmentation, the application
must contain a complete statement of such a plan.52 All applications
for determinations are jointly prepared by the water judges and may
526
be modified by the judges to require additional information.
The application must be filed with the water clerk of the proper
district court.12 7 By the fifth day of each month, the water clerk must
"prepare a resume of all applications filed . . . during the preceding

month. '"5 28 This resume must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in each county of the division by the tenth day of the
month. '29' Notification must also be sent to persons "who the referee
has reason to believe would be affected or who have requested . . ."
a resume by submitting their names and addresses to the water clerk,
and who have paid a twelve dollar fee.5 30 Statements of opposition

to an application may be filed with the water clerk by "the last day
of the second month following the month in which the application
' 55 1
[was] ... filed.
After the filing of an application, the referee 5 2 is required to
524 Id.
55 Id.
526 Id.
5

27Id. § 148-21-18(1). The position of water clerk, as an associate clerk of the district
court, is provided for in CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-11 (Supp. 1969).
52Id. § 148-21-18(3). The information that must be contained in the resume is as follows:
(1) the name and address of the applicant; (2) a description of the water right or conditional water right involved; and (3) a description of the ruling sought. This description is apparently quite vague, and one might not be able to determine whether he could
or should file a statement of opposition. Even the required information on the application might not contain information precise enough to form the basis of an objection
since these forms may not be completed by an attorney but by one seeking changes. To
illustrate, important and unanswered questions may be:
(1) Is the change to be seasonal or for year-round use?
(2) Will the water be used at the same location or at a different location ?
(3) If a new location, will that new location be outside the division ?
(4) Will the water be used for the same purposes?
5

2CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-18(3)

(Supp. 1969).

530 Id.
531id. § 148-21-18(1).
s2 ld. §§ 148.21-10(4) to -10(6). This position of referee is not the "referee" position
described in Coto. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-9-4,-12,-19 (1963) which was repealed by
Ch. 373, § 20, [1969] Colo. Sess. Laws 1200.
According to COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-10(5) (Supp. 1969), the water
judge's selection is limited to a list of not less than three persons submitted by the
executive director of natural resources provided that "in any water division the water
judge may elect to perform the functions which . . . would otherwise vest in the water
referee."
Subsection six describes the training and experience required before one may be
considered for the job of referee. "[R]eferees shall possess such training and experience
as to qualify them to render expert opinions and decisions on the complex matters of
water and water rights and administration. The persons may, . . . be either full time,
part time or contractual court employees .... " Id. § 148-21-10(6).
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make an investigation into the facts of the application, 533 and "shall
in the first instance have the authority and duty to rule upon [the]
determinations of water rights and conditional water rights .... ""'
The ruling of the referee is governed by standards which are specified
in the new Act. For example, a particular point or means of diversion
may serve more than one water right.53 5 Further, if the appropriation
is completed with reasonable diligence, the priority date awarded is
the date the appropriation was initiated;53 6 however, if the appropriation was not completed with reasonable diligence, the priority date
is the date from "which the appropriation was completed with reasonable diligence.'3
Another standard requires that a change of a water right, plan
of augmentation or water exchange project must not injure persons
entitled to use water rights or decreed conditional water rights. 8'
If the proposed plan or change will cause injury, the applicants must
be allowed to propose adjustments that would avoid the injury. Those
adjustments include:
1) a limitation on the use of the water involved in the change,
3
considering the historical use and annual climatic differences ;1
2) a relinquishment of part of the requested change or relinquishmient of another decree held by the applicant and used in conjunction
540
with the requested change;
3) the invocation of a time limitation in terms of months per
541
year on the diversion for which the change is sought;
4) "[s]uch other conditions as may be necessary to protect the
vested rights of others. 5 4 2
Finally, in a plan for augmentation, the referee must note the
principle that
the supplier may take an equivalent amount of water at his point or
points of diversion or storage if such water is available without impairing the rights of others. Any substituted water shall be of a quality
53 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §

148-21-18(4) (Supp. 1969).

The referee without conducting a formal hearing shall make such investigations
as are necessary to determine whether or not the statements in the application
and statements of opposition are true and to become fully advised with respect
to the subject matter of the applications and statements of opposition. The
referee shall consult with the appropriate division engineer and may consult
with the state engineer, the Colorado water conservation board, and other state
agencies.
5
34Id. § 148-21-17(2).
535
536
537

8

3

Id.§ 148-21-21(2).
1d. § 148-21-21(1).

1d.

Id. § 148-21-21(3).
§ 148-21-21(4) (b).

63Id.
0

4

Id. § 148-21-21(4) (c).

41 Id. § 148-21-21(4) (d).
5
42d.§ 148-21-21(4) (e).
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and quantity so as to meet the requirements for which the water of the
senior appropriator has normally been used, and such substituted
water shall be accepted by the senior appropriator5 43
in substitution for
water derived by the exercise of his decreed rights.
Based upon these standards, the referee may issue a ruling which
must come "within the month following the last month in which the
statement of opposition [was] filed ....,
The referee may approve
or disapprove in part or in total the application even if no objection
has been made,5 45 and the ruling becomes effective upon entry in his
records and thereafter is filed with the division engineer.5 46 Within
twenty days after the entry of the referee's ruling, a protest may be
5 7
filed stating the factual and legal grounds for such protest. 1 If, however, there have been statements of opposition filed, the referee may
548
choose not to rule and refer the matter to the water judge.
49
Once every six months, hearings are commenced by water judges
on matters referred by referees and rulings that have been protested.5 5'
The "hearings shall be ... conducted in accordance with trial practice
and procedure, except that no pleadings shall be required."5 ' While
a judge is bound by the same standards as the referee, 51 2 his decision
5
may either "confirm, modify, reverse, or reverse and remand"
5Id.§ 148-21-21(5).

-1d. § 148-21-19(1). However, it should be noted that plans for augmentation filed before
July 1, 1971, will not be referred to the referee. Id. § 148-21-23(2). Instead, in September or October of 1971, the judge will hold hearings and make decisions without the
assistance of the referee. Id. Until the judge has made his determinations on plans filed
before July 1, 1971, and
the basis for the administration of ground water has been established the state
engineer and division engineers shall exercise the broadest latitude possible in
the administration of waters ... to encourage and develop temporary . . . plans
and voluntary exchanges of water and to make such rules and regulations and
take such other reasonable action as may be necessary in order to allow continuance of existing uses and to assure maximum beneficial utilization ...
Id. § 148-21-23(4).
After July 1, 1973, such plans for augmentation will be handled as applications for
water right determinations. Id. § 148-21-23(2). This process includes referral of the
applications or plans to the referee. Id. § 148-21-10(7).
55ld. § 148-21-19(1).
546 Id.
547 Id. § 148-21-20(2).
548
Id. § 148-21-19(2).
549 There have been a few problems with respect to this aspect of the procedures. For
example, the judges are occasionally taking references from referees and passing on
those decisions without regard for the time required by the law - that the water judge
consider cases every six months which have been referred to him by the referee. Many
of these matters are being taken care of administratively by conversations with the court
and with referees. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL WATER COMMITTEE, Minutes of Executive
Committee Meeting 10-11, Sept. 15, 1970.
550COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-20(1) (Supp. 1969).

Id. § 148-21-20(3). However, it is not clear whether the language "trial practice and
procedure" indicates that the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure are to be employed in
the "hearing". One might argue that the legislature intended that only those practices
and procedures employed at trial be available in these hearings, disallowing the use of
such pre-trial procedures as discovery.
552 See text accompanying notes 219-26 supra.
M COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-20(5) (Supp. 1969).
551
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the referee's ruling. Hence, a decision on an application referred by
the referee may be fully disposed of by the judge.55 In any event, the
judge may reconsider a decision concerning a change in a water right
or a plan for augmentation when there may have been injury to vested
rights within two years of the decision. 55 5 The judge may also correct
clerical mistakes in the judgment and decree; 5 6 order notice of proceedings to correct substantive errors;"' and order a show cause hearing
for the benefit of those claimed to be injured by the ruling of the
referee. 58 Lastly, while -[a]ppellate review shall be allowed to the
judgment and decree, or any part thereof, as in other civil actions, ...
no appellate review shall be allowed with respect to that part of the
judgment or decree which confirms a ruling with respect to which no
protest was filed."5 59
c. The Regulation
The water judges, along with the state and division engineers,
distribute the water resources of the state. In making this distribution,
54 Id.
5 5
5 1d.

58

§ 148-21-20(6).
Id.§ 148-21-20(10).

55

7Id.

58

5 Id. § 148-21-20(11).
5 9

5

§ 148-21-20(9). There is some question as to the role that the state engineer plays
in water litigation. The minutes of the Legislative Council Water Committee reflect this
uncertainty.
Mr. Beise: In a case brought by the Prowers County Grazing Association
(W-16), the Association sought a permit from the state engineer to drill a
well. The applications had been denied by the state engineer so the Association made an application to the court for a water right. The Association sought
to get an alternate point of diversion for several water rights which have been
largely useless in the past. They sought to use wells to fill this water right.
The state engineer decided in this case that the state should not be a party
to the case. The division engineer was willing to become a party to the case,
but the state engineer refused. The referee did not call on the division engineer for his advice, as is required by law. The Southeastern Colorado Water
Conservancy District called on the state engineer to enter the case on behalf
of the state and, again, the state engineer refused. The letters between Mr.
Beise and the state engineer are appended to these minutes.
There is a definite problem of the state engineer not making the protest.
If no other water user files a protest to an application for water right, one of
the major purposes of S.B. 81 will be defeated because water users will be
allowed to file unopposed and will get adjudicated water rights when the river
is already over-appropriated. The Association's application was for a water right
outside the boundaries of the district. It is conceivable that a protest by the
district could be disregarded for that reason. The district did insist that, by
stipulation, the Association would agree to a certain number of acre feet of
water to be used per year; that the wells would be used to irrigate certain lands;
and that the wells would all have meters.
One of the major points I wish to make is that the Association is now
drilling wells for which the state engineer has denied a permit. There is a
problem of the court circumventing the law by allowing a well to be drilled
after the state engineer has refused a permit. We feel that the state engineer
should have protested the application on the grounds that the Association had
not gained a permit to drill the well for which it was making an application.
The state engineer should represent the people of the state of Colroado to protect the water rights of all the people.
1d.

Representative McCormick: It appears to me that the taxpayers of the
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District who pay 4/10ths of a mill
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on their property for the district are serving a function which the state engineer
should perform; i.e., that of protecting the water rights of the people of the
state. We had hoped that in S.B. 81 we would be able to eliminate from the
record many of these worthless decrees. It seems that the taxpayers of the district are supplementing the state engineer's function of protecting the water
rights of the people in the Arkansas Valley.
Mr. Beise: There are other examples in the state where the water court
is being used to revitalize decrees which have never been valuable, have never
produced water, and in essence have been abandoned - these are actual cases
-this
is not legal theory- this is an existing problem. We think that the
state engineer should represent the people of Colorado and protect the people's
water rights. This should not be left up to chance or to interference by the
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District.
Mr. Geissinger: In most cases the state will not find it necessary to become a party in interest in opposing an application for a water right because
other parties will protest an application for a new water right if it is not
justified. The groundwater administration law provides that no wells will be
drilled unless a permit is first obtained from the state engineer. This is a condition precedent to a water right and the court should not circumvent this
portion of the law.
The real parties at interest are the water users and they should be the
ones who protest in most cases. The state has a definite obligation in this case.
It is clear that it is not the function of the Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District to determine this point of law.
Mr. Kuiper: The division engineer is ordinarily present and willing to
testify. However, that is not the same thing as the state engineer being a party
litigant, and the statute does not provide, as far as I know, for the state engineer to become the party litigant concerning water cases.
Mr. Geissinger: I think it is an administrative problem in that the water
users have not been made aware of the fact that the law requires that a permit
be obtained before a well can be drilled. The judge should require that, as
part of an application for a groundwater right, the applicant provide a permit
to drill his well. If the case is one which involves the state as a whole the
state should enter the case.
Representative McCormick: What if there is a void and there is no protest? Are we leaving the door open for the possibility of people filing on water
that actually belongs to someone else and subverting other people's water rights.
Mr. Kuiper: There are some cases in which the state engineer should
enter even if there is no protest. As to whether or not the state engineer should
enter the case, this should be permissive. Certain guidelines should be established under which the state engineer should be allowed to enter the case on
the part of the state.
Mr. Hamburg: There would need to be some legislation before the state
engineer could become a party to these cases.
Representative Jackson: Should the state engineer become a party in every
case?
Mr. Beise: There are some cases, but not every case, in which the state
engineer should have an interest. The state engineer should have a prerogative
to become a party.
Mr. Hamburg: It should be pointed out that the state has never been a
party to water litigation. S.B. 81 does not change this situation. The bill does
not give the state engineer authority to enter water litigation. There should be
a standard established for the state engineer to become a party. The standard
should determine under what circumstances and to what extent the state engineer should become a party.

Mr. Pasco: In the debate over S.B. 81 in 1969 the point was made that
water users do not want to have to fight the state when they get their water
rights. This would certainly not make it easier and cheaper to litigate water
questions.
Representative Fentress: The state engineer should not be required to be
a party to all cases. This would be extremely expensive as was pointed out
earlier by the state engineer.
Representative Jackson: It might be that the state engineer should be a
party to all water cases for a time.
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL WATER COMMrrTEE, Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting
1-5, Sept. 15, 1970.
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the judges and the engineers are governed by the following provisions
of the act:
1) Water from a well may be charged against an appropriative
right.

560

2) An owner of an appropriative right to surface water may
secure the right to have a well as an alternate point of
diversion. 561
3) "Until July 1, 1971, all diversions by well to supply ... water
[for a decreed right to surface water] . . .may be charged
against [such a right] . . . even if the owner has not secured
the right to an alternate point of diversion at the well .... 6
4) "In authorizing alternate points of diversion for wells, the
widest possible discretion to permit the use of wells shall
prevail." However, withdrawals of well water will not be
permitted to injure senior appropriators. 68
These provisions are designed to permit maximum beneficial use from
an integration of ground and surface water. 64
To further develop maximum beneficial use, the division engineers
are given the power to issue orders5 65 necessary to implement the
provisions of the act. These orders include:
1) total or partial discontinuance of a diversion where water is
not being beneficially applied;56"
2) a total or partial discontinuance of a diversion of water needed
567
to fulfill the rights of senior appropriators;
5 60

COLO.REV.

611d.

STAT. ANN. §

148-21-17(3)(a).

§ 148-21-17(3) (b).

5

62d. § 148-21-17(3) (c).

5

631d. § 148-21-17(3) (d).

5" For a more extensive discussion of the Act's integration of ground and surface water,
see PART Two, § I(C)(3) infra.
565 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-35(1) (Supp. 1969).
sm6Id. § 148-21-35(2).
567

Id. If the discontinuance is for the purpose of satisfying a senior right,
the division engineer shall be governed by the following: The materiality of
the injury depends on all factors which will determine in each case the amount
of water such discontinuance will make available to such senior priorities ....
Such factors include current and prospective volumes of water . . . ; distance
and type of stream bed between diversion points; . . .velocities of this water
I . . ; . . . duration of available flow; and the predictable return flow ....
In the event a discontinuance has been ordered pursuant to the foregoing, and
nevertheless such does not cause water to become available to such senior
priorities at the time and place of their need, then such discontinuance order
shall be rescinded. If a well has been approved as an alternate means of diversion for a water right for which a surface means of diversion is decreed, such
well and such surface means must be utilized to the extent feasible and permissible under this article to satisfy said water right before diversions under
junior water rights are ordered discontinued.
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3) releasing "from storage . . . any water [the divison engineer]
finds to have been illegally or improperly stored.....;,.s
4) administering any plan for augmentation involving the movement of water within the division or from one division to
another ;569
5) the installation and maintenance, at the owners expense of
necessary meters, gauges and devices, as well as the reporting
of meter readings; 70
6) the inspection of the means of diversion, transportation, storage
57
and uses of water. 1
If an order of a division engineer "is not complied with, the
[division or state engineer] . . . shall apply to the water judge . . . for
an injunction enjoining the person . . . from continuing to violate [the
order] ....
572 If the division engineer's order involves a diversion of
water or a release of water from a reservoir, the judge must consider
whether the water is being beneficially used; whether the diversion will
cause injury to those with senior rights; and whether other users would
benefit from the release of improperly stored water.573
3. The Tabulation of Water Rights
Perhaps the single most important duty of the division engineer
is the tabulation of water rights authorized by the act.57 4 As one
commentator has noted: "The tabulation of water rights has been
neglected for a hundred years and the current tabulation is the first
one on a state-wide basis that has ever been attempted. There are
approximately 37,000 decrees which have to be tabulated. 5 75 The
task is also important because the tabulation sets forth "the priority
and amount [of each water right and conditional water right] . . . as
established by court decrees. "576
While the act enumerates the rules to be followed if there is a
conflict of dates regarding the priority position listed in the tabula568

.

§

148-21-35(3).

S6Id. § 148-21-35(4).
570 Id. § 148-21-35(5).
571Id. § 148-21-35(6).
s72 Id. § 148-21-36(1). If a person claims to be injured by a violation of the division engineer's order or by a violation of a judge's injunction, he may bring an action against
the violator "in any district court of competent jurisdiction and recover threefold the
damages sustained and the cost of the suit, including reasonable attorney's fees." Id.
§ 148-21-37.
73
5
Id. § 148-21-36(2).
s74Id. § 148-21-27.
575 LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL WATER COMMITTEE,
57

Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting

8, July 6, 1970.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-27(1)(a)

(Supp. 1969).
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tion,5 77 the initial problem seems to be determining whether the listed
priority is accurate. The following remarks point out some of the

problems:
Mr. Jerry Goldsmith: The tabulation has put an impossible
burden on the small water user in Division 4. The list is too long. It is
incomprehensible. The idea that the tabulation will be readjudicated
every two years is a burden which no water user should have to assume.
Mr. Sayre: The tabulation is so confusing that it is difficult for
even the large water users who can afford an attorney to be adequately
protected. The large water users will have to oversee the administration
of this tabulation for the first few years. It will take at least four years
even for large water users to figure out what the tabulation is all about.
Mr. Goldsmith: This is a definite problem with the people on the
Western Slope. If the tabulation is to be taken seriously, as it is to be
used to administer and deliver water, it should be correct and understandable.
Mr. Roland Fischer: The ordinary water user has no way of
understanding this tabulation. The Colorado Water Conservation
District has filed a general protest to the tabulation so it can come in
later with more specific protests as errors are discovered.
Mr. Barkley: Another problem with this tabulation is that every
water right owner has to check every owner ahead of him to make sure
5 78
the tabulation has not inadvertently switched his right with another.
To alleviate some of the difficulties presented by the tabulation, it has
been indicated that the state engineer will correct any errors in the
5 79
initial tabulation until 1974 when it is adjudicated.
In addition to pointing out an error, a water user may file a
written protest 8 0 once the revised 1970 tabulation has been completed. 5 8' Once a protest has been filed, "the water judge shall order
such notice, conduct such proceedings and enter such orders as he
5771) The principle of "first in time, first in right" applies as among rights decreed in the
same suit in the same water district. Id. § 148-21-27(1 ) (b) (iii).

2) Rights decreed in a prior appropriation suit are senior to those obtained in a later
but different suit brought in the same district. Id. § 148-21-27(1) (b) (iv).
3) The principle of "first in time, first in right" also applies as among "rights decreed
in the various original adjudication suits in the various water districts of the same
division .... Id. § 148-21-27(1) (b) (v).
4) Rights decreed in supplemental proceedings in the various water districts of the same
division will "not extend back further than the day following the entry of the final
decree in the preceding adjudication suit in such district." Id. § 148-21-27(1) (b) (vi).
5) "If the preceding principles would cause in any particular case a substantial change in
the priority of a particular water right to the extent theretofore lawfully enjoyed for
a period of not less than eighteen years, then the division engineer shall designate
the priority for that water right in accordance with historic practice." Id. § 148-21-27
(1) (b) (vii).
578 LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL WATER COMMITTEE, Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting
5-6, Sept. 15, 1970. See White, A Guide to the Examination of Water Tabulations, 47
DENVER L.J. 213 (1970).
579 LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL WATER COMMITTEE, Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting
8, July 6, 1970.
580COLO. REV.STAT. ANN. § 148-21-27(5) (Supp. 1969).
581Id. § 148-21-27(4). The tabulation and any revisions must have been filed with the
water clerk by Oct. 10, 1970.
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deems appropriate to deal with such protests pending the proceedings
'
in section 148-21-28. 1582
After the tabulation in 1970, there are to be subsequent tabulations in each even-numbered year beginning in 1974.588 The same
principles used in compiling the first tabulation apply to these new
tabulations.5 4 Succeeding tabulations will include priorities awarded
subsequent to the preceding tabulation; incorporate any change of
water rights that have been approved; note conditional rights that have
become water rights; modify any rights or conditional rights that the
division engineer determines to have been abandoned in part; and omit
6
those totally abandoned.5" 5 There are also provisions for notice, 1
58 9
objections, " judicial hearings, 5 8 and judgments.
It is anticipated that the new act will create a more efficient
procedure for administering water rights in Colorado and will move
toward maximizing the beneficial use of the state's water. While there
are some problems to be resolved in the act, its long-range effect may
achieve the desired goals.
PART Two: WATER WHICH MAY OR
MAY NOT BE TRIBUTARY

While water flowing in natural streams is always tributary and
governed by the system of prior appropriation, there are other classi582Mid. § 148-21-27(5).
-3

Id. § 148-21-28(1). July 1, of each tabulation year, is the date the tabulation must be
prepared.

584 d.

The division engineer must investigate the circumstances relating to each right in
making a decision of abandonment.
5-Id.
§ 148-21-28(2) (a). The procedural due process problem of adequate notice may
arise under this provision as it did under COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-27(2)
(Supp. 1969), since the division engineer is apparently not expressly required to update
a list of "last known owner~s] or claimants]." To illustrate: according to Schroeder
v. New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962), notice of any change or proposed change in a
water right must be given by mail only to those whose names and addresses are easily
ascertainable. This element, however, is a qualification upon the extent to which one
giving notice must determine whose legally protected interests are directly affected.
The new Colorado Act requires that the referee give written notice only to those
whom he "has reason to believe would be affected." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-2118(3) (Supp. 1969). Thus, the referee is not required to go beyond his own belief
and determine who will be effected, even to the limited extent of determining those
persons whose names and addresses are easily ascertainable.
This entire problem, however, may be obviated in the light of COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN.§ 148-21-27(5) (Supp. 1969).
7
58 COLO.REV. STAT. ANN.§ 148-21-28(2) (b)(Supp.1969).
5" Id. § 148-21-28(2) (f). "The hearings shall be conducted in accordance with trial
practice and procedure except that no pleadings other than the protest shall be required.
The protestant shall appear either in person or by counsel in support of the protest. The
division engineer shall appear in support of the tabulation ...." Id.
589
Id. The decree will then be filed with the state and division engineers, a copy of which
may be obtained by request for a fee. Id. § 148-21-28(2) (h). Naturally, the water
judge may correct clerical mistakes on his own initiative or by petition, and for valid
reasons may correct substantive errors. Id. § 148-21-28(2) (i).
'-5Id.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 47

fications of water which may or may not be tributary. Since the use of
such water depends upon its tributary or nontributary nature, PART Two
describes those waters which may be placed in either category and also
discusses the manner in which such waters may be used.
I.

GROUND WATERS

The legal scope of the term "ground water" varies considerably
from state to state.5 90 In Colorado, ground water includes "any water
not visible on the surface of the ground under natural conditions." 5 9'
Within this broad definition, Colorado water law has traditionally
recognized two distinct categories of ground water. The first, "tributary ground water," is defined as water flowing beneath the surface
that will, if not intercepted, reach and become a part of some natural
stream. It is necessary that the general path of such water, whether it
is percolating or flowing in a well-defined channel, be reasonably
determined and that the stream to which the water contributes be
identified. 92 The second category is "nontributary ground water":
water which will not reach and become part of some natural stream. 593
A. Early Cases
The early cases generally dealt with tributary ground water; and,
in McClellan v. Hurdle,5" 4 the Colorado courts took advantage of the
first opportunity to demonstrate their willingness to apply the doctrine
of prior appropriation to such water. The McClellan case involved a
stream which, "at times and places, flows above the ground ...

and

at other times and places, below the surface, as a subterranean current.
The surface water and underflow of said stream are connected and
coexist.

' 595

The court said, "It is not necessary to legally define

water courses having these peculiar characteristics. They are, as conduits
of water, such source of supply as to furnish an appropriator a legal
basis for the appropriation of the available water." 596 However, the
5 90

J. SAX, supra note 1, at 238.
COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-2(2) (Supp. 1965). The term "ground water" is
used in the Colorado statute interchangeably with "underground water." Id.
5
92 Medano Ditch Co. v. Adams, 29 Colo. 317, 326, 68 P. 431,434 (1902).
593 An example of nontributary ground water would be an underground lake or pool which
is cut off by some impervious stratum so that it can.".ot become a contributing factor to
the flow of a natural stream. See McHendrie, The lau of Underground Water, 13 ROCKY
MT. L. REV. 1, 3 (1940).
594 3 Colo. App. 430, 33 P. 280 (1893).
595 Id. at 431, 33 P. at 280.
591

5

9Id. at 435. 33 P. at 282.
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surface appropriator's claim for damages and an injunction were denied
because he had failed to prove diversion of the underflow. (The
upstream interference was deemed to be with the underground flow
and McClellan, the surface appropriator, had failed to prove that his

dam was adequate for retaining and utilizing water at any depth below
the surface.) 597
Elsewhere in the opinion, the court in dictum took exception to
the trial court's view that "water that percolates through the soil...
is regarded as part of the land, and belongs to the owner thereof, and
he may make such use of the water as he sees fit, while it remains on,
in, or under his land." '98 To so hold, the court indicated, "would be
to concede to superior owners of land the right to all sources of supply

that go to create a stream." 599 Therefore, one who lawfully appropriates water at a certain point has a right to receive enough water to
satisfy his appropriation, whether the water reaches that point through
percolation through the soil, by a subterranean channel, or by an
obvious surface channel. 600
A few cases decided subsequent to McClellan implicitly seemed to
recognize that percolating waters belong to the surface landowner. 60 1
However, ever since the case of Comstock v. Ramsay, 60 2 the Supreme
Court of Colorado has clearly and consistently held that seepage and
03
percolation belong to the river and thus are subject to appropriation.
Thus, a long line of cases has settled the proposition: All underground
waters which by flowage, seepage, or percolation will eventually, if not
597 Id. at 436, 33 P. at 282.
WSId. at 434, 33 P. at 282.
599 Id.

60OId.
801 In Bruening v. Dorr, 23 Colo. 195, 47 P. 290 (1896), the court acknowledged that the
plaintiff in error was relying on the "well recognized doctrine that percolating water,
existing in the earth, belongs to the soil, is part of the realty, and may be used and controlled to the same extent by the owner of the land." Id. at 198, 47 P. at 292. But,"
said the court, "we cannot perceive the applicability of this principle to the facts of this
case. .... There is no uncertainty as to the existence, quantity and flow of the water
in question, whether it passes through or over the intervening land." Id. at 199, 47 P.
at 292 (emphasis added).
In Medano Ditch Co. v. Adams, 29 Colo. 317, 68 P. 431 (1902), the court took
great pains to discuss the evidence supporting a finding that the underground flow
would naturally follow the respective original channels, bounded by the original banks.
"Such conditions," observed the court, "do not present a case of percolating waters,
within the meaning of the law." Id. at 326, 68 P. at 434.
The court in these cases, however, may have been using the term "percolating
waters" to refer to "nontributary waters." For a discussion of the confusion in terms,
see note 619 infra. For a discussion of whether nontributary waters may be subject to
the doctrine of appropriation, see note 634 infra and accompanying text.
802 55 Colo. 244, 133 P. 1107 (1912).

6W Safranek v. Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 334-35, 228 P.2d 975, 977 (1951); Nevius v. Smith,
86 Colo. 178, 181-82, 279 P. 44, 45 (1929). See also McHendrie, supra note 593, at 11.
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intercepted, become part of some natural stream are subject to the law
60 4
of appropriation.
Having thus established that tributary ground water was subject
to the law of appropriation, it therefore became important to determine
when such water was tributary and when it was not. The early decisions
were made on a case-by-case basis, the courts taking judicial notice of
facts learned from experience to help overcome the difficulty of lack
of evidence. For example, in Medano Ditch Co. v. Adams " " the court
said, "[E]xperience demonstrates that the volume of water of the stream
which disappears in the sands of its bed would follow the general
course directly underneath the surface of such bed. ' 60 6 Similarly, in
Dalpez v. Nix,"°7 the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he trial judge
recognized this natural law of gravitation, of which all courts take
judicial notice." 60 8 However, it was not until recently - perhaps because
of the slow development of detection and discovery techniques - that
the court recognized that nearly all ground water is tributary and that
the burden of proof should logically fall upon the party asserting the
nontributary nature of the water. The first case so holding was DeHaas
v. Benesch,6 09 in which the court stated:
[tjhe burden of proof on the issue of whether water is or is not
tributary to a stream is upon the party asserting it is not tributary, not
upon the one asserting that it is. The natural presumption is, that all
flowing water finds its way to a stream.6 10

As authority for this proposition the court cited cases on developed
waters where the burden of proof discussed related to a somewhat differ6

N'Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 461-62, 366 P.2d 552, 555 (1962); Black
v. Taylor, 128 Colo. 449, 459, 264 P.2d 502, 507 (1954); Safranek v. Limon, 123 Colo.
330, 334, 228 P.2d 975, 977 (1951); DeHaas v. Benesch, 116 Colo. 344, 350-51, 181
P.2d 453, 456 (1947); Lomas v. Webster, 109 Colo. 107, 110, 122 P.2d 248, 250

(1942); Dalpez v. Nix, 96 Colo. 540, 549, 45 P.2d 176, 180 (1935); Faden v. Hubbell,
93 Colo. 358, 369, 28 P.2d 247, 251 (1933); Nevius v. Smith, 86 Colo. 178, 182, 279
P. 44, 45 (1929); Comrie v. Sweet, 75 Colo. 199, 201, 225 P. 214, 215 (1924); Fort

Morgan Res. & Irr. Co. v. McCune, 71 Colo. 256, 259, 206 P. 393, 394 (1922); Rio
Grande Res. & Ditch Co. v. Wagon Wheel Gap Co., 68 Colo. 437, 444, 191 P. 129,
131 (1920); Trowel Land & Irr. Co. v. Bijou Dist., 65 Colo. 202, 216, 176 P. 292, 296
(1918); Durkee Ditch Co. v. Means, 63 Colo. 6, 8, 164 P. 503, 504 (1917); Comstock
v. Ramsay, 55 Colo. 244, 255-56, 133 P. 1107, 1110 (1913); La Jara Creamery Ass'n

v. Hansen, 35 Colo. 105, 109, 83 P. 644, 645 (1905); Buckers Irr. Mill. & Imp. Co. v.
Farmers' Co., 31 Colo. 62, 71, 72 P. 49, 52 (1902); Platte Valley Irr. Co. v. Buckers

Co., 25 Colo. 77, 82, 53 P. 334, 336 (1898); Bruening v. Dorr, 23 Colo. 195, 197-98,
47 P. 290, 292 (1896); Ogilvy Irr. & L. & Co. v. Insinger, 19 Colo. App. 380, 386-87,
75 P. 598, 599 (1904).
29 Colo. 317, 68 P. 431 (1902).
6w Id.

at 327, 68 P. at 435.

m 96 Colo. 540, 45 P.2d 176 (1935).

6N Id. at 546, 45 P.2d at 179.
6o 116 Colo. 344, 181 P.2d 453 (1947).

1o0Id. at 350, 181 P.2d at 456.
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ent matter.6 11 At the time, the presumption could have been challenged
12
as unsupported by authority, but the case of Safranek v. Limon1
quickly picked up the language, and the presumption has since stood
as law. 1l
B. Statutory Regulation
The early case law which applied the concepts of appropriation
to "tributary ground water" eventually proved to be inadequate for
regulating and controlling the use of ground water generally. Even
the traditional distinction between tributary and nontributary ground
waters seemed to provide an insufficient classification for dealing with
ground water problems.6 14 Hence, Colorado has belatedly made attempts
to establish a statutory scheme, although the constitutional mandate
declaring that only waters tributary to a natural stream are subject to
appropriation continues to provide potential problems for the statutory
615
regulation of ground water use.

1. Ground Water Problems
There appear to have been at least three major problems regarding
ground water use to which traditional appropriation concepts were not
applicable. The first was conservation of ground water resources, i.e.,
preventing unreasonable depletion and lowering of the level of the
ground water tables. The appropriation system simply was not oriented
toward conservation.
Second, the relative rights between well owners would not be
efficiently determined by the traditional doctrines of appropriation;
for while it is true that priorities between well owners drawing from
a ground water source which was clearly tributary and moving on a
more or less well-defined channel could theoretically be determined,
it is possible to conceive of well owners drawing from the same underground lake or pool which is not tributary - notwithstanding the
presumption to the contrary. In such a case they may interfere with
each other's use by lowering the level of the ground water table, and
the doctrine of appropriation presumably would not be available to
govern relative priorities.
A third problem regarding the regulation of ground water was
The burden of proof discussed there related to the long established rule that the party
asserting that he had a valid claim to developed waters, i.e., that he had done work
which caused water to reach a stream that would not have so reached without his work,
bore the burden of establishing that development. See Leadville Co. v. Anderson, 91
Colo. 536, 17 P.2d 303 (1932); Comrie v. Sweet, 75 Colo. 199, 225 P.2d 214 (1924);
La Jara Ass'n v. Hansen, 35 Colo. 105, 83 P. 644 (1905); Platte Valley Irr. Co. v.
Buckers Co., 25 Colo. 77, 53 P. 334 (1898).
612 123 Colo. 330, 228 P.2d 975 (1951).
613 Id. at 334, 228 P.2d at 997.
614 Comment, Appropriation and Colorado's Ground Water: A Continuing Dilemma? 40 U.
COLO. L. REV. 133, 134-36 (1967).
615 See PART Two, § I(B) (2) (a) infra.
611
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determining relative priorities between well owners and surface water
appropriators. In theory, the only conflict which could arise between
a well owner and a surface water appropriator would be in a situation
in which the well source was tributary to the surface water - in which
case the doctrine of appropriation would govern. However, it is inferred
from later legislative attempts to deal with this problem6 16 that previously existing legal machinery did not provide adequate determinations
of these priorities. As suggested by an excellent comment on the subject,
"[als long as surface water supplies remain adequate to meet the
requirements of users, little attention is likely to be given to the
correlation between underground water withdrawals and stream behavior. Wells in the vicinity may multiply in number and capacity unnoticed
or without objection."61 As a result, "[r]ival claimants to waters of
surface streams have usually litigated their relative rights as between
themselves, without intervention of owners of wells who depend on
ground water . . .and the reverse holds true with respect to adjudi'
cations of ground water rights." 618
2. Nontributary Ground Waters
Complicating these problems is the uncertain law with respect
to nontributary ground water. Indeed, much of the statutory regulation
has attempted to clarify the status of such water.
a. Historical Background
Although an early case referred in dictum to the "well recognized
doctrine that percolating water, existing in the earth, belongs to the
soil, is part of the realty and may be used and controlled to the same
extent by the owner of the land,"8' 1 9 the 1951 decision in Safranek v.
616

§§ 148-18-1 to -38 (Supp. 1965).
Comment, supra note 614, at 136.
618 Hutchins, Ground Water Legislation, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 416, 426-27 (1958).
6 9
1 Bruening v. Dorr, 23 Colo. 195, 198, 47 P. 290, 291 (1896), discussed in note 601
supra (emphasis added).
Some confusion in this area stems from the ambiguous nature of the term "percolating waters." Although "percolating waters" have generally been considered to be a
subclassification of tributary waters in Colorado, some authorities and some jurisdictions
define percolating waters in such a way as to include what Colorado would classify as
nontributary water. For instance, according to Wells A. Hutchins,
[t)hroughout the history of ground water law, a legal distinction between
waters of definite underground streams and percolating waters has run through
various texts, statutes, and court decisions. According to this distinction, a
definite underground stream has the characteristics of a watercourse on the
surface - definite channel with bed and banks, definite stream of water, and
definite source or sources of supply - whereas percolating waters comprise
all ground waters that do not conform to the classification of a definite stream.
This classification has been criticized [sicl by ground water hydrologists
as having no scientific basis or satisfactory applicability.
Hutchins Ground Water Legislation, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 416 (1958) (footnotes
omitted) [hereinafter cited as Hutchins]. This distinction was picked up in a later commentary on Colorado ground water law as a distinction "between water which is 'tributary' to surface streams and water which is said to 'percolate'." Comment, supra note
614, at 135. It is felt that for purposes of Colorado ground water !aw, the definition of
percolating waters provided by Mr. McHendrie (text accompanying note 593 supra)
is most useful.
617
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Limon12 0 recognized the complete absence of Colorado authority on

the law pertaining to nontributary ground water.6 2 ' Furthermore, in
Safranek the court declined to rule on the question itself and appeared
to give no indication of what it would decide. 622 Nevertheless, by
virtue of a curious bootstrapping operation, nontributary ground water
was, for a period of approximately two years, subject to the doctrine of
reasonable use and possibly subject to the vested ownership rights of
the owner of the overlying land.

The operation began with the passage of the Ground Water Act
of 1957 which attempted to provide a system for conserving ground
waters by subjecting them to the administrative provisions of that Act
and by attempting to prevent the unreasonable depletion of ground
water resources.

23

The general applicability of the Act to "ground

waters" included, by virtue of its definition of that term, "any water
not visible on the surface of the ground under natural conditions," 2 '
i.e., both tributary and nontributary ground waters. However, some of

the specific sections of the Act seemed to implicitly recognize the legal
existence of a "ground water appropriation,'

'625

and at least one

authority interpreted the Act as establishing, by implication, the applicability of the doctrine of appropriation to nontributary ground
620

123 Colo. 330, 228 P.2d 975 (1951).

621 Id. at 336, 228 P.2d at 978.
22

6

Id.

623 Law of May 1, 1957 [19571 Colo. Sess. Laws 863 (repealed 1965). Essentially this act

required the registration of wells and the closing of those in critical areas. It applied to
all water that was not visible on the surface of the ground under natural conditions
which included both tributary and nontributary ground water. Id. A ground water commission was created, consisting of landowners from various irrigation divisions throughout the state. Id. The commission had the power to designate critical ground water districts wherever it appeared that the withdrawal of ground water was approaching, had
reached, or had exceeded the normal rate of replenishment. Id. When such a designation
was made the commission could immediately close the area to further development of
its ground water resources and could direct the state engineer to discontinue issuance of
permits for new wells. Id. The commission then would hold an election within the
critical district to select a district advisory board which would assist the ground water
commission and the state engineer in the administration of all matters affecting the
critical district. Id.
The feature of the act which eventually led to its repeal, was the requirement of a
majority vote of the district advisory board in order to maintain an area as "critical" for
more than twelve months. Id. For all effective purposes, the downfall of the act began
in January of 1958, when the Bijou alluvial basin was made a critical water area. Shortly
thereafter, the district advisory board was elected and its first action was to unanimously
request removal of the critical designation. Moses & Vranesh, Colorado's New Ground
Water Laws, 38 U. Coco. L. REv. 295 (1966). This action essentially rendered the act
ineffective, and it was subsequently repealed by the "Colorado Ground Water Management Act of 1965," COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-18-1 to -38 (Supp. 1965).
024 Law of May 1. 1957 [1957) Colo. Sess. Laws 863 (repealed 1965).
6
25Id. See the dissenting opinion in Whitten v. Coit, 153 Colo. 157, 190, 385 P.2d 131,
149 (1963).
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waters. 626 In an article in the Rocky Mountain Law Review, 6 2 7 William

R. Kelly attempts to refute the proposition that nontributary ground
waters are made subject to the doctrine of appropriation by the 1957 Act
and argues that the Act is rather a police power act designed only to
prevent the unreasonable use of ground water by requiring the registration of wells and the closing of areas shown to be critical.6 28
First, Mr. Kelly argues that the legislative history of the Act
reveals substantial deletion of references to appropriation concepts;
and where references to appropriation remain in the language of the
Act, they can be construed as merely a recognition that tributary ground
water can be appropriated. 29 Second, the author notes that -[t]he
Colorado Constitution6 80 applies to the principles of appropriation
and public ownership only to water of natural streams, declaring that
this water is property of the public and that priority in time shall
control among appropriators." 6131 Finally, the author argues that the
Colorado case law recognizes that there may be a property right in
water independent of priorities on a natural stream(32 and that the
Colorado Supreme Court has indicated that it will recognize the doctrine
of reasonable use, if the ground waters do not furnish a material part
of the supply of a natural stream.638
An examination of Mr. Kelly's authorities reveals that his final
argument is, in fact, unsupported by the Colorado cases.6 34 ParticuHutchins, supra note 619, at 420, 424. Hutchins states that the 1957 Colorado statute
purports to be all inclusive. "The Colorado act uses the terms 'underground water' and
'ground water' interchangeably; the terms refer to any water not visible on the surface
of the ground under natural conditions." Id. at 420. He further claims Colorado enacted
a comprehensive statute based on priority of appropriation. Id. at 424.
62 Kelly, Colorado Ground Water Act of 1957 - Is Ground Water Property of the Public?
31 RoCKy MTN. L. REV. 165, (1959).
628 Id. at 167.
629 Id. at 165-66.
630

COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 7.

631 Kelly, supra note 627, at 167.
632 Id.
633 Id. at 167 n.19. The author cites San Luis District v. Rio Grande Drainage District, 84
Colo. 99, 268 P. 533 (1928).
634 Mr. Kelly cites the following cases for the proposition that there may be a property
right in water independent of priorities on a natural stream. Lomas v. Webster, 109
Colo. 107, 122 P.2d 248 (1942); San Luis Dist. v. Prairie Co., 84 Colo. 99, 268 P. 533
(1928); Haver v. Matonock, 79 Colo. 194, 244 P. 914 (1926); Ironstone Ditch Co. v.
Ashenfelter, 57 Colo. 31, 140 P. 177 (1914); Ripley v. Park Center, 40 Colo. 129, 90
P. 75 (1907). While the cases technically support the proposition, as it is stated, it is
clear that the property right established by the cases is a priorit) right, usufructory in
nature, and is very similar to an appropriative right. While such a priority right might
not be taken away by mere legislation (without just compensation), these rights are
not inconsistent with an appropriative system such as the one sought to be established
by the 1957 Act. Witness the coexistence of the "independent" priority rights established by Mr. Kelly's cases and the traditional appropriation system pertaining to waters
of natural streams in Colorado:
For instance, in Lomas v. Webster, supra, and Haver v. Matonock, supra, the right
recognized was the landowner's first and prior right to the use of seepage or spring
waters which first arise upon his land, if capable of being used thereon. While the developed waters cases cited by Mr. Kelly do contain language to the effect that waters
which are lawfully contributed to a natural stream and which otherwise would not have
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larly noteworthy is Mr. Kelly's lack of direct relevant support for his
suggestion that "there may be a property right in water independently
of the priorities of a natural stream."16 3 5 Safranek explicitly rejected
the notion that "percolating sub-surface waters, not tributary to any
stream, are the property of the owner of the land, as at common
law . ..'8 and declared that the law applicable to such waters is a
question "upon which there is an absence of statutory law in Colorado
6' 87
as well as of direct decision by our courts. "
Notwithstanding the decision in Safranek, the Supreme Court of
Colorado adopted Mr. Kelly's reasoning in the case of Whitten v.
Coit6"8 and appeared to recognize the questionable applicability 6of
39
Mr. Kelly's authorities by not citing them in its own extensive opinion.
Nevertheless, the court quoted and approved his conclusion - including
the parts which were not based on sound authority:
The purpose of the Ground Water Act of 1957 is to provide administration facilities to control reasonable use and to provide a record of
facts upon which such reasonable use can be determined.
It is submitted that the basis should not be and is not, based on
priority of diversion. The landowner has property in the water in his
soil. Itis a vested right which cannot be taken away by mere legis6 0
lation. 4

The question which the court's approval of this language raises
and the point of this discussion is whether or not there is, in fact, a
vested ownership right in nontributary ground waters which "cannot
be taken away by mere legislation." Two years after the decision in
reached the stream belong to the one who made the contribution, see Ironstone Ditch
Co. v. Ashenfelter, 57 Colo. 31, 42-43, 140 P. 177, 181 (1914); Ripley v. Park Center,
40 Colo. 129, 133, 90 P. 75, 76 (1907), the more reasonable interpretation of these
cases and the other cases on developed waters is that the developer has the prior right
to the use of his developed waters. See PART THREE § I.
The clear implication of Mr. Kelly's argument is that the property right of the
landowner in the nontributary waters beneath his soil is an ownership right. It is this
implication which is inaccurate. San Luis Dist. v. Prairie Co., supra, also cited by Mr.
Kelly, explicitly refused to rule on this precise question, as did Safranek v. Limon, 123
Colo. 330, 228 P.2d 975 (1951), discussed in text accompany notes 636 & 637 infra.
05 Kelly, supra note 627, at 167.
6 Safranek v. Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 334, 336, 228 P.2d 975, 977-78 (1951).
6I7ld. at 336, 228 P.2d at 978.
08 153 Colo. 157, 385 P.2d 131 (1963).
09The Supreme Court of Colorado explicity stated the issue before them on appeal,
"whether the doctrine of prior appropriation of water to beneficial use is applicable
Id.
i..."
at 163, 385
to under ground waters which are not tributary to any stream .
P.2d at 134-35. In considering this question, the court examined the 1957 law and declared it did not make any substantive changes. The court concluded, "[i]f . .. underground water does not belong to the river and does not contribute to a natural stream,
it is not public water and is not subject to the doctrine of prior appropriation." Id. at
173, 385 P.2d at 140.
The court then went on by way of dictum to address a second question. If the doctrine of prior appropriation does not apply to nontributary ground water, what law does
apply? In response to this question, the court said that they approved the language of
Mr. Kelly. Id. See also text accompanying note 640 infra.
"0 Id. (emphasis added), citing Kelly, supra note 627, at 171.
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Whitten, legislation was enacted 641 which explicitly purported to subject
nontributary ground waters to a modified doctrine of appropriation.
To the extent that Whitten was based on statutory interpretation, i.e.,
that the legislature did not intend to make nontributary water subject
to the appropriation doctrine, the Ground Water Management Act of
1965 is impeccably sound in adopting a system of appropriation for
nontributary ground waters; obviously, the legislature may indicate a
different intent. However, to the extent that there is deemed to be
a vested ownership right in nontributary ground waters which cannot
be taken away by mere legislation, the 1965 Act can be challenged
constitutionally as attempting to take property without just compensation. It is suggested that the original authorities upon which the
property concept approved in Whitten was based are insufficient to
support a constitutional attack on the Ground Water Management Act
of 1965.
b. The Ground Water Management Act of 196542
Basically, the Ground Water Management Act seeks to establish
a mechanism for adjudicating water rights and regulating the use of
ground water within each designated ground water basin. To imple43
ment this policy, the Act established a Ground Water Commission
which is charged with the responsibility of determining "designated
ground water basins.' '644 The Act further provides for the formation
of ground water management districts to facilitate regulation of the
use, control, and conservation of ground water within each designated
basin.6 45 In addition to these and other administrative provisions, the
641COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-18-1 to -38 (Supp. 1965), as amended, CoLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 148-18-1 to -38 (Supp. 1969).

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado summarized the Act as
follows:
In 1965, the Colorado legislature passed the "Colorado Ground Water Management Act" (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in an attempt to permit the
full development of ground water sources, protect owners of surface water
rights and alleviate the growing friction between the surface water appropriators and the well owners. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 148-18-1 (Supp. 1965).
The Act separates certain water which it terms as "designated ground water"
from the system of appropriation for surface waters, and it creates a permit
system for the allocation and use of ground waters within the designated
ground water basins. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann §§ 148-18-1 to -38 (Supp. 1965).
Appropriators of the designated ground waters are required to obtain a permit
for their appropriations and the Act establishes a system of prior appropriation,
similar in operation to the system regulating surface water rights, to regulate
the water rights of the ground water users. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 148-18-6
to-8 (Supp. 1965).
The administration and enforcement of the Act is placed in the hands of
an administrative commission, the state engineer and locally formed ground
water management districts....
Jackson v. Colorado, 294 F. Supp. 1065, 1068 (D. Colo. 1968).
643 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 148-18-3 (Supp. 1965), as amended, CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 148-18-3 (Supp. 1969).
%4 Id. § 148-18-5.
64
5 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-18-17, 19 to -23, as amended, CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 148-18-17, 19 to -23 (Supp. 1967).
642
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Act attempts to define the relationship between the appropriation
doctrine and nontributary ground water.
(1) Appropriation and Nontributary or "Designated"
Ground Water
Although the Ground Water Management Act of 1965 did not
boldly state that nontributary ground waters were henceforth to be
governed by the doctrine of appropriation, it seemed to say substantially the same thing by declaring that "the traditional policy of the
State of Colorado, requiring the water resources of this state to be
devoted to beneficial use in reasonable amounts through appropriation, is affirmed with respect to the designated ground waters of this
State.....646 Designated ground water is
[1] that ground water [i.e., any water which is not visible on the
surface under natural conditions] which in its natural course would
not be available to and required for the fulfillment of decreed surface
rights, or [2] ground water in areas not adjacent to a continuously
flowing natural stream wherein ground water withdrawals have consti-

tuted the principal water usage for at least fifteen years preceding
January 1, 1965; and [3] which in both cases is within the boundaries,
647
either geographic or geologic, of a designated ground water basin.

It is clear that all nontributary ground waters would be included in
this definition of "designated ground waters," and it is almost as clear
that some portion of the tributary ground waters would be included
as well. 64
As mentioned above,"4 the Supreme Court of Colorado has indicated a strong aversion to the idea of subjecting nontributary waters
to the doctrine of appropriation,6"' even to the point of suggesting
possible constitutional problems with any attempts to do this. " '1 Two
features of the Ground Water Management Act of 1965 are designed
to deal with these difficulties: First, the Act attempts to modify the
doctrine of appropriation in order to attain reasonable use and full
economic development of ground water resources; and second, the Act
- 61Id. § 148-18-1 (Supp. 1965) (emphasis added).
WUId. § 148-18-2(3) (emphasis added).
48 For instance, it is possible to think of tributary waters (as that term has been traditionally defined) which are percolating -moving
at a rate calculated in feet per year (see
would not be available to and required for
Comment, supra note 614, at 139) -which
the fulfillment of decreed surface rights. It is also possible to conceive of tributary ground
water existing in an area not adjacent to a natural stream wherein ground water withdrawals have not constituted the principal usage for at least 15 years prior to January 1,
1965. Such designated ground waters which may be deemed tributary to the surface
waters of the state would be subject to both the Ground Water Management Act of 1965
and to surface water appropriation doctrines, including statutes such as COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 148-11-22 (Supp. 1965), as amended in part and repealed in part, Law of
June 7, 1969 [1969] Colo. Sess. Laws 1223, authorizing the state engineer to regulate
the use of such waters. See text, PART Two, § I(C) (1) infra.
49 See PART Two, § I(B) (2) (a) supra.
Whitten v. Coit, 153 Colo. 157, 385 P.2d 131 (1963).
651See text accompanying note 640 supra.

80See

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 47

attempts to accommodate, to some extent, the "vested rights" of well
owners owning and using wells prior to the effective date of the Act.
(2) Full Economic Development of Ground Water
Resources
Some of the problems of applying an unadulterated appropriation
doctrine to "nontributary" or even "designated" ground water were
explicitly enumerated by the Supreme Court of Colorado in Whitten
v. Coit. 52 After discussing some of the hydrologic characteristics of
closed artesion aquifers,6 53 the court considered
some complex problems which the "appropriation" doctrine would be
inadequate to handle.
1. Assume that the most junior well is many miles from the

most senior and the intermediate well is close to the senior. The intermediate well has a greater effect on the senior in a shorter period of
time, but ultimately and irretrievably the junior well will have an
effect on both the intermediate and the senior well. Question: If the

"appropriation" doctrine is to be applied, which well should be
restricted in order to protect the senior? It should be born in mind

that the senior well itself has the effect of reducing its own pressure.

2. Assume the existence of fifteen wells of varying distances from
the most senior. Each will ultimately interfere to a greater or lesser
extent with the pressure in the senior well. Question: Under the
doctrine of "appropriation" are the wells except the most senior to
be shut down in order to protect the pressure of the senior well?
3. If this is not to be done, what standards of interference are
to be applied, and are these standards to be determined by the court ?654
Colo. 157, 385 P.2d 131, 138 (1963).
"The term 'aquifer' is a member of a geological formation that contains or transmits
ground water." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-2(4) (Supp. 1965). The aquifer in
Wrlhitten was closed because it was not a flowing tributary to a natural stream. Whitten
v. Coit, 153 Colo. 157, 169, 385 P.2d 131, 138 (1963). "The fact that the pressure
brings water from a well drilled into one of the aquifers above the top of the aquifer
itself qualifies it as artesian .... " Id.
65
4Whitten v. Coit, 153 Colo. 157, 169-70, 385 P.2d 131, 138 (1963). Two other problems of applying appropriation concepts to ground water are pointed out in Comment,
Appropriation and Colorado's Ground Water: A Continuing Dilemma? 40 U. COLO.
L. REv. 133, 141-42 (1967):
The irregular depth of the saturated zone in each aquifer provides a further example of the difficulties of utilizing appropriation principles to govern
well operations. A junior well, situated above a deep portion of an underground
reservoir, can be prevented from calling upon the lower storage component of
the aquifer where a senior diversion extends to the unproductive bottom of a
shallow area. Full development of the resource in storage is blocked by the
rights of a user whose efficient but limited location allows him to insist on an
economically unrealistic water level throughout the aquifer.
Perhaps more important is the total effect of the appropriation doctrine
on planned development and conservation of ground water reserves. But in
practice, it is evident that "Ithe airy abstractions of 'rights in perpetuity' in
a mined ground water basin have no meaning." For example, underground
reserves such as the Ogallala formation of Colorado's High Plains are in approximate balance if no withdrawals are made. Wells which draw from the
system create a depletion of the available total and mark a step closer to exhaustion. Lack of central management under appropriation rules hastens this
result in a race for the basin floor. Each user is motivated to draw maximum
value from the reservoir, the sooner the better.
Id. at 141 (footnotes omitted).
652153
03
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The approach of the Ground Water Management Act of 1965 to
these problems can be described as follows.
As to designated ground waters, i.e., ground waters which are not
likely to interfere with or compete with surface water rights, the
doctrine of appropriation is to be modified "to permit the full economic
development of designated ground water resources. Prior appropriations of ground water should be protected and reasonable ground
water pumping levels maintained, but not to include the maintenance
of historical water levels." 65" One example of the manner in which
this modification is to be implemented is provided by the Act for the
situation which arises when a person desires to obtain a ground water
right within a designated ground water basin. Such person must file
an application with the Ground Water Commission6 5" which shall
thereupon cause notice of the application to be published. 657 If no
objections are filed, the commission shall grant the application if it
finds that existing rights from the same source are not impaired and
658
that there would not be unreasonable waste.
As to ascertaining standards of reasonableness, the Act provides
the following guideline:
In ascertaining whether a proposed use will create unreasonable
waste or unreasonably effect the rights of other appropriators, the
commission shall take into consideration the area, and geologic conditions, the average annual yield and recharge rate of the appropriate
water supply, the priority and quantity of existing claims of all persons
to use the water, the proposed method of use, and all other matters
appropriate to such questions. With regard to whether a proposed use
will impair uses under existing water rights, impairment shall include
the unreasonable lowering of the water level, or the unreasonable
deterioration of water quality, beyond reasonable economic limits of
withdrawal or use.6 59
Thus, a great deal of discretion is left to the Ground Water
Commission to regulate the use of designated ground water under

general appropriation principles and standards of reasonableness to be
determined by them with a view toward permitting the full development of ground water resources. The extent to which they will be able
to attain their goal will, of course, depend on their own resourcefulness.
An excellent example of what the Commission has been able to
accomplish so far in determining standards of reasonableness is provided by the recent case of Fundingsland v. Colorado Ground Water
Commission,6 6 the only major decision which has been handed down
WCOLo.REV. STAT. ANN. §148-18-1 (Supp. 1965).
6ld. §148-18-6(1). The commission was created by the same act. Id.§ 148-18-3 (Supp.
1965), as amended, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-3 (Supp. 1969).
67Id. § 148-18-6(2).
8
Id. § 148-18-6(3).
"Gd.§ 148-18-6(5) (Supp. 1965).
60468 P.2d 835 (Colo. 1970).
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by the court construing the 1965 Act. In that case Mr. Fundingsland's application for a permit to drill a well in the Northern High
Plains Designated Ground Water Basin was denied by the Ground
Water Commission. After a trial de novo to the district court in which
expert testimony was presented on both sides, the trial judge entered
judgment denying plaintiff's application. In affirming the trial court's
judgment upon a writ of error, the Supreme Court of Colorado, per
Mr. Justice Pringle, thoroughly discussed the sufficiency of the evidence
and the standards of reasonableness implicit in the trial court's findings.
First, the court approved the so-called 3-mile test as a proper
method for the trial court (and the Commission) to use in determining
the effect of Fundingsland's proposed use on the ground water supply
in the particular district - the Northern High Plains Designated
Ground Water Basin. The 3-mile test was designed by the Commission
for use in that district to implement COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 148-18-6(5) (Supp. 1965), quoted above."6 ' It utilizes a circle with
a 3-mile radius drawn around the proposed well site. If the Commission
determines that existing pumping rates within the circle would result
in an excess of 40 percent depletion of the available ground water in
that area over a rate of 25 years, an application to drill a new well
may be denied. According to testimony elicited in the trial court, the
3-mile circle represents the area over which a well, located at the
center, would have an effect if permitted to pump intermittently for
25 years, taking into account the saturated thickness of the aquifer,
the number of wells in the area, and the yield of those wells. In determining what the draw down effect would be on the water in the 3-mile
circle, a "modified Theiss equation' '662 was used; and in determining
the balance of water in the aquifer, the amount of recharge to the
aquifer was considered, along with the fact that there was only intermittent pumping (estimated at approximately 100 days per year)
within the area. After noting the reasonableness of the 40 percent
depletion rate and the 25 years as the period during which the depletion
is to be allowed, the court concluded that the "testimony and other
evidence in the record before the district court support the reasonableness of the 3-mile test and establish that the 3-mile test takes into
3
account the factors specified by the statute.' '66
It is important to note that the district court characterized the
3-mile test as a "general finding of fact based partly on data and expert
opinion and partly on policy as an index or yardstick to compute the
effect of a given well on the water level and existing ground water
66 See text accompanying note 659 supra.
662 This method of defining the behavior of the water table in the vicinity of a pumped
well is described with all its technical intricacies in R. DEWiEsT, GEOHYD(ROLOGY 260
(1965).
663 468 P.2d 835, 837 (Colo. 1970).
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users from a common source of supply."6'64 The test was developed
specifically for use in the Northern High Plains Designated Water
Basin, and the court was willing to consider the applicant's evidentiary
challenges to certain factual assumptions implicit in the use of the test
(i.e., plaintiff challenged the assumptions that the aquifer was
homogenous, isotropic, and level). The Colorado Supreme Court
approved the district court's finding of fact as such and approved the
3-mile test as a proper method for determining the facts, i.e., as a
method which takes into account the factors specified by the statute.
The 3-mile test, in other words, is not law. It is, rather, a method
devised under the 1965 Act for dealing with the first two problems of
applying appropriation concepts to nontributary ground water mentioned by the court in Whitten v. Coit.66 5
The second major question addressed by the court in Fundingsland
dealt with the plaintiff's contention that the Colorado constitution
prohibited the state from denying the right to divert the unappropriated
waters of any natural stream to beneficial use.6 66 After noting that
there is a "mining" or depletion condition in the area from present
usage, the court said:
It is clear that the policies of protecting senior appropriators and
maintaining reasonable ground water pumping levels set forth by the
underground water act require management which takes into account
the long range effects of intermittent pumping in the aquifer....
If the plaintiff were permitted to proceed on his theory of "unappropriated water" and pump water from his proposed well until such
time as it were no longer economically feasible to withdraw water from
the aquifer, then no subsequent regulation of his pumping could
protect senior appropriators, and all pumping from the basin within
the area of influence of the plaintiff's well would have to cease until
a reasonable pumping level was restored through the slow process of
recharge. This is not the concept of appropriation
contained in the
667
statute, and not the one this court will follow.

66 8
Finally, the court held that the language in Fellhauer v. People
to the effect that the wells in the Arkansas Valley could be regulated
only in compliance with reasonable rules, regulations, standards, and
a plan did not apply in this case dealing with the management of
underground waters in designated ground water basins. " 9
(3) "Vested Rights" of Prior \Well Owners
As mentioned earlier,6 7 the Colorado Supreme Court's rejection

6 Id. at 840 (emphasis added).
"5See text accompanying note 654 supra.
§6. This contention raises the "race-to-the-bottom"

6" COLO. CONST. art. XVI,
7

set forth in note 654 rupra.

" 468 P.2d 835, 839 (Colo. 1970).
668 See Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986 (Colo. 1968).
66

See discussion of Fellhauer in text accompanying notes 709-16 infra.

870°See

PART Two, § I(B) (2) (a) supra.
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of the appropriation doctrine under the 1957 Act as applied to nontributary ground waters may have been more than a disagreement with
the wisdom of the policy in light of considerations of conservation and
full economic development of ground water resources; 6 71 for there is
language in the court's opinion in Whitten v. Coit6 72 to the effect that
the landowner has vested property in the water in his soil which cannot
be taken away by mere legislation. 7 Although that statement can
be attacked as dictum, unsupported in any event by the authorities,174
it could nevertheless present a possible constitutional difficulty with
the declaration of designated (including nontributary) ground waters
to be subject to appropriation. 675 If such waters do in fact constitute
part of the real property of the owner of the overlying lands as at
common law, it can be argued that the property may not be taken
676
without just compensation.
However, it can also be argued from an analysis of the underlying sources of the statement in Whitten that if the landowner did
have a property right in the nontributary waters under his land, then
that right was in the nature of a usufructory, appropriative right to
the use of such waters. 7 7 The Ground Water Management Act of
1965 did, in fact, recognize the prior appropriative rights of well owners
as such, providing that all priority claims based on an actual taking of
designated ground water for beneficial use prior to the effective date
of the Act shall relate back to the date of placing the designated
67 8
ground water to a beneficial use.
C. Tributary Ground Waters
According to the early cases, tributary ground water was subject
to the doctrine of appropriation along with and in the same manner
as tributary surface water.6 79 However, the early courts also demonstrated a propensity to treat the tributary ground and surface waters
of a particular stream as separate and independent physical entities,
thus avoiding any major confrontation between surface appropriators
and well owners. For instance, the case of McClellan v. Hurdle8 dealt
with a conflict between a well owner and a downstream senior surface
appropriator. Although it was clear in that case that the well owner
was diverting part of the underground flow of the stream, the surface
See PART Two, § I(B) (2) (a) supra.
153 Colo. 157, 173, 385 P.2d 131, 140 (1963).
673 Id. at 174, 385 P.2d at 140.
674
See note 634 supra.
67
5 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-1 (Supp. 1965).
676 U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also note 641 supra and accompanying text.
677 See note 634 supra for an analysis of the underlying sources.
678 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-8(1) (Supp. 1965).
6n See text accompanying notes 594-604, supra.
M 3 Colo. App. 430, 33 P. 280 (1893).
671

672
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appropriator's claim was not recognized, in part because he failed to
show that his diversion facilities extended deep enough into the stream
bed to effectuate a diversion of the underground flow as well as the
6
surface flow of the stream. 11
Ignorance of the physical interdependence of tributary ground
and surface waters has not been the only reason for the critically slow
development of an integrated system for the regulation and administration of tributary ground and surface waters in Colorado. Other
reasons were an inherent inertia in the law and the accumulation of
certain expectations and vested interests in the status quo while the
gradual recognition of the need for change was taking place. According
to Hutchins,
[tjhe fact that surface streams "lose" water into the ground at
some times and places and "gain" water therefrom at others has long
been recognized not only by ground water hydrologists and engineers
but also by attorneys, judges, and legislators as well. Nevertheless,
integration of surface and ground water doctrines and rights of use has
not always kept pace with comprehension of physical conditions.
Rival claimants to waters of surface streams have usually litigated their
relative rights as between themselves, without intervention of owners
of wells who depend on ground water that feeds the stream or that
escapes from it, and the reverse holds true with respect to most adjudications of ground water rights. Lack of correlation has more serious
results in such cases than where separate adjudications are made of
rights on a surface stream and on its main tributaries, because the
character of the surface water rights is the same - appropriative, or
appropriative and riparian, depending on the jurisdiction. But in some
states surface stream rights may be solely appropriative and ground
water rights may be based on land ownership - even the rule of
absolute ownership in overlying land. Repeated court decisions may
have welded this rule into a rule of property, which may be difficult
to overturn when many more rights become vested
and more knowledge
68 2
as to physical interrelationships is available.

Although in Colorado tributary ground water has never been subject
to a rule of property ownership,6 a lack of affirmative legislative and
administrative action helped to create a political situation which was
supportive of the status quo:
[11n the absence of any other specific statutory language prior to 1965,
individual farmers in Colorado invested thousands of dollars in developing underground water as a source of supply for their crops. It is no
wonder, then, that . . . House Bill No. 1066 . . . was considered as

a threat to their personal livelihood and a taking of their property
without due process of law ....
[I]t is not surprising that many persons view the . . . action in 1965 with deepfelt bitterness and resent-

ment, when the main thing wrong with this legislation is that
it was
6 84
enacted some 20 or 30 years later than it should have been.
681 See text accompanying note 597 supra.
682 Hutchins, supra note 619 at 426-27.

Compare the discussion of nontributary ground water in note 634 supra and accompanying text.
64 Comment, supra note 614, at 145-46 (1967), quoting COLORADO LECISLATIVE COUNCIL,
IMPLEMENTATION OF 1965 WATER LEGISLATION XXV (Research Pub. No. 114, 1966).
683
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In any event, affirmative legislative action did not take place
until 1965. Prior to that time, the lack of clear legislative authority
made the state engineer reluctant to regulate anything but surface
water.6 s5
1. H. 1066 and the Problems of Implementation
By 1965 the need for desegregating the principles governing
ground and surface waters had become critical. According to Clarold
F. Morgan,
[i]n 1929 less than 810 irrigation pumps were in use in the state's
four major basins; in 1959 the total had risen to approximately 8,900,
a ten-fold increase. The four year period following 1960 produced a
fifty-five percent increase in the number of wells drilled in Colorado,
and in 1964 alone, 5,911 wells were completed. 686
Such statistics are foreboding indicators of the burgeoning rush to
board Colorado's underground waterwagon. Even the vast underground
resources are not inexhaustible. Surface stream flow rights may be
affected, water tables can be depressed to unreachable depths, and the
allocation of available supply among claimants may often give rise to
6 87
economic, legal and administrative conflict.

In view of this crisis, H. 1066 was enacted in 1965 in order to force

the state engineer to "execute and administer the laws of the state
relative to the distribution of the surface waters of the state including
the underground waters tributary thereto in accordance with the right
of priority of appropriation .... .. 88 H. 1066 did not provide a set
of guidelines for the state engineer to follow in executing this

mandate,6" 9 but merely provided that "he shall adopt such rules and
regulations and issue such orders as are necessary for the performance
85 Moses & Vranesh, supra note 623, at 300. Compare the statement of Mr. Benjamin F.
Stapleton, Jr., the chairman of the Colorado Water Conservation Board quoted in
Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986 (Colo. 1968):
House Bill 1066 [the 1965 Act), merely gave the State Engineer the right to
shut down wells. House Bill 1066 was, in my opinion, superfluous since the
State Engineer had not only the right but the responsibility under then-existing
laws to shut down wells which were interfering with the prior rights of other
water users. The State Engineer insisted that he had no authority and to force
the State Engineer to take action on these matters existing laws were amended
to make what was already crystal clear even more self-evident by specific command to the State Engineer to take action against well owners in the operation
and management of the total water resources of the state.
I have always believed that the State Engineer had the authority to shut down
wells if they were interfering with the rights of senior appropriators and yet,
because shutting down of a well is always controversial, no action was taken
by the State Engineer, acting on the excuse that he had no authority under
state laws.
Id. at 990.
88 Comment, supra note 614, at 133.
6
8 Id.
6 88

at 133-34.
CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-11-22(1) (Supp. 1965), as amended, COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 148-21-34 to -36 (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
60 See PART Two, § I(C) (3) (e) infra. The only guideline provided by the Act was that
a diversion was not to be enjoined unless there was "material injury" to the vested right
of other appropriators.
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of the foregoing duties.''690 The problems encountered by the state
engineer in attempting to implement H. 1066 form a substantial part
of the background of the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969 and will briefly be described here.
One of the fundamental problems arising out of H. 1066 was
implicit in the very fact that ground waters were to be administered
by the state engineer in accordance with the laws relative to the distribution of the surface waters of the state. According to Clarold Morgan,
"To the extent that underground water and surface water share common
characteristics, expanding appropriation concepts to solve ground water
problems may be valid. Yet a failure to acknowledge variations can
result in unwarranted distortions of the relationship between stream
'
and well." 691
For instance, replenishment of a depleted ground water
supply may be much more time-consuming than the replenishment of
a dried up stream. Thus, the conservation imperative becomes much
more critical when dealing with tributary ground water. Furthermore,
the effect of a junior diversion on a senior appropriation becomes more
difficult to determine when ground waters are involved. The effect
is likely to depend on hydrologic characteristics peculiar to ground
water - such as the distance between the two points of diversion,
the saturated thickness of the aquifer, etc. If the water flow of a stream
is only minimally affected by cutting off a junior diversion, it is difficult
to argue that enjoining the junior user is consistent with the concept
of maximizing the beneficial use of the waters of the state.6 92
H. 1066 did not explicitly declare a policy of maximizing the
beneficial use of waters or promoting the full development of the water
resources of the state as did the Ground Water Management Act of
1965.693 The only indication that this policy was recognized was that
a junior diversion was to be enjoined only when necessary to prevent
material injury to the vested rights of other appropriators. 694 H. 1066
further provided that
[i]n determining whether or not the vested rights of other appropriators are materially injured by any well ...

there shall be a rebuttable

presumption that there is no injury if a well or its replacement was both
in existence prior to the date of this section, and used continuously
in the subsurface channel of a
since that date, and is not located 695
continuously flowing surface stream.
690

CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-11-22(1)

(Supp. 1965), as amended, COLO. REv. STAT.

ANN. §§ 148-21-34 to -36 (Supp. 1969).

691 Comment, supra note 614, at 138.
6902The state's policy of maximizing the beneficial use of the waters of the state was recognized in Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961). See PART
693
6 94

Two, § I(C) (3) (c) inira, for a discussion of the case.
See text accompanying note 655 supra.
Coio. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-11-22(2)
ANN. §§ 148-21-34 to -36 (Supp. 1969).

695Id. (Emphasis added).

(Supp. 1965), as amended, COLO. REV. STAT.
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However, among the significant problems which later arose under
H. 1066 were the difficulties in defining the terms "material injury"
'
and "subsurface channel.

696

Other problems encountered under H. 1066 arose out of the
hydrologic relationship between a stream and the adjacent underground
waters.
Colorado's irrigation wells are almost exclusively junior to surface

rights. It is convenient, but perhaps unsound, to conclude that each
well in the vicinity of a surface stream must defer to senior priorities

in keeping with appropriation rules. The legislative committee on
water had indicated that "[giround water in aquifers under and
adjacent to effluent streams is hydraulically related to the stream
flow." Recasting this observation in more general terms, a surface
appropriator draws not only upon visible surface water to fill his
needs, but also relies on the total hydrologic structure to support

his diversion. If the stream and adjacent underflow through the
ground water reservoir are viewed as a single resource, each surface

right necessarily demands both adequate surface volume and favorable
underground water levels. On this basis, efficiency in perfecting a
diversion of water at the surface alone is arguably only partial efficiency. "[The appropriator] is not entitled to command the whole or
a substantial flow of the stream merely to facilitate
his taking the
' '6 9 7
fraction of the whole flow to which he is entitled.
The Supreme Court of Colorado recognized these problems in the
Fellhauer case, discussing both the right of the senior surface users
to uplift by underground waters to support the stream's surface flow
and the duty of a senior user to pump in order to satisfy his surface
decree. 9 8
Another set of major problems arising out of H. 1066 stemmed
from the failure of the legislature to provide any administrative guidance for the resolution of extremely complex problems. For instance,
there was no legislative direction for the state engineer to follow in
awarding priority to tributary ground water. "9 The Ground Water
Law of 1957 provided that "the priority date of the ground water
appropriation shall not be postponed to a time later than its true date
of initiation by reason of failure to adjudicate such right in a surface
water adjudication."' 00 However, since this section was repealed in
1965,01 the state engineer could choose to determine well priorities
by means of supplemental adjudications; and an early case appeared
to hold that no priority in a supplemental proceeding may be given
a number or date earlier than the last priority in the last preceding
6"See Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 995 (Colo. 1968).
67 Comment, supra note 614, at 143.
68 Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 997 (Colo. 1968).
6
Moses & Vranesh, supra note 623, at 301.
700 Law of May 1, 1957, [1957] Colo. Sess. laws 863 (repealed 1965).
70 1
COLO. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-9 (Supp. 1965).
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adjudication.70 2 As Moses and Vranesh point out, "if this case is to be
strictly followed, many, if not all, senior wells could be shut down by
the state engineer in an attempt to satisfy junior surface rights."7 8
H. 1066 did not provide solutions or guidelines for developing
answers to problems such as these. In fact, H. 1066 did not even
provide a clear mandate to the state engineer to adjudicate or otherwise
determine the relative priorities of wells. It merely provided that "he
shall adopt such rules and regulations and issue such orders as are
necessary for the performance of the foregoing duties.' '704
2. The Response of the Legislature, the State Engineer,
and the Court
In 1967, the legislature expressed its own dissatisfaction with the
adequacy of H. 1066 by passing S. 407.705 That Act provided $50,000
for a two-year investigation of relationships between surface and
ground water and for an evaluation of the need for additional legislation to "provide for integrated administration of all diversions and
uses of water within the state ... "706 Among the findings, conclusions,
and recommendations generated by the studies were those of Morton
W. Bittinger & Associates and Wright Water Engineers:
Findings
1. The average annual water supply within the South Platte River
Basin is adequate to meet present requirements. However, because of
the wide fluctuations in runoff, the distribution of water availability
is far from satisfactory.
2. The groundwater reservoir along the main stem of the South
Platte River between Denver and the State line contains approximately
ten million acre-feet of water. Only a small percentage of this capacity
is utilized and this only in a haphazard and unplanned way.
3. Groundwater pumping and transmountain importations have
been major factors in stabilizing water supplies in the South Platte
Basin. However, the pumping of groundwater has caused infringement
upon prior surface water rights. Studies indicate that this infringement
is not as severe as many have felt it to be.
4. The water supplies of the South Platte Basin are not being
utilized or administered as efficiently and effectively as they could be.
5. Deficiencies exist in the completeness and accuracy of water
use records.
Conclusions
1. Planned utilization of 10 to 15 percent of the available
groundwater storage capacity in the alluvium is reasonably attainable.
Use of the groundwater storage capacity can provide more efficient
utilization of the total resources of the Basin, reduce shortages, and
7

0Hardesty Res., Canal & Land Co. v. Arkansas Valley Sugar Beet Co., 85 Colo. 555, 559,
277 P. 763, 765 (1929).
70 Moses & Vranesh, supra note 623, at 302.
7 04

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-11-22(1)

(Supp. 1965), as amended, COLO. REV. STAT.

ANN. §§ 148-21-34 to -36 (Supp. 1969).
705 Law of April 19, 1967, [19671 Colo. Sess. Laws 249 (repealed 1969).
7N id. § l(1)(b).
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minimize conflicts between water users. This planned utilization in
conjunction with surface water supplies would basically involve a
heavier draft upon the groundwater supplies during low runoff years
with provision for replenishment of those supplies during years of
surplus runoff.
2. To achieve more optimum distribution of water supplies and
accomplish desired goals, certain surface water rights should be served
from groundwater sources during low runoff periods. Such operations
would allow more surface water to be diverted in the upper regions,
making greater re-use of return flows possible.
3. Since the groundwater in storage adjacent to the main stem
of the South Platte River is currently being used to support the
flowing stream, and many users are dependent upon and have rights
in the return flow which joins the river via the groundwater system,
provisions must be made to protect these rights and to supply them with
alternate sources of water to insure the continued utilization of the
groundwater supply. The cost of providing such facilities should be
borne by those who benefit.
4. Optimum use of water resources within the South Platte Basin
cannot be achieved without control of nonbeneficial uses or waste of
water.
5. Integrated management of groundwater and surface water can
be best achieved on an overall South Platte River Basin basis.
Recommendations
1. It is recommended that legislation should be passed which
will allow and encourage the integrated management and administra70 7
tion of groundwater and surface water in the South Platte Basin.

While the study was being completed, the state engineer made a
feeble attempt to regulate ground waters under his jurisdiction by
ordering 39 wells to be shut down in the Arkansas Valley. He had not
promulgated the rules and regulations called for in H. 1066, and the
litigation resulting from his acts gave the Supreme Court of Colorado
the opportunity to address itself to some of the major problems of
attempting to integrate the administration and regulation of the tributary ground and surface waters of the state. 708
The Fellhauer litigation arose out of an action brought by the
Attorney General under H. 1066709 to enjoin the plaintiff in error,
Roger Fellhauer, from pumping and using water from the alluvium
of the Arkansas River contrary to an order of the water division

engineer. Although the priority right of his well had not been adjudicated, all of the surface flow of the Arkansas River during each

irrigation season had been appropriated long before Fellhauer's well
was drilled in 1935. Since the division engineer did not issue his order
to shut down 39 of the approximately 1,600 to 1,900 wells in the

Arkansas Valley pursuant to reasonable rules and regulations, the
court held that he proceeded discriminately in violation of the equal
707MORTON W. BITTINGER & Assoc. & WRIGHT WATER ENGINEERS. REPORT ON ENGINEERING WATER CODE STUDIES FOR THE SOUTH PLATTE RIVER 3, 4 (August, 1968).
708 Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986 (Colo. 1968).
7 09

COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-11-22 (Supp. 1965).
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protection clause of the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution and of the due process clause in article I, section 25 of the
Colorado constitution. The court further held that in order to be valid
and constitutional, regulation of wells must comply with the following
three requirements:
(1) The regulation must be under and in compliance with reasonable
rules, regulations, standards and a plan established by the state
engineer prior to the issuance of regulative orders.
(2) Reasonable lessening of material injury to senior rights must be
accomplished by the regulation of the wells.
(3) If by placing conditions upon the use of a well, or upon its
owner, some or all of its water can be placed to a beneficial use by
the owner without710material injury to senior users, such conditions
should be made.

What the court had in mind as factors to be taken into account
in promulgating these rules and regulations may be inferred from some

of the other portions of the extensive opinion. First, in setting forth
the background against which the division engineer's actions could be
considered, the court described the hydrologic factors which determine
the effect which a well diversion is likely to have upon a stream. 711
Second, in discussing the conditions to be placed upon the use

of a well, the court noted the possibility that a junior well owner could
discharge a certain portion of the well water into the stream and use
the remainder with no material injury resulting to senior users. In
connection with this idea, the court went on to discuss the maximum

utilization doctrine as initially suggested by Colorado Springs v.
Bender.712 Thereafter, in a section of the opinion which expressly
avoided ruling on the issues discussed, the court raised the questions
of whether a senior surface user has the right to uplift by underground
waters in order to support the stream's surface flow and whether the

surface appropriator must take any affirmative action to supplement
or protect his right from the loss of uplift. Also mentioned was the
Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 993 (Colo. 1968).
When water is pumped from a well, a cone of depression is formed, i.e., a
conical drained area in which the point of the inverted cone is at the bottom
of the well pipe. This depression causes surrounding water in the aquifer to
flow into the cone from all sides. Except for wells in very close proximity of
the surface stream, the effect of this diversion upon the visible stream is not
immediate. The time that the stream begins to be affected and the extent of
the effect in quantity of water and duration depends upon a number of factors,
including (a) distance of the well from the stream, (b) transmissibility of the
aquifer, (c) depth of the well, (d) time and volume of pumping, and (e)
return flow characteristics. A well in or at the bank of the stream may have
substantially the same effect as a surface diversion at that point. The effect of
a well, which is a considerable distance from a stream and which is used for
irrigation, may not take place until the nonirrigation season, and, by the next
irrigation season, the conical depression at the well may be completely recharged with new water entering the alluvium.
Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 992 (Colo. 1968).
712
Id. at 994. Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961), is discussed in text, PART Two, § I(C) (3) (c) infra.
710
711
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validity of the concept that a surface user who drills a well must use
the well water as a part of his surface priority. All of these complexities
raised by the maximum utilization doctrine, the court noted, "must be
faced under planning and the establishment of rules and regulatio ns .... ,718
As a third factor to be considered in promulgating rules and
regulations, the court recognized that the state engineer must achminister
the waters under his jurisdiction "in accordance with the right of
priority of appropriation.71 4 The court disapproved of the fact (again
without ruling) that the division engineer did not take into account
relative priorities of unadjudicated wells in determining whether to
regulate one well rather than another. But the court also recognized
that the right of priority of appropriation was only one factor to be
considered if the maximum utilization doctrine was to be implemented.
"In this connection," said the court, "we think it well to quote a portion
from the following significant law review article- Morgan, Appropriation and Colorado's Ground Water: A Continuing Dilemma?
40 U. Colo. L. Rev. 133 (1967) (footnotes omitted):"
The Colorado system of appropriation was tailored to the conditions
of surface stream diversions in an arid western climate.
. ..such factors as well size, the transmissibility and saturated thickness of an aquifer, and the spacing of wells did not complicate the
century-old problems for which the doctrine was designed. Wells junior
in time are frequently scattered at indiscriminate distances and bear
random priorities. Although wells closest to a senior diversion frequently will have the greatest impact, appropriation rules look exclusively to seniority, disregarding the all-important factors of proximity
and actual effect. As a result, the first wells called upon to stop pumping must be the most junior wells, even though they may be geographically the most distant and the least offensive to the senior. Strict
administration on the basis of seniority would plainly "prevent a full
beneficial use of water" in the aquifer.
Because of these complexities, the need for detailed engineering
data on well size, location, operation, priority and anticipated effects
is essential to an effective application of the appropriation theory to
well operations. Wells which number in the thousands cannot be
governed by priority where priorities are unknown. Futile calls on
distant or even proximate diversions are unavoidable without a precise
understanding of the well-surface relationship in each case. And, of
course, effective economic planning calls for certainty in supply predictions. Unavailability of, or inattention to, critical information of this
type makes it possible to transform well-operators who are located in
an overdeveloped aquifer or near surface streams into involuntary dry
land operators as they wait for senior rights to come back to life.
Much ground water will remain inaccessible to all, sealed from economic productivity by misapprehension of hydrologic fact. 715
71 Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 997 (Colo. 1968).
7 14
Id. at 996 (emphasis added).
715 Id. at 996-97, quoting Comment, supra note 614, at 138-40.
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Thus, in a lengthy opinion comprised largely of gratis dicta, the
Supreme Court of Colorado went "as far as it was thought feasible
in the evaluation of the 1965 Act and its administration" 7 1 and
thereby furnished a significant portion of the legal background for the
preparation and enactment of the Water Right Determination and
Administration Act of 1969.
3. The Water Right Determination and Administration Act
of 1969

a. Declaration of Policy
The major thrust and purpose of S. 81 is made apparent in that
Act's declaration of policy:
(1) It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state of Colorado
that all waters originating in or flowing into this state, whether found
on the surface or underground, have always been and are hereby
declared to be the property of the public, dedicated to the use of the
people of the state, subject to appropriation and use in accordance with
law. As incident thereto, it shall be the policy of this state to integrate
the appropriation,use and administrationof underground water tribuas to
tary to a stream with the use of surface water, in such a way
7 17

maximize the beneficial use of all of the waters of this state.

The declaration of policy continues:
(2) (a) Recognizing that previous and existing laws have given
inadequate attention to the development and use of underground
waters of the state, . . . and that the future welfare of the state

depends upon a sound and flexible integrated use of all waters of the
state, it is hereby declared to be the further policy of the state of
Colorado that in the determination of water rights, uses and administration of water the following principles shall apply:
(b) Water rights and uses heretofore vested in any person by
virtue of previous or existing laws, including an appropriationfrom
a well, shall be protected subject to the provisions of this article.
(c) The existing use of ground water, either independently or in
conjunction with surface rights, shall be recognized to the fullest extent
ossible, subject to the preservation of other existing vested rights,
at his own point of diversion on a natural watercourse, each
diverter must establish some reasonable means of effectuating his
diversion. He is not entitled to command the whole flow of the stream
merely to facilitate his taking the fraction of the whole flow to which
he is entitled.
(d) The use of ground water may be considered as an alternate
or supplemental source of supply for surface decrees heretofore entered,
taking into consideration both previous usage and the necessity to
protect the vested rights of others.
(e) No reduction of any lawful diversion because of the operation
of the priority system shall be permitted unless such reduction would
increase the amount of water available to and required by water rights
having senior priorities.1 8
716 Id.at 995.
717

COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-2(1) (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
-8 Id.§§ 148-21-2(2) (a-e) (emphasis added).
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The manner in which S. 81 attempts to implement its policy and the
four basic principles set forth above will be explored in this section.
b. Protection of Rights and Uses Heretofore Vested,
Including an Appropriation From a Well
As previously mentioned, most well priorities have not been
adjudicated.7 19 Moses and Vranesch have pointed out that, under the
1965 Act, if the state engineer had chosen to determine the relative
priorities of wells through supplemental adjudications, many senior
wells could have been shut down in an attempt to satisfy junior surface
rights. 2 0 The basis for this argument was the holding in Hardesty
721
Reservoir, Canal & Land Co. v. Arkansas Valley Sugar Beet Co.
that no priority in a supplemental proceeding may be given a number
72 2
or date earlier than the last preceding adjudication.
S. 81 continues this policy with respect to all priority rights which
have been "adjudicated" prior to the effective date of the Act. It
directs the state engineer to follow the following procedure, among
others, in compiling his initial July 1, 1970, tabulation of priorities:
(iv) As among water rights decreed in the same water district in
different adjudication suits, all water rights decreed in an adjudication
suit shall be senior to all water rights decreed in any subsequent
adjudication suit.723
However, the Act further provides that "the 1974 tabulation and
succeeding tabulations shall include the priorities awarded subsequent
to those listed in the preceding tabulation .. 724 Priorities awarded
in proceedings conducted subsequent to the 1970 tabulation will have
been awarded pursuant to the water right "determination" proceedings
set forth by S. 81 rather than in a traditional "adjudication" suit.72 "
In these water right "determination" proceedings, the following exception for well rights is to apply:
With respect to the divisions described in section 148-21-8,

priorities awarded in any year for water rights or conditional water
rights shall be junior to all priorities awarded in previous years and
junior to all priorities awarded in decrees entered prior to June 7,
1969, or in decrees entered in proceedings which are pending on such

date; except that with respect to water rights which are diverted by
means of wells, the priorities for which have not been established or

sought in any such decree or proceeding, if the person claiming such
19

supra note 623, at 301.
T" Id.at 302.
72 85 Colo. 555, 277 P. 763 (1929).
7
Id. at 561, 277 P. at 763, citing Baca Irr. Ditch Co. v. Model Land & Irr. Co., 80 Colo.
398, 252 P. 358 (1927).
"2 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 148-21-27(1) (b) (iv) (Supp. 1969).
7Id.§ 148-21-28(1) (emphasis added).
72 For the distinction between these two terms, see Greer, A Review of Recent Activity in
Colorado Water Law, 47 DENVER L.J. 181n.6 (1970).
7 Moses & Vranesh,
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a water right files an applicationfor determination of water right and
priority not later than July 1, 1971, except in water division 3, where
such application must be filed not later than July 1, 1972, and such
application is approved and confirmed, such water right, subject to the
provisions of section 148-21-21 (1), shall be given a priority date as of
the date of actual appropriationand shall not726be junior to other priorities by reason of the foregoing provision.

It is in this manner that S. 81 attempts to implement its policy
that "[w]ater rights and uses heretofore vested in any person by virtue
of previous or existing laws, including an appropriation from a well,
shall be protected subject to the provisions of this article.1 727 The policy
of the provision is apparently designed to protect the interests of well
owners who have not adjudicated their priorities relying upon (1) the
assumption implicit in the prior law that ground and surface waters
would be treated as separate physical entities 728 or (2) affirmative
legal pronouncements such as the Ground Water Act of 1957 which
provided that the priority date of a ground water appropriation shall
not be postponed to a time later than the true date of initiation by
reason of failure to adjudicate such right in a surface adjudication. 2"
However, serious objections may be raised by well owners who
did adjudicate their priorities prior to the effective date of the Act
and who were, for that reason, denied a priority date extending back
further than the last preceding adjudication. Furthermore, notwithstanding the relation back provisions for unadjudicated well priorities,
most well appropriations are in fact junior to most surface appropriations, and unless the conservation and "maximum beneficial use"
policies of the act are effective, many well owners will not be allowed
to operate as they have in the past.
c. Reasonable Means of Diversion

One of the means which has been devised to attempt to maximize
the beneficial use of the ground and surface waters of the state, in a
manner consistent with the recognition of vested priority rights, has
been the development of the doctrine of reasonable diversion. The
general purpose of the doctrine is to promote the overall efficiency
of diversion and application to beneficial use of the waters of the state.
That is, not only must a particular diversion be reasonably efficient
within its own individual context, but it also must be reasonably
consistent with the efficiency of the entire distributive system within
which it operates.
The principle of reasonable diversion was not originated in Colorado by the enactment of S. 81 but rather with the case of Colorado
725 COLO. REV.
727 Id.§

STAT. ANN. § 148-21-22 (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
148-21-2(2)(b).

723See text accompanying note 680 supra.
7

CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-9 (1963). See also text accompanying note 684 supr,.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 47

Springs v. Bender 80 decided in 1961. In that case Bender brought
an action against the city of Colorado Springs, seeking an injunction
restraining the city from diverting certain tributary ground waters in
violation of Bender's alleged prior appropriation. The trial court
granted the injunction finding that "when the defendants pumped
water during the time it was needed by plaintiffs for irrigation purposes, it was not available because the water table was lowered below
the intake of plaintiff's pumping facilities. 81 The Supreme Court of
Colorado reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the trial
court for further consideration in light of "some well-defined legal
principles which are pertinent to the problems presented.' '732 Among
them was the following:
At his own point of diversion on a natural water course, each
diverter must establish some reasonable means of effectuating his
diversion. He is not entitled to command the whole or a substantial
flow of the stream merely to facilitate his taking the fraction of the
whole flow to which he is entitled. Schodde v. Twin Falls Land &
Water Co., 224 U.S. 107, 119, 32 S. C. 470, 56 L. Ed. 686. This
principle applied to diversion of underflow or underground water
means that priority of appropriation does not give a right to an inefficient means of diversion, such as a well which reaches to such a shallow
depth into the available water supply that a shortage would occur
to such senior even though diversion by others did not deplete the
stream below, where there would be an adequate supply for the senior's
lawful demand. 783

In light of this principle the court concluded that after the trial court
has heard additional evidence,
(2) The elevation of water in the aquifer at which each junior
appropriator must cease to divert water in order to meet the demands
of a senior appropriator must be fixed.
(3) In determining the facts mentioned [under (2)] the conditions surrounding the diversion by the senior appropriator must be
examined as to whether he has created a means of diversion from the
aquifer which is reasonably adequate for the use to which he has
historically put the water of his appropriation. If adequate means for
reaching a sufficient supply can be made available to the senior, whose
present facilities for diversion fail when water table is lowered by
acts of the junior appropriators, provision for such adequate means
should be decreed at the expense of the junior appropriators, it being
unreasonable to require the senior to supply such means out of his own
financial resources. This reasonable provision of the law recognizes
that the nature of underground aquifers is such that they sometimes
have very great depth. In such circumstances an economical and productive diversion might be made by a junior appropriator of a very
high value use with which a senior could not compete; and while the
junior might well afford the expense of a deep withdrawal, and even
leave an adequate volume of water available for a senior, yet the
148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961).
3 ld. at 460, 366 P.2d at 554.
7n Id. at 461, 366 P.2d at 554.
7 d. at 462, 366 P.2d at 555.
1
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expense of bringing it to the surface would be beyond the reasonable
economic reach of the latter. Such situations 784
do not ordinarily develop
with regard to surface stream developments.
S. 81 codified the principle of reasonable diversion by adopting
some of the language of the Bender case. However, it is not as clear
(although it may be reasonably inferred) that S. 81 also adopts the
principle that a junior appropriator must pay for the cost of improving
a senior's means of diversion. This latter question may become fairly
significant in litigation under the Act, particularly when the courts
consider the mandatory use of wells as alternate means of diversions
for surface rights.
Two other aspects of S. 81 which further the policy of creating
reasonably efficient distributive systems are the provisions dealing
with plans for augmentation7 85 and the provision making it the duty
of the division engineers to issue orders as to waste.73 ' With regard
to the latter provision, it is interesting to note that it is the duty of
the state engineer or division engineers to issue "such orders as are
necessary to implement the provisions of section 148-21-34 [making
it their duty to administer the waters of the state in accordance with
this article and other applicable laws] ...... For example, "[e]ach
division engineer shall order the total or partial discontinuance of any
diversion in his division to the extent the water being diverted is not
necessary for application to a beneficial use . .

"788

d. Wells as Alternate Sources of Supply

One of the principle methods by which S. 81 attempts to implement the reasonable diversion doctrine is by encouraging, and in some
cases requiring, surface appropriators who are also well owners to
utilize their wells to satisfy their surface rights before putting a call
on the river. The rationale of this policy is that suggested by Clarold
Morgan: "A surface diversion, by virtue of the very fact that it taps
only a small portion [the surface portion] of the entire alluvial basin
water supply, may thereby be considered to be inefficient and therefore
an unreasonable means of diversion."7 39 One "is not entitled to command the whole flow of the stream merely to facilitate his taking the
' 740
fraction of the whole flow to which he is entitled.
The applicable statutory scheme is as follows: "The use of ground
water may be considered as an alternate or supplemental source of
7Id.

at 464-65, 366 P.2d at 556.
§ 148-21-23

73 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

(Supp. 1969).

-6Id. § 148-21-35.
Id. § 148-21-35(1).
81d. § 148-21-35(2).

737
7

79
7

See text accompanying note 697 supra.
§ 148-21-2(c) (Supp. 1969).

40 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.
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supply for surface decrees heretofore entered, taking into consideration
both previous usage and the necessity to protect the vested rights of
others. ' 7 41 Section 17 of the statute makes this principle more explicit
by providing permissive procedures for allowing surface diverters to
secure and utilize their wells as alternate points of diversion:
Subject to section 148-21-35(2), in determining and administering
the use of water, judicial and administrative officers shall be governed
by the following:
(b) In every case in which the owner of an appropriative right
to divert water shall supply his water needs by the use of a well, the
water diverted by that well may be charged to its own appropriation;
or it may be used to divert water under the provisions set forth in paragraph (c) of this subsection (3). This statutory statement is intended
as a legislative acknowledgment of the long-held practice in Colorado
under which various water rights may be carried through the same
physical structure.
(c) In any case in which the owner of an appropriative right to
divert water at the surface of a stream or to have water so diverted
delivered for his use or benefit shall have a well so situated as to draw
water from the same stream system, that owner may secure the right to
have such well, or more than one if he has more than one such well,
made an alternate point of diversion to said surface right by procedures
provided in this article for securing alternate points of diversion.
(d) Until July 1, 1971, all diversions by well to supply a water
use for which there is a surface decree may be charged against and be
considered as part of the exercise of said surface decree even if the
owner has not secured the right to an alternate point of diversion
at the well, but nothing in this article shall be construed to prevent
regulation of the well in accordance with law and within the system
of priorities established for regulation of diversions of water in
Colorado.
(e) In authorizing alternate points of diversions for wells, the
widest possible discretion to permit the use of wells shall prevail. In
administering the waters of a water course, the withdrawal of water
which will lower the water table shall be permitted but not to such a
degree as will prevent the water source to be recharged or replenished,
under all predictable circumstances, to the extent necessary to prevent
injury to senior appropriators in the order of their priorities, with due
742regard for daily, seasonal, and longer demands on the water supply.

Finally, section 35 of the statute provides:
If a well has been approved as an alternate means of diversion for a
water right for which a surface means of diversion is decreed, such well
and such surface means must be utilized to the extent feasible and
permissible under this article to satisfy said water right before diver743
sions under junior water rights are ordered discontinued.

Thus, the owner of a surface right who is also owner of a well
in the same stream system may, if he chooses, have his well determined
741

Id. § 148-21-2(d) (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
§ 148-21-17(3) (emphasis added).
743Id. § 148-21-35(2) (emphasis added).
74

2Id.

COLORADO WATER LAW

1970

to be an alternate point of diversion for his surface right. This would
be an advantage to him inasmuch as he would be able to utilize the
well to effectuate his diversion when the surface stream was depleted
by natural causes or by appropriators who are senior to him. To a
certain extent, he would have the option of drawing upon the substantial storage capacities of the underground alluvial aquifer beneath
the surface stream. On the other hand, if the surface stream has been
depleted by users who are junior to him, he may be forced to utilize
his alternate means of diversion (before putting a call on the river)
when he would not otherwise be required to do so (if he did not have
an alternate means of diversion). Utilizing the pumping facilities of
his well would in any event be a more expensive method of diversion,
and he could be forced into this alternative solely by virtue of his
decision to have his well determined to be an alternate means of
diversion.
Thus, some water users responded to this situation as follows:
Water users stated that they were having difficulty deciding
whether to use their wells as alternate points of diversion under
Senate Bill 81. The state engineer was asked for assistance in the form
of suggested guidelines and methods to integrate ground and surface
water use.

One interpretation given to Senate Bill 81, which some senior
water appropriators thought unfair, concerned charging the use of a well
against a surface right. It was stated that the division engineer would
require a senior appropriator who had a well to use the well at his own
expense before he could put a call on the river. The objection was
that a senior should be allowed to leave his well idle and call the river,
or if juniors upstream wish to divert water when the senior is short,
the juniors should pay for the operation of the well. The well was
drilled for the purpose of adding to the water supply in some areas,
but it could become merely a more expensive point of diversion for the
7 44
same amount of water as used in the past.

It is possible, however, that under existing law junior appropriators
might be forced to pay for the additional expense of effectuating a
senior's diversion by means of his alternate point of diversion. If
encouraging and requiring the use of alternate points of diversion is
considered to be a manifestation of the reasonable diversion doctrine
and if the principle of the Bender case, in which it was suggested that
junior appropriators may be required to pay the expense of improving
the adequacy of the senior's diversion facilities, is to be adopted as
the law, then it would seem that some authority exists for the proposition that junior appropriators may be required to pay for the additional
744 COLORADO LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
TION 3-4 (Research Pub. No. 147, Dec. 1969).
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expense of operating a well as an alternate point of diversion for a
senior surface right.745
e. Materiality of Injury
One of the problems or inefficiencies discussed previously with
regard to nontributary ground waters dealt with the effect of the strict
application of the doctrine of appropriation to ground waters generally.7 46 It was suggested that strict adherence to vested priorities
could result in the regulation of a distant junior well which had little
or no effect on the senior well for whose benefit the regulation is
instituted, while a nearby, intermediate well remained unregulated.
The 1965 Act approached this problem by allowing the state engineer
to apply for an injunction restraining a diversion "when necessary
to prevent such diversion from materially injuring the vested rights
of other appropriators ....-14 However, the failure of that act to
explicitly define the term "material injury" was problemmatical in the
administration of that act.
S. 81 similarly provides that a diversion shall not be discontinued
to protect senior water rights unless the diversion is causing or will
cause material injury to such rights. It provides, in addition, the following definition of "material injury:"
The materiality of injury depends on all factors which will determine in each case the amount of water such discontinuance will make
available to such senior priorities at the time and place of their need.
Such factors include the current and prospective volumes of water in
and tributary to the stream from which the diversion is being made;
distance and type of stream bed between the diversion points; the
various velocities of this water, both surface and underground; the
probable duration of the available flow; and the predictable return flow
to the affected stream. Each diversion shall be evaluated and administered on the basis of the circumstances relating to it and in accordance with provisions of this article and the court decrees adjudicating
and confirming water rights. In the event a discontinuance has been
ordered pursuant to the foregoing, and nevertheless such does not cause
water to become available to such senior priorities at the time and place
of their need, then such discontinuance order shall be rescinded. 74s

f. The Aftermath of S. 81
The process of developing an efficient and effective legal and
administrative structure for the regulation of ground and surface
water use is far from completion. The judiciary has not yet had a
chance to clarify and interpret the act in any significant way, and the
legislative machinery continues its process of evaluation and study
with a view toward considering further refinements and possible
745 Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 464-65, 366 P.2d 552, 556 (1961).
746 See PART Two, § I(C) (1) supra.
74 7
748

CoLo.REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-11-22(2) (Supp.1965).
Id. § 148-21-35(2) (Supp. 1969).
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substantive changes in the Act.7 49 The Water Committee of the Legislative Council is presently investigating further changes in S. 81
concerning judicial procedures under the Act; the role of the state
engineer in water adjudication; duties of real estate developers to
provide water for their customers; adjusting dates in the publication
of the tabulation of water decrees; state aid in financing water projects;
abandonment of water decrees; adjusting the date for filing plans for
augmentation (and possibly clarifying augmentation); possible changes
to portions of the Ground Water Management Act; and funds and
authority for water management by the state engineer.750
However, according to the Legislative Council,
[w]hile several complaints from water users have been listed with
respect to Senate Bill 81, it should be noted that the reaction to the 1969
water legislation was found to be generally positive. Most water users
apparently considered legislation to be necessary, and751
that integration of
ground and surface water was overdue in Colorado.
II. SPRING WATERS
"A spring is water issuing by natural forces out of the earth at a
particular place. 71 52 Such waters are likely to be found in damp,
marshy, or boggy areas where underground waters find their way to
the surface.753
By statute, a landowner has the right to use spring water arising
upon his land. 754 However, if the spring water is tributary, the landowner must acquire his right to use the spring water in accordance
with the prior appropriation system; 7"5 he will not be allowed to
displace or supersede a prior right. 756 Further, it should be noted that
anyone who unlawfully causes "any diminution of or obstruction or
interference with the flow of waters from any . . . natural springs to
the injury of any appropriator of any such waters, shall be liable in
7 7
damages to the injured party to the amount of such injury. 1 5
7

See, e.g., COLORADO LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 1969 WATER
LEGISLATION (Research Pub. No. 147, Dec. 1969).

750

Interview with Robert Crites, Legislative Council Staff, in Denver, Colorado, Oct. 1,
1970.

7 1

5 COLORADO

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 1969 WATER LEGISLA-

(Research Pub. No. 147, Dec. 1969).
752 3 H. FARNHAM, LAW OF WATERS 2738 (1904).
753 See, e.g., Genoa v. Westfall, 141 Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370 (1960); Black v. Taylor, 128
Colo. 449, 264 P.2d 502 (1953).
TION

T

7S CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-2-2 (1963).

75 Cline v. Whitten, 150 Colo. 179, 185, 372 P.2d 145, 148 (1962); Coryell v. Robinson,
118 Colo. 225, 234, 194 P.2d 342, 346 (1948). When such waters are being put to a
beneficial use for domestic purposes or are being used for watering stock, appropriation
does not require that such waters actually be diverted. Genoa v. Westfall, 141 Colo. 533,
546-47, 349 P.2d 370, 378 (1960); Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530, 533 (1883).
56
7' Karl F. Hehl Eng'r Co. v. Hubbell, 132 Colo. 96, 100, 285 P.2d 593, 595 (1955);
Nevius v. Smith, 86 Colo. 178, 180, 279 P. 44 (1928).
77'COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-2-5 (1963).
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An owner of land on which nontributary spring waters arise has
a prior right to use as much of the spring water as he needs.75 8 When
nontributary spring waters are not capable of being used on the land
upon which they arise, a special statutory right of appropriation applies
by which other appropriators may acquire the use of such waters, 59
subject always to the owner's prior right. When there are two or more
appropriators in addition to the landowner upon whose land the nontributary spring waters first arise, "the determinations shall fix and
decree the rights of appropriators from such springs among themselves." 76 0
III.

WASTE, SEEPAGE,

AND RETURN WATERS

A. Waste Waters
Waste waters have been defined as "those waters which, after
having been diverted from sources of supply for use, have escaped from
conduits or structures in course of distribution or from irrigated lands
after application to the soil.''761 Several cases have used the term "waste
water" to refer to water which has been discharged from the terminus
of a ditch after the ditch company had satisfied all of its wants and
needs"' u or which has been discharged from irrigated lands.7 63 In all
of these cases the waters involved appeared to have been surface
waters,76 4 and this suggests a possible distinction between waste waters
and seepage waters.76 5
Most of the waste water cases in Colorado have determined the
relative rights between the appropriator of the water and the user who
has utilized the excess, waste water which has flowed or percolated
to his land from the land or structures of the appropriator. Although
the first case to consider this problem76 6 upheld an injunction against
the appropriator, restraining him from interfering in any manner with
75sCline v. Whitten, 144 Colo. 126, 128, 355 P.2d 306, 308 (1960); Lomas v. Webster,
109 Colo. 107, 110, 122 P.2d 248, 250 (1942); Haver v. Matonock, 79 Colo. 194, 198,
244 P. 914, 915 (1926); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-2-2 (1963).
9
7 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-2-3 (Supp. 1969).
7l0 Id.
61

7

62

J. SAX, supra note 1, at 213, quoting W. HUTCHINS,
OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST 23 (1942).

SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW

See Green Valley Ditch Co. v. Schneider, 50 Colo. 606, 115 P. 705 (1911); Mabee v.
Platte Land Co., 17 Colo. App. 476, 68 P. 1058 (1902). In Water Supply & Storage
Co. v. Larimer & Weld Res. Co., 25 Colo. 87, 53 P. 386 (1898), the court referred to
waters which wasted into Dry Creek from Dry Creek ditch without any further explanation. Id. at 94, 53 P. at 388.
76 3
See Tongue Creek Orchard Co. v. Orchard, 131 Colo. 177, 280 P.2d 426 (1955);
Burkart v. Meiberg, 37 Colo. 187, 86 P. 98 (1906).
76 4
See Tongue Creek Orchard Co. v. Orchard, 131 Colo. 177, 280 P.2d 426 (1955); Green
Valley Ditch Co. v. Schneider, 50 Colo. 606, 115 P. 705 (1911); Burkart v. Meiberg.
37 Colo. 187, 86 P. 98 (1906); Water Supply & Stor. Co. v. Larimer & Weld Res. Co.,
25 Colo. 87, 53 P. 386 (1898).
765 Seepage waters are discussed in PART Two, § III(C) infra.
7
Mabee v. Platte Land Co., 17 Colo. App. 476, 68 P. 1058 (1902).
7
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the flow of the waste or surplus water after it was discharged from the
main ditch,767 later cases have established that the appropriator may
divert such water before it leaves his own property and may apply it
to beneficial use or use the water to supply his own "wants and
needs."

76 8

There is no obligation on the part of the appropriator to maintain
conditions upon his property or of his use in order to keep up the
discharge of waste water for the benefit of mere users thereof (as
opposed to other appropriators from the stream) as long as he acts in
good faith.7 6 9 Nor does it appear that a user of waste water derives
a right to continuance of the waste flow because of his reliance
thereon.770 The rights of the appropriator are extensive enough to
allow him to sell his water right and change his point of diversion,
even if this change works to the detriment of those who have used the
waste water in the past. 77 1 However, if the appropriator does not act
in good faith and willfully discharges water as waste elsewhere in order
to prevent previous users of waste from again using such waters, he
772
may be enjoined from doing so.
Once waste waters have left the land of the initial appropriator
and have reached the stream to which it is tributary, it is clear that they
7

671d.

7

at 479, 68 P. at 1058-59.

UId. The court reached the result by defining waste waters as "that which flowed from

the ditch after the ditch had supplied all of the wants of those with whom it was under
contract to carry to the extent of their contracts, that alone which flowed from the ditch
after the ditch company had supplied its own wants and necessities, whether under contract or otherwise... " Id. at 479, 68 P. at 1059. In Burkart v. Meiberg, 37 Colo. 187,
86 P. 98 (1908), the court reached the result by defining waste water as follows:
Just what constitutes waste water in every instance, we do not decide, but it is
unquestionably true that, so far as concerns the right to make a valid appropriation of it, this water is not waste water so long as it remains upon the
lands of the defendants, and does not, in any event, become such until it has
escaped and reached the lands of others ....
Id. at 189, 86 P. at 99.
7
" Tongue Creek Orchard Co. v. Orchard, 131 Colo. 177, 181, 280 P.2d 426, 428 (1955);
Green Valley Ditch Co. v. Schneider, 50 Colo. 606, 609-10, 115 P. 705, 706 (1911).
770Tongue Creek Orchard Co. v. Orchard, 131 Colo. 177, 182, 280 P.2d 426, 428 (1955);
Burkart v. Meiberg, 37 Colo. 187, 189, 86 P. 98, 99 (1906).
71 See Tongue Creek Orchard Co. v. Orchard, 131 Colo. 177, 280 P.2d 426 (1955). Some
question as to this principle arises from the holding in Pulaski Irrigating Ditch Co. v.
Trinidad, 70 Colo. 565, 203 P. 681 (1922), that the initial appropriator may not sell
his water right and change the point of diversion. The court said: "It is also settled law
that an appropriator is limited in his use of water to his actual needs. He must not waste
it, and if there is a surplus remaining after use, it must be returned to the stream from
whence it came." Id. at 568, 203 P. at 682. Also, in Burkart v. Meiberg, 37 Colo. 187,
86 P. 98 (1906), the court said:
If the defendants have no present or immediate need of the full quantity of
water which they may divert and use, they cannot waste it, but it is their duty
to allow such portion as they have no immediate need for to remain in the
natural stream, or, if diverted, to return such surplus again into the same
stream, where, unless they then intend to recapture it, it becomes subject to
diversion by the various ditches, in accordance with their numerical priorities.
La Jara Creamery, etc., Co. v. Hansen, 35 Colo. 105, 83 P. 644 (1905).
Id. at 190, 86 P. at 99.
7
2 Green Valley Ditch Co. v. Schneider, 50 Colo. 606, 610, 115 P. 705, 706 (1911).
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are governed by the relative priorities along that stream. 7 3 Although
no case has so held directly, it is probable that stream priorities would
govern waste waters after they leave the property of the initial appropriator and before they reach the streambed. The court in Burkhart v.
Meiberg77 4 said in dictum:
After defendants' appropriation has done duty to their own land, they
cannot, even by grant, confer upon plaintiff the right to use it, or any
of it, as against the superior claims of other appropriations from the

same stream. By mere acquiescence on their part, to plaintiff's use, after
waste water has passed from their lands, they have not estopped themselves thereafter to intercept and make beneficial use of it before it
escapes from their control. And if such further use may be restrained
by another appropriator from75the same source of supply, plaintiff cannot assert any such equity3
The implication is that tributary waste water may be used once it has
left the lands of the appropriator but that any such use would be
subject to any prior appropriation from the stream to which such water
is tributary.
B. Seepage Waters
Seepage water is water which has been lost prior to application
through leakage from manmade structures, such as canals or reservoirs,
or water which has been applied but not consumptively used. 77 6
1. Tributary Seepage Waters
The Colorado law regarding tributary seepage water was first
clearly enunciated in Comstock v. Ramsay7 "7 in which the court held
that water escaping underground and becoming percolating water which
would naturally reach a stream was part of that stream." 8 Such seepage,
sometimes referred to as percolating water, belongs to the people of
7" Water Supply & Stor. Co. v. Latimer & Weld Res. Co., 25 Colo. 87, 94, 53 P. 386, 388
(1898).
37 Colo. 187, 86 P. 98 (1906).
75Id. at 190-91, 86 P. at 99.
6
77
See Coryell v. Robinson, 118 Colo. 225, 194 P.2d 342 (1948); Faden v. Hubbell, 93
Colo. 358, 28 P.2d 247 (1933); Comstock v. Ramsay, 55 Colo. 244, 133 P. 1107 (1913).
Percolating water has been defined as "those underground bodies of water which
are not flowing in well defined channels, but are diffused subterranean waters moving
towards the lowest point and which, if not intercepted, will ultimately contribute to
running streams." McHendrie, The Law of Underground Water, 13 RocKY MTN. L.
REv. 1, 3 (1940). This definition could include, among other things, seepage water.
77 55 Colo. 244, 133 P. 1107 (1913).
778 Id. at 255-56, 133 P. at 1111. The court said: "We take judicial notice of the fact that
77

practically every decree . . . is dependent for its supply . . . upon return, waste and

seepage waters. This is the very thing which makes an enlarged use of the waters of
our streams .. .possible." Id. at 254, 133 P. at 1110; accord, Coryell v. Robinson, 118
Colo. 225, 234, 194 P.2d 342, 346 (1948); Dalpez v. Nix, 96 Colo. 540, 547, 45 P.2d
176, 179 (1935); Faden v. Hubbell, 93 Colo. 358, 369, 28 P.2d 247, 251 (1933);
Nevius v. Smith, 86 Colo. 178, 181-82, 279 P. 44, 45 (1929); Fort Morgan Res. &
Irr. Co. v. McCune, 71 Colo. 256, 258-59, 206 P. 393, 394 (1922); Rio Grande Res.
& Ditch Co. v. Wagon Gap Imp. Co., 68 Colo. 437, 442, 191 P. 129, 130-31 (1920);
Trowell Land & Irr. Co. v. Bijou Irr. Dist., 65 Colo. 202, 214, 176 P. 292, 296 (1918);
Durkee Ditch Co. v. Means, 63 Colo. 6,8,164 P. 503, 504 (1917).

1970

COLORADO WATER LAW

the state by force of the constitution 7 7 9 and is thereby subject to the
laws of appropriation, whether or not it has actually reached the
stream.780 It is also settled that water which escapes as seepage from
a reservoir and becomes part of a natural stream or would become part
of a natural stream if it is allowed to continue its natural flow is not
subject to recapture by anyone if such seepage is necessary to fulfill
781
the appropriations made on such stream.
782

2. Nontributary Seepage Waters
Seepage waters which would never reach a stream are subject to
independent appropriation; that is, the person upon whose land the
nontributary water first arises has a prior right to it if he can put it
to a beneficial use.7 8 He may lose such rights, however, by acquiescence in an adverse use thereof by another continued uninterruptedly
784
for the statutory period.
3. Damage Liability for Seepage Waters
Colorado statutes make the owners of reservoirs liable for all
damages arising from seepage or escaped water.78" However, such
liability is not absolute; if an act of God is the sole cause of the damage,
78
Further, in order to
the reservoir owner will have a viable defenses.
mitigate the amount of damages resulting from seepage or escaped
waters, the reservoir owner may present evidence concerning the feasibility of drainage of the lands which have been damaged.787
If damage results from the seepage, drainage, or waste of waters
appropriated for irrigation purposes, the plaintiff has a remedy available if he proves that the other party breached the duty imposed by
7"[S] ince it [seepage water) belongs to the river it belongs to the people of the state by

article 16, section 5 of her Constitution." Nevius v. Smith, 86 Colo. 178, 182, 279 P.
44, 45 (1929).
M Comstock v. Ramsay, 55 Colo. 244, 255-56, 133 P. 1107, 1111 (1913).
781Fort Morgan Res. & Irr. Co. v. McCune, 71 Colo. 256, 261, 206 P. 393, 395 (1922);
see Comstock v. Ramsay, 55 Colo. 244, 133 P. 1107 (1913).
78 For further discussion of nontributary seepage, waste and drainage, see PART Two,
§ VI infra.
7
8See, e.g., Lomas v. Webster, 109 Colo. 107, 110, 122 P.2d 248, 250 (1942); COLO.
784

REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-2-2 (1963).
Lomas v. Webster, 109 Colo. 107, 111, 122 P.2d 248, 250-51 (1942);

see also PART

ONE, § V(E) (2) infra.
78 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-5-4 (1963); Garnet Ditch & Res. Co. v. Sampson, 48
Colo. 285, 288-89, 110 P. 79, 80-81 (1920).
786 Ryan Gulch Res. Co. v. Swartz, 83 Colo. 225, 229. 263 P. 728, 729-30 (1928); Ryan
Gulch Res. Co. v. Swartz, 77 Colo. 60, 68, 234 P. 1059, 1062 (1925), wherein the
court held that if an act of God was the sole proximate cause of the damage, no liability
would attach; but if negligence in the construction and maintenance of a reservoir contributed to or cooperated with the act of God, the reservoir owner cannot escape liability.
See Moore v. Standard Paint & Glass Co., 145 Colo. 151, 157, 358 P.2d 33, 36-37
(1960); Barlow v. North Sterling Irr. Dist., 85 Colo. 488, 277 P. 469 (1929); Maggard
v. North Sterling Irr. Dist., 85 Colo. 491, 492, 277 P. 470 (1929).
787 Bijou Irr. Dist. v. Cateran Land & Livestock Co., 73 Colo. 93, 96, 213 P. 999, 1001
(1923); For discussion of the measure of damages, see Mustang Res., Canal, and Land
Co. v. Hissman, 49 Colo. 308, 112 P. 800 (1910).
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statute.7 "8 The one claiming injury must prove negligence in irrigation
or in construction and maintenance of irrigation ditches.78 9
C. Return Waters
Return waters include waste and seepage waters which ultimately
flow into a natural stream and form a substantial and material source
of its supply. 79 0 Such waters frequently result from appropriations for
irrigation purposes where all the water appropriated is not consumptively used. 79 '
As tributary waters, they are not subject to independent appropriation or recapture by the original appropriator; rather, they belong
792
to the appropriators on the stream in the order of their priorities.
Most of the cases dealing with return waters or return flow have
involved applications to change diversion points. 793 Due to appropriators having vested rights in the continuance of conditions on the
stream as they existed at the time they made their appropriations, 9 4
the amount of return flow, both before and after a proposed change,
becomes a material factor in determining whether such applications
should be approved.
795
As was suggested in Vogel v. Minnesota Canal & Reservoir Co.,
return flow has also been a significant consideration in regard to the
maximum utilization of water:
It does not follow that junior appropriators, up the stream, must at all
times and under all conditions, let sufficient water remain therein and
flow past their headgates to supply that priority. The senior appropriator may lawfully demand that he have at his headgate sufficient water
to supply his present needs, and if that result be obtained, through

the stream, the
return waters after first use by junior appropriators up796
senior appropriator has no just ground of complaint.

IV.

DIFFUSED SURFACE WATERS

Diffused surface waters are generally described as
[tjhe uncollected flow from falling rain or melting snow, or . . .
waters which rise in the earth from springs and diffuse over the
78 COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-7-7 (1963),

providing that the owners of ditches have

a statutory duty to carefully maintain and keep the embankments of ditches in good
repair.
78North Sterling Irr. Ditch Co. v. Dickman, 59 Colo. 169, 172-73, 149 P. 97, 98-99
(1915). See also Bridgeford v. Colo. Fuel & Iron Co., 63 Colo. 372, 167 P. 963 (1917);
Greeley Irr. Co. v. House, 14 Colo. 549, 24 P. 329 (1890); Catlin Land & Canal Co. v.
Best, 2 Colo. App. 481, 31 P. 391 (1892).
90
7 See Comstock v. Ramsey, 55 Colo. 244, 133 P. 1107 (1913).
791 W. HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST 8
(1942).
792 Fort Morgan Res. & Irr. Co. v. McCune, 71 Colo. 256, 261, 206 P. 393, 395 (1922).

793 See PART ONE, §IV(A) supra.
794

Denver v. Colorado Land & Livestock Co., 86 Colo. 191, 193, 279 P. 46, 47 (1929);

see Farmers Highline Canal & Res. Co. v. Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d 629 (1954);
Vogel v. Minnesota Canal & Res. Co., 47 Colo. 534, 107 P. 1108 (1910); Handy Ditch
Co. v. Louden Irr. Canal Co., 27 Colo. 515, 62 P. 847 (1900).
79547 Colo. 534, 107 P. 1108 (1910).
9
7 6 Id. at 540, 107 P. at 1111.
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surface of the earth. At this stage the flow follows no defined course
or channel and forms no more definite body of water than a mere bog
or marsh. It continues to retain its character as diffused surface water
until it reaches
some well-defined channel and becomes part of a
97
watercourse.

There is only one case in Colorado dealing with the right to use
rainwater. 79 8 Therein the water was located on the public domain,
and the court held that such water was subject to appropriation under
section 2269 of MILLs' ANN. STAT. 800

With regard to rainwater initially located on private land, such
waters would presumably be appropriable s0 l under the doctrine of
appropriation unless they were found to be nontributary to a natural
stream. 80 2 To be tributary the only requirement is that the water would
ultimately reach and become part of a natural stream;80 3 it is not necessary that the waters flow continuously.8 0 4 If the water were nontributary,
it would seemingly be subject to the prior right of the landowner upon
80 5
whose land it was initially located.
The main problems, however, arising in connection with melting
snow and rainwater do not involve rights of use: rather, they involve
rights of drainage.80 6 Such problems are also found when dealing with
seepage, waste water, and occasionally spring water.
V.

DRAINAGE

The term "drainage," as applied to the land, generally connotes the
removal of water from the land by some artificial means, such as an
80 7
artificial channel, trench, ditch, drain, or levee.
79' SY.

CIRIACY-WANTRUP,

WATERS AND
HUTCHINS].

WATER

W.A. HUTCHINS,
§ 52.1, at

RIGHTS

C.O. MARTZ,

300-01

(1967)

S. SATO

&

A.W. STONE,

[hereinafter cited as I

79 Denver, Tex. & Ft. W. R.R. v. Dotson, 20 Colo. 304, 38 P. 322 (1894).
799 Id. at 305, 38 P. at 323.
800Id. at 306, 38 P. at 323. The court stated that "the appropriation was a valid one under
section 2269 of Mills' An. Stats. [sic]." This section provided:
That all ditches now constructed or hereafter to be constructed for the purpose
of utilizing the waste, seepage or spring waters of the State, shall be governed
by the same laws relating to priority of right as those ditches constructed for
the purpose of utilizing the water of running streams; Provided, that the person
upon whose lands the seepage or spring water first arise, shall have the prior
right to such waters if capable of being used upon his lands.
By declaring that the appropriation of rainwater (diffused surface water) was valid
under this section, the court appeared to classify diffused surface water with seepage
and spring water. In the years between 1889 and 1970, the court has interpreted this
statutory provision (presently COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-2-2 (1963)) to apply
only to nontributary seepage and spring water. See, e.g., Lomas v. Webster, 109 Colo.
107, 122 P.2d 248 (1942); Nevius v. Smith, 86 Colo. 178, 279 P. 44 (1928).
801 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-2-1 (Supp. 1969).
8°-Id. § 148-2-2 (1963).
803 See Lomas v. Webster, 109 Colo. 107, 122 P.2d 248 (1942); Nevius v. Smith, 86 Colo.
178, 279 P. 44 (1928).
8 4
0 In re German Ditch & Res. Co., 56 Colo. 252, 270, 139 P. 2, 9 (1913).
805 See note 800 supra. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-2-3 (Supp. 1969) with
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-2-3 (1963).
8W 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 797, at 303.
87 See 28 C.J.S. Drains§ 1 (1941).
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A. Appropriation of Drainage Waters
Drainage waters, like all other waters, are either tributary or
nontributary. If they are nontributary, they may be treated similarly to
nontributary spring water. If tributary, they are subject to the doctrine
of prior appropriation. The only Colorado case which deals with tributary drainage water, however, raises questions about the integrity of
this assumption which will be briefly considered here."' 8
Olney Springs Drainage District v. Auckland 0 9 involved an action
by plaintiff Auckland against the drainage district and others to enjoin
the defendants from diverting the water collected in the drainage
system of the district away from its outlet above plaintiff's lands.
Defendants' drainage ditch emptied into a swale or draw on plaintiff's
land and plaintiff had diverted water from the draw for beneficial use
long before the drainage district was organized. However, when the
drainage ditch was built and broke in several places casting excessive
amounts of water onto plaintiff's land, plaintiff entered upon defendants' right-of-way and diverted water to beneficial use from the
drainage ditch itself. In upholding the trial court's finding that this
drainage water was subject to appropriation in the same manner as
other waters of the state, the court mentioned the fact that counsel for
defendants themselves contended that the swale or draw is a natural
stream. "Plaintiff's right to the use of the water may be justified under
the general doctrine of appropriations from natural streams, if on no
other ground, which we need not decide."8 10 The question which this
rationale raises is whether drainage waters in artificialchannels which
do not follow the course of a natural stream would be subject to the
doctrine of appropriation from natural streams.
A second, related question is raised by the court's disposition of
defendants' objection that the trial court interfered with the discretionary powers of the directors of the drainage district to change the
course of its outlet ditch. The court said that where the rights of others
are involved, it will correct an abuse committed under the guise of
discretionary powers. The court found an abuse in that the proposed
change would injure rather than benefit the drainage district.81 ' By
implicitly recognizing the validity of the discretionary powers argument,
the court left open the question of whether or not the argument would
prevail over a valid appropriation of drainage waters in the absence
of an abuse of discretion.
808 Olney Springs Drainage Dist. v. Auckland, 83 Colo. 510, 267 P. 605 (1928).
80983 Colo. 510, 267 P. 605 (1928).
810 Id. at 515, 267 P. at 607 (emphasis added).
811 Id. at 516, 267 P. at 608.
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B. Drainage Easements
Historically, there were two alternative doctrines for governing the
relative rights of drainage between landowners. According to the first
alternative, the common law rule or "common enemy" doctrine,
the proprietor of the lower tenement or estate may at his option
lawfully obstruct or hinder the flow of such water thereon, and in so
doing may turn it back or away from his own lands, and onto and
over the lands of other 8proprietors
without liability by reason of such
12
obstruction or diversion.

According to the second alternative doctrine, the civil law rule,
the owner of the upper or dominant estate has a legal and natural
easement or servitude in the lower or servient estate for the drainage
of surface water, flowing in its natural course and manner; and such
natural flow or passage of the waters cannot be interrupted or prevented by the servient owner to the detriment or injury of the estate
of the dominant proprietor, unless the right to do so has been acquired
by contract, grant, or prescription.8 18

The civil law rule was adopted in Colorado in the case of Boulder
v. Boulder & White Rock Ditch & Reservoir Co. s 14 but was modified
to also require that waters drained over the servient lands by artificial
means not be sent down in a manner or quantity which would do more
harm than formerly. The court in that case said:
In a recent case in this Court, Johnson v. Kraeger, 72 Colo. 547,
212 Pac. 820,... the modified civil law of surface waters was applied.

The case does not explicitly so state, but the lower proprietor, the
plaintiff in that action, was held not entitled to recover damages for the
discharge of water upon her land from drains which had been constructed by the upper proprietor on his land, when the water came down
upon the plaintiff's lands before the drains were laid and did not
send it down [sic] in a manner or quantity to do more harm than
formerly. This is a modification of the original civil law rule ....
[W]e think it does, and should, prevail in this state .... 815

In addition to the initial modification of the civil law rule, several
cases decided subsequent to Boulder Whiterock have articulated concepts derived from the law of negligence in drainage cases. For instance,
in Olney Springs Drainage District v. Auckland8 16 the court said:
A natural water course may be used as a conduit or outlet for the
drainage of lands, at least where the augmented flow will not tax
the stream beyond its capacity and cause the flooding of adjacent lands.
19 C.J. p. 685, § 157. But, as said in Farnham on Water and Water
Rights, p. 2555, "There is no right on the part of one land owner to
drain the water from his land over that of his neighbor without the
81256

AM. JUR. Waters § 69 (1947)

(footnotes omitted).

Id. § 68 (footnotes omitted).
81473 Colo. 426, 216 P. 553 (1923).
815 Id. at 430, 216 P. at 555: In Johnson v. Kraeger, the action was predicated on trespass.
The court said that the claim was based on a sound principle, but that if the drains
do not send water down in a manner or quantity to do more harm than previously, it
could see no equity in plaintiff's position. Id.
81883 Colo. 510, 267 P. 605 (1928).
813
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latter's consent." And further, at page 2697 of the same work: "One
who attempts to gather water into a drain, or to maintain a drain for his
own convenience, is bound to take due care that no injury is done
by it."
817
We agree with these statements as applied to the case at bar.

Although the first quoted statement of Farnham appears to be
inconsistent with the civil law rule, the due care principle was cited and
applied more recently in the case of Ambrosio v. Perl-Mack Co. 1 8
Plaintiffs, in that case, contended that defendants had burdened the
water course with more water in a concentrated mass at an accelerated
flow than would naturally reach the said draw and that they sustained
damages thereby. Plaintiffs did not allege or prove negligence. The
Supreme Court cited "the doctrine of the civil law" and Boulder v.
Boulder & Whiterock Ditch & Reservoir Co.,819 in affirming the
judgment in favor of defendant.
The court found that defendants not only took due care but were
free from negligence, did not materially increase the flow of water
into the Kalcevic water course, and did not seriously tax the capacity
of the water course. 2 The court then concluded that "the defendants

acted lawfully under the modified civil law doctrine of dominant and
servient estates as approved by this Court in City of Boulder v. Ditch
821

Co.)1

It is not clear whether this development represents a further modification of the "modified civil law rule" or whether it represents
concepts of negligence independently applied; neither is it clear when
the due care concept may be applied and when it may not. The two
logical possibilities appear to be as follows:

1.

The Olney and Ambrosio cases represent concepts of negligence independently applied; that is, the servient estate must
carry the burden of the waters from the dominant estate, but the
servient landowner may obtain relief from the dominant proprietor either (1) if the latter sends water down in a manner
or quantity to do more harm than formerly, or (2) if the latter
drains his waters over the servient estate negligently. However,
this interpretation would seem to render nugatory the negligence or due care requirement, because the latter appears to
be inclusive of the former requirement. That is, if a servient
landowner were to sustain a claim of negligent drainage against
a dominant landowner, he would have to show that the negligent drainage caused more harm than formerly occurred (or
would have occurred under natural conditions). If such a

Id. at 515-16, 267 P. at 607-08.
143 Colo. 49, 351 P.2d 803 (1960).
819 73 Colo. 426, 216 P. 553 (1923).
817

818

82 0
821

Ambrosio v. Perl-Mack Co., 143 Colo. 49, 54-55, 351 P.2d 803, 806 (1960).
Id. at 55, 351 P.2d at 806.
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plaintiff could show that the manner or quantity of drainage
caused more harm than formerly, he could sustain a claim
under the first requirement, irrespective of any showings of
negligence. The first requirement places a type of strict liability
on the dominant landowner whose drainage causes the requisite
amount of harm.
2.
The second possible relationship between the due care
concept and the "modified civil law rule" of drainage is that the
due care concept represents a further modification of the "modified civil law rule" and is included therein. Under such an
interpretation, a plaintiff-servient landowner would have to
show both that the drainage was causing more harm than formerly and that it was done without the exercise of due care.
Such an interpretation is suggested by Hutchins, et al.822 based
on the law of other jurisdictions:
The civil-law rule recognizes a servitude of natural
drainage. Therefore the landowner has a right of action when

another party interferes with natural conditions and causes
water to be discharged upon his land in a greater quantity

or in different manner than would occur under natural conditions. Nevertheless, it has been held that the owner of lands
may drain them by ditches even if the draining causes the
water to flow more rapidly and in greater volume upon the
land of an adjoining owner, provided he acts with a prudent

regard for the welfare of the adjoining owner, but that he
may not turn water upon such adjoining lands which would
not otherwise have flowed there.823
This second interpretation appears to be the more reasonable of the
two logical possibilities mentioned.
The Colorado cases, however, do not clearly support the second
interpretation. In the recent case of Hankins v. Borland,8 4 for instance,
the Supreme Court of Colorado sustained the injunctive relief granted
by the trial court to the servient landowner against the dominant only
upon the finding "that the combined water from Hankins and other
defendants was sent down in a manner and quantity to do more harm
than it formerly had done or in amounts in excess of natural
amounts .... .s825
Furthermore, the court's statement of the "modified civil law rule"
did not include any requirement of due care on the part of the dominant
landowner. However, it can be argued against this interpretation that
this case was an action for injunctive relief only and not damages and
that the trial court had also noted in the same case that the defendant82 1 HuTcHiNs, supra note 797, at 306-08.

= Id. at 305.
8
8Id.

163 Colo. 575, 431 P.2d 1007 (1967).

at 580-81, 431 P.2d at 1010.
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dominant landowners "had the duty to repair the drain and should be
enjoined from further use of the drain unless and until it is properly
repaired or could be operated without injury to plaintiff."8 26
In another case, 7 the court denied relief to a plaintiff in a
damage action against a municipality on two grounds. The first ground
was that the "modified civil law doctrine" subjects the servient owner
to the burden of drainage of surface waters.8 28 The city had channeled
water from a higher area to a place continguous to and above the land
of the plaintiffs so as to overflow on the land of plaintiff, which was
the lowest point in a natural drainage area and was below the grade
of the street. There was no inquiry as to whether the city's drainage
system caused more damage to the adjacent land than would have
occurred naturally, and there was no inquiry into the care exercised by
the city in the exercise of its drainage rights. The court merely said:
Even assuming that the city was the responsible agent in the
acceleration of the surface drainage in the instant case, and the record
is far from satisfactory on this point, yet the plaintiffs do not bring
themselves within the scope of the constitutional provision upon which
they rely. They are within the doctrine that subjects the servient owner
of land to a drainage easement in favor of those who are fortunate
82 9
enough to own adjacent land on the higher level.
The second ground on which the court relied was that the damage was
also caused by the lack of effective drainage from plaintiffs' lands;
and, according to municipal drainage law, the city has no duty to drain
or otherwise protect land which is below grade or below the general
80
level of the street. 8
Despite the indications from the court that the due care concept
is not part and parcel of the "modified civil law rule", the cases are
not entirely clear, and the authorities from other jurisdictions, as well
as sound reasoning, support the other view.88 1
C. Municipal Drainage
A similar and related, yet distinct, set of developments has taken
place in the law of drainage involving the rights and liabilities of a
municipality with respect to the drainage of surface waters. As early
as 1897, the case of Aicher v. Denver 2 set forth the two central
82

6 Id. at 579, 431 P.2d at 1009.
8 Englewood v. Linkenheil, 146 Colo. 493, 362 P.2d 186 (1961).
8 28
Id. at 499, 362 P.2d at 189.
Id. at 502, 362 P.2d at 190-91.
0

3

Id. at 500, 362 P.2d at 189-90.

For other cases dealing with the modified civil law rule, see Hankins v. Borland, 163
Colo. 575, 431 P.2d 1007 (1967); Johnson v. Johnson, 89 Colo. 273, 1 P.2d 581
(1931); Debevtz v. New Brantner Ext. Ditch Co., 78 Colo. 396, 241 p. 1111 (1925).
83210 Colo. App. 413, 52 P. 86 (1897).
831
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doctrines pertaining to municipal drainage which, with some modification, continue to exist today. These two doctrines concern (1) the
duty (or lack of duty) of a municipality to provide drainage and
disposition of surface waters for the protection of private property
which is below grade or below the general level of the street and
(2) the duty of the municipality to exercise due care in the construction
and maintenance of those drainage facilities which it chooses to provide. 8 3 In Aicher the Court of Appeals said:
[A] city is not bound to protect from surface waters those who
may be so unfortunate as to own property which is below the general
level of the street. If a person sees fit to erect improvements on land
which is below the grade which the city authorities may establish, a
failure on their part to provide for the drainage and disposition of
surface waters, or the adoption of an imperfect plan for this purpose,
or of insufficient drainways to carry off waters in case of excessive
storms, as a rule impose on the city no liability. The party is bound to
protect himself ....

This whole subject is very exhaustively discussed

in 2 Dillon's Mun. Corp., §§ 1038, 1039, et. seq..... [Plaintiff] has
failed to show whether the track was on the grade fixed by the city,
and he has likewise omitted to prove that this drainway was built by
834
the city and imperfectly constructed.

The remainder of this subsection will discuss the developments which
have taken place with respect to the above-mentioned doctrines since
the decision in Aicher.
1. The No-Duty-to-Drain Rule
Several rationales have been suggested to explain why a city is
under no duty to drain or protect private property which is below grade.
Perhaps the most frequently cited rationale is the governmentalproprietary distinction of municipal law. For instance, in the case of
Denver v. Masons3 5 the Supreme Court of Colorado said:
By the great weight of authority, it is held that a municipality is
under no legal duty to construct drainage sewers; that no liability
attaches because of the adoption of a defective plan of drainage,
because it is thereby exercising a governmental function; but that in the
construction and maintenance of sewers, a municipality acts in its
ministerial capacity and is liable for negligence in connection therewith.8 36

A second justification which has been offered to explain the
Id.
834Id. at 418,

833

52 P. at 87-88 (emphasis added).

m 88 Colo. 294, 295 P. 788 (1931).

at 295, 295 P. at 789. The Mason case went on to hold that a city could be found
liable for failure to exercise reasonable care to remedy a known defective sewer system.
However, the court did not explicitly state as a ground for its holding that the duty fell
within the general orbit of the city's proprietary function. For citations to other cases
dealing with the governmental-proprietary distinction, see Cerise v. Fruitvale District,
153 Colo. 31, 384 P.2d 462 (1963) (holding that the operation and maintenance of the
sewer system involved in the case are activities carried on by the sanitation district in its

836Id.

proprietary capacity).
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no-duty-to-drain rule derives its reasoning from the common enemy
doctrine (which, incidentally, does not obtain in Colorado):
It would seem that the principle to be applied in the instant case
is the one adopted in the cases involving change of street grades by a
municipality. On that subject, it is stated in Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed.), volume IV, page 3060: "But since surface-water
is a common enemy, which the lot-owner may fight by raising his lot
to grade, or in any other proper manner, and since the municipality
has the undoubted right to bring its streets to grade, and has as much

power to fight surface-water in its streets as the adjoining private
owner, it is not ordinarily, if ever, impliedly liable for simply failing
to provide culverts or gutters adequate to keep the surface-water off the
adjoining lots, below grade, particularly if the injury is one which
would not have occurred had the lots been filled so as to be on a level
with the street."
Colorado
seems to have adopted that doctrine in Aicher v,.Denver,
83 7
supra.

A third explanation of the no-duty-to-drain rule has not been
articulated by the Colorado court but nevertheless offers some insight
into the reason for the existence of the rule and the status of a municipality in the law of drainage generally:
The civil-law rule has not been applied alike to public and private
landowners. The California view has been that a private landowner has
no right to obstruct the flow of surface water that naturally drains
across his property from adjoining land, but that a governmental
agency, in constructing public improvements such as streets and
highways, may validly exercise the police power to obstruct the flow
of surface waters not running in a natural
channel without making
8 38

compensation for the resulting damage.
Reading these three rationales together, it appears that the no-dutyto-drain rule represents an exception to the modified civil law rule of
drainage generally. That is, a municipality is not subject to the "natural
easement" of the modified civil law rule to the extent that it wishes to
erect public improvements such as a street or highway pursuant to an
established grade. To this limited extent, the common enemy doctrine,
rather than the civil law rule, applies to the municipality. There being
no duty pursuant to the modified civil law rule to provide drainage
away from property which is below grade, there cannot otherwise be
imposed on the municipality a duty to drain pursuant to its general
public functions, since such a decision falls within the orbit of the
municipality's governmental function.
It is important here to note a distinction in the factual situations
to which the no-duty-to-drain rule applies, because some of the recent
Colorado cases fail to explicitly mention the distinction. Since the rule
837 Malvernia Inv. Co. v. Trinidad, 123 Colo. 394, 399-400, 229 P.2d 945, 948 (1951)
(emphasis by the court).
831 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 797, at 306.
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states that there is no duty on the part of the municipality to provide
drainage away from private property which is below grade, the rule is
applicable in cases where such a landowner claims damages due to an
obstruction or lack of drainage below his own property rather than
damages due to activities on land above his own. Thus, in Denver v.
Stanley Aviation Corp.,8 39 water backed up from Denver's sewage pipe
running under Stapleton airfield onto plaintiff's land situated above
the sewage pipe on a natural water course in Aurora. The essence of
plaintiff's claim was negligence, claiming that the City and County of
Denver knew or should have known that its 63-inch pipe was inadequate
and would cause damage to plaintiff's property and that the city should
have installed a larger pipe. In the course of the opinion the court
cited the civil law rule of drainage as follows:
In 1953 [when plaintiff purchased his property] plaintiff's
property was servient to the lands above it. It took this property fully
aware of the impending and the inevitable damage that would occur
on the lower levels of its property, and almost defiantly assumed the
risk. In Debevtz v. Ditch Co., 78 Colo. 396, 241 Pac. iii, this court
approved the following language of the trial court:
"The plaintiff purchased his land in the lowest point next to the
Platte River and his land is burdened with the easement of carrying the
water which naturally flows from all of the land above it."
The application of the above observation to the case at bar is
obvious.s40

It is submitted that the application of the (modified) civil law
rule to the Stanley Aviation case is not obvious, particularly if the implication is that the City and County of Denver has any rights of natural
easement over plaintiff's lands. If anything, plaintiff has a right of
natural easement over Stapleton airfield, which is below plaintiff's
property unless plaintiff's land is "below grade," and the no-duty-todrain rule applies. The better interpretation of the court's language
quoted above is that since plaintiff's land was servient to the lands
above it (owned by the City of Aurora), and since plaintiff knew or
should have known of the capacity of the drainage facilities below his
land (owned and constructed by the City and County of Denver),
plaintiff assumed the risk of any negligence on the part of Denver in
not installing larger drainage facilities.
Similarly, in the case of Englewood v. Linkenheil!s1' the Colorado
Supreme Court appeared to rely on both the modified civil law rule,
84 2
as stated in Boulder v. Boulder & White Rock Ditch & Reservoir Co.,
m 143 Colo. 182, 352 P.2d 291 (1960).
NO Id. at 187, 352 P.2d at 294.
841146 Colo. 493, 362 P.2d 186 (1961)
H2 73 Colo. 426, 216 P. 553 (1923).
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and the no-duty-to-drain rule of Aicher v. Denver,84 8 without distinguishing between the two. However, in that case the city was responsible for
channeling water from a higher area to a place contiguous (and above)
the land of the plaintiffs so as to overflow on the land of the plaintiffs.
The court also found that "the plaintiffs' servient location plus lack of
844
effective drainage is responsible for the unfortunate situation.1
Thus, both the modified civil law rule and the no-duty-to-drain rule
were applicable in the case because the damage was caused by drainage
activities, or lack thereof, both above and below plaintiffs' land.
2. Duty of Due Care in the Construction and Operation of
Drainage Facilities
It is clearly established in Colorado that a municipality must exercise a duty of due care in the construction, operation, and maintenance
of drainage facilities which it has chosen to construct, operate, and
maintain.84" The Aicher case, as noted above, also held that:
[i]f a person sees fit to erect improvements on land which is below
the grade which the city authorities may establish, a failure on their
part to provide for the drainage and disposition of surface waters,

or the adoption of an imperfect plan for this purpose, or of insufficient
drainways to carry off waters 8in46 case of excessive storms, as a rule
impose on the city no liability.

However, the case of Denver v. Stanley Aviation Corp.,s47 seriously questions this portion of the Aicher doctrine. In the Stanley
Aviation case, the essence of the plaintiff's charge was negligence:
that the defendant in 1936 improved Stapleton Airfield and extended
the improvements in 1948, thereby further obstructing the drainage
course, resulting in damage to plaintiff's property from flood waters
in July 1956; that the defendant knew, or should have known, in 1936
and in 1948, that its acts might cause such damage and should have

848
installed a larger pipe.
Although the court reversed the judgment and verdict in favor of
the plaintiff, it did so on the ground that plaintiff assumed the risk of
defendant's negligence and that in any event plaintiff failed to sustain
the burden of showing negligence. In so doing the court implicitly
recognized the legal integrity of plaintiff's claim. The Stanley Aviation
case is potentially distinguishable from the Aicher case in that there
was no explicit finding or reliance on the fact that the plaintiff's lands
"

10 Colo. App. 413, 52 P.86 (1897).

Englewood v. Linkenheil, 146 Colo. 493, 499, 362 P.2d 186, 189 (1961) (emphasis
added).
845 See Cerise v. Fruitvale Dist., 153 Colo. 31, 384 P.2d 462 (1963), and cases cited therein.
M
Aicher v. Denver, 10 Colo. App. 413, 418, 52 P. 86, 87-88 (1897) (emphasis added).
"
143 Colo. 182, 352 P.2d 291 (1960).
M

w Id. at 185, 352 P.2d at 293.
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were or were not "below grade." The court only mentions that plain'
tiff's lands were "situated in a depressed area." 849
Nevertheless, the
case throws some question on the doctrine that a municipality is not
liable for the adoption of an imperfect plan or insufficient drainways
when a plaintiff's land is below the general level of the street.
D. Drainage Districts
The legislature of Colorado has provided for drainage districts
upon petition to secure the artificial removal of water from such
agricultural land which could be, but is not presently, cultivable or
useful. 8 50 Irrigation districts likewise have the authority to undertake
investigation to determine the feasibility and cost of drainage of an
irrigation district.8 5 ' In order to facilitate the establishment of drainage
works, the board of directors of a district shall have the right of
eminent domain to construct such works across any water course,
street, avenue, highway, canal, or ditch.85 2
VI.

LAKES AND PONDS

Unlike watercourses and streams which are flowing bodies of
water, lakes and ponds8 5 3 are practically without movement.8" 4 Further,
lakes are definite bodies of standing water as distinguished from
marshes, which are "areas of soft, low-lying, water-logged land which
may or may not have water standing in place on the surface .... ,,855
Lakes are also natural formations as opposed to reservoirs 5 ' which
are man made.
9

Id. at 184, 352 P.2d at 293.
850 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 47 (1963), as amended, CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-4-3
to -4 (Supp. 1965).
8 1
Id. § 150-2-36 (1963).
52d. § 150-2-13.
8

A pond is a small lake. J. SAX, supra note 1, at 226.
Id. Professor Sax offers the following definition for a lake:
A lake may be defined as a natural body of water, fresh or salt, occupying
a basin or hollow of the earth, of greater or less depth and area, and may or
may not have a current or single direction of flow. Usually, however, they are
bodies of standing water with no current, or an imperceptible one, with some
portion of their bottoms below the bottom of their outlets. But the mere fact
that there is a current from a higher to a lower level does not make that a
river or water course which otherwise would be a lake; so, also, the fact that
a river swells out into a broad, pond-like sheet, with a current, does not make
that a lake which otherwise would be a river. Some lakes have no surface
outlet at all, notably Great Salt Lake, a body of exceedingly salt water eighty
miles in length and sixty miles in width.
id.
&55 Id.
8See
generally COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §148-5-1 (1963).
854
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Generally, the rights to the waters of lakes are determined in the
same manner as the rights to other waters in the jurisdictions. 57 Given
the presumption in Colorado that all water is tributary unless proven
otherwise,85 8 the law of prior appropriation should apply in most cases.
In The Denver, Texas & Fort Worth Railroadv. Dotson,859 for example,
the court described the Can de Auga as a stationary body of water" °
and held that it was subject to appropriation. "1
VII.

DEVELOPED WATER

8 62 or salvaged86 3
Developed water, also described as artificial
water, is that water which has been added to the supply of a natural
stream and which never would have come into the stream had it not
been for the efforts of the party producing it.864 In Ripley v. Park
Center Land and Water Co.,865 for example, the Court held that water
produced by draining various mines in the Cripple Creek mining district
was developed water. 8 6 The court's finding was based on evidence
showing that such water formed no part of the stream's natural f'ow
and never would have reached the stream but for the efforts of the
petitioner. 867 Likewise, in Pike's Peak Golf Club, Inc. v. Kuiper,86 8
water obtained from draining a swamp was held to be salvaged or
developed. The court noted that the water never was a part of any
natural stream86 9 and had been produced as a result of alleviating
natural loss caused by transpiration in the sub-irrigation of native hay
crops.

8 70

A party who increases the supply of water in a stream by adding
developed water is entitled to appropriate the amount which he has
87 Supra note 851, at 227.
858 See, e.g., Safranek v. Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 228 P.2d 975 (1951).
859 20 Colo. 304, 38 P. 322 (1894).
86 0
ld. at 305, 38 P. at 323.
861 Id. at 306, 38 P. at 323.
862 Ripley v. Park Center Land and Water Co., 40 Colo. 129, 131, 90 P. 75, 76 (1907).
863 Pikes Peak Golf Club, Inc. v. Kuiper, 455 P.2d 882 (Colo. 1969).

8 4 Id.; Comrie v. Sweet, 75 Colo. 199, 201, 225 P. 214 (1924); Ripley v. Park Center
Land and Water Co., 40 Colo. 129, 131, 90 P. 75 (1907).
86540 Colo. 129, 90 P. 75 (1907).
86Id. at 130-31, 90 P. at 75.
867 Id. at 131, 90 P. at 75.
868455 P.2d 882 (Colo. 1969). For another discussion of this case, see Greer, A Review
of Recent Activity in Colorado Water Law, 47 DENVER L.J. 181 (1970).
869 Pikes Peak Golf Club, Inc. v. Kuiper, 455 P.2d 882, 883 (Colo. 1969).
870 Id.
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added regardless of prior appropriation rights on the stream 8 7 ' But
since all water is presumed to be tributary, 72 the party alleging that
he appropriated developed water has the burden of proving by clear
and satisfactory evidence that such water would not have reached the
8 73
stream under natural flow conditions.
PART THREE: PROPERTY CHARACTERISTICS

PART THREE considers the property characteristics of a water right,
discussing in particular the consequences of its being a real property
interest capable of separable ownership. It notes the formalities of
conveyance which must be observed in transferring a water right and
outlines the factors to be considered in determining whether a water
right passes as an appurtenance in a conveyance of land.
I. PROPERTY RIGHT
Under the system of prior appropriation in Colorado, title to all
surface and underground waters. 74 flowing in natural streams8 75 is
vested in the public; 8 76 and while ownership is vested in the public,
a perpetual right to its use exists in the people. 77 Upon application
of appropriated water to a beneficial use, legal ownership and control
are transferred to the appropriator, 78 and he acquires an alienable
right in real property.17 This right has been referred to as an ease871 See Pikes Peak Golf Club, Inc. v. Kuiper, 455 P.2d 882 (Colo. 1969); Leadville Mine
Development Co. v. Anderson, 91 Colo. 536, 17 P.2d 303 (1932); Comrie v. Sweet,
75 Colo. 199, 225 P. 214 (1924); Ironstone Ditch Co. v. Ashenfelter, 57 Colo. 31,
140 P. 177 (1914); Ripley v. Park Center Land and Water Co., 40 Colo. 129, 90 P. 75
(1907).
872 See, e.g., Safranek v. Limon, 123 Coo. 330, 228 P.2d 975 (1951).
873 Comrie v. Sweet, 75 Colo. 199, 201, 225 P. 214 (1924).
8
4 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-3(4) (Supp. 1969). But see COLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 148-18-3 (Supp. 1969).
m Whitten v. Coit, 153 Colo. 157, 385 P.2d 131 (1963): "Thus the constitutional provisions referred to [COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6] make specific reference in recognizing the 'appropriation' doctrine only to the waters in 'natural streams.' " Id. at 164,
385 P.2d 135; Metro-Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colorado River Water Dist., 148
Colo. 173, 187, 365 P.2d 273, 281 (1961).
8
COLO. CONST.art. XVI, § 5.
8 77
La Plata River Co. v. Hinderlider, 93 Colo. 128, 25 P.2d 187 (1933); Fort Morgan
Land & Canal Co. v. South Platte Ditch Co., 18 Colo. 1, 2, 30 P. 1032, 1038 (1892);
Strickler v. Colorado Springs, 16 Colo. 61, 26 P. 313 (1891); Wheeler v. Northern
Colo. Irr. Co., 10 Colo. 582, 587, 17 P. 487, 489 (1888); Monte Vista Canal Co. v.
Centennial Irr. Co., 22 Colo. App. 364, 123 P. 831 (1912); Wyatt v. Larimer & Weld
Irr. Co., 1 Colo. App. 480, 494, 29 P. 906, 910 (1892).
8
Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 199, 96 P.2d 836, 840 (1939); Wyatt v. Larimer &
Weld Irr. Co., 1 Colo. App. 480, 494, 29 P. 906, 910 (1892).
8
79 Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 199, 96 P.2d 836, 840 (1939); La Plata River Co. v.
Hinderlider, 93 Colo. 128, 132, 25 P.2d 187, 188 (1933); Fort Lyon Canal Co. v.
Rocky Ford Co., 79 Colo. 511, 515, 246 P. 781, 782 (1926); Arnold v. Roup, 61 Colo.
316, 325, 157 P. 206, 210 (1916); Strickler v. Colorado Springs, 16 Colo. 61, 70, 26
P. 313, 316 (1891); Monte Vista Canal Co. v. Centennial Irr. Co., 22 Colo. App. 364,
368, 123 P. 831, 832 (1912); Wyatt v. Larimer & Weld Irr. Co., 1 Colo. App. 480, 500.
29 P. 906, 912 (1892).
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ment, 880 a usufructuary estate, 88 ' a freehold 8 2 and an interest in real
estate.8 3 The nature of the appropriative right as real property is well
described in Monte Vista Co. v. Centennial Co.,884 in which it was

stated:
[E]ven after appropriation, this title, except perhaps as to the limited
quantity [of water] that may be flowing in the consumer's ditch,
remains in the general public, while the paramount right to its use
continues in the appropriator. The right is usufructuary. There is no
property [right] in the corpus of the water so long as flowing naturally.

There is no property in the channel of the stream, and the water-right
is distinct from the right to the ditch, canal or other structure in which
the water is conveyed. The original right and title is secured by
5

appropriation.

88

II. APPURTENANCE TO THE LAND
In the early case of Arnett v. Linhart,886 the court stated:
Although a water right may be appurtenant to the land, it is the subject
of property and may be transferred either with or without the land ....
[W]hether a deed to land conveys the water right depends upon the
intention of the grantor, which is to be gathered from the express
terms of the deed; or, when it is silent as to the water right, from the
presumption that arises from the circumstances, and whether such right
is or is not incident to and necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the
88 7
land.
People ex rel Standart v. Farmers High Line Canal Co., 25 Colo. 202, 213, 54 P. 626,
630 (1898); accord, Farmers High Line Co. v. New Hamp. Co., 40 Colo. 467, 478,
92 P. 290, 293 (1907) (wherein a water right was referred to as an easement in the
ditch); Gutheil Park Inv. Co. v. Montclair, 32 Colo. 420, 424, 76 P. 1050, 1051 (1904);
see Grand Valley Irr. Co. v. Lesher, 28 Colo. 273, 65 P. 44 (1901); Wyatt v. Larimer
and Weld Irr. Co., 18 Colo. 298, 33 P. 144 (1893).
881 Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882). The right to the use of the
water is a "usufruct" and when one acquires this right, it is a "usufructuary right."
This is the right to buy, use and sell the water, but this does not mean acquiring a type
of sovereign dominion over that appropriated water. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1713
(4th ed. 1951). But see, United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 73-74
(1912).
882 La Plata Co. v. Hinderlider, 93 Colo. 128, 132, 25 P.2d 187, 188 (1933); Gutheil v.
Montclair, 32 Colo. 420, 424, 76 P. 1050, 1051 (1904); Grand Valley Irr. Co. v. Lesher,
28 Colo. 273, 284, 65 P. 44, 47 (1901); Monte Vista Co. v. Centenial Co., 22 Colo.
App. 364, 370, 123 P. 831, 833 (1912); cf. Knapp v. Colorado River Water Conserv.
Dist., 131 Colo. 42, 279 P.2d 420 (1955):
Although a water right has attained to the dignity of real property, it can not
be said that it has attained to the dignity of an estate in fee or a freehold
estate. It is still a possessory right, even after its consummation, and dependent
on the continuous use of the water, and a failure to comply with this condition
subjects the right to loss by abandonment ....
Id. at 53, 279 P.2d at 425, quoting 2 C. KINNEY, supra note 71, at 1978.
883 West End Irr. Co. v. Garvey, 117 Colo. 109, 115, 184 P.2d 476, 479 (1947); Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Childs. 25 Colo. 360, 363, 54 P. 1020, 1021 (1898); Talcott v. Mastin, 20
Colo. App. 488, 498, 79 P. 973, 977 (1905).
88422 Colo. App. 364, 123 P. 831 (1912).
885 Id. at 368-69, 123 P. at 832.
886 21 Colo. 188, 40 P. 355 (1895).
887Id. at 190, 40 P. at 355. For other cases holding that a water right is a distinct subject
of grant and may be transferred with or without the land, see Bessemer I.D. Co. v.
Woolley, 32 Colo. 437, 442, 76 P. 1053, 1054 (1904); Crippen v. Comstock, 17 Colo.
App. 89, 92, 66 P. 1074, 1075 (1902); Gelwicks v. Todd, 24 Colo. 494, 497, 52 P.
788, 789 (1898); Oppenlander v. Left Hand Ditch Co.. 18 Colo. 142, 149, 31 P. 854,
856 (1892); Combs v. Agricultural Ditch Co.. 17 Colo. 146, 151, 28 P. 966, 968
(1892).
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III.

CONVEYANCE

OF TITLE

WATER LAW
AND

CONCOMITANT FORMALITIES

A. Written Conveyance as Real Estate
A water right is real estate, and in a conveyance of water rights
all the formalities of conveyance of real estate must be observed. 88

The Colorado statute states:
In the conveyance of water rights in all cases except where the ownership of stock in ditch companies or other companies constitutes the
ownership of a water right, the same formalities shall be observed and
complied with as in the conveyance of real estate. 88 9

When the ownership of stock in a ditch company constitutes the
ownership of a water right, the shares of stock, as personal property,8"0
are transferable as such in accordance with the by-laws of the com-

pany. 9' In addition to a transfer of stock certificates, a transfer of
ownership upon the books of the corporation is necessary to convey
title. 92 Until the book transfer is actually made, the transferee has no
right to take the water.89 ' These stock transfers may be subject to
certain restrictions imposed by the corporation, provided that proper
notice is given in the by-laws and stock certificates.89 4
Real property rights also exist in the ditches through which
appropriated waters flow.'" Hence, transfers of ditch rights are
similarly subject to the limitations and restrictions which attend a
conveyance of real property.""
8" Cooper v. Shannon, 36 Colo. 98, 103, 85 P. 175, 177 (1906).

§ 59-1-6
(1963) (Conveyance-trust-power must be in writing); Id. § 59-1-8. (Contracts for interests in land must be written); Id. § 59-1-23. (Term conveyance, how construed).
8 0 Talcott v. Mastin, 20 Colo. App. 488, 498, 79 P. 973, 977 (1905). In First National
Bank v. Hastings, 7 Colo. App. 129, 42 P. 691 (1895), the court stated: "Water rights
belonging to land, and stock in a ditch corporation, are two essentially different kinds
of property. . . . Water rights for irrigation are regarded as real property, and shares of
stock in a corporation, are personal property." Id. at 132, 42 P. 692.
9'Talcott v. Mastin. 20 Colo. App. 488, 498, 79 P. 973, 977 (1905). citing 1 MILLS'
U9 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118-1-2 (1963). See also CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.

ANN. STAT. § 480.

892 Id. at 498, 79 P. at 977, citing I MILLS' ANN. STAT. § 508; see Cache La Poudre Irr.

Co. v. Larimer & Weld Res. Co., 25 Colo. 144, 53 P. 318 (1898).
93See Supply Ditch Co. v. Elliott, 10 Colo. 327, 334, 15 P. 691, 694 (1887).

8ONCostilla Ditch Co. v. Excelsior Ditch Co., 100 Colo. 433, 436, 68 P.2d 448, 449 (1937).
concerned a by-law prohibiting transfer of water from one tract of land to another without approval by company directors. This by-iaw was held to be arbitrary and unreasonable as against a newly acquiring stockholder purchasing without notice of such policy.
However, in Model Land & lrr. Co. v. Madsen, 87 Colo. 166, 168, 285 P. 1100, 1101
(1930), the court held a similar by-law in existence prior to the acquiring stockholder's
purchase of stock as reasonable and not against public policy.
85 Farmers' High Line Canal & Res. Co. v. New Hamp. Real Estate Co., 40 Colo. 467,
479, 92 P. 290, 294 (1907); Child v. Whitman, 7 Colo. App. 117, 119, 42 P. 601, 602
(1895). See generaly Blake v. Boye, 38 Colo. 55, 88 P. 470 (1907); Smith Canal or
Ditch Co. v. Colorado Ice & Stor. Co.. 34 Colo. 485, 82 P. 940 (1905).
89 Child v. Whitman, 7 Colo. App. 117, 119, 42 P. 601, 602 (1895)

(deed must contain

reference to ditch in order to convey an interest in the ditch); Burnham v. Freeman,
ii Colo. 601, 19 P. 761 (1888): "An interest in such a ditch is an interest in realty.
It cannot pass by a mere verbal sale." Id. at 606, 19 P. at 764.
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B. Parol Transfers Under Circumstances of Equity
Generally, transfers of real estate, being within the statute of
frauds, must be by deed or written instrument.9 7 and attempts to
transfer real property by parol contracts are void. 898 Exceptions do
exist, however, and parol agreements concerning transfers of priorities
and title to water rights have been upheld as between parties to the
agreement when followed by a change of possession and use of the
8

right.

99

Parol contracts have also been upheld when executed for consideration. ° In Croke v. American National Bank,90 ' for example, the
plaintiff, in accordance with a parol contract, constructed a ditch
through the land of another for the right to joint use of the ditch
thereafter. The court held that the parol agreement was not void under
the statute of frauds90 2 and that the plaintiff was entitled to use the
ditch to carry water, subject to the defendant's right to use the ditch
for the same purpose. 90 3 Parol agreements have likewise been upheld
on the basis of part performance: "Part performance of an oral agreement to convey an interest in land will remove it from the statute of
frauds.

' 90 4

For specific performance of such parol agreements to be

enforced against third parties, the equitable owner must prove that
the third party purchased with notice, actual or constructive, of the
equitable owner's rights. 90 5
IV.

RELATION TO DITCH RIGHT

A. Separable Ownerships of Ditch and Water Right
A ditch and the right to water carried in the ditch are distinct
property interests, "° ' and as such, are subject to separable ownership. 907
This separable ownership is evidenced by the fact that to acquire an
897COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 59-1-6 (1963): "No estate or interests in lands ... shall

be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared, unless .. .by deed or conveyance
in writing .. " Id.
898See Quelland v. Roy, 148 Colo. 316, 365 P.2d 899 (1961) (assignment of lease has to
be in writing); Ward v. Ward, 94 Colo. 275, 30 P.2d 853 (1934) (oral promise to
bequeath realty held void).
899 Park v. Park, 45 Colo. 347, 356, 101 P. 403, 406 (1909).
900McLure v. Koen, 25 Colo. 284, 287, 53 P. 1058, 1059 (1898); Lipscomb v. Nichols,
6 Colo. 290, 292 (1882).
9 18 Colo. App. 3, 70 P. 229 (1902).
902Id. at 6, 70 P. at 230.

m Id. at 5, 70 P. at 229.
904Rupp v. Hill, 149 Colo. 48, 53, 367 P.2d 746, 749 (1961) ciling Park Ni.Park, 45 Colo.
347, 101 P. 403 (1909) and Estate of Doerfer, 100 Colo. 304, 67 P.2d 492 (1937).
9
05See McLure v. Koen, 25 Colo. 284, 53 P. 1058 (1898).
9o6Monte Vista Canal Co. v. Centennial Irr. Ditch Co., 22 Colo. App. 364, 368-69, 123 P.
831, 833 (1912).
907Crippen v. Comstock, 17 Colo. App. 89, 66 P. 1074 (1901): "One might, however,
have acquired a right to the water flowing in the ditch .. .without having acquired an
interest in the ownership of the ditch itself." Id. at 92, 66 P. at 1075.
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appropriative right to water, one need not own the ditch through which
the water is to be carried.9" 8 Other evidence of separable ownership
includes the possibility of abandoning one's ditch without abandoning
one's water right.90 9 Likewise, a ditch and a water right may be condemned separately in eminent domain proceedings.9 1 ° Further support
of separable ownership of ditch and water rights is to be found in
several cases involving mutual ditch companies.9
B. Separate Conveyances

Just as a ditch and water right are two distinct property interests
which may be separately owned, so may they be separately conveyed.91
However, some restrictions may be imposed by the charter of the
9 13
company or the contract.
C. Abandonment of Ditch
It is an established principle that the right to a specified quantity
of water from a ditch constitutes an easement in a ditch914 and that an
easement in a ditch cannot be lost by nonuse alone, short of the period
of limitations for actions to recover such property. 15 Numerous cases91"
have followed the doctrine laid down by Washburn:
Nothing short of a use by the owner of the premises over which it was
granted, which is adverse to the enjoyment of such easement by the
owner thereof, for the space of time long enough to create a prescrip9 17
tive right, will destroy the right granted.

It is also true, however, that nonuse for an unreasonable period of time
without proof of some fact or condition excusing such long nonuse will
result in a presumption of abandonment." i
08 See p. 243 supra.
9

°°Nichols v. McIntosh, 19 Colo. 22, 28, 34 P. 278, 281 (1893); New Mercer Ditch Co.
v. Armstrong, 21 Colo. 357, 364, 40 P. 989, 991 (1895).
910 See Schneider v. Schneider, 36 Colo. 518, 86 P. 347 (1906).
911 Pioneer Irr. Co. v. Board of Commr's, 236 F. 790, 792 (D. Colo. 1916); Farmers' High
Line Canal & Res. Co. v. Southworth, 13 Colo. 111, 21 P. 1028 (1889); Wheeler v.
Northern Colo. Irr. Co., 10 Colo. 582, 17 P. 487 (1887).
912
Oppenlander v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 18 Colo. 142, 151, 31 P. 854, 857 (1892). See
Crippen v. Comstock, 17 Colo. App. 89, 66 P. 1074 (1901).
913 See PART ONE, §§ IV(C) (1) & (2) supra.
914 Wyatt v. Larimer & Weld Irr. Co., 18 Colo. 298, 307, 33 P. 144, 147 (1893). See
.generally Fruit Growers' Ditch & Res. Co. v. Donald, 96 Colo. 264, 41 P.2d 516
(1935); Farmers' High Line Res. Co. v. White, 32 Colo. 114, 75 P. 415 (1904).
915Fruit Growers' Ditch & Res. Co. v. Donald, 96 Colo. 264, 269, 41 P.2d 516, 518
(1935); People ex rel Standart v. Farmers' High Line Canal & Res. Co., 25 Colo. 202,
213, 54 P. 626, 630 (1898).
916Fruit Growers' Ditch & Res. Co. v. Donald, 96 Colo. 264, 269, 41 P.2d 516, 518
(1935); Farmers' High Line Canal & Res. Co. v. New Hamp. Real Estate Co., 40 Colo.
467, 479, 92 P. 290, 293-94 (1907); People ex rel Standart v. Farmers' High Line
Canal & Res. Co., 25 Colo. 202, 213, 54 P. 626, 630 (1898).
917
E. WASHBURN, AMERICAN LAW OF EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES 717-18 (4th ed. 1885).
918 Mason v. Hills Land & Cattle Co., 119 Colo. 404, 408, 204 P.2d 153, 155-56 (1949).
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V. DEEDS OF TRUST
Under deeds of trust, liens may be secured by a water right as well
as a right in the ditch itself. 19 To determine what rights pass to the
grantee under a deed of trust, one must look to the intention of the
grantor and the express terms of the deed of trust; and when the deed
of trust is silent or ambiguous, then one must look to presumptions
that arise from the circumstances of each particular case.9 -0
A question requiring particular attention concerns the status of
water rights and ditches acquired by a grantor after the execution of a
deed of trust and used for the benefit of the land covered. Where
appropriate language is included in a deed of trust, it is settled that
such property may become subject to the lien thereon.9 2 '
Upon a foreclosure of a deed of trust, all claimants under the
grantor must be made parties, or their easements or water rights will
919 Crippen v. Comstock, 17 Colo. App. 89, 66 P. 1074 (1901): "That the interest in the
ditch itself was not conveyed . . . by the first deed of trust is apparent ....
The plaintiff

• . . might, however, have acquired a right to the water flowing in the ditch ... without
having acquired an interest in the ownership of the ditch itself." Id. at 92, 66 P. at 1075.
920Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Markham, 106 Colo. 509, 516, 107 P.2d 313, 316
(1940) held that when a deed to property specifically describes the water right granted,
the grantee will not take any additional rights by implication; James v. Barker, 99 Colo.
551, 556, 64 P.2d 598, 602 (1937) held that when additional water rights represented
by certificates of stock in a reservoir company were necessary to the complete use of the
land conveyed and they were not expressly reserved by the grantor, they passed with the
conveyance; Cooper v. Shannon, 36 Colo. 98, 104-06, 85 P. 175, 177-78 (1906) held
that when a sheriff's deed for land sold on execution against owner did not purport to
convey the water right which was separate from the land, no water right passed to the
purchaser, and failure of the owner of the water right to go to the irrigation company
each season and pay the stipulated price for carrying his water was not an act from which
intention to convey could be inferred; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Childs, 25 Colo. 360, 54 P.
1020 (1898) held that when a deed of trust conveyed two tracts of land together with
certain water rights and a water right that had been located and used on one tract was during the existence of the trust deed -segregated
from that tract and transferred to
and used exclusively upon the second tract, a release of the former tract that did not
mention this specific water right but released only such water rights as were used in
connection with the land released did not release this water right; it remained subject to
the lien of the trust deed and, upon foreclosure, passed to the purchaser; Gelwicks v.
Todd, 24 Colo. 494, 498, 52 P. 788, 790 (1898) held that when the water right was
incident and necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the land and the latter was of no
practical value for agricultural purposes without it, the water right was intended to pass
under the language "together with all appurtenances." ld. at 498, 52 P. at 790. Arnett
v. Linhart, 21 Colo. 188, 190, 40 P. 355 (1895) held that where the deed expressly
conveyed a one-half interest in the ditch, the grantors manifestly intended to convey a
like interest in the water right and reserve a one-half interest in that right as well as in
the ditch itself.
921 Bessemer Irr. Ditch Co. v. Woolley, 32 Colo. 437, 76 P. 1054 (1904)
involved a
habendum clause of a trust deed which stated, "To have and to hold the same, with
all the privileges thereunto belonging or in any wise appertaining, and all the estate,
right, title, interest, claim or demand in and to the same, either now or which may
hereafter be acquired, unto the said grantee, his heirs and assigns." Id. at 445, 76 P. at
1055. The court held that this habendum clause did not purport to be a grant of any
after-acquired property but merely confirmed in the grantee any estate or title in and
to the lands specifically granted which the grantor might thereafter acquire. Crippen v.
Comstock, 17 Colo. App. 89, 92, 66 P. 1074, 1075 (1901) held that an irrigating ditch
which was not commenced at the time a deed of trust of land was executed and which
was not specifically mentioned in such deed was not conveyed thereby. Jarvis v. State
Bank, 22 Colo. 309, 318, 45 P. 505, 509 (1896) held that although subsequently acquired property may become subject to the lien of a mortgage, a mechanic's lien for
work done and materials furnished on such after-acquired property takes precedence of
the mortgage if apt words covering it are inserted in the instrument.
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not pass to the foreclosure purchaser.9" Similarly, when land of an
owner of stock in a mutual irrigation company is sold under a deed of
trust but without the stock being transferred, the grantor and the
present owner of the stock are necessary parties to an action by a
purchaser to enforce rights formerly held by the grantor as a stock9 23
holder in the irrigation ditch.
EPILOGUE

Since this study attempts to set forth the elementary principles
of Colorado water law and deliberately tries to avoid extensive discussion with respect to trends which might be developing and with respect
to theories about what the law ought to be, a conclusion becomes
unnecessary. However, as the need for water continues to increase, it
seems that certain proposals for increasing the basic water supply
should be noted. One commentator offers the following ideas:
The proposals for improving the water supply are almost unlim-

ited. Among the more prominent are those for phreatophyte control
(elimination of water loving plants along the edges of reservoirs and
watercourses), timber harvesting (modification of vegetative cover on
watersheds to reduce evapotranspiration), reducing seepage and other
wasteful irrigation practices by devices such as lining canals and covering reservoirs, salvaging sewage water for reuse and weather modification.
In addition to these technical approaches, economists and lawyers
have made some contribution to the water supply problem with suggestions about reallocation of water through legal and market restrictions.
In one of its simplest forms, this technique is well known. If, for
example, a municipality which charges citizens a fixed monthly water
fee experiences a water crisis brought on by excessive lawn watering,
it is easy to abate the crisis by putting water users on individual meters
and making the cost per gallon quite high. The problem 'solves itself"
when people can no longer afford to waste water. Whether or to what
extent it is desirable to utilize such techniques raises intriguing political
9 24
and legal problems.

It would appear that the solutions to such "intriguing political and
legal problems" will shape much of the future development of Colorado
water law.

9m See Schwab v. Smuggler-Union Co., 174 F. 305 (8th Cir. 1909).
M Oligarchy Ditch Co. v. Farm Inv. Co., 40 Colo. 291, 297-98, 88 P. 443, 445 (1906).
" J. SAX, supra note 1, at 4.

APPENDIX
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
ARTICLES RELEVANT TO COLORADO LAW:

1958 - 1968:

Carver, A Federal Policy for Development of Western Water, 14
ROCKY MT. M.L. INST. 473 (1968);

Clyde, Water Rights Problems Affecting Resource Development, 10
ROCKY MT. M.L. INST. 503 (1965);

Danielson, Water Administration in Colorado- Higher-Ority or Priority?, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 293 (1958);
Delaney, Water for Oil Shale Development, 43 DENVER L.J. 72 (1966);
Ellis, Water Rights: What They Are and How They Are Created, 13
ROCKY MT. M.L. INST. 451 (1967);

Grove, The New Danube Commission: An Interdisciplinary Study in
Law and Politics, 41 DENVER L.C.J. 204 (1964);
Hanks, Peace West of the 98th Meridian - A Solution to FederalState Conflicts Over Western Waters. 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 33
(1968);

Hart, Creative Federalism: Recent Trends in Regional Water Resource
Planning and Development, 39 U. COLO. L. REV. 29 (1966) ;
Hutchins, Some Recent Developments in Water Law in the Western
States, 30 UTAH B. BULL. 9 (1960);
Hutchins, Ground Water Legislation, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 416
(1958);
Kelly, Colorado Ground Water Act of 1957 - Is Ground Water Property of the Public?, 31 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 1965 (1959);
Martz, The Law of Underground Waters, 11 OKLA. L. REV. 26 (1958);
Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1966);
Mitchem & Clark, Federal-State Water Rights, 39 DICTA 1 (1962);

Morreale, Federal State Conflict Over Western Waters - A Decade of
Attempted "Clarifying Legislation", 20 RUTGERS L. REv. 423
(1966);

Moses, The Law of Ground Water - Does Modern Buried Treasure
Create a New Breed of Pirates?,11 ROCKY MT. M.L. INST. 277
(1966);
Moses & Vranesh, Colorado's New Ground Water Law, 38 U. COLO.
L. REV. 295 (1966);
Ross, Acquisition of Existing Water Rights, 13 ROCKY MT. M.L. INST.
477 (1967);

COLORADO WATER LAW

1970

Sax, Problems of Federalism in Reclamation Law, 37 U. COLO. L. REV.
49 (1964);
Scott, Kansas v. Colorado Revisited, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 432 (1958);
Widman, Ground Water - Hydrology and the Problem of Competing
Well Owners, 14 ROCKY MT. M.L. INST. 523 (1968);
Symposium on Public Water Law, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 437 (1960);

Note, Regulatory Aspects of Federal Water Pollution Control, 45
DENVER L.J. 267 (1967);
Note, Water for Recreation: A Plea for Recognition, 44 DENVER L.J.
288 (1967);

Note, Foreign Water in Colorado-

The City's Right to Recapture and

Re-use Its Transmountain Diversion, 42 DENVER L.C.J. 116
(1966);

Note, The Federal Reserved Water Doctrine- Application to the
Problem of Water for Oil Shale Development, 3 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 75 (1968);

Note, Water-Granting of Conditional Decree of Water Priority
Under the Doctrine of Relation Back, 34 ROCKY MT. L. REV.
423 (1962);

Note, Water-

Actual Physical Diversion Not Necessary to Effect

an Appropriation, 33 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 249 (1961);

Note, Appropriation and Colorado's Ground Water: A Continuing
Dilemma?, 40 U. COLO. L. REV. 133 (1967);
Note, Who Pays When a Well Runs Dry?, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 402
(1965);

Note, Developments in Colorado Water Law of Appropriation in the
Last Ten Years, 35 U. COLO. L. REV. 493 (1963);

Note, Water Rights-

Finality of General Adjudication Proceedings

in the Seventeen Western States, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 152 (1966);
Note, Public Fishing Rights, 12 Wyo. L.J. 167 (1958).
1952 - 1958:
Burke, Western Water Law, 10 Wyo. L.J. 180 (1956);

Chilson, Revision of Water and Irrigation Statutes, 31 DICTA 29
(1954);
Danielson, Ground Water in Nebraska, 35 NEBR. L. REV. 17 (1955);

Engle, Colorado River Controversy: The Project Does Not Threaten
Water Rights, 31 L.A.B. BULL. 131 (1956);
Harris, New Mexico's Role in the Development of the Law of Underground Water, 31 DICTA 41 (1954);

Martz, Who Has the Better Right to Underground Waters in Colorado
-

Landowner or Appropriator?, 31 DICTA 20 (1954);

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 47

Stone, Are There Any Adjudicated Streams in Montana?, 19 MONTANA
L. REV. 19 (1957);

Trelease, The Concept of Reasonable Beneficial Use in the Law of
Surface Streams, 12 Wyo. L.J. 1 (1957);
Trelease, Preferences to the Use of Water, 27 ROCKY MT.L. REV. 133
(1955);

Windsheffel, Kansas Water Rights - Another Chapter,26 J. B. ASS'N
KAN. 185 (1957);
Windsheffel, Water Law in Kansas, 23 J. B.Ass'N KAN. 171 (1954);
Symposium on Water Law, 5 KAN. L. REv. 491 (1957);
Symposium, 22 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 155 (1957);
Symposium, 22 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 323 (1957);
The Power of the Denver Water Board to Enact Penalty Regulations,
31 DICTA 349 (1954);
The "Tidelands" Problem, 30 DICTA 217 (1953);
Note, Waters and Water Courses - Percolating Waters - Appropriation, 5 KAN.L. REV.470 (1957);
Note, Water and Water Courses -

Public Lands -

Federal Control

of Non-Navigable Waters as Related to Fisheries, 18 MONT.
L. REv. 116 (1956);

Note, Western Water Rights: May They Be Taken Without Compensation?, 13 MONT.L. REV. 102 (1952);
Note, Rank v. Krug - A New Chapter in the CentralValley Litigation,
29 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 407 (1957);
Note, The Recurring Problem of Colorado's Underground Water, 28
ROCKY MT.L. REV. 371 (1956);
Note, Water Law-Presumption That All Waters Are Tributary
Applied to Ground Water; Right to Lift Recognized, 28 ROCKY
MT.L. REV. 145 (1955);

Note, Percolating Waters- Ownership Rule Restated in Arizona, 26
ROCKY MT.L. REV. 104 (1953);
Note, Constitutionality of Colorado Statutes Providingfor Transmountain Water Diversions, 25 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 363 (1953);
Note, Water Adjudication Decree -

Notice -

Statute of Limitations,

25 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 239 (1953);

Note, The Right to Use Waste Water Before It Re-enters the Stream,
12 Wyo. L.J. 47 (1957);
Note, RiparianRights in AppropriationStates, 9 WYo. L.J. 130 (1955);
See 45 CALIF. L. REV. 584

(1957).

